[ExI] Mental Phenomena

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Tue Jan 21 18:03:52 UTC 2020

Hi Ben,

Yes, thanks for asking questions about my intentions instead of just
dismissing me as an idiot.  I’ve answered this question multiple times on
this list, but I guess you haven’t seen this yet so let me try again.

There is evidence of a clear consensus around qualia as indicated in
Qualia Theory <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6>”.
The only disagreement is what is the nature of qualia, as you can see in
the many competing sub camps.

In order to communicate the general ideas contained in RQT
<https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6> about how to eff
the ineffable, why it is qualia blind to only use one word “red” for all
things red, and why the so called impossibly “hard mind body problem” is
really just a color problem and all that (already a somewhat difficult task
to communicate)  Of all the theories of qualia, we take the most straight
forward, easiest to falsify “Molecular Materialism
<https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Molecular-Materialism/36>” theory, and  we
go way beyond even that, for simplicity sake.  We imagine an imaginary
world where there are only two colors red and green.  Not even any other
shades of color – just red and green.  And in this overly simplistic world
it is glutamate reacting in a synapse that has the elemental pixel quality
of redness, and glycine that has the elemental quality of greenness.  All
this, so we can say things like glutamate has a color property of white (it
reflects white light) and it has a colorness quality of redness.  Our
abstract descriptions of how glutamate behaves in a synapse is one and the
same as what we directly experience as elemental redness.

So, if someone thinks redness = glutamate has been falsified, just
substitute some other set of physics in the brain that hasn’t’ yet been
falsified.  Replace every occurrence of glutamate, above, with whatever
that things is.

If you think there is a more likely theory than glutamate = redness (it
must be very falsifiable, as most competing theories of “molecular
materialism, it isn’t clear how to falsify them)  I would be happy to
substitute whatever you think could be a description of the necessary and
sufficient set of physics that is a description of what we directly
experience as redness.  And of course, it would be great if you would
create a camp for what you think is most likely, so we can see how many
other people agree with you, compared to competing theories.  You still
haven’t fully falsified Molecular Materialism for me, so I’m still
supporting that as my top working hypothesis choice.

The problem is, everyone gets lost in the minor details everyone disagrees
on, and focuses on that.  While completely missing what all the experts
agree is important (that which is contained in RQT
<https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Molecular-Materialism/36>.)  That is the
power of cononizer – the ability to push disagreements into lower level sub
camps, out of the way of building consensus around what most experts agree
is important:” There is no hard mind body problem, it’s just that nobody
knows what color anything is.

So, Ben, Please.  From here on out, whenever I say glutamate, please
replace that word with a description of whatever physics you most likely
think is a description of redness.

On Tue, Jan 21, 2020 at 2:36 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 20/01/2020 19:32, Brent Allsop wrote:
> OK very good points. So, let me see if I can address these good points in
> the way I’m saying things.
> If you do a neuro substitution from redness physics to greenness physics,
> (and visa versa) that would be possible if, in one step, you replaced all
> the glutamate being presented to the binding neuron (including any possible
> memory of glutamates colorness property) with glycine and your memory of
> glycine's colorness property, that would be possible as i've pointed out
> many times.
> But, still you must include this binding neuron (or something that
> performs this required functionality) in your thought experiment, otherwise
> composite computationally bound elemental physical qualities like redness
> and greenness aren’t possible.  And also, this same binding mechanism must
> be able to connect a pre inverted system, with a post inverted system, so
> that you can see that redness and grenness are inverted.
> Brent, I think the biggest problem here *is* the way you're saying
> things. A way that, as I've already demonstrated, cannot possibly reflect
> reality. As far as I know.
> You acknowledged my argument ("availability argument") as a good one, but
> failed to respond to my reply, saying I think the argument demolishes the
> idea of molecules being able to represent (or contain, or whatever) qualia.
> My question "I've falsified the theory, wouldn't you say?", was never
> answered. And now you continue to talk about glutamate and glycine, etc.,
> and 'physical rednesss' being an 'elemental quality'. So I can only assume
> your answer is "No".
> Obviously, if there's something wrong with my argument, I'd like to know
> what it is, so please tell me!
> Unless you can show my argument to be wrong, you can't continue to talk in
> these terms. Well, you can, of course, but how can you expect anyone to
> take you seriously?
> So, please, either falsify my argument or stop talking about molecules
> like glycine having a 'colourness property', which my argument shows is
> impossible.
> --
> Ben Zaiboc
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
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