[ExI] Is Artificial Life Conscious?

Tue May 10 00:48:54 UTC 2022

On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 09:04, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Redness isn't about the black box functionality, redness is about how the
> black box achieves the functionality.
>

That may seem plausible, but the functionalist position is that however the
functionality is achieved, redness will be preserved.

On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:53 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Exactly, I couldn't have set it better myself.
>> Those aren't reasons why redness isn't substrate dependent.
>> If you ask the system: "How do you do your sorting, one system must be
>> able to say "bubble sort" and the other must be able to say: "quick sort"
>> Just the same as if you asked: "What is redness like for you, one would
>> say your redness, the other would say your greenness."
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:51 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Those are not reasons why redness can't supervene.
>>>
>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 3:42 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> OK, let me explain in more detail.
>>>> Redness can't supervene on a function, because you can substitute the
>>>> function (say bubble sort) with some other function (quick sort)
>>>> So redness can't supervene on a function, either because "you replace a
>>>> part (or function) of the brain with a black box that affects the rest of
>>>> the brain in the same way as the original, the subject must behave the same"
>>>> So redness can't superven on any function.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 07:55, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> OK, let me try saying it this way.
>>>>>> You use the neural substitution argument to "prove" redness cannot be
>>>>>> substrate dependent.
>>>>>> Then you conclude that redness "supervenes" on some function.
>>>>>> The problem is, you can prove that redness can't "supervene" on any
>>>>>> function, via the same neural substitution proof.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It supervenes on any substrate that preserves the redness behaviour.
>>>>> In other words, if you replace a part of the brain with a black box that
>>>>> affects the rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the subject
>>>>> must behave the same and must have the same qualia. It doesn’t matter
>>>>> what’s in the black box.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 07:47, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat
>>>>>>>> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 02:36, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think colourness qualities are what the human behaviour
>>>>>>>>>>> associated with distinguishing between colours, describing them, reacting
>>>>>>>>>>> to them emotionally etc. is seen from inside the system. If you make a
>>>>>>>>>>> physical change to the system and perfectly reproduce this behaviour, you
>>>>>>>>>>> will also necessarily perfectly reproduce the colourness qualities.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> An abstract description of the behavior of redness can perfectly
>>>>>>>>>> capture 100% of the behavior, one to one, isomorphically perfectly
>>>>>>>>>> modeled.  Are you saying that since you abstractly reproduce 100% of the
>>>>>>>>>> behavior, that you have duplicated the quale?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here is where I end up misquoting you because I don’t understand
>>>>>>>>> what exactly you mean by “abstract description”.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [image: 3_robots_tiny.png]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is the best possible illustration of what I mean by abstract
>>>>>>>> vs intrinsic physical qualities.
>>>>>>>> The first two represent knowledge with two different intrinsic
>>>>>>>> physical qualities, redness and greenness.
>>>>>>>> "Red" is just an abstract word, composed of strings of ones and
>>>>>>>> zeros.  You can't know what it means, by design, without a dictionary.
>>>>>>>> The redness intrinsic quality your brain uses to represent
>>>>>>>> knowledge of 'red' things, is your definition for the abstract word 'red'.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But the specific example I have used is that if you perfectly
>>>>>>>>> reproduce the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>>>> different substrate, and glutamate is involved in redness qualia, then you
>>>>>>>>> necessarily also reproduce the redness qualia. This is because if it were
>>>>>>>>> not so, it would be possible to grossly change the qualia without the
>>>>>>>>> subject noticing any change, which is absurd.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think the confusion comes in the different ways we think about
>>>>>>>> this:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>>> different substrate"
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Everything in your model seems to be based on this kind of "cause
>>>>>>>> and effect" or "interpretations of interpretations".  I think of things in
>>>>>>>> a different way.
>>>>>>>> I would emagine you would say that the causal properties of
>>>>>>>> glutamate or redness would result in someone saying: "That is red."
>>>>>>>> However, to me, the redness quality, alone, isn't the cause of
>>>>>>>> someone saying: "That is Red", as someone could lie, and say: "That is
>>>>>>>> Green", proving the redness isn't the only cause of what the person is
>>>>>>>> saying.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The causal properties of the glutamate are basically the properties
>>>>>>> that cause motion in other parts of the system. Consider a glutamate
>>>>>>> molecule as a part of a clockwork mechanism. If you remove the glutamate
>>>>>>> molecule, you will disrupt the movement of the entire clockwork mechanism.
>>>>>>> But if you replace it with a different molecule that has similar physical
>>>>>>> properties, the rest of the clockwork mechanism will continue functioning
>>>>>>> the same. Not all of the physical properties are relevant, and they only
>>>>>>> have to be replicated to within a certain tolerance.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The computational system, and the way the knowledge is
>>>>>>>> consciousnessly represented is different from simple cause and effect.
>>>>>>>> The entire system is aware of all of the intrinsic qualities of
>>>>>>>> each of the pixels on the surface of the strawberry (along with any
>>>>>>>> reasoning for why it would lie or not)
>>>>>>>> And it is because of this composite awareness, that is the cause of
>>>>>>>> the system choosing to say: "that is red", or choose to lie in some way.
>>>>>>>> It is the entire composit 'free will system' that is the initial
>>>>>>>> cause of someone choosing to say something, not any single quality like the
>>>>>>>> redness of a single pixel.
>>>>>>>> For you, everything is just a chain of causes and effects, no
>>>>>>>> composite awareness and no composit free will system involved.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am proposing that the awareness of the system be completely
>>>>>>> ignored, and only the relevant physical properties be replicated. If this
>>>>>>> is done, then whether you like it or not, the awareness of the system will
>>>>>>> also be replicated. It’s impossible to do one without the other.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If I recall correctly, you admit that the quality of your conscious
>>>>>>>> knowledge is dependent on the particular quality of your redness, so qualia
>>>>>>>> can be thought of as a substrate, on which the quality of your
>>>>>>>> consciousness is dependent, right?  If you are only focusing on a different
>>>>>>>> substrate being able to produce the same 'redness behavior' then all you
>>>>>>>> are doing is making two contradictory assumptions.  If you take that
>>>>>>>> assumption, then you can prove that nothing, even a redness function can't
>>>>>>>> have redness, for the same reason.  There must be something that is
>>>>>>>> redness, and the system must be able to know when redness changes to
>>>>>>>> anything else.  All you are saying is that nothing can do that.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am saying that redness is not a substrate, but it supervenes on a
>>>>>>> certain type of behaviour, regardless of the substrate of its
>>>>>>> implementation. This allows the system to know when the redness changes to
>>>>>>> something else, since the behaviour on which the redness supervenes would
>>>>>>> change to a different behaviour on which different colour qualia supervene.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is why I constantly ask you what could be responsible for
>>>>>>>> redness.  Because whatever you say that is, I could use your same argument
>>>>>>>> and say it can't be that, either.
>>>>>>>> If you could describe to me what redness could be, this would
>>>>>>>> falsify my camp, and I would jump to the functionalist camp.  But that is
>>>>>>>> impossible, because all your so-called proof is claiming, is that nothing
>>>>>>>> can be redness.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If it isn't glutamate that has the redness quality, what can?
>>>>>>>> Nothing you say will work, because of your so-called proof.  Because when
>>>>>>>> you have contradictory assumptions you can prove all claims to be both true
>>>>>>>> and false, which has no utility.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Glutamate doesn’t have the redness quality, but glutamate or
>>>>>>> something that functions like glutamate is necessary to produce the redness
>>>>>>> quality. We know this because it is what we observe: certain brain
>>>>>>> structures are needed in order to have certain experiences. We know that it
>>>>>>> can’t be substrate specific because then we could grossly change the qualia
>>>>>>> without the subject noticing, which is absurd, meaning there is no
>>>>>>> difference between having and not having qualia.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Until you can provide some falsifiable example of what could be
>>>>>>>> responsible for your redness quality, further conversation seems to be a
>>>>>>>> waste.  Because my assertion is that given your assumptions NOTHING will
>>>>>>>> work, and until you falsify that, with at least one example possibility,
>>>>>>>> why go on with this contradictory assumption where qualitative
>>>>>>>> consciousness, based on substrates like redness and greenness, simply isn't
>>>>>>>> possible?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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