[ExI] Cryonics for uploaders discussion: Video (John Clark)

William Flynn Wallace foozler83 at gmail.com
Sat May 5 17:51:15 UTC 2018

The idea of a soul as a physical thing is just wrong.

The idea of a metaphysical soul is profound.

bill w

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 4:39 AM, Ben Zaiboc <ben at zaiboc.net> wrote:

> Re Rose <rocket at earthlight.com> <rocket at earthlight.com> wrote:
> "Since the agency of an individual is subjective we have to be very
> careful
> we're not creating new beings with our uploading technology and still
> dying
> as individuals - unless your goal is to make an animated library of people
> patterned on existing people who died (or maybe didn't even die yet). We
> might all agree it would be very, very great to have certain people's
> connectomes preserved and reanimated - I'd have dinner with a reanimated
> Feynman or Turing in one second flat while jumping with joy for the good
> their re-existence would do the whole damn world while I'm at it, but if
> the originals would still be dead and gone - well, if that's the case, we
> should know that it is."
> This whole concept of a 'me that is not me' baffles me. Leaving aside
> ideas like the 'soul' (which I hope we can all agree is nonsense), what is
> it that constitutes an individual? More importantly, what is it that
> constitutes an individual that is somehow inherently not reproducible? I
> can't think of a single candidate. There are several ideas about what is
> necessary for an individual mind to exist, but all of the elements involved
> are reproducible.
> I don't think anyone would argue against the idea that a copy of a mind is
> not the same as the original, but the mistake lies in thinking that this
> means it doesn't recreate the */same mind/*. Just as copying a CD of
> Beethoven's 9th Symphony recreates the same music.
> Arguments centring around continuity don't work, and it doesn't require
> proof of the quantisation of time to show why. People have had all brain
> activity stopped for hours and been successfully revived (accidents
> involving falling into icy water and 'dying' before they drowned). Arguing
> that they therefore can't be the 'same person' is rather silly, and would
> be impossible to prove.
> Ben Zaiboc
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