[ExI] Symbol Grounding

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Mon Apr 24 20:10:14 UTC 2023

Hi Jason,
On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 12:37 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> "To summarize: We have established that if absent qualia are possible,
> then fading qualia are possible; if inverted qualia are possible, then
> dancing qualia are possible; and if absent qualia are possible, then
> dancing qualia are possible. But it is impossible that fading qualia are
> possible, and it is extremely implausible that dancing qualia are possible.
> It is therefore extremely implausible that absent qualia and inverted
> qualia are possible. It follows that we have good reason to believe that
> the principle of organizational invariance is true, and that functional
> organization fully determines conscious experience."
> -- David Chalmers in "The Conscious Mind" (1996)

I thought I already pointed out that in order to establish any of this, the
substitution must succeed.  But we are predicting that, when they get to
the first one or more neurons, which is responsible for the first pixel of
redness subjective experience, one will not be able to substitute anything
different than redness, and get the subjective to experience redness, for
that pixel.  I know functionalists think this is logically impossible,
since the output of the neuron being replaced, will be the same.  But there
are logical problems with this assumption that neurons only work like small
discrete logic gates, and the way the neuro substitution sleight of hand
(directing people away form what matters), is done.

But before we head down that rabbit hole, let me ask you this, to be we are
at least on the same page at this level.  Would you agree that
consciousness is dependent on the quality of redness and greenness.  And
that if you inverted redness and greenness (and all the associated
dictionaries and memories of the same), it could still function the same,
as in say the strawberry is red, but it would answer the question: "What is
redness like for you." differently.  In other words, would you agree that
phenomenal consciousness is substrate dependent on the particular
qualities, on which the composite experience is composed?
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