[ExI] Zombies are logically inconsistent: a proof

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Wed May 17 11:34:32 UTC 2023


On Wed, May 17, 2023, 4:19 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Good morning,
>


Thanks, to you as well! Or good afternoon depending on when and where you
receive this. ��


> On Tue, 16 May 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > It follows from corrolary 4 that we as physical beings can have no more
> access to this information than any zombie does, i.e. we have
> > no more (or less) access to our own mental states than does a zombie.
>
> This is what I thought. Can someone explain to me how believers in
> zombies motivate that other people are not zombies?


Brent would say there's some special molecule in our brains. Searle would
say there's some unique causal power in our biology. Chalmers would say
there's some extra property in our universe which enables consciousnesses
to accompany certain causal organizations (which is not logically necessary
in other conceivable universes). Dualists would say God puts a soul into
each human (but they never say why God could not put a soul into a machine).

They must point to a
> clear criterion and say this is "not zombie", and lacking that, you are
> a zombie.
>
> It seems to me the only non-zombie there can ever be with that point of
> view, is oneself.


Yes I think they accept this. If it's logically possible for a physically
identical being to behave in all manners in the same ways, and not be
conscious, then there can be no test to determine if another is conscious.

Moreover, there can be no test anyone could perform to know they're not
themselves a zombie (this point is often overlooked by believers in zombies
but it follows from their belief that qualia have no effects in the world).

Dennett realizes this second point which is why he says that if zombies
were possible then we're all zombies.

Jason
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