[ExI] Possible seat of consciousness found
stathisp at gmail.com
Sat Feb 22 07:58:25 UTC 2020
On Sat, 22 Feb 2020 at 09:15, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Hi Stathis,
> On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 2:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> On Sat, 22 Feb 2020 at 07:20, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>> OK, so we have
>>> "Qualia = subjective experiences = an aspect of phenomenal
>>> And we have
>>> " Behaviour = that which an external observer can see"
>>> and we have
>>> “*As long as the 'behavior' remains the same the subjectivity must
>>> also remain the same.*”
>>> which connects the two in a consistent and factual way.
>>> Would you also agree with the converse of the above statement?:
>>> “*As long as the 'subjectivity' (quale) remains the same the
>>> behavior must also remain the same.*”
>> Yes. If we consider a behaviour such as speech, the subject will not say
>> that their qualia have changed unless they think that they have changed.
>> Or at least if there is a set of behavior for a particular 'subjectivity'
>>> redness, and a set of behavior for a different subjectivity 'greenness,'
>>> if the subjectivity is different the corresponding sets of behaviors for
>>> each of those different 'subjectivity' (quale), must be disjoint. In other
>>> words any particular set of behavior can't have two different
>>> 'subjectivity' (quale).
>> Yes, but there is a potential problem here. If we speculate that the
>> subject’s qualia have changed from redness to greenness, but their
>> behaviour does not change because they do not notice a change, then in what
>> sense is it meaningful to say that the qualia have changed?
> Wait, what? We're not talking about the substrate independent layer, were
> talking about what consciousness is made of: qualia. That which we know
> (i.e. that which we can notice) is what consciousness is, and this
> noticeable knowledge is composed of diverse colored qualia.
> We are only talking about qualia being sufficiently different (i.e.
> redness and greenness) that we can notice such differences. If you can't
> notice the difference, then that qualia is defined to be in the set that is
> considered to be that singe quale. It is only a different quale if you can
> notice that it is different.
Yes, I agree. If a change in qualia is impossible to notice then it isn’t
really a change. It also won’t be associated with a change in behaviour. So
if it is noticed, there will be a change in behaviour: “colours look
different than they used to”. A corollary of this is that if there is no
change in behaviour, there can be no change in qualia.
To me, what you are saying is like saying: Despite *ALL* of our objective
> measurements and experiences being consistent with the earth being round,
> and *NONE *of our objective measurements and experiences being consistent
> with it being flat, it still could be flat.
> We know the world is round, because of what astronauts in orbit experience
> and ALL of our objective measurements are consistent with. Then a flat
> earther replying: But despite EVERYTHING being consistent with the earth
> being round, it still could be flat. We just can't know that it is not
> flat, despite ALL observations being consistent with it being round and no
> observation consistent with it being flat.
> And, for you, these behaviors which are factually related to particular
>>> subjectivity (qualia) are independent of any particular set of physics
>>> (only because of the substitution argument).
>>> In other words, we have a dependent subjective layer like redness and
>>> greenness (and corresponding disjoint sets of behavior) out of which
>>> consciousness is constructed, that rides on top of any physical layer in a
>>> way that can be considered physical substrate independent.
>>> The terminology I think we should use is the former is consciousness is
>>> substrate dependent (where that substrate is subjectivity or quala) the
>>> behavior of which is independent of any particular set of physics.
>>> But I'm imagining you won't like even this kind of qualia being any kind
>>> of substrate, so I was trying to come up with another term qualia strate to
>>> make you happy.
>> You’re right, I don’t think it is good to use the word “substrate”
>> referring to qualia because “substrate” specifically refers to a physical
>> substance. But I am confused as to why you would say consciousness is
>> dependent on qualia, since consciousness and qualia are essentially the
>> same thing.
> My recollection is that you often respond to what I've said, above,
> claiming something like: "We can never know for sure."
We know for sure that consciousness and qualia are essentially the same
thing because we have defined the words that way.
Here is the all important part relevant to this:
>> The only difference is that consciousness is usually used to mean
>> multiple qualia taken together
> If we are aware of redness and greenness, at the same time, as a composite
> experience that is our knowledge of the strawberry, there must be something
> that is "binding" all this together, otherwise, it would be like the
> physics that is subconscious, and we wouldn't be aware of it with the
> redness and greenness that is our knowledge of the strawberry.
Robots and computers manage multiple inputs without any specific “binding”.
The “binding” consists in the fact that the different inputs and outputs
We know, as surely as we know "I think therefore I am" what redness is
> qualitatively like, and we necessarily know how this is different than
> greenness. And when we experience them together (computationally bound) we
> can necessary notice that they are qualitatively different.
> If you computationally bind conscious knowledge in 4 hemispheres together,
> you will directly experience the qualia behavior in another's brain, in
> addition to both hemispheres of your own brain, and if the other two
> hemispheres are red green inverted from your qualia, you will necessarily
> notice it is different.
You might notice something, but you won’t know what the other two
hemispheres on their own experience. For example, if you connect yourself
to someone else’s brain and notice that, through their eyes, strawberries
look green, whereas before they looked red, this is not just you noticing
it but both of you. After you are disconnected, both of you will remember
the colours changing, and neither will be sure what the other experiences
on his own.
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