[ExI] Why stop at glutamate?

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Gadersd,
It sounds to me like you're describing moving from the first one of these,
to the second.
[image: 3_functionally_equal_machines_tiny.png]
Sure, it can still tell you the strawberry is red, but there is different
objective stuff in that brain, that now has a grenness subjective quality.

The question is, how do you add an additional pixel, computationally bound
with all the other knowledge of the strawberry, so the person will agree,
it is the same redness?
And how do you do one, with a new quality that nobody has ever experienced
before?
Jason suggested there could be a million different possible color
properties.  How do you get one of them, and how do you know what it would
be like?







On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 9:24 AM Gadersd via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> But this set of stuff must be a seperate set, from whatever has a grenness
> property, right?
>
>
> The subgraph corresponding to redness is different than the subgraph
> corresponding to greenness.
>
>  In other words, you can't replace something with a redness property with
> something that has a greenness property and expect the person to say there
> has been no change?
>
>
> If the brain was modified so that the subgraph corresponding to redness
> has ceased to be and the greenness subgraph now replaces it then the person
> will experience greenness in the situations where he or she used to
> experience redness. After the procedure an honest person will report that
> things that used to appear red now appear green, assuming that the language
> dictionary in his or her brain wasn’t also modified to swap the words red
> and green.
>
> So, in that way, what redness is like, is substrate dependent on that set
> of stuff (all things that are redness), and you can't use something that
> has a different colorness property, and expect them to say it is the same
> redness?
>
>
> Qualia depends on the interaction graph, but the interaction graph does
> not necessarily depend on specific particles. The same interaction subgraph
> corresponding to redness can manifest in the biological brain or in a
> simulation of that brain. There are similar particle interactions occurring
> in each case such that some subgraphs are shared. These shared subgraphs
> are the commonality of experience.
>
> On Apr 13, 2023, at 11:25 PM, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 9:03 PM Gadersd via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> I just wish people with these kinds of "qualities arise from <whatever>"
>> theories would explicitly acknowledge (instead of ignoring), what everyone
>> knows absolutely, that color qualities are real, and then provide some
>> example of some kind of "function" or some configuration of parts, the sum
>> total of which could be pointed to and say: "THAT  is redness."  at least
>> in a way that would pass the laugh test?
>>
>>
>> The particle interactions that occur in the brain can be represented as a
>> graph and analyzed within the language of graph theory. Take a brain over
>> some time interval and build a computation graph of all the particle
>> interactions that occur within the brain over that time period. According
>> to my theory there is a subgraph within that graph that corresponds to that
>> person’s experience of redness. Whenever the person experiences redness
>> that subgraph is present. Build a computation graph of a different person.
>> Whenever the new person experiences the same color qualia the same subgraph
>> is present within the total interaction graph. Commonality of experience is
>> simply the set of subgraphs that are common. Which subgraphs correspond to
>> particular experiences must be experimentally determined.
>>
>> Particle interaction graphs are not arbitrary like codes. They are
>> physically grounded, objectively determined, and do not necessarily depend
>> on the specific types of particles involved, which implies a form of
>> substrate independence.
>>
>> Many of us have provided numerous examples and explanations. I am
>> perplexed at your disregard.
>>
>
> I appreciate your patience, and persistence with helping me to better
> understand.  I hear you saying that there is a bunch of different stuff
> that has a redness property (i.e. lots of stuff reflects 700 nm light).
> So, I can understand and agree with that.  The set of necessary and
> sufficient stuff, which can result in a redness experience, may be diverse
> (more than just glutamate).  But this set of stuff must be a seperate set,
> from whatever has a grenness property, right?  In other words, you can't
> replace something with a redness property with something that has a
> greenness property and expect the person to say there has been no change?
> So, in that way, what redness is like, is substrate dependent on that set
> of stuff (all things that are redness), and you can't use something that
> has a different colorness property, and expect them to say it is the same
> redness?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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