[ExI] Mental Phenomena

Thu Feb 13 19:03:49 UTC 2020

Hi Dylan,
Thanks for jumping in.  Nice to have some additional input.
The prediction is that the brains of people that are red/green color blind
simply use the same quale to represent both red and green.  As John would
point out, you don't have enough diversity in your knowledge to represent
both red and green knowledge, making you blind to what the rest of us have
sufficient physical diversity to represent.

If you remain convinced in the validity of the neural substitution argument
(you must think the 3rd robot has qualia) then what is red qualitatively
like for that 3rd robot that represent all things red with only the
abstract word "red"?

I would bet you also feel the same way about robot #3 as John feels when he
says: "I can't say anything about Robot #3 because it makes no sense to me."
This just proves that you don't yet get it.

On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 11:09 AM Dylan Distasio via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Your exact assertions are the same ones I immediately think of, and I'll
> be honest, I still don't grok Brent's arguments despite all the effort
> expended.   Maybe I haven't spent enough time on it yet, but I still don't
> buy this argument of qualia being at the neurotransmitter level as
> physical, irreducible qualities (apologies if I am misrepresenting the
> argument).
>
> I'm red/green color blind due to differences in my rods/cones in my eyes
> compared to others.  Although I clearly know some shades of red/green (i.e.
> have no trouble with stop lights regardless of placement of the red/green)
> , but there are some shades that look indistinguishable to me despite the
> fact I know other people can distinguish them.
>
> What does this say about the qualia for red and green?  I assume the
> argument is going to be that the processing is downstream of vision and I
> still have true red/green qualia based on neurotransmitter interactions.
>
> I remain convinced that if you were able to swap out every single neuron
> with a true approximation of the signalling going on in physical wetware
> (let's pretend there is a mechanical neuron that properly accepts
> signalling from various neurotransmitters and passes those signals on via
> some means (chemical or electrical) to other neurons original or replaced)
> that not only would the person be unaware of it happening one neuron at a
> time, but at the end of the process, they would not be any different than
> they were other than operating on a different substrate.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 12:15 PM Will Steinberg via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Things are NOT colors.  A strawberry has nothing to do with the red
>> quale, it simply reflects 680 nm light.
>>
>> 680 nm light is NOT a color.  It is interpreted as a red quale when it
>> interfaces with the eyes and brain.
>>
>> Some entities can't sense that light.  Some might see something
>> different.  Some might be moving very fast and experience a doppler effect
>> and not even see the light as 680 nm.  Not only is everything relative, but
>> everything is VERY relative because qualia are not standalone, they only
>> happen when information enters a system.  They depend on both.
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 10:12 AM John Clark via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Feb 12, 2020 at 9:31 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> you guys are all completely qualia blind.*
>>>
>>>
>>> You have 2 possibilities to consider:
>>> 1) Solipsism is true, we are zombies and so we really are qualia blind
>>> and you are the only conscious being in the universe.
>>> 2) You are qualia delusional, that is to say your philosophical ideas
>>> are self contradictory.
>>>
>>> > *Not only do you not know the physical color anything, you don't
>>>> care.*
>>>
>>>
>>> I am unable to care much until you explain exactly (or at least
>>> approximately) what you mean by "physical color". And if it doesn't involve
>>> the subjective ability to notice a change in the wavelength of
>>> electromagnetic radiation and the ability to objectively act on that
>>> differentiation then whatever you mean by it just isn't very interesting. I
>>> mean... if it doesn't effect anything objectively and it doesn't effect
>>> anything subjectively either then I just can't work up much enthusiasm
>>> about studying it.
>>>
>>> > *Having this dictionary will tell us what color things are,*
>>>>
>>>
>>> You keep trying to find the nature of things at the most fundamental
>>> level and yet for some strange reason you keep talking about dictionaries.
>>> A dictionary is a list of definitions of words. Every definition is itself
>>> made of words, every one of those words has its own definition also made of
>>> words, and the infinite loop continues. You're not going to obtain
>>> philosophical insight by reading a dictionary. And if there isn't an
>>> infinite chain of "why" questions and there really is one correct answer to
>>> the consciousness question at the most fundamental level then at some point
>>> in the chain of questions you are going to say "I see a termination because
>>> a miracle occurs here" or if you prefer "a brute fact occurs here". After
>>> all, an effect without a cause does not violate any law of logic.
>>> Fortunately with data processing the miracle is as small as possible
>>> because changes don't get simpler than changing on to off.
>>>
>>>
>>>> > *where we connect our brains with 3 millions neurons, so we can
>>>> directly experience the actual physical colors in other's brains, the same
>>>> way the physical knowledge in our left hemisphere is directly
>>>> computationally bound to the physical knowledge in our right. *
>>>>
>>>
>>> We know with experiments with people that when those 3 million neurons
>>> connecting the brain's hemispheres  are cut the individual who received the
>>> surgery starts acting in ways that are different from the way he acted
>>> before the surgery.  And both hemispheres are capable of acting
>>> independently of the other, and that behavior is different from each other,
>>> and neither matches the behavior of the pre-surgery individual. And it can
>>> be shown that one hemisphere can know things that the other does not. And
>>> so I would maintain neither hemisphere knows what it's like to be the
>>> other, and neither hemisphere knows what it's like to have 2 working
>>> hemispheres connected by 3 million information carrying cables, and the
>>> pre-surgery individual doesn't know what it will be like to have a split
>>> brain in his head.
>>>
>>> *> we aren't jsut some kind of brain in a vat.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know why you keep saying that as if it's something of
>>> fundamental importance, skulls and vats are just slightly different types
>>> of containers for brains.
>>>
>>> > *And it's up to the experimentalists. *
>>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly, and just like Evolution itself experimentalists can see
>>> intelligent behavior but they can't see qualia or consciousness.
>>> Nevertheless Evolution managed to produce consciousness at least once (in
>>> me) and probably many billions of times, so I conclude consciousness must
>>> be a byproduct of something that Evolution can see, something like
>>> intelligent behavior. And experimentalists can form some conclusions about
>>> qualia and consciousness, but only if they make some assumptions that,
>>> although my hunch is are largely correct, they can't prove and will never
>>> be able to prove.
>>>
>>> *> the current popular consensus that "The supervening qualities are the
>>>> result of the ones and zeroes"*
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ones and zeroes are pure abstractions but information is physical and so
>>> is the difference between a electrical circuit that is open and a
>>> electrical circuit that is closed. So I guess i believe in half of what you
>>> call the "popular consensus" (although in my experience it's not all that
>>> popular).  Supervenience is just a two dollar word for "depends on" and I
>>> think that both intelligent behavior and consciousness is the result of not
>>> ones and zeros but of open/closed or on/off; you can represent one and zero
>>> with on and off if you want but you don't have to, if you're working in
>>> Boolean logic and not arithmetic you can have them represent true or false
>>> or any other binary quality you like.
>>>
>>> *> I'll bet any amount of money, at any odds, that functionalists camps
>>>> will be the first to be experimentally falsified, once experimentalists
>>>> stop being qualia blind. Anyone care to put any money, where their mouth
>>>> is? *
>>>>
>>>
>>> I've been known to make small bets on scientific matters before (and to
>>> be honest I usually ended up losing money) but I refuse to make a bet if I
>>> don't understand exactly, or even approximately, what the bet actually is.
>>>
>>>  John K Clark
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