[ExI] Is Artificial Life Conscious?

Mon May 9 22:53:42 UTC 2022

Exactly, I couldn't have set it better myself.
Those aren't reasons why redness isn't substrate dependent.
If you ask the system: "How do you do your sorting, one system must be able
to say "bubble sort" and the other must be able to say: "quick sort"
Just the same as if you asked: "What is redness like for you, one would say
your redness, the other would say your greenness."

On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:51 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Those are not reasons why redness can't supervene.
>
> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 3:42 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> OK, let me explain in more detail.
>> Redness can't supervene on a function, because you can substitute the
>> function (say bubble sort) with some other function (quick sort)
>> So redness can't supervene on a function, either because "you replace a
>> part (or function) of the brain with a black box that affects the rest of
>> the brain in the same way as the original, the subject must behave the same"
>> So redness can't superven on any function.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 07:55, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>
>>>> OK, let me try saying it this way.
>>>> You use the neural substitution argument to "prove" redness cannot be
>>>> substrate dependent.
>>>> Then you conclude that redness "supervenes" on some function.
>>>> The problem is, you can prove that redness can't "supervene" on any
>>>> function, via the same neural substitution proof.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It supervenes on any substrate that preserves the redness behaviour. In
>>> other words, if you replace a part of the brain with a black box that
>>> affects the rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the subject
>>> must behave the same and must have the same qualia. It doesn’t matter
>>> what’s in the black box.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 07:47, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 02:36, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat
>>>>>>>> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think colourness qualities are what the human behaviour
>>>>>>>>> associated with distinguishing between colours, describing them, reacting
>>>>>>>>> to them emotionally etc. is seen from inside the system. If you make a
>>>>>>>>> physical change to the system and perfectly reproduce this behaviour, you
>>>>>>>>> will also necessarily perfectly reproduce the colourness qualities.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> An abstract description of the behavior of redness can perfectly
>>>>>>>> capture 100% of the behavior, one to one, isomorphically perfectly
>>>>>>>> modeled.  Are you saying that since you abstractly reproduce 100% of the
>>>>>>>> behavior, that you have duplicated the quale?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here is where I end up misquoting you because I don’t understand
>>>>>>> what exactly you mean by “abstract description”.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: 3_robots_tiny.png]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is the best possible illustration of what I mean by abstract vs
>>>>>> intrinsic physical qualities.
>>>>>> The first two represent knowledge with two different intrinsic
>>>>>> physical qualities, redness and greenness.
>>>>>> "Red" is just an abstract word, composed of strings of ones and
>>>>>> zeros.  You can't know what it means, by design, without a dictionary.
>>>>>> The redness intrinsic quality your brain uses to represent knowledge
>>>>>> of 'red' things, is your definition for the abstract word 'red'.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But the specific example I have used is that if you perfectly
>>>>>>> reproduce the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>> different substrate, and glutamate is involved in redness qualia, then you
>>>>>>> necessarily also reproduce the redness qualia. This is because if it were
>>>>>>> not so, it would be possible to grossly change the qualia without the
>>>>>>> subject noticing any change, which is absurd.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think the confusion comes in the different ways we think about this:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>> different substrate"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Everything in your model seems to be based on this kind of "cause and
>>>>>> effect" or "interpretations of interpretations".  I think of things in a
>>>>>> different way.
>>>>>> I would emagine you would say that the causal properties of glutamate
>>>>>> or redness would result in someone saying: "That is red."
>>>>>> However, to me, the redness quality, alone, isn't the cause of
>>>>>> someone saying: "That is Red", as someone could lie, and say: "That is
>>>>>> Green", proving the redness isn't the only cause of what the person is
>>>>>> saying.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The causal properties of the glutamate are basically the properties
>>>>> that cause motion in other parts of the system. Consider a glutamate
>>>>> molecule as a part of a clockwork mechanism. If you remove the glutamate
>>>>> molecule, you will disrupt the movement of the entire clockwork mechanism.
>>>>> But if you replace it with a different molecule that has similar physical
>>>>> properties, the rest of the clockwork mechanism will continue functioning
>>>>> the same. Not all of the physical properties are relevant, and they only
>>>>> have to be replicated to within a certain tolerance.
>>>>>
>>>>> The computational system, and the way the knowledge is consciousnessly
>>>>>> represented is different from simple cause and effect.
>>>>>> The entire system is aware of all of the intrinsic qualities of each
>>>>>> of the pixels on the surface of the strawberry (along with any reasoning
>>>>>> for why it would lie or not)
>>>>>> And it is because of this composite awareness, that is the cause of
>>>>>> the system choosing to say: "that is red", or choose to lie in some way.
>>>>>> It is the entire composit 'free will system' that is the initial
>>>>>> cause of someone choosing to say something, not any single quality like the
>>>>>> redness of a single pixel.
>>>>>> For you, everything is just a chain of causes and effects, no
>>>>>> composite awareness and no composit free will system involved.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am proposing that the awareness of the system be completely ignored,
>>>>> and only the relevant physical properties be replicated. If this is done,
>>>>> then whether you like it or not, the awareness of the system will also be
>>>>> replicated. It’s impossible to do one without the other.
>>>>>
>>>>> If I recall correctly, you admit that the quality of your conscious
>>>>>> knowledge is dependent on the particular quality of your redness, so qualia
>>>>>> can be thought of as a substrate, on which the quality of your
>>>>>> consciousness is dependent, right?  If you are only focusing on a different
>>>>>> substrate being able to produce the same 'redness behavior' then all you
>>>>>> are doing is making two contradictory assumptions.  If you take that
>>>>>> assumption, then you can prove that nothing, even a redness function can't
>>>>>> have redness, for the same reason.  There must be something that is
>>>>>> redness, and the system must be able to know when redness changes to
>>>>>> anything else.  All you are saying is that nothing can do that.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am saying that redness is not a substrate, but it supervenes on a
>>>>> certain type of behaviour, regardless of the substrate of its
>>>>> implementation. This allows the system to know when the redness changes to
>>>>> something else, since the behaviour on which the redness supervenes would
>>>>> change to a different behaviour on which different colour qualia supervene.
>>>>>
>>>>> That is why I constantly ask you what could be responsible for
>>>>>> redness.  Because whatever you say that is, I could use your same argument
>>>>>> and say it can't be that, either.
>>>>>> If you could describe to me what redness could be, this would falsify
>>>>>> my camp, and I would jump to the functionalist camp.  But that is
>>>>>> impossible, because all your so-called proof is claiming, is that nothing
>>>>>> can be redness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If it isn't glutamate that has the redness quality, what can?
>>>>>> Nothing you say will work, because of your so-called proof.  Because when
>>>>>> you have contradictory assumptions you can prove all claims to be both true
>>>>>> and false, which has no utility.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Glutamate doesn’t have the redness quality, but glutamate or something
>>>>> that functions like glutamate is necessary to produce the redness quality.
>>>>> We know this because it is what we observe: certain brain structures are
>>>>> needed in order to have certain experiences. We know that it can’t be
>>>>> substrate specific because then we could grossly change the qualia without
>>>>> the subject noticing, which is absurd, meaning there is no difference
>>>>> between having and not having qualia.
>>>>>
>>>>> Until you can provide some falsifiable example of what could be
>>>>>> responsible for your redness quality, further conversation seems to be a
>>>>>> waste.  Because my assertion is that given your assumptions NOTHING will
>>>>>> work, and until you falsify that, with at least one example possibility,
>>>>>> why go on with this contradictory assumption where qualitative
>>>>>> consciousness, based on substrates like redness and greenness, simply isn't
>>>>>> possible?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>
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