[ExI] Quantum consciousness, quantum mysticism, and transhumanist engineering
johnkclark at gmail.com
Sun Mar 26 22:32:24 UTC 2017
Brent, you asked:
What could make "red", "OxF00" be experienced as redness and what
differences does "green" or "0x0F0" cause you to experience greenness?
And then you wrote this:
, qualia just are - you experience them as is, there is no interpretation
I'd say you just answered your own question, some things are brute facts
they "just are".
> redness just is. What is it, in your theory, that has this redness and
> greenness, that are experienced, as is, without any interpretation?
That question makes no sense. If redness just is, if it's just a brute
fact that X produces redness then there is no why, there is no what, it
just is. I think it's a brute fact that consciousness is the way data feels
when it is being processed, it just is. So nothing more of substance can
be said about the fundamental nature of consciousness, but fear not, lots
and lots more can be said about how intelligence works.
> You, and john are completely missing the point, and making obvious
> mistakes (as it seems to me) by doing so, and not modeling things with
> anything in your theory that is redness, such that it is distinguishable
> from greenness.
> It wouldn't be particularly difficult to make a robot that can
distinguish red things from green things just as well as you can. Of course
I don't know if the robot experiences red and green in the same way I do,
but then I don't know that you do either.
Can you not see that everything you are talking about is removing the
ability to distinguish between anything that is redness and greenness.
> No, I don't see that at all!. A robot can put red marbles in one bin
and green marbles in another bin and I don't see how it could do that if it
couldn't distinguish between red and green.
> Remember, that nothing but this particular set of neurons, firing in
> exactly the right functional way, outputting the correct neurotransmitter
> at the right time will convince the binding neuron/system that it is
> redness, which is different than greenness.
If that is true you can never prove it's true, but if it is true then you
and I do NOT experience the redness qualia the same way because our brains
are NOT exactly the same so the particular set of neurons in your brain are
NOT firing in exactly the same functional way in my brain and they are NOT
outputting the same neurotransmitter at exactly same time.
> Earlier, Stathis claimed: "But the comparison of redness and greenness, or
> anything else whatsoever that the system does, will necessarily occur
> provided only that the substituted part is behaviourally identical" In
> other words, you are saying that there is a way to distinguish between
> redness and greenness, as long as it is behaviorally identical.
> I think Stathis is claiming if something can distinguish between red and
green and then one part of the thing is substituted for another part that
then that thing can still
distinguish between red and green
because otherwise it wouldn't be
. How on earth can anybody dispute that?
>you can't see the mistake you are making with this. If you swap anything
> being presented to the binding system, with anything that is not redness,
A neuron is not saying anything about redness, all it's saying is this is
chemical X. In fact it's not even saying that, it's saying this is *probably
*chemical X because neurons can be fooled; masquerading as chemicals they
are not is how many neurotoxins work.
John K Clark
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