[ExI] People often think their chatbot is alive

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 17 Jul 2022 at 13:15, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Jul 16, 2022 at 3:08 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Jul 16, 2022 at 1:34 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> OK, let me ask you this.  Are you interested in finding out the
>>> colorness qualities of anything in physics?
>>>
>>
>> Physics, or biophysics?  If colorness is a quality of perception, then it
>> isn't just about physics divorced from the biology of the observer.
>>
>
> Are you saying redness is not the final result of perception of red
> things?  And that your perception system doesn't render that surface of the
> 3D strawberry, into your consciousness, with whatever it is that has a
> redness quality?
>
> And what do you mean by "observer"?  It sounds like you are talking about
> something other than the physics, or biophysics, or however you want to
> classify all the stuff in the brain, which is the cause of your redness
> experiences, and your computational situational awareness of the strawberry?
>
>
>> And of course, again, once we discover which of all our descriptions of
>>> physics in the brain is a description of redness, (it will falsify all the
>>> crap in the gap theories like substance dualism and functionalism) and
>>> result in a clear scientific consensus about not only what
>>> consciousness is, but an understanding of what consciousness is like.
>>> Along with that will be a near unanimous consensus that abstract systems,
>>> like the one on the right in the image, would not be considered to be
>>> conscious by anyone, with any reasonable intelligence.
>>>
>>
>> That you are driving toward that conclusion tells me that you are
>> probably incorrect.  It seems quite possible that such an abstract system
>> could be conscious in every meaningful way.
>>
>
> Those are falsifiable claims.  And this is how they will be falsified, I
> predict.
>
> 10 years from now.  (5, if we got 10,000 signatories on the RQT
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>
> camp this year, or one of its sub camps, even the crap in the gap ones like
> functionalism or substance dualism, which seperate redness from physical
> reality), then someone like Elon Musk finally gets the message (because of
> all the signatures) and finally realizes how to observe the brain in a non
> qualia blind way, and using the tools of neuralink, hacking the brain,
> demonstrate that NOBODY can experience redness without glutamate.
>

How could this ever be demonstrated? In future, there might be some new
technology that replaces glutamate, or even if there isn’t, it is
conceivable that there might be. All it takes to disprove “nobody can
experience redness without glutamate” as a philosophical proposition is the
logical possibility.

(or pick your most likely whatever could be redness).  Then 90% of all the
> supporters of the 'crap in the gap' theories realize their theory has been
> experimentally falsified by these demonstrations, and they jump camps to
> whichever one was best predicting these experimental results.  (i.e.
> Molecular Materialism
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/36-Molecular-Materialism>,
> if it is glutamate)  And 90+ percent of the peer ranked mind experts
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/81-Mind-Experts/1>, are now supporters of
> that camp, demonstrating the achievement of a clear scientific consensus.
>
>  If not, how could your claims be falsified?  If they aren't falsifiable,
> they aren't scientific, are they?
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20220717/8272f54d/attachment.htm>