[ExI] Is Artificial Life Conscious?

Adrian Tymes atymes at gmail.com
Mon May 9 22:50:31 UTC 2022 

Those are not reasons why redness can't supervene.

On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 3:42 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> OK, let me explain in more detail.
> Redness can't supervene on a function, because you can substitute the
> function (say bubble sort) with some other function (quick sort)
> So redness can't supervene on a function, either because "you replace a
> part (or function) of the brain with a black box that affects the rest of
> the brain in the same way as the original, the subject must behave the same"
> So redness can't superven on any function.
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 07:55, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>
>>> OK, let me try saying it this way.
>>> You use the neural substitution argument to "prove" redness cannot be
>>> substrate dependent.
>>> Then you conclude that redness "supervenes" on some function.
>>> The problem is, you can prove that redness can't "supervene" on any
>>> function, via the same neural substitution proof.
>>>
>>
>> It supervenes on any substrate that preserves the redness behaviour. In
>> other words, if you replace a part of the brain with a black box that
>> affects the rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the subject
>> must behave the same and must have the same qualia. It doesn’t matter
>> what’s in the black box.
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 07:47, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 02:36, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think colourness qualities are what the human behaviour
>>>>>>>> associated with distinguishing between colours, describing them, reacting
>>>>>>>> to them emotionally etc. is seen from inside the system. If you make a
>>>>>>>> physical change to the system and perfectly reproduce this behaviour, you
>>>>>>>> will also necessarily perfectly reproduce the colourness qualities.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An abstract description of the behavior of redness can perfectly
>>>>>>> capture 100% of the behavior, one to one, isomorphically perfectly
>>>>>>> modeled.  Are you saying that since you abstractly reproduce 100% of the
>>>>>>> behavior, that you have duplicated the quale?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here is where I end up misquoting you because I don’t understand what
>>>>>> exactly you mean by “abstract description”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> [image: 3_robots_tiny.png]
>>>>>
>>>>> This is the best possible illustration of what I mean by abstract vs
>>>>> intrinsic physical qualities.
>>>>> The first two represent knowledge with two different intrinsic
>>>>> physical qualities, redness and greenness.
>>>>> "Red" is just an abstract word, composed of strings of ones and
>>>>> zeros.  You can't know what it means, by design, without a dictionary.
>>>>> The redness intrinsic quality your brain uses to represent knowledge
>>>>> of 'red' things, is your definition for the abstract word 'red'.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> But the specific example I have used is that if you perfectly
>>>>>> reproduce the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>> different substrate, and glutamate is involved in redness qualia, then you
>>>>>> necessarily also reproduce the redness qualia. This is because if it were
>>>>>> not so, it would be possible to grossly change the qualia without the
>>>>>> subject noticing any change, which is absurd.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think the confusion comes in the different ways we think about this:
>>>>>
>>>>> "the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>> different substrate"
>>>>>
>>>>> Everything in your model seems to be based on this kind of "cause and
>>>>> effect" or "interpretations of interpretations".  I think of things in a
>>>>> different way.
>>>>> I would emagine you would say that the causal properties of glutamate
>>>>> or redness would result in someone saying: "That is red."
>>>>> However, to me, the redness quality, alone, isn't the cause of someone
>>>>> saying: "That is Red", as someone could lie, and say: "That is Green",
>>>>> proving the redness isn't the only cause of what the person is saying.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The causal properties of the glutamate are basically the properties
>>>> that cause motion in other parts of the system. Consider a glutamate
>>>> molecule as a part of a clockwork mechanism. If you remove the glutamate
>>>> molecule, you will disrupt the movement of the entire clockwork mechanism.
>>>> But if you replace it with a different molecule that has similar physical
>>>> properties, the rest of the clockwork mechanism will continue functioning
>>>> the same. Not all of the physical properties are relevant, and they only
>>>> have to be replicated to within a certain tolerance.
>>>>
>>>> The computational system, and the way the knowledge is consciousnessly
>>>>> represented is different from simple cause and effect.
>>>>> The entire system is aware of all of the intrinsic qualities of each
>>>>> of the pixels on the surface of the strawberry (along with any reasoning
>>>>> for why it would lie or not)
>>>>> And it is because of this composite awareness, that is the cause of
>>>>> the system choosing to say: "that is red", or choose to lie in some way.
>>>>> It is the entire composit 'free will system' that is the initial cause
>>>>> of someone choosing to say something, not any single quality like the
>>>>> redness of a single pixel.
>>>>> For you, everything is just a chain of causes and effects, no
>>>>> composite awareness and no composit free will system involved.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am proposing that the awareness of the system be completely ignored,
>>>> and only the relevant physical properties be replicated. If this is done,
>>>> then whether you like it or not, the awareness of the system will also be
>>>> replicated. It’s impossible to do one without the other.
>>>>
>>>> If I recall correctly, you admit that the quality of your conscious
>>>>> knowledge is dependent on the particular quality of your redness, so qualia
>>>>> can be thought of as a substrate, on which the quality of your
>>>>> consciousness is dependent, right?  If you are only focusing on a different
>>>>> substrate being able to produce the same 'redness behavior' then all you
>>>>> are doing is making two contradictory assumptions.  If you take that
>>>>> assumption, then you can prove that nothing, even a redness function can't
>>>>> have redness, for the same reason.  There must be something that is
>>>>> redness, and the system must be able to know when redness changes to
>>>>> anything else.  All you are saying is that nothing can do that.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am saying that redness is not a substrate, but it supervenes on a
>>>> certain type of behaviour, regardless of the substrate of its
>>>> implementation. This allows the system to know when the redness changes to
>>>> something else, since the behaviour on which the redness supervenes would
>>>> change to a different behaviour on which different colour qualia supervene.
>>>>
>>>> That is why I constantly ask you what could be responsible for
>>>>> redness.  Because whatever you say that is, I could use your same argument
>>>>> and say it can't be that, either.
>>>>> If you could describe to me what redness could be, this would falsify
>>>>> my camp, and I would jump to the functionalist camp.  But that is
>>>>> impossible, because all your so-called proof is claiming, is that nothing
>>>>> can be redness.
>>>>>
>>>>> If it isn't glutamate that has the redness quality, what can?  Nothing
>>>>> you say will work, because of your so-called proof.  Because when you have
>>>>> contradictory assumptions you can prove all claims to be both true and
>>>>> false, which has no utility.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Glutamate doesn’t have the redness quality, but glutamate or something
>>>> that functions like glutamate is necessary to produce the redness quality.
>>>> We know this because it is what we observe: certain brain structures are
>>>> needed in order to have certain experiences. We know that it can’t be
>>>> substrate specific because then we could grossly change the qualia without
>>>> the subject noticing, which is absurd, meaning there is no difference
>>>> between having and not having qualia.
>>>>
>>>> Until you can provide some falsifiable example of what could be
>>>>> responsible for your redness quality, further conversation seems to be a
>>>>> waste.  Because my assertion is that given your assumptions NOTHING will
>>>>> work, and until you falsify that, with at least one example possibility,
>>>>> why go on with this contradictory assumption where qualitative
>>>>> consciousness, based on substrates like redness and greenness, simply isn't
>>>>> possible?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> _______________________________________________
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>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
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