[ExI] Possible seat of consciousness found

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Stathis,

Hrmmm, but our brain does a huge amount of computational binding, for all
pixels, all in parallel.  The only way computers are able to almost keep
up, while only barely computationally binding single registers, is by doing
all this minimal binding of pixels, one at a time, sequentially, *VERY*
fast.



So, in addition to: why would evolution do things in a substrate
independent way, if substrate independence needs lots of additional
unnecessary dictionaries, there is also evolution couldn’t do it
sequentially, the way computers do it, because it could never achieve the
same speed.  Our phenomenal consciousness, running directly on physical
qualities, all done in parallel is the only way it could have evolved.
That is certainly more likely than any kind of discrete logic computational
binding evolving, especially in a substrate independent way.



Saying: “If all the different inputs are integrated, then that should be
enough for all the different inputs to be integrated in its consciousness”
doesn’t make you ashamed of how ‘hand wavy’ this type of stuff is, and you
don’t see any need for some kind of ‘miracle’ to make the odd substrate
independent (qualia are separated from reality) you are assuming can happen?



Can you even describe what computational binding is, and what a composite
qualitative experience is?  Because the way you say things like this, it
seems to prove you have no idea what a composite qualitative experience
must be.




On Sun, Feb 23, 2020 at 7:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, 24 Feb 2020 at 07:58, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 22, 2020 at 12:59 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Robots and computers manage multiple inputs without any specific
>>> “binding”. The “binding” consists in the fact that the different inputs and
>>> outputs intimately interact.
>>>
>>
>> Wait,  What???
>>
>>
>> The first step a computer does to know if a pixel is ‘ripe enough’ is to
>> load an abstract representation of that one pixel’s color into a register
>> of a CPU, Then load another value into another register (dictionary: ripe
>> enough) then do a difference operation.  This difference operation is
>> performed by a huge set of *DISCRETE* logic gates.  These kinds of
>> *DISCRETE* operations on registers in a CPU is the limit of the amount
>> of computational binding a computer can do.  The abstract output of this
>> large set of *DISCRETE* binding is loaded into a register.  This gives
>> you yet another abstract difference value, which is loaded into a register.
>>  This third value is the CPU’s abstract knowledge of whether it is positive
>> (dictionary: ripe), or negative (dictionary: not ripe).  And that JUST
>> gives you the ripeness of one pixel.
>>
>>
>> We, on the other hand are aware of not just that one pixel, we are aware
>> of all of them as one computationally bound composite conscious
>> experience.  We are also aware of, if each of the pixels is red, it is
>> ripe, so this “the strawberry is ripe” info must also be computationally
>> bound in with all the other pixels.  (And if any part of the strawberry is
>> green, we know that part isn’t ripe yet, all in one unified composite
>>  experience.)
>>
>>
>> There is nothing enabling any of these *DISCRETE* abstract computer
>> pixels to be bound to any of the other pixels, other than what is done with
>> a few CPU registers.  Heck, only one pixel at a time can ever be in the CPU
>> at any one time.  The closest you get is some additional iteration on all
>> the pixels, loading them, one at a time, into a register, then collecting a
>> sum, then doing a divide to get an average or something.  But this single
>> abstract number that represents the average of all the pixels is in no
>> way providing any kind of "intimacy" between any of the pixels.
>>
>>
>> In other words, since there is no machinery in any of this *DISCRETE* logic
>> enabling any of these pixels to be aware of any of their pixel neighbors,
>> it is all necessarily like our sub conscious.  NOT conscious, due to lack
>> of computational binding.
>>
>>
>> You said: “The “binding” consists in the fact that the different inputs
>> and outputs intimately interact.”
>>
>>
>>
>> How can any such *DISCREET* “intimacy” be in any way one single
>> composite computationally bound composite qualitative experience?  Oh, yea,
>> you just wave your hands, and ignore the necessary “a miracle happens here”
>> step.
>>
>
>  I return to my standard line: if the machine or animal behaves as if all
> the different inputs are integrated, then that should be enough for all the
> different inputs to be integrated in its consciousness. There is no way an
> extra process to combine the inputs could evolve.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
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>
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