[ExI] teachers
efc at swisscows.email
efc at swisscows.email
Sun Sep 3 21:55:40 UTC 2023
Good evening,
(edit: sending again due to these strange google mail server errors that
temporarily blocks the message from the list sometimes.)
On Thu, 31 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2023, 6:17 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Good evening Jason,
>
>
>
> Good morning,
>
> ��
>
>
> Yes, it is a very common sense model, but just like ethics, it is
> probably easy to come up with corner cases and thought experiments which
> poke holes at it at the extremes.
>
> Conventional theories of personal identity are fine for conventional situations. It's only in unconventional situations we can see
> where or how they might break. (Like Einstein considering what would happen if he approached the speed of light.)
I agree, as long as the unconventional situations are not impossible. If
they are impossible, and can never be, they might instead risk confusing
the matter while yielding very little insight.
> > If completely strict, you end up with the empty individualism of #1, if unrestricted you end up with the open
> individualism of #3,
> > since if one permits gradual changes, it is still subject to gradually morphing into any other person, and even with
> the restriction
> > of bodily continuity, our metabolism is constantly churning out old material and replacing it with new material,
> (something like half
> > the atoms in your brain are replaced every 8 days through metabolism). What if these atoms were collected and used to
> construct a new
> > version of you, Ship of Theseus style? Which one are you? How do we track bodily continuity when we are each,
> effectively rivers
> > through which atoms flow?
>
> In terms of identity, that's why I would think of two anchors, bodily
> continuity and mind continuity.
>
> What about something like an amoeba dividing. Can we say which one the original becomes? I see three possible answers:
Is it possible to generalize across species? After all an amoeba is so
different from us biologically speaking that this might be a case that
might not transfer. But regardless...
> 1. It becomes one of the two
> 2. becomes neither of the two
> 3. It becomes both of the two
> The answer that to my intuition seems to make the least sense is #1.
Maybe #2? As per bodyily continuity, I'd say not #1?
> There is also the dimension of location,
> to cover the case of id when copied. That would change location from 1x
> to 2x, thus somehow "violating" the id, making it a separate one. But
> I'll stop for now, because I think you'll get to that below.
>
> This reminds me of a theory called the closest continuer theory of personal identity.
Interesting! Never head of it, but I do like Robert Nozick! Hmm, this
seems vaguely familiar:
"Let us start with defining a closeness metric among persons.
Intuitively, think of it this way: if person y is closer to person x than person y* is, then y is a better
candidate than y* to be the same person as x.
How close person y is to person x is determined by a complex combination of various factors,
including at least the following (p. 69 is helpful here):
* psychological similarity: y’s plans, ambitions, desires, preferences, projects, commitments,
principles, etc. are qualitatively similar to x’s.
* psychological dependence: y’s psychological characteristics “stem from, grow out of, [or] are
causally dependent on” x’s psychological characteristics, in an appropriate way (p. 37).
* bodily similarity: y’s body parts (including x’s brain) are qualitatively similar to x’s.
* bodily dependence: y’s bodily characteristics stem from, grow out of, or are causally dependent
on x’s bodily characteristics, in an appropriate way."
(source: https://scholr.harvard.edu/files/sberker/files/phil169-meeting2.pdf)
Psychological and bodily factors... I just gave it a glance right now
can't say I fully understand it, but it is an interesting concept!
In the same pdf, a case:
"Case 1: A duplicate of your body, including the brain, is created based on measurements of your own
body and brain. Both persons go on living, with qualitatively identical physical and psychological
characteristics (at least initially).
verdict: You continue to exist, and the duplicate is not you (because the person with the old body has
greater bodily continuity than the person with the new body and scores the same with regard to all
other factors that make for closeness)."
I'm trying to understand if I can drop my idea of locality, or my idea
of locality is in fact what's in the pdf in a more thought out and
elaborate form.
> > "You see, The Object contains the Continuum of Souls. It is a connected set, with a frothy, fractal structure, of
> rather high
> > dimensionality. The Continuum contains an infinite number of Souls, all Souls in fact, and an infinite number of them
> are You. Or at
>
> I'm sorry, but I think you need to unpack that for me. I have a feeling
> that is a quote from a book, so for me, a "continuum of souls" and "connected
> set, with a frothy, fractal structure, of rather high dimensionality"
> means nothing to me.
>
> I just mean within an infinite and comprehensive reality, all possible observers exist, and every of all possible variations of thet
> observer exist. Thus there is an infinite and continuous spectrum of people out there, with similar nearly identical bodies and
> memories, many more like you now than you are like yourself from two weeks ago. On what account then, do we identify our current self
> with yourself from two weeks ago, and not with any of these other, much closer (in terms of bodies and minds) to our current self?
Ahh ok, so basically the MWI? Well, first of all, I'm still not
convinced that MWI is reality. But let's just assume, I'm residing with
you on that topic, and let's see what I would think, if I would look at
MWI as not only a theory but something close to certainty.
In that case, I'd say that a model of consciousness breaks down. It is
based on physical beings in a physical world, and the physical world is
the boundary for where this concept has any meaning. Without any
information transfer between them, I don't see how the infinity of
infinities would apply since they are forever "locked away" and will
never affect each other.
> What does causal history bring to the table?
Within one world or many besides the fact that we are beings operating
in causal history?
> I see the practical appeal, in that it's an easy to apply rule of thumb, but I am not understanding the mechanics or theoretical
> basis of it.
Well, the basis is common sense reality, but when it comes to the
mechanis and theoretical basis that that will lead to I was kind of
hoping that your sharp mind would perhaps fill in the details? ;)
If not that, at least make it implode. ;)
> And moreover, how do we handle personal identity in many-worlds, when every one of our copies in all the many branches share the
> history of a continuously changing body and mind?
But it's not a joint history, it's history only within its own universe
perhaps? Starting out with body and mind continuity, perhaps we need to
treat it as a coordinate system? What more axles could be added? ;)
> > least, close enough to being You so that nobody could tell the difference. Not even You.
> > And the Continuum also contains an infinite number of souls that are almost You. And an infinite number that are sort
> of You. And
> > because it is a Continuum, and because there is really no objective way to tell which one is really You, then any
> method one uses to
> > try to distinguish between You and non-You will produce nothing but illusion. In a sense, there is only one You, and it
> is Everyone.
> > Of course, You can tell which one is you, can’t you? Or can you?"
> > -- Douglas Jones in "A Conversation" (1996)
>
> I'm sorry, it could be the time of night, or it could be my two beers at
> the birthday dinner I just came back from, but I do not understand what
> Douglas is talking about here.
>
>
> This is a quote from the short story "a conversation: on aliens online", I thought I had linked to it, but if not it is on
> http://frombob.to
> (It's one of my favorite stories, I highly recommend it).
Ah, got it! Goes on the reading list! =)
> In the case of a concussion, the body is the same (roughly), and in case
> of the mind, there is continuity in that memory, experiences, my daily
> flow of events from before and after the interruption are the same.
> Coma, the same thing. So I think you make a good point, and when I say
> continuity I do not mean being awake or conscious. I believe I am the
> same person before and after I wake up from sleeping, and I believe I am
> the same before and after fainting. The continuity is one of experience,
> identity and memory and body. Neither is interrupted by concussions or
> coma.
>
> My point with these is one is interrupted discontinuously. With the coma, the conscious continues but the body changes (between
> points of consciousness), and with the concussion, the body is the same but the consciousnss discontinuously changes (between trying
> to catch a football, to say waking in a hospital).
I think that perhaps Nozick above has a point? If I take my statement,
and try to translate it to Nozicks idea, then body is the same (apart
from continuous changes as outlined by the biological organism, that is,
no copying has been made etc.) in terms of mind, memory is there,
identity etc. so closest continuer? Grasping after my badly defined
termed locality, there is also just one body, still remaining there,
which adds a point in favour of the same identity.
But yes, it is starting to feel like a coordinate system with
arbitrarily (or perhaps not?) choosen axles.
> However!
>
> To illustrate the other side of the equation, let's say you are "mind
> wiped". We have bodily continuity, but not one of the mind, and in that
> case I would say that it is not the same person before and after.
>
> Let's say the previous 10 memories are wiped (as generally happens in head trauma that causes loss of consciousness), is this, in
> your mind, a discontinuous interruption of continuity?
If our identity and mind was reduced to only be memories, then I'd say
yes. Taking other factors into account (body, experience, identity, other
memories, location) and the loss of only 10 memories, then no.
> > I don't mean to ask for what purpose or reason we are here, I mean rather: what is the reason you are you, and I am me?
> What was
> > necessary (physically) for you to be the person you are peering through your eyes? What physical changes might have
> interrupted or
> > prevented that from happening? What accounts for or explains the fact that you are Daniel (rather than someone else, or
> no one)?
>
> The reason? My parents and my upbriging. But this is not your point.
> Could you take your reasoning to the next step, because I feel there is a good
> point coming here.
>
> This is something I believe theories of personal identity must (or should at least try) to answer.
>
> What had to happen, for you to exist with consciousness. If, for example, a different sperm fertilized the egg, would you be
> experiencing life as a your brother or sister, or would you be experiencing nothing at all?
>
> What if the sperm was only one gene different, causing your eyes to be a different color? Would you be non-existent, or would you
> still exist, just with different color eyes?
Ok, more clear. Let me then ask, why do you feel like personal identity
should be able to answer this question? I'm not certain that the
question of personal identity needs to answer those hypotheticals, but I
am not ruling it out.
> > But the fact is that you (and I) were. The probability of it is an after
> > construction and also why I am not a fan of philosophical arguments
> > suchas Pascals wager. I think statistics, especially applied in this
> > way, and across ethereal realms leaving our material world, tend to lead
> > us astray.
> >
> > Not everyone buys the appropriateness of using probability arguments in this way; but I consider it effectively the
> same thing as
>
> Are you serious? I thought I was basically the only one.
>
> I think it falls under the category of "observer selection bias". It's a big problem in physics and cosmology. You see it mentioned
> in experiments that involve the simulation argument, Boltzmann brains, the sleeping beauty problem, the doomsday argument, quantum
> suicide, anthropic reasoning, etc.
>
> Here are some references that might be useful:
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_Bias_(book)
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selection_bias
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_argument
>
> In particular look at the criticisms of these ideas and reasoning, who is making them and what they are saying.
Thank you Jason.
>
> Do you have a
> link to someone who does not like using probability arguments in this
> way? The reason I am asking is that, as you can see, I am not able to
> clearly state why I feel the way I do, and perhaps by reading someone
> who actually spent a philosophical career thinking about it, my own
> position could become a bit more clear.
>
> Let me know if the above ones are useful and if not perhaps I can find some others.
Let me start there, and see where it leads me.
> To me, this sounds like the illusion of probability. I can take a smoked
> almond from a bowl on my table and drop it on the floor and the
> probability of it ending up there, starting from the big bang is
> infinitely low. The probability of it ending up on the floor after I
> drop it is infinitely high. So depending on my human frame of reference,
> my starting point, I can toy with probabilities and make everything seem
> like magic. I think, this is also why I do not like statistical
> arguments about things which are not even part of our universe.
>
> You seem to be advocating something like the "Relative Self Sampling Assumption" and rejectibg anything like the Absolute Self
> Sampling Assumption, as defined here:
>
> https://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg04665.html
Well, if I understand these definitions completely, and taking my MWI
stance into account, the RSSA might be the closest one amongst those 4.
> > What do you make the ship of Theseus where the old/original planks are secretly gathered and used to reconstruct the
> ship in its
> > original form? What would you make of applying the same to a person's body, whose old atoms are collected and reformed
> into an
> > identical copy?
>
> If you mean a ship of theseus transformation from original to copy to
> original, I think that would fit in with my model, since its not a copy,
> and since continuity would be preserved. Or maybe I a fooling myself? ;)
>
> I mean let's say we gather all the exhaled CO2 and excreted urine, and overtime build them up a copy of the body at a previous point
> in time where all those atoms were in the original body. We now have two versions of the person, with continuous claims on the
> material substrate.
In this case, I think the first one is the closest continuer, right?
> Another possibility to consider: if you don't like transporters discontinuously swapping matter, what if we run a brain simulation in
> a VM, pause the VM, send it's image over the internet to another computer, and unpause the VM image? Has the consciousness
> continuously transferred to a new medium and is it the same consciousness as existed before?
If you pause the VM, and send the image over, I'd consider it a new VM.
If you on the other hand, perform a live migration, and let's assume we
can do this with great granularity, I can see how that would map onto
continuity.
> > Yes, this is actually a theme of the TV show Foundation. Backup clones are kept, and new memories are constantly
> synchronized to
> > their brains.
>
> Ah, did that one start again?
>
> It did. It's airing now.
Great! This is added to the watch list! =)
> > This does not work if you require bodily continuity as well, as every night when we sleep, atoms are discontinuously
> replaced between
> > successive moments of consciousness (between when we fall asleep at night and awaken in the morning, our bodies have
> changed, food
> > has metabolized and become part of our bodies, carbon from our bodies has been exhaled as CO2, etc.).
>
> But there is continuity in the fact that the bodys processes are not
> interrupted, atoms are replaced, but the system is not interrupted.
>
> What about swapping an atom (a discrete unit) makes it continuous? Is it the fact that it's a small enough change that we don't
> notice it?
Well, first of all, it is not just the atom, it's the atom of the body,
the mind, and the location, so by only focusing on the atom we miss the
forest. The second aspect, the way I see it, is the functioning of the
body as a biological system, where it follows from the design that it
does behave in this way. So in order for us to try and get to a
definition, that's why we need to look at more dimensions. Personality
seems to be (sorry, could possibly be) a multi-dimensional definition.
> Is there a maximum number of atoms we can swap at once without losing the person? If so, what is your guess for how big that number
> can be?
See above.
> With
> the mind as well. Might adding locality as nother dimension work? Or
> make it more clear?
>
> I think it makes things less clear. (At least, closest continuer theories make less sense to me). E.g., What if the two copies are
> created the same Planck length away from the original? What ig one is closer but is missing an eyelash, or a neuron? It doesn't
> provide good justifications to its answers and seems very ad hoc.
Yes, it does. I think that you would have to think of locality across a
nr of dimensions and not only about locality as a physicist thinks about
it.
> Hmm, I did not get any attachments. Maybe they were scrubbed by the list
> software? Could you send them directly to my email?
>
> Will do.
Thank you very much, got them.
> > > Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but doesn't really argue for it. I would recommend
> Zuboff's
> > linked paper to
> > > see the reasons for believing it.
> >
> > Thank you, will keep that in mind, and have a look at the paper. =)
> >
> > Thank you as well, for your always great questions and for making me have to think. :-)
>
> Had no idea! And here I thought that you were just drumming up old and
> well thought through thoughts, and I was the one who was doing all the
> thinking! ;) I find this great for challenging myself and forcing me to
> think through what I believe and why I believe it.
>
> Excellent to hear. That's the main benefit I get from participating in these discussions. To write is to think.
Amen to that! =)
> The only disadvantage and the one who suffers is my wife who complains
> that I write long letters to strangers, and never a long letter to her. ;)
>
> Aww. Perhaps she should join us on this list. ☺️
Sadly she is a lawyer and only enjoys very human drama and crime
preferably at least 50 years in the past. All technology in her life
is happily outsourced to her husband. ;)
But I'm currently on a business trip, so this week at least, there won't
be any complaints. ;)
Best regards,
Daniel
>
>
> Jason
>
>
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> > > >
> > > > The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal
> > identity. That
> > > > topic asks: which I
> > > > experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders
> of a
> > person.
> > > > There are in general three
> > > > approaches generally taken:
> > > > 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own
> isolated
> > thing,
> > > > there's no such thing as a
> > > > self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
> > > >
> > > > 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either bodily or psychological continuity. A
> self is
> > a
> > > > continual things either though
> > > > the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined psychological
> organization.
> > > >
> > > > 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological preconditions for
> an
> > experience
> > > > being yours, all experiences
> > > > are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> > > >
> > > > I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3,
> #3 is
> > more
> > > useful
> > > > (it permits decision
> > > > theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those
> given in
> > "One
> > > self:
> > > > the logic of experience"
> > > > which I cite here:
> > > >
> > > > https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> > > >
> > > > One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of whether some
> particular
> > copy is
> > > > you, as all conscious
> > > > perspectives are you.
> > > >
> > > > Jason
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> wrote:
> > > > My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant
> the
> > physical me
> > > > immortality. I would
> > > > look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives
> on, just
> > as a
> > > part
> > > > of me lives on in
> > > > a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a child.
> > > >
> > > > However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of theseus
> uploading
> > is much
> > > > more interesting from
> > > > an identity point of view.
> > > >
> > > > As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over
> time. I
> > would
> > > not
> > > > have a break, and
> > > > my mind would transition onto the new media.
> > > >
> > > > I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading grants a form
> of
> > immortality
> > > > think about that
> > > > scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves
> being
> > "immortal"
> > > > through a shop of
> > > > theseus procedure if it were possible?
> > > >
> > > > As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my identity is
> probably based
> > on my
> > > > mind, sense of
> > > > continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not
> work
> > with the
> > > > definition of
> > > > identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and
> location
> > would
> > > be
> > > > single.
> > > >
> > > > Best regards,
> > > > Daniel
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
> > > >
> > > > An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is
> not so
> > much
> > > > continuity
> > > > as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same
> thing].
> > > >
> > > > If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload
> will
> > remember being
> > > > me, but
> > > > /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no, killing me
> painlessly, or
> > even
> > > > instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan
> doesn't
> > solve the
> > > > problem
> > > > either.
> > > >
> > > > If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me,
> but you
> > haven't
> > > > moved
> > > > me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied,
> somehow
> > changes
> > > > into 'not-me'.
> > > > I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same?
> How can
> > there
> > > not
> > > > now be two
> > > > 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective
> experience, with
> > no
> > > > discontinuity with
> > > > the original singular being?
> > > >
> > > > When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I
> will
> > keep a
> > > copy.
> > > > Which one is
> > > > the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make any difference?
> > > >
> > > > You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you move
> data?
> > You make
> > > a
> > > > second copy
> > > > of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made
> would be
> > 'moving
> > > me',
> > > > yet you say
> > > > it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an
> uncopyable
> > supernatural
> > > > 'soul') how
> > > > this could be.
> > > >
> > > > This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think we
> should
> > really
> > > > understand it,
> > > > yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?
> > > >
> > > > Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and
> not-discontinuity not
> > being the
> > > > same thing?
> > > >
> > > > Ben
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > extropy-chat mailing list
> > > > extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> > > > http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
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