[ExI] teachers
Jason Resch
jasonresch at gmail.com
Fri Sep 1 02:24:09 UTC 2023
On Thu, Aug 31, 2023, 6:17 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Good evening Jason,
>
Good morning,
��
> On Mon, 28 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Sorry for being unclear. I meant that identity includes both. Not
> just
> > hw and not just sw, buth both, combined. I'm not saying it solves
> all
> > problems, but it seems to me as if it does solve at least some
> > challenges.
> >
> > Ahh I see what you mean now. One could define personal identity in terms
> of the continuity of the same body and mind, but then the
> > question is how strict must the similarity be for the identity to hold?
>
> Yes, it is a very common sense model, but just like ethics, it is
> probably easy to come up with corner cases and thought experiments which
> poke holes at it at the extremes.
>
Conventional theories of personal identity are fine for conventional
situations. It's only in unconventional situations we can see where or how
they might break. (Like Einstein considering what would happen if he
approached the speed of light.)
> > If completely strict, you end up with the empty individualism of #1, if
> unrestricted you end up with the open individualism of #3,
> > since if one permits gradual changes, it is still subject to gradually
> morphing into any other person, and even with the restriction
> > of bodily continuity, our metabolism is constantly churning out old
> material and replacing it with new material, (something like half
> > the atoms in your brain are replaced every 8 days through metabolism).
> What if these atoms were collected and used to construct a new
> > version of you, Ship of Theseus style? Which one are you? How do we
> track bodily continuity when we are each, effectively rivers
> > through which atoms flow?
>
> In terms of identity, that's why I would think of two anchors, bodily
> continuity and mind continuity.
What about something like an amoeba dividing. Can we say which one the
original becomes? I see three possible answers:
1. It becomes one of the two
2. becomes neither of the two
3. It becomes both of the two
The answer that to my intuition seems to make the least sense is #1.
There is also the dimension of location,
> to cover the case of id when copied. That would change location from 1x
> to 2x, thus somehow "violating" the id, making it a separate one. But
> I'll stop for now, because I think you'll get to that below.
>
This reminds me of a theory called the closest continuer theory of personal
identity.
> >
> > Well, over the course of a life time, and assuming no external
> > interference, I'd say that there is a continuity of both body and
> mind,
> > as per the laws governing the workings of body and mind.
> >
> > When it comes to the question of if this is a 10% person or a 100%
> > person, that would depend on the context and purpose of the
> conversation
> > it is used in.
> >
> > > And is there a continuous spectrum between any two persons?
> >
> > If you're talking about one organism separated by time, according
> to the
> > above, I'd say yes. Separate persons, no. But I think I
> misunderstand you here.
> >
> >
> > I mean from the perspective of within an infinite reality, as described
> here:
> >
> > "You see, The Object contains the Continuum of Souls. It is a connected
> set, with a frothy, fractal structure, of rather high
> > dimensionality. The Continuum contains an infinite number of Souls, all
> Souls in fact, and an infinite number of them are You. Or at
>
> I'm sorry, but I think you need to unpack that for me. I have a feeling
> that is a quote from a book, so for me, a "continuum of souls" and
> "connected
> set, with a frothy, fractal structure, of rather high dimensionality"
> means nothing to me.
>
I just mean within an infinite and comprehensive reality, all possible
observers exist, and every of all possible variations of thet observer
exist. Thus there is an infinite and continuous spectrum of people out
there, with similar nearly identical bodies and memories, many more like
you now than you are like yourself from two weeks ago. On what account
then, do we identify our current self with yourself from two weeks ago, and
not with any of these other, much closer (in terms of bodies and minds) to
our current self? What does causal history bring to the table?
I see the practical appeal, in that it's an easy to apply rule of thumb,
but I am not understanding the mechanics or theoretical basis of it.
And moreover, how do we handle personal identity in many-worlds, when every
one of our copies in all the many branches share the history of a
continuously changing body and mind?
> > least, close enough to being You so that nobody could tell the
> difference. Not even You.
> > And the Continuum also contains an infinite number of souls that are
> almost You. And an infinite number that are sort of You. And
> > because it is a Continuum, and because there is really no objective way
> to tell which one is really You, then any method one uses to
> > try to distinguish between You and non-You will produce nothing but
> illusion. In a sense, there is only one You, and it is Everyone.
> > Of course, You can tell which one is you, can’t you? Or can you?"
> > -- Douglas Jones in "A Conversation" (1996)
>
> I'm sorry, it could be the time of night, or it could be my two beers at
> the birthday dinner I just came back from, but I do not understand what
> Douglas is talking about here.
This is a quote from the short story "a conversation: on aliens online", I
thought I had linked to it, but if not it is on http://frombob.to
(It's one of my favorite stories, I highly recommend it).
>
> > Ah, but this was my badly made point above, that only
> bodily-continuity
> > is not enough. In a cell there is no mind, so the question then is
> not
> > relevant.
> >
> > > if we ask: "what experiences will this body eventually have?" I
> think this perspective would have to say the
> > experiences of both
> > > twins belong to the future continuations of this cell.
> >
> > Same here. Cell is not enough. The continuity I'd say has to cover
> both
> > the body and the mind.
> >
> > Do concussions (or any discontinuous break in consciousness) end a
> person? What about a coma, when someone is unconscious for many
> > months and then awakens with a (materially) completely new body? If
> continuity of body AND mind are strictly required and must be
> > continuous, then I see interruptions in either as posing problems.
>
> In the case of a concussion, the body is the same (roughly), and in case
> of the mind, there is continuity in that memory, experiences, my daily
> flow of events from before and after the interruption are the same.
> Coma, the same thing. So I think you make a good point, and when I say
> continuity I do not mean being awake or conscious. I believe I am the
> same person before and after I wake up from sleeping, and I believe I am
> the same before and after fainting. The continuity is one of experience,
> identity and memory and body. Neither is interrupted by concussions or
> coma.
>
My point with these is one is interrupted discontinuously. With the coma,
the conscious continues but the body changes (between points of
consciousness), and with the concussion, the body is the same but the
consciousnss discontinuously changes (between trying to catch a football,
to say waking in a hospital).
> However!
>
> To illustrate the other side of the equation, let's say you are "mind
> wiped". We have bodily continuity, but not one of the mind, and in that
> case I would say that it is not the same person before and after.
>
Let's say the previous 10 memories are wiped (as generally happens in head
trauma that causes loss of consciousness), is this, in your mind, a
discontinuous interruption of continuity?
> > > This is strange, and something we rarely consider, but it all
> comes down to: why am I experiencing this perspective,
> > rather than some
> > > other? What pre-conditions were necessary for me to have been
> born, be alive, and experience life?
> > >
> > > Did it depend on certain atoms?--(what if my mom ate a different
> lunch when she was pregnant?) Does it depend on
> > certain
> > > genes?--(what if my eyes had been a different color?)
> >
> > I think here maybe we start to diverge into questions of existence,
> > possibly reasons for living, and possibly teleological ideas.
> >
> > I don't mean to ask for what purpose or reason we are here, I mean
> rather: what is the reason you are you, and I am me? What was
> > necessary (physically) for you to be the person you are peering through
> your eyes? What physical changes might have interrupted or
> > prevented that from happening? What accounts for or explains the fact
> that you are Daniel (rather than someone else, or no one)?
>
> The reason? My parents and my upbriging. But this is not your point.
> Could you take your reasoning to the next step, because I feel there is a
> good
> point coming here.
>
This is something I believe theories of personal identity must (or should
at least try) to answer.
What had to happen, for you to exist with consciousness. If, for example, a
different sperm fertilized the egg, would you be experiencing life as a
your brother or sister, or would you be experiencing nothing at all?
What if the sperm was only one gene different, causing your eyes to be a
different color? Would you be non-existent, or would you still exist, just
with different color eyes?
> > But the fact is that you (and I) were. The probability of it is an
> after
> > construction and also why I am not a fan of philosophical arguments
> > suchas Pascals wager. I think statistics, especially applied in
> this
> > way, and across ethereal realms leaving our material world, tend
> to lead
> > us astray.
> >
> > Not everyone buys the appropriateness of using probability arguments in
> this way; but I consider it effectively the same thing as
>
> Are you serious? I thought I was basically the only one.
I think it falls under the category of "observer selection bias". It's a
big problem in physics and cosmology. You see it mentioned in experiments
that involve the simulation argument, Boltzmann brains, the sleeping beauty
problem, the doomsday argument, quantum suicide, anthropic reasoning, etc.
Here are some references that might be useful:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_Bias_(book)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selection_bias
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument
In particular look at the criticisms of these ideas and reasoning, who is
making them and what they are saying.
Do you have a
> link to someone who does not like using probability arguments in this
> way? The reason I am asking is that, as you can see, I am not able to
> clearly state why I feel the way I do, and perhaps by reading someone
> who actually spent a philosophical career thinking about it, my own
> position could become a bit more clear.
>
Let me know if the above ones are useful and if not perhaps I can find some
others.
> > using fine-tuning of the universe: it seems something improbable has
> happened: is there an explanation? For the fine-tuning, the
> > answer that demystifies the improbability is the anthropic principle.
> For why you were born, when it seems so unlikely, the answer
> > that demystifies the improbability is open individualism.
>
> To me, this sounds like the illusion of probability. I can take a smoked
> almond from a bowl on my table and drop it on the floor and the
> probability of it ending up there, starting from the big bang is
> infinitely low. The probability of it ending up on the floor after I
> drop it is infinitely high. So depending on my human frame of reference,
> my starting point, I can toy with probabilities and make everything seem
> like magic. I think, this is also why I do not like statistical
> arguments about things which are not even part of our universe.
>
You seem to be advocating something like the "Relative Self Sampling
Assumption" and rejectibg anything like the Absolute Self Sampling
Assumption, as defined here:
https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg04665.html
> > I think we covered this in the original scenario. I'd argue that a
> copy,
> > then restored, is not the same person due to the mind factor not
> being
> > continuous. I do see a possibility for the same person in a ship of
> > theseus procedure, since body and mind continuity would not be
> violated,
> > but only transformed.
> >
> > What do you make the ship of Theseus where the old/original planks are
> secretly gathered and used to reconstruct the ship in its
> > original form? What would you make of applying the same to a person's
> body, whose old atoms are collected and reformed into an
> > identical copy?
>
> If you mean a ship of theseus transformation from original to copy to
> original, I think that would fit in with my model, since its not a copy,
> and since continuity would be preserved. Or maybe I a fooling myself? ;)
>
I mean let's say we gather all the exhaled CO2 and excreted urine, and
overtime build them up a copy of the body at a previous point in time where
all those atoms were in the original body. We now have two versions of the
person, with continuous claims on the material substrate.
Another possibility to consider: if you don't like transporters
discontinuously swapping matter, what if we run a brain simulation in a VM,
pause the VM, send it's image over the internet to another computer, and
unpause the VM image? Has the consciousness continuously transferred to a
new medium and is it the same consciousness as existed before?
> > Yes and no. Depending on how the upload was done, from where to
> where,
> > and how the continuity of the mind was handled. If a ship of
> theseus
> > operation was performed, and then copied onto a different set of
> > hardware, that would be one continuous and one copy. If you have
> linked
> > clones, I could see preservation, but also waste if the two clones
> > always had to give the same answer. Although from a disaster
> recovery
> > point of view, that would be a fascinating concept!
> >
> > Yes, this is actually a theme of the TV show Foundation. Backup clones
> are kept, and new memories are constantly synchronized to
> > their brains.
>
> Ah, did that one start again?
It did. It's airing now.
I saw season one, and apart from there
> being a bit too much violence, it did have some interesting ideas. But
> nothing beats the original books in my opinion. =)
>
I wish there were a copy on audible.
> > > the first time, and in a dying brain when the last two surviving
> neurons fire for the last time. Then from the mental
> > continuity
> > > perspective all mine states of all organisms are part of a
> connected set.
> >
> > I don't see how. It's separate organs, with separate reactions. I
> can
> > however see and fully acknowledge that from a process point of
> view, or
> > "tree of life" point of view, we are all related. But that's purely
> > biologically and not related to my mind and sense of identity.
> >
> > Here I was operating from the assumption of mind continuity. This is
> what I would say is the view (common among
> > physicalists/materialists/functionalists) where if you stepped into a
> teleporter, you would survive on the other end when you were
> > reconstructed, even if new atoms were used. If we can survive
> teleporters, then it's the mind-state that must be preserved for
> > survival, not any particular collection of atoms. In this case, if the
> last mind state of a dying brain happens to be the same mind
> > state of another brain which continues on, this is in effect, identical
> to the transporter scenario. The mind survives because its
> > mind-state is instantiated elsewhere where it continues on, despite that
> different material is used.
>
> Ahhh, got it. I do see a break in continuity there, so for me, that
> would be a new, identical clone.
>
��
> > This does not work if you require bodily continuity as well, as every
> night when we sleep, atoms are discontinuously replaced between
> > successive moments of consciousness (between when we fall asleep at
> night and awaken in the morning, our bodies have changed, food
> > has metabolized and become part of our bodies, carbon from our bodies
> has been exhaled as CO2, etc.).
>
> But there is continuity in the fact that the bodys processes are not
> interrupted, atoms are replaced, but the system is not interrupted.
What about swapping an atom (a discrete unit) makes it continuous? Is it
the fact that it's a small enough change that we don't notice it?
Is there a maximum number of atoms we can swap at once without losing the
person? If so, what is your guess for how big that number can be?
With
> the mind as well. Might adding locality as nother dimension work? Or
> make it more clear?
I think it makes things less clear. (At least, closest continuer theories
make less sense to me). E.g., What if the two copies are created the same
Planck length away from the original? What ig one is closer but is missing
an eyelash, or a neuron? It doesn't provide good justifications to its
answers and seems very ad hoc.
>
> > Please do! No need for me to armchair philosophize, when I can
> read a
> > paper about some fascinating biological procedure!
> >
> > Hodan Twins:
> ...
> >
>
> Great! Thank you very much. =)
>
> > > Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is
> getting late
> > > here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)
> > >
> > > Physics reveals a complete symmetry and interchangeability
> between spaces and time. But we seem to have a bias against
> > the latter
> > > situation. If we take time-space symmetry seriously, we must
> recognize this as a bias internal to us. It suggests that
> > duplicates are
> > > self, as much as the same self is preserved over time.
> >
> > I think that is a very big step and conclusion to make. Could you
> divide
> > it up into smaller steps? Maybe then I'll see the point.
> >
> >
> > I've attached and excerpt from something I wrote that goes into this in
> more detail, in particular see the story about the
> > "Duplicators vs. Restorers"
>
> Hmm, I did not get any attachments. Maybe they were scrubbed by the list
> software? Could you send them directly to my email?
>
Will do.
> > (Also, I have included also the story of the deep space travelers, which
> also introduces some of the issues with personal identity,
> > particularly as it it pertains to duplication. It's not relevant to the
> interchangeability of space and time, but you might still
> > find it interesting.)
> >
> > I also found these archived pages of an old member of this list, Lee
> Corbin, who wrote several articles on personal identiy, which
> > are an interesting read, and relate to this topic:
> > * "Why Duplicates Are Self: A Proof"
> > * "The Pit and the Duplicate"
> > * "Continuity of Identity: The Last Refuge of the Soul"
> >
> >
> >
> > > Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but
> doesn't really argue for it. I would recommend Zuboff's
> > linked paper to
> > > see the reasons for believing it.
> >
> > Thank you, will keep that in mind, and have a look at the paper. =)
> >
> > Thank you as well, for your always great questions and for making me
> have to think. :-)
>
> Had no idea! And here I thought that you were just drumming up old and
> well thought through thoughts, and I was the one who was doing all the
> thinking! ;) I find this great for challenging myself and forcing me to
> think through what I believe and why I believe it.
>
Excellent to hear. That's the main benefit I get from participating in
these discussions. To write is to think.
> The only disadvantage and the one who suffers is my wife who complains
> that I write long letters to strangers, and never a long letter to her. ;)
>
Aww. Perhaps she should join us on this list. ☺️
Jason
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The question you are asking about below
> concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal
> > identity. That
> > > > topic asks: which I
> > > > experiences belong to which person's, in
> other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a
> > person.
> > > > There are in general three
> > > > approaches generally taken:
> > > > 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each
> observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated
> > thing,
> > > > there's no such thing as a
> > > > self which has multiple distinct
> thought-moments.
> > > >
> > > > 2. Continuity theories/closed
> individualism: either bodily or psychological continuity. A self is
> > a
> > > > continual things either though
> > > > the continuation of some physical body, or
> some more abstractly defined psychological organization.
> > > >
> > > > 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There
> are no bodily or psychological preconditions for an
> > experience
> > > > being yours, all experiences
> > > > are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> > > >
> > > > I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and
> #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is
> > more
> > > useful
> > > > (it permits decision
> > > > theory) and further, there are strong
> probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those given in
> > "One
> > > self:
> > > > the logic of experience"
> > > > which I cite here:
> > > >
> > > >
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> > > >
> > > > One consequence of Open Individualism is
> that it dissolves any concern of whether some particular
> > copy is
> > > > you, as all conscious
> > > > perspectives are you.
> > > >
> > > > Jason
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via
> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > > > My position is that a separate
> uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant the
> > physical me
> > > > immortality. I would
> > > > look at it as a mind-seed, or
> something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just
> > as a
> > > part
> > > > of me lives on in
> > > > a child, although actually that part
> is way more of me, than in a child.
> > > >
> > > > However, when talking about continuity
> and uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading
> > is much
> > > > more interesting from
> > > > an identity point of view.
> > > >
> > > > As some, or all of you already know,
> imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I
> > would
> > > not
> > > > have a break, and
> > > > my mind would transition onto the new
> media.
> > > >
> > > > I would like to know what the people
> here who do not believe uploading grants a form of
> > immortality
> > > > think about that
> > > > scenario? Would it fit in with your
> idea of identity and would you see yourselves being
> > "immortal"
> > > > through a shop of
> > > > theseus procedure if it were possible?
> > > >
> > > > As for the copy approach, a starting
> point for me would be that my identity is probably based
> > on my
> > > > mind, sense of
> > > > continuity and location. In a copy,
> continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work
> > with the
> > > > definition of
> > > > identity. In a theseus there would be
> no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and location
> > would
> > > be
> > > > single.
> > > >
> > > > Best regards,
> > > > Daniel
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via
> extropy-chat wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin
> Sunley wrote:
> > > >
> > > > An important component of
> what a lot of people want out of immortality is not so
> > much
> > > > continuity
> > > > as it is
> not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].
> > > >
> > > > If I'm dying of cancer,
> and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will
> > remember being
> > > > me, but
> > > > /I'm/ still gonna
> experience a painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or
> > even
> > > > instantaneously, during or
> in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't
> > solve the
> > > > problem
> > > > either.
> > > >
> > > > If "me" is ever on two
> substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you
> > haven't
> > > > moved
> > > > me, and a copy, by
> definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So this 'me' that you are
> talking about, must be something that, when copied, somehow
> > changes
> > > > into 'not-me'.
> > > > I don't understand this. If it's
> an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can
> > there
> > > not
> > > > now be two
> > > > 'me's? Two identical beings, in
> every way, including their subjective experience, with
> > no
> > > > discontinuity with
> > > > the original singular being?
> > > >
> > > > When I hit 'send' on this
> message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will
> > keep a
> > > copy.
> > > > Which one is
> > > > the real message? If they were
> conscious, why would that make any difference?
> > > >
> > > > You say "you may have copied me,
> but you haven't moved me". But how do you move data?
> > You make
> > > a
> > > > second copy
> > > > of it then delete the first
> copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be
> > 'moving
> > > me',
> > > > yet you say
> > > > it wouldn't. Can you clarify
> why? I can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable
> > supernatural
> > > > 'soul') how
> > > > this could be.
> > > >
> > > > This is a crucial point, for
> those of us interested in uploading, so I think we should
> > really
> > > > understand it,
> > > > yet it makes no sense to me.
> Would you please explain further?
> > > >
> > > > Could you also please explain
> the comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not
> > being the
> > > > same thing?
> > > >
> > > > Ben
> > > >
> _______________________________________________
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> > > >
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> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
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> > > >
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> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
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