[ExI] are qualia communicable? Was Why stop at glutamate?

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Sat Apr 15 10:24:36 UTC 2023

On Fri, Apr 14, 2023, 10:50 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Hi Jason,
> On Fri, Apr 14, 2023 at 8:39 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> An elemental quality of everything Jason is describing is a standalone
>>> pixel of a redness quality.
>> I don't believe in such things. A pixel of redness only exists by virtue
>> of it's relations to all the rest of a vastly complex brain. You can't
>> pluck it out of the brain and treat it as an independent elemental entity.
> Yes, we are simply making different falsifiable predictions, here.  It is
> now up to the experimentalist to falsify at least one of our competing
> predictions.
> I don't think we have a camp on canonizer, yet based on anything like your
> competing idea:  "A pixel of redness only exists by virtue of it's
> relations to all the rest of a vastly complex brain."  I'd sure love to get
> this canonized, somewhere, to see if anyone else would support it.  I'm
> very doubtful, but that belief could be falsified.

I wouldn't really call that idea a camp, I consider it more a corollary of
functionalism, or any emergentist account of mind/qualia.

>> only the elemental qualities does.
>> This pixel of elemental redness, and the resulting change from redness to
>>> greenness, must identity match up with some objective description of the
>>> same.
>>> It is simply discovering what this identity is, and figuring out how
>>> elemental redness can be computationally bound with all the other stuff
>>> that would be different, in different brains.
>>> My prediction is that we will discover which of all our descriptions of
>>> stuff in the brain is a description of redness, We finally know which camp
>>> is THE ONE, we finally know the true color properties of things, hard
>>> problem solved, we can eff the ineffable, since our terms and properties of
>>> our subjective experiences would then be objectively grounded.
>> I don't see how you can identify the common element between two
>> individuals' red experience when there's no way (that I see) to determine
>> whether or when two individuals even have the same red experience. Can you
>> explain this process to me?
> You identify whatever P1, glutamate, or whatever it is that is the
> objective description of a subjective pixel with a redness quality.

But how do we objectively determine a subjective quality? That's the part I
don't understand.


Then, if you see one person representing red light with that, and the other
> representing green light with that, you can then say in an objectively
> grounded way:
> His redness(p1) is like the other's greenness(also p1), which you both
> call red.
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