[ExI] The relevance of glutamate in color experience

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 3 May 2022 at 04:01, Rafal Smigrodzki via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, May 1, 2022 at 10:07 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>> Yes, this is the Neuro Substitution Argument for functionalism
>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/79-Neural-Substitn-Argument/1-Agreement> Stathis,
>> I and others have been rehashing, forever, trying to convince the other
>> side..  Stathis, Chalmers, and other functionalists
>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/18-Qualia-Emerge-from-Function>
>> believe they must accept functionalism because of this argument.  This is a
>> specific example of the 'dancing qualia' contradiction (one of many) which
>> results if you accept this argument.
>>
>> I like to point out that this argument is dependent on two assumptions.
>> 1., that all the neurons do is the same thing discrete logic gates do in
>> abstract computers.  2. That the neuro substitution will succeed.  If
>> either of these two fail, the argument doesn't work.
>>
>
> ### This is not true. The argument is valid regardless of the mechanism of
> computation in the device that is substituting for a part of the brain.
> Only requirement for the substitution argument is that the substituted
> device must not change the way the rest of the recipient brain works (i.e.
> the overall pattern of neural activity and behavior controlled by the
> brain).
>
> By way of illustration, instead of using a digital device for
> substitution, we may consider a genetically engineered brain that has the
> identical functional organization as a normal human brain but substitutes
> e.g. D-glutamate for L-glutamate as the transmitter. This would require
> re-engineering the structure of the relevant glutamate receptors, adding a
> glutamate isomerase to make D-glutamate out of L-glutamate and perhaps
> other minor tweaks but it would not change the functional aspects of
> neurotransmission in the modified brain or its parts.
>
> Obviously, if the chemical structure of glutamate somehow determined
> qualia, then such a modified brain would have different qualia. If however
> the modified D-glutamate brain is able to substitute for a part of the
> standard L-glutamate brain without changing the overall patterns of neural
> activation and without changing behavior then the substitution would prove
> that glutamate has nothing to do with qualia.
>

The argument can be generalised by using a black box that interacts with
the brain in the same way as the replaced tissue. It is an argument showing
that qualia cannot be separated from behaviour.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20220503/f563c5ed/attachment.htm>