[ExI] Mental Phenomena
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Thu Feb 6 15:38:48 UTC 2020
Can you see what you are doing? Any time I define this "stathis redness
behavior" sufficiently enough so it can be objectively observed, so it can
be objectively distinguished from "stathis grenness behavior", you can use
the substitution argument to prove it can't be that. What then, is the
stathis redness behavior? I claim it is just a slight of hand stathis
uses, so that any time you sufficiently define it, he just says it is some
other behavior. In other words, stathis can't define this impossible to
objectively define "stathis redness behavior". Brent redness behavior, can
be objectively defined, glutamate is an example. It could also be anything
else, maybe even some "function". But before it can be a "function" you
must be able to give an example of that function sufficiently, so it can be
objectively distinguishable between a grenness function, otherwise, it is
this stathis grenness function which isn't objectively detectable. And if
redness arises from this function, and if it changes to grenness when the
function changes to greeness. Then it is a physical fact that redness
arises from that function. And whatever that is, you can use the same
substitution argument to prove it isn't that. And if I can't call that,
whatever it is that is changing from the redness function, to the greenness
function a substrate, then what can I call it? Because no matter what you
call it, it is still the same thing, the behavior of redness. And if you
substitute it for something sufficiently different, it is no longer redness.
QED, as I continue to say, there must be a problem in the way you are doing
a substitution, because we know, absolutely, that we have qualia, and you
can't substitute redness behavior, with some different behavior, without it
stopping being redness.
On Thu, Feb 6, 2020 at 8:15 AM John Clark via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 5, 2020 at 6:05 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > *I'm trying to say something closer to qualia and qualia behavior are
>> the same thing. *
> I think that's a good guess and an excellent operational hypothesis, but
> we'll never prove it's true because, just like Evolution, the Scientific
> Method can not observe qualia, it can only observe behavior. Nevertheless I
> embrace that operational hypothesis and even elevate it to the level of an
> axiom despite the lack of a proof and despite my inability to detect qualia
> in anything other than in myself. And that's the only reason I don't think
> rocks experience qualia, and that's the only reason I think you do.
> *> If the behavior isn't changing, and qualia are changing*
> That is contradictory. If "qualia and qualia behavior are the same thing"
> and if "behavior isn't changing" then qualia isn't changing either.
> *> that changing qualia must be some place else.*
> And I don't know what you mean by that.
>> > *if you substitute all behavior (or function or magic or anything),
>> with something that is different, and the qualia never change, *
> Brent, the only way you have of knowing that "qualia never change" is by
> making use of a unproven operational hypothesis that makes use of
>> *> qualia are impossible, or at best not approachable via science.*
> I agree. But I know for a fact that qualia are NOT impossible because I
> know I have them, I can directly experience qualia in myself; therefore I
> must conclude that the second part of the above is true, qualia is "not
> approachable via science", or at least it's not without making use of an
> axiom that like all axioms remains unproven. Or to put it another way, I
> believe it's a brute fact that qualia is the way data feels when it is
> being processed intelligently.
> John K Clark
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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