[ExI] Is Artificial Life Conscious?

Mon May 9 23:02:59 UTC 2022

Redness isn't about the black box functionality, redness is about how the
black box achieves the functionality.

On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:53 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Exactly, I couldn't have set it better myself.
> Those aren't reasons why redness isn't substrate dependent.
> If you ask the system: "How do you do your sorting, one system must be
> able to say "bubble sort" and the other must be able to say: "quick sort"
> Just the same as if you asked: "What is redness like for you, one would
> say your redness, the other would say your greenness."
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:51 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Those are not reasons why redness can't supervene.
>>
>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 3:42 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> OK, let me explain in more detail.
>>> Redness can't supervene on a function, because you can substitute the
>>> function (say bubble sort) with some other function (quick sort)
>>> So redness can't supervene on a function, either because "you replace a
>>> part (or function) of the brain with a black box that affects the rest of
>>> the brain in the same way as the original, the subject must behave the same"
>>> So redness can't superven on any function.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 07:55, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>
>>>>> OK, let me try saying it this way.
>>>>> You use the neural substitution argument to "prove" redness cannot be
>>>>> substrate dependent.
>>>>> Then you conclude that redness "supervenes" on some function.
>>>>> The problem is, you can prove that redness can't "supervene" on any
>>>>> function, via the same neural substitution proof.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It supervenes on any substrate that preserves the redness behaviour. In
>>>> other words, if you replace a part of the brain with a black box that
>>>> affects the rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the subject
>>>> must behave the same and must have the same qualia. It doesn’t matter
>>>> what’s in the black box.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 07:47, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 02:36, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think colourness qualities are what the human behaviour
>>>>>>>>>> associated with distinguishing between colours, describing them, reacting
>>>>>>>>>> to them emotionally etc. is seen from inside the system. If you make a
>>>>>>>>>> physical change to the system and perfectly reproduce this behaviour, you
>>>>>>>>>> will also necessarily perfectly reproduce the colourness qualities.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> An abstract description of the behavior of redness can perfectly
>>>>>>>>> capture 100% of the behavior, one to one, isomorphically perfectly
>>>>>>>>> modeled.  Are you saying that since you abstractly reproduce 100% of the
>>>>>>>>> behavior, that you have duplicated the quale?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Here is where I end up misquoting you because I don’t understand
>>>>>>>> what exactly you mean by “abstract description”.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [image: 3_robots_tiny.png]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is the best possible illustration of what I mean by abstract vs
>>>>>>> intrinsic physical qualities.
>>>>>>> The first two represent knowledge with two different intrinsic
>>>>>>> physical qualities, redness and greenness.
>>>>>>> "Red" is just an abstract word, composed of strings of ones and
>>>>>>> zeros.  You can't know what it means, by design, without a dictionary.
>>>>>>> The redness intrinsic quality your brain uses to represent knowledge
>>>>>>> of 'red' things, is your definition for the abstract word 'red'.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But the specific example I have used is that if you perfectly
>>>>>>>> reproduce the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>>> different substrate, and glutamate is involved in redness qualia, then you
>>>>>>>> necessarily also reproduce the redness qualia. This is because if it were
>>>>>>>> not so, it would be possible to grossly change the qualia without the
>>>>>>>> subject noticing any change, which is absurd.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think the confusion comes in the different ways we think about
>>>>>>> this:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>> different substrate"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Everything in your model seems to be based on this kind of "cause
>>>>>>> and effect" or "interpretations of interpretations".  I think of things in
>>>>>>> a different way.
>>>>>>> I would emagine you would say that the causal properties of
>>>>>>> glutamate or redness would result in someone saying: "That is red."
>>>>>>> However, to me, the redness quality, alone, isn't the cause of
>>>>>>> someone saying: "That is Red", as someone could lie, and say: "That is
>>>>>>> Green", proving the redness isn't the only cause of what the person is
>>>>>>> saying.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The causal properties of the glutamate are basically the properties
>>>>>> that cause motion in other parts of the system. Consider a glutamate
>>>>>> molecule as a part of a clockwork mechanism. If you remove the glutamate
>>>>>> molecule, you will disrupt the movement of the entire clockwork mechanism.
>>>>>> But if you replace it with a different molecule that has similar physical
>>>>>> properties, the rest of the clockwork mechanism will continue functioning
>>>>>> the same. Not all of the physical properties are relevant, and they only
>>>>>> have to be replicated to within a certain tolerance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The computational system, and the way the knowledge is
>>>>>>> consciousnessly represented is different from simple cause and effect.
>>>>>>> The entire system is aware of all of the intrinsic qualities of each
>>>>>>> of the pixels on the surface of the strawberry (along with any reasoning
>>>>>>> for why it would lie or not)
>>>>>>> And it is because of this composite awareness, that is the cause of
>>>>>>> the system choosing to say: "that is red", or choose to lie in some way.
>>>>>>> It is the entire composit 'free will system' that is the initial
>>>>>>> cause of someone choosing to say something, not any single quality like the
>>>>>>> redness of a single pixel.
>>>>>>> For you, everything is just a chain of causes and effects, no
>>>>>>> composite awareness and no composit free will system involved.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am proposing that the awareness of the system be completely
>>>>>> ignored, and only the relevant physical properties be replicated. If this
>>>>>> is done, then whether you like it or not, the awareness of the system will
>>>>>> also be replicated. It’s impossible to do one without the other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If I recall correctly, you admit that the quality of your conscious
>>>>>>> knowledge is dependent on the particular quality of your redness, so qualia
>>>>>>> can be thought of as a substrate, on which the quality of your
>>>>>>> consciousness is dependent, right?  If you are only focusing on a different
>>>>>>> substrate being able to produce the same 'redness behavior' then all you
>>>>>>> are doing is making two contradictory assumptions.  If you take that
>>>>>>> assumption, then you can prove that nothing, even a redness function can't
>>>>>>> have redness, for the same reason.  There must be something that is
>>>>>>> redness, and the system must be able to know when redness changes to
>>>>>>> anything else.  All you are saying is that nothing can do that.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am saying that redness is not a substrate, but it supervenes on a
>>>>>> certain type of behaviour, regardless of the substrate of its
>>>>>> implementation. This allows the system to know when the redness changes to
>>>>>> something else, since the behaviour on which the redness supervenes would
>>>>>> change to a different behaviour on which different colour qualia supervene.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is why I constantly ask you what could be responsible for
>>>>>>> redness.  Because whatever you say that is, I could use your same argument
>>>>>>> and say it can't be that, either.
>>>>>>> If you could describe to me what redness could be, this would
>>>>>>> falsify my camp, and I would jump to the functionalist camp.  But that is
>>>>>>> impossible, because all your so-called proof is claiming, is that nothing
>>>>>>> can be redness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If it isn't glutamate that has the redness quality, what can?
>>>>>>> Nothing you say will work, because of your so-called proof.  Because when
>>>>>>> you have contradictory assumptions you can prove all claims to be both true
>>>>>>> and false, which has no utility.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Glutamate doesn’t have the redness quality, but glutamate or
>>>>>> something that functions like glutamate is necessary to produce the redness
>>>>>> quality. We know this because it is what we observe: certain brain
>>>>>> structures are needed in order to have certain experiences. We know that it
>>>>>> can’t be substrate specific because then we could grossly change the qualia
>>>>>> without the subject noticing, which is absurd, meaning there is no
>>>>>> difference between having and not having qualia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Until you can provide some falsifiable example of what could be
>>>>>>> responsible for your redness quality, further conversation seems to be a
>>>>>>> waste.  Because my assertion is that given your assumptions NOTHING will
>>>>>>> work, and until you falsify that, with at least one example possibility,
>>>>>>> why go on with this contradictory assumption where qualitative
>>>>>>> consciousness, based on substrates like redness and greenness, simply isn't
>>>>>>> possible?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
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>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>
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>
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