[ExI] teachers

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Sun Sep 24 21:52:39 UTC 2023


On Fri, Sep 22, 2023 at 1:44 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> Ergo... choose your wife with care! ;)
>

Good advice.


>
> > Then I don't think our positions are too far off. I don't ask for any
> belief
> > or acceptance of some idea as some final truth. Rather,
> > I see all ideas as having some probability/confidence we might ascribe
> to
> > them. And even in such cases when an idea happens to be
> > true we can never know it is true.
>
> Yes, it does seem like we're not that far apart. One difference is our
> subjective probabilities, and the other is the realism/anti-realism
> aspect, although, I don't have a fixed position and am somewhere between
> the two anti-realism positions. Probably an interesting topic for
> another thread to try and decide on a position there. =)
>

Isn't anti-realism a kind of idealism? And previously you seemed to have a
strong objection to idealism.



>
>
> > I think a nice way to think about theories (especially if one comes from
> a
> > computing background) is to think of them as functions.
> > A prediction then, is equivalent to evaluating a function for some
> situation
> > x: y = F(x).
> > Then "y", the output of the function, is what we might call that
> function's
> > "prediction".
> > The only thing we have assumed (or postulated) here is the validity of
> F()
> > for the situation x.
>
> Well, if we decouple it from the real world, and treat it as a function
> (pure mathematics) then yes, I think that's valid. If a part of the
> function is verification, then sometimes the function in this reality
> doesn't compute. Or do I misunderstand you?
>

I am not sure how to parse that exactly, but I will try to restate it in
another way.
We assume theories and their validity for certain domains.
A theory is a mathematical abstraction, not unlike a particular function in
mathematics.
We test theories by using them to make predictions (but plugging an input
'x' into the function, and seeing it's output 'y', which is what that
theory says we should see), and then we make an observation of reality and
compare that observation O with the prediction y. If they disagree, either
there was some experimental error, or the theory is invalid. If they agree,
then the theory has passed a test, and we can increase our confidence in
the validity of the theory.

We can always compute the function for any given "x" value to get a
prediction. However, not all x values are practical or possible to test.
For instance, testing whether a 1-ton diamond falls with the same
acceleration predicted by the theory. Or testing whether antimatter falls.
It is too difficult/expensive to gather enough antimatter and contain it
reliably, to perform this "drop test." In other cases, the "y" is an
observation we are unable to make, so we cannot compare the prediction of a
theory to reality. For example, observing the insides of black holes (and
making it back out again to report what was seen), or observing the
electron go through the other slit (that the person in the other branch
would have seen).

Any theory you might imagine, even something universally accepted like "F =
ma" will have limitations on our ability to test (for example, testing this
theory for masses greater than the mass of the observable universe is
impossible in principle), and it remains uncertain whether this function
has any validity for negative <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_mass>
or imaginary masses <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tachyonic_field>.

So this is why I don't find it especially troubling when a theory has
portions of its domain or range that are unverifiable. As long as there are
portions of its range that do intersect with observable reality, then we
can establish some confidence in the validity of the theory (even though
there may always remain an infinite number of untested or untestable
predictions of that theory).


>
> > Consider the plight of a brilliant fish scientist confined to a small
> pond.
> > This fish scientist observes rocks fall, and bubbles
> > rise, he also makes precise measurements of the surface of the water on
> the
> > pond and finds it to be curved ever so slightly, as if it
> > is a partial surface of a sphere. The brilliant fish scientist then
> develops
> > a theory of gravity, based on the idea that everything
> > is pulled towards some unseen center. The fish scientist drops two rocks
> on
> > opposite sides of the pond, and finds their paths are not
> > completely parallel, a further confirmation of this theory that
> everything is
> > pulled towards a center. Furthermore, the difference in
> > angle aligns with the curvature of the pond's surface, adding further
> > credence to his theory (the direction rocks fall is always 90
> > degrees from the angle of the pond's surface at the point the rock is
> dropped
> > from).
> > The brilliant fish scientist then makes a bold prediction: he infers
> that
> > reality must be much larger than the small pond he is
> > confined to: the curvature of the pond's surface suggests he lives on a
> > sphere with a diameter of 40,000 kilometers. The fellow fish,
> > however, think he is a bit silly for making such a prediction. Though
> the
> > fellow fish accept his theory of gravity and the
> > measurements of the pond surface's curvature, they think it is
> unwarranted to
> > discuss anything that neither he nor they could ever
> > confirm. The fish scientist argues, if his theory is true, it explains
> > everything: why rocks dropped from different points don't fall
> > in a parallel direction, why the pond's surface is not completely flat,
> but
> > curved, and why rocks fall and bubbles rise. Yes, it
> > implies the existence of things we can't directly see, but such unseen
> things
> > are necessary for his theory to work at all (things
> > would fall over, or collapse inward, if there wasn't already something
> > underneath us and to the side of us).
> >
> > I think this is where we are. Our best theories necessarily include
> things
> > beyond our capacity to see, because they are so powerful.
> > Note that general relativity makes an analogous prediction regarding the
> > curvature of space itself. We have used satellites to
> > measure the curvature of space, and found its curvature to be less than
> 0.4%.
> > This implies (assuming general relativity) that space
> > must go on at least 250X further than what we can see in every
> direction. So
> > that the volume of the space we can see is no more than
> > 1 / 250^3 (or  1/17,576,000th) of what is out there. What do you say
> about
> > the reality of all this other space? It is implied by our
> > theory (and by our measurement of the curvature of space). But we will
> never
> > be able to travel out beyond our present confines to see
> > this other space. It is over the cosmological horizon. We are, like
> those
> > fish, trapped in our own local backwater. Even if a fish
> > jumps out of the pond to try to see a little further, it still can't see
> > beyond the horizon.
>
> I do agree, with the difference that the prediction is about our
> space, which we theoretically could explore, as physical beings moving
> through space. So my probability of belief does assign some value to it
> and that value is higher than for predictions generating ideas outside
> of our universe.
>

But those places beyond the horizon *are outside* our universe, because
space is expanding faster than light, these places will forever be causally
disconnected and isolated from our local observable universe. We can never
affect them, nor they ever affect us. They are causally empty/impotent
predictions of relativity.


>
>
> >
> > Can a true agnostic (who neither accepts or rejects any theory) even do
> > physics? If you give a theory-agnostic physicist a physics
> > problem to solve, how does he or she decide which theory to use to make
> a
> > prediction? If the  theory-agnostic physicist chooses a
> > particular theory to use to make a prediction, is that not a form of
> > acceptance of the theory? It seems to me the true agnostic must
> > refuse to take any action or make any prediction.
>
> I think that depends on what the agnostic believes the theory to be. If
> it is a tool with the purpose of making predictions and navigating our
> world, the agnostic can freely use any tools, since the tool is not the
> world itself. It's just a thought construct that takes input and
> generates output.


But what motivates the agnostic to believe a theory will work, unless that
theory describes something that is real?


> If that output can be verfied, it is elevated to
> something close to knowledge and stops being belief. Those theories do
> yield extrapolations when they are interpreted in certain ways, that go
> beyond our world, and the true agnostic ignores those extrapolations. HE
> might engage in them in order to try and prove them, but if they are per
> definition outside our world, I do not think he would waste his time and
> let nobler creatures fight those battles.
>
> What is interesting though is the decision to ignore the "extra" for the
> time being, or assign it some probability. But then the question is, if
> it is meaningful to play with probabilities when it comes to things
> outside our world or if that only risks trapping you in the theory.
>

I don't see any risk of becoming trapped in a theory. A theory we can
accept as a tentative description of reality (which may be true or false).
We can ask what a theory (which may be widely regarded as true) says about
a larger reality (which we may or may not be in a position to see). At
least, I see no reason we should not be able to ask these things of
otherwise well-tested, well-accepted, well-confirmed, theories. General
Relativity fits this category, and I see no reason we can't ask this theory
what it says about the minimum size of the universe compared to our
observable part of the universe.


>
> "Sometimes it's hard to agnostic", to paraphrase a famous line from a
> country song. Hmm, or was it "Stay in your world"...? ;)
>

I can see that.


>
> >       or 4, letting the equations do the talking without
> >       human interpretations.
> >
> > I don't think that's realistic. You can confine yourself entirely to the
> > equations, but you still get numerical answers that tell you
> > reality is bigger than what we see.
> > For example regarding the mathematics of cosmic inflation. You could ask
> at
> > what time period t, does the math predict that inflation
> > stops?
> > The equations would provide you a strictly mathematical answer: never
> > You could also ask for a numerical prediction for the number of big
> bangs
> > that inflation will produce once inflation is initiated.
> > And again you get a numerical answer: infinite.
>
> Well, if it is not testable or verifiable, a restatement could be, if I
> input this value in this equation I get this answer. But yes, I think it
> is stretching it a bit. We are people and understand our world through
> our senses, thoughts and language, so doing all the science and expect
> us to not do anything with the result does seem a bit inhuman.
>
> > It's not that scientists woke up one day and wanted to find many
> universes,
> > it's that so many of our best theories directly imply
> > them, from a simple reading of the math. A simple reading of relativity
> (plus
> > a measurement of the curvature of space) implies space
> > is at least tens of millions of times greater than all of the trillions
> upon
> > trillions of cubic light years we can see. Our best
> > theory for explaining the big bang suggests the process that generated
> it
> > continues forever, perpetually causing new big bangs for
> > all time. The math of QM necessitates the introduction of parallel
> histories,
> > which interact with ours to cause interference effects
> > which we see in everyday experiments. These extra histories are there,
> in the
> > equations (you can't apply the equations without
> > including them).
>
> Well, I think we've been done this route before.
>
> >       I would like to draw a line between what, within
> >       a theory, we can test and prove/disprove, and beyond that line, we
> >       statements of the theory we cannot currently (or never) test or
> prove.
> > I
> >       think the tools and concepts on each side of this line, should be
> >       treated differently. I do not, however, think that we should stop
> >       theorizing. I think the utility of these extrapolations is in
> >       inspiration and motivation, that makes us push further. I agree
> that
> > too
> >       much or too strict agnosticism could lead to us stopping to expand
> the
> >       horizons. So I agree with some, but I would still like to uphold a
> >       difference of the content of theories between provable and
> >       extrapolation, but both have their value and their use.
> >
> > There are three categories of
> > predictions:
> https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Untitled-presentation-4.jpg
> > 1. Tested
> > 2. Testable but not yet tested
> > 3. Not testable
> > #1 of course deserves our greatest credence, but I see no reason to
> > distinguish credence between #2 and #3.
>
> I think 3 is definitely below 2, since it loses any grounding in the
> world, and is of no use.


I don't see utility as having any bearing on veracity.


> The trick is to distinguish between 2 and 3 and
> that is not always so clear, so that is why I am not prepared to dismiss
> any interpretation of QM. What sounds impossible today might be possible
> tomorrow, however, interpretations that end up as 3 will always be less
> credible to me than 2.
>

The reason I see them as equally credible, is that their acceptance comes
down entirely to one's confidence in the truth of the theory itself.


>
> By putting too much emphasis on 3 on the other hand, can distract us and
> make us waste our time from other work which clearly falls into 1 and 2.
> But, that assumes we can make that judgment.
>
> > Perhaps https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lojban ?
>
> Ahh.. the language of spock? ;) .u'u (repentance) somehow I can see the
> logicin that!
>
>
>
> > I think there are so many different subfields and specialties that
> everything
> > is quite fragmented and compartmentalized, such that
> > even if one did discover a great unifying theory today, there's a good
> chance
> > it would be completely glossed over because no one else
> > has the right combination of specialties to understand it, assuming that
> they
> > even heard about it and read it. Consider that there
> > are over 10,000 scientific publications every day. How many can any
> person
> > read in a day?
>
> Sigh, how sad that would be. The truth having existed for decades or
> centuries, and no one having the knowledge to understand it.
>

Yes..


>
> >
> >
> >       > No one knew why nature is quantum mechanical. It appeared one of
> the
> > most profound mysteries, it tormented many of the
> >       founders of
> >       > the theory. Wheeler spent his whole life trying in vain to
> understand
> > why it was this way.
> >
> >       That's one guy who didn't give up due to lack of understanding. A
> whole
> >       life!!
> >
> > Yes, he continued working well into his 80s. There's a great book which
> > covers much of Wheeler's life, called Trespassing on
> > Einstein's Lawn.
> >
> > "Behind it all is surely an idea so simple, so beautiful, so compelling,
> that
> > when—in a decade, a century, or a millennium—we grasp
> > it, we will all say to each other, how could it have been otherwise? How
> > could we have been so stupid for so long?"
> > -- John Archibald Wheeler in “How Come the Quantum?” (1986)
>
> Wouldn't surprise me at all!
>

I think this is in fact the case. Elementary arithmetic can serve as a
fundamental physical theory of everything:
https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Conclusions


>
> >
> > "I have never been able to let go of questions like: How come existence?
> How
> > come the quantum?"
> > -- John Archibald Wheeler in “Geons, Black Holes, and Quantum Foam”
> (1998)
> >
> > Note Wheeler was 87 in 1998.
> >
> >
> >       > And only very recently have a few researchers offered a
> plausible
> > answer. The one thing their explanations share in
> >       common is they
> >       > are ultimate ensemble-type theories (an infinite comprehensive
> > reality where all possibilities exist). As it turns out,
> >       if you start
> >       > with such an assumption, then you can answer why the universe is
> > quantum mechanical.
> >
> >       But it is just an assumption?
> >
> > All theories are assumed.
>
> Very much true. But it is important not to lose sight of that fact I
> think.
>

I agree.


>
> >
> >       And can the assumption ever be proven?
> >
> > Theories are never proven, at best they persist in states of being "not
> yet
> > refuted". But our confidence in theories increases as
> > they survive more and more tests which have the capacity to refute them.
>
> And that could be another mega-thread about truth. Don't you think? =)
>

On "truth"? Perhaps. There would need to be some difference in opinion
though, otherwise there wouldn't be much fuel for conversation.


>
> > Such theories touch on things outside our reality, but they also touch
> on
> > things inside our reality. For instance, they make
> > predictions about things we can observe and test (e.g. predictions about
> the
> > nature of reality or properties of physical laws). It is
> > for this reason that they are falsifiable (there are tests they can
> undergo
> > which have the capacity to refute them), and having
> > passed such tests, we can have a non-zero confidence in them.
>
> Possibly, but definitely not the same level of confidence as what can be
> proven. See above about the agnostics dilemma.
>

I agree, the #1 (tested predictions) will always have a higher confidence
than #2 (untested) or #3 (untestable) predictions.
A collection of #1 tested predictions bolsters a theory, and our confidence
in a theory is what provides any ground for belief in #2 or #3.


>
> > Empirical evidence concerns what is observable. I would agree, that if
> for
> > example, there was a theory that made no observable
> > predictions whatsoever, it would not be a scientific theory and would
> not be
> > worthy of our time to discuss. But this is not the case
> > concerning any of these theories (QM, GR, Inflation, etc.) They all make
> > predictions we can, and have, tested empirically.
>
> Yes, but as you say, the empirical is a non-problem. When
> interpretations try and "cross over", that's when the fun starts.
>


I think we need an agreed upon definition for "interpretation".


>
> > Can you explain this part more fully, I don't understand. In both cases,
> we
> > exist in a time when it hasn't yet been tested. What then
> > makes us more confident in the prediction? I don't see why the fact that
> we
> > could test it is of any relevance in the time before we
> > test it.
>
> The difference is (and I think something got lost in the text, but I'm
> not sure) that if theories make predictions about our world, they belong
> to 1 and 2 above, and if they make predictions in category nr 3, they
> are just idle speculation. Therefore confidence in theories that help us
> navigate this world


I think there is some confusion here.

All theories concern and make predictions that can be tested, otherwise
they wouldn't be scientific theories in the first place.
But all (or almost all) theories, also make predictions about things that
cannot be tested (for reasons of practicality or principle).

I still see no reason one should have to hold a #2 prediction to be more
likely to be true then a #3 prediction, when it's the same theory that
predicts both.


> can be higher than extrapolations and
> interpretations about possible worlds we can never reach.
>
>
> >       I've heard arguments that MW doesn't add anything to the QM
> equations,
> >       and thus is an interpretation and not a new theory.
> >
> > In that sense it could be called an interpretation (as it adds nothing
> new to
> > the theory that isn't already there).
>
> Maybe this is an additional point of confusion and difference? The
> status of theory vs interpretation?
>

Let me make an attempt at definitions:

1. *Theory*: A framework (usually mathematical) for making predictions
concerning future observations, given an initial starting state or
configuration.

2. *Interpretation*: A particular way of understanding, explaining, or
conceptualizing the underlying pure mathematics of a theory.


Do these seem good to you? Do you have any suggested changes or
improvements?


>
> > In the sense that I say it is not an interpretation, I do so in a
> different
> > sense, because it is just an acceptance that the
> > underlying equations are true. To me, calling it an interpretation is
> then a
> > bit misleading, as we wouldn't call belief that "F = ma"
> > an interpretation of momentum.
>
> To give you another example "In fact, the only claim made by this
> interpretation is that there is no collapse of the wavefunction. There
> is just a universal wavefunction that evolves unitarily. The rest is for
> future physicists and philosophers to try to understand".
>
> (
> https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/653331/how-real-are-the-worlds-of-the-many-worlds-interpretation
> )
>
> I tried to find the text where the author did not like the fact that it
> is interpretation and not theory but couldn't find it. The quote above
> kind of touches on the spirit of that text at least.
>

Yes, I think in that sense, neither CI, nor MWI are interpretations. They
are, properly speaking, different theories. Where MW is the conventionally
accepted math of existing QM, and Copenhagen is some other (not yet
defined) mathematics that describes when/how the Shrodinger equation stops
being followed.

Then, the things that you might call "interpretations" would relate to
things like "Is the wave function physically real or just some non-real
mathematical abstraction". They are two different ways of interpreting the
same equation, which have no mathematical difference, and are only
different on account of the different language and words we surround those
mathematical entities with.


>
> >       It is also listed
> >       under interpretations, and to me, it seems like an interpretation
> among
> >       many that theorize and try to explain how the qm equations work.
> >
> > The existence of many histories is predicted by the equations (it's not
> the
> > starting assumption). The parallel histories exist all
> > the same in CI. CI just adds the assumption that all but one suddenly
> > disappear when an observer looks at the system. Of course, this
> > means that before any observers were born in this universe, both CI and
> MW
> > agree on the existence of many parallel histories.
> >
> >
>
>


> >
> >       Well, here I agree based on how I understand CI vs MWI. If I
> understand
> >       you correctly CI needs some adjustment of the equation right,
> which MWI
> >       does not need? Please correct me here. So CI according to what I
> said
> >       (or read) above, would perhaps move closer to becoming an
> additional
> >       theory since it modifies or adjusts the equation? I'm on deep water
> >       here, so take it with a grain of salt.
> >
> >
> > You're correct. CI needs to describe measurement. That is, what
> qualifies as
> > a measurement, and why does it lead to a deviation from
> > Schrodinger's equation (as happens under it's hypothesized "collapse of
> the
> > wave function").  If fleshed out, this would be a
> > different theory from QM without collapse. But as it is, even proponents
> of
> > CI disagree about when collapse happens. It used to be
> > thought any measurement would do it, but the  the quantum eraser
> experiment
> > shows can't be our measurement that does it, so perhaps
> > our knowledge (or our consciousness) of the result triggers it. In
> saying our
> > consciousness causes collapse, it has tied our progress
> > in the measurement problem to the question of what consciousness is. And
> this
> > is why the only known experimental test to disprove
> > collapse as objectively real requires a conscious observer whom we are
> able
> > to quantum erase their memory.
> >
> >
> >
> >       > measurement which would say when the universe stops obeying QM
> during
> > wave function collapse. But no advocate of CI,
> >       other than
> >       > perhaps Roger Penrose, has suggested what this alternate math
> would
> > be. If advocates of CI did propose alternate
> >       mathematical
> >
> >       Give them time! ;)
> >
> > They've had 100 years. ��
>
> Come on, what about 100 more? ;)
>
> >
> >
> >       > descriptions for their theory, it would be clear that MW and
> > Copenhagen are different theories. CI refuses to make such
> >       > specifications which keeps the waters muddied, and maintains the
> > illusion that no possible test can be done to
> >       distinguish between
> >       > them.
> >
> >       Refuses to make such specifications... yet. ;) Another
> justification
> > for
> >       my agnosticism is that we've not reached the finish line and many
> > things
> >       and geniuses could come and go. Sadly, as you said in the example
> of
> >       heliocentrism, it can take 100s of years. =(
> >
> > But the thing is, ever since Everett we have had a solution to the
> > measurement problem. He showed why we would have the appearance of
> > wave function collapse even if the wave function never collapsed. Ever
> since
> > they time, I think it's become a mind of fools errand to
> > try to explain it as a real phenomenon (when we can show how without
> assuming
> > it, we can explain it's appearance).
> > The situation is a bit like trying to find some new unseen force that
> kept
> > the moon in the sky, well after Newton's theory of gravity
> > and inertia provided us a perfect explanation for what keeps it there.
> >
> >
> >
> >
>




> >       Since we live "in time" I find that proposition easier to swallow,
> than
> >       universes completely beyond this one. So my degree of belief is
> higher
> >       in points in time, partly supported by my human experience.
> >
> > I think there the right framing, in terms of different degrees of
> confidence.
> >
> > For instance, I might be 99% confident in the existence of past and
> future
> > points in time, but 95% confident in the many histories of
> > QM.
>
> Makes sense. And in my case, since I like to stick to the pragmatically
> material, at the moment my confidence in MWI and other similar
> interpretations is very low, just as it is when it comes to the bearded
> man in the sky.
>
> Do I say 0%? Probably not, but how close to 0 is 0? ;) But at the same
> time I am reluctant to add probabilities to states and things out of
> this world, and I feel much better saying we don't know.
>

To me, we have two theories:
One can explain quantum computers, the other cannot.
And we now have quantum computers.


>
>
> > You only get the handwaving "we don't know" from the interpretations
> that
> > deny the reality of these parallel states. But in denying
> > the reality of the intermediate parallel states it becomes impossible to
> > explain the correct answer existing in final state.
> >
> > To seal the deal, ask what happens when we run a brain simulation on a
> > quantum computer, initialized so it perceives many different
> > inputs. Does this not realize many parallel conscious states?
>
> We don't know. Let's run a brain simulation and see how it goes.


We know what the equations of QM say, and all interpretations say the same
thing:
We get a massive superposition of, let's say, billions of simultaneous
simulations of the brain, each experiencing a different input.

   - CI says: while all these billions of brain simulations exist and were
   simulated, once we interact with the quantum computer all but 1 disappears.
   (but it does not deny that they billions of separate brain computations
   *did* exist)
   - MW says: while all these billions of brain simulations exist and were
   simulated, once we interact with the quantum computer, we entangle our
   state with the superposition and become superposed ourself, such that we
   get a corresponding copy of ourself corresponding to each of the billions
   of individual simulated brain states.

There is no mystery, question, or disagreement between MW and CI until such
time that we measure/interact with the quantum computer, because before
such time, there is no wave function collapse.



> What
> you say is hand waving, I interpret as many view points, the agnostic
> one being one of them like the quote above.
>

If you think any part of what I said is hand waving, simply ask for
clarification on any point and I would be happy to delve deeper.


>
> >       Among the many ways it
> >       could be explained, MWI is one theoretical interpretation of how it
> >       could work.
> >
> > Look at the explanations the AI gave under different assumed
> interpretations.
> > Did you find the explanation assuming CI satisfactory?
>
> Due to my lack of the underlying equations, I would not trust myself to
> judge, except for the fact, that I do feel more inclinved to believe
> theories which do not postulate multiple worlds.
>

The theory does not postulate multiple worlds.

We postulate the theory itself, which in this case is QM.

The multiple worlds are predictions of this theory. This is true both in CI
and MW.

The only difference between CI and MW concerns what happens to these worlds
when a measurement is made. CI says all but one disappear, MW says they
continue to exist.

The quantum computer is particularly useful to highlight this difference,
because quantum computers permit us to delay the measurement/collapse for
arbitrarily long times, and to perform arbitrarily complex
computations/operations, completely free of measurement/collapse.


>
>
> >
> >       Here is one example:
> >
> >
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Broglie%E2%80%93Bohm_theory#Experiments
> >
> > I don't think anything there is specific to Bohm's interpretation. I see
> > Bohm's interpretation as entirely philosophical. It admits
> > the existence of all the parallel histories, it just says that only one
> of
> > them is "really real" and that the unfortunate souls in
> > the branches that aren't really real are not really conscious.
>
> Well, that's one example that shows that the various interpretations
> have their own ways of believing they can prove one or the other.
> Correctly or incorrectly, they do exist.
>

Hmm. I am not sure how to resolve this. It seems incompatible with what is
said here (which was my understanding), that BM gives identical predictions
to QM:

   -
   https://www.reddit.com/r/AskPhysics/comments/78x6e0/ive_heard_that_bohmian_mechanics_aka_pilot_wave/

I do not understand the intricacies of BM well enough to say whether or not
that is true, but perhaps you can find some BM expert who claims the theory
does make different predictions, in which case it would not be an
interpretation, but its own theory.


>
> >       "An experiment was conducted in 2016 which demonstrated the
> potential
> >       validity of the de-Broglie-Bohm theory via use of silicone oil
> > droplets.
> >       In this experiment a drop of silicone oil is placed into a
> vibrating
> >       fluid bath, it then bounces across the bath propelled by waves
> produced
> >       by its own collisions, mimicking an electron's statistical
> behavior
> > with
> >       remarkable accuracy".
> >
> > The question to ask is whether Bohm's theory predicts anything different
> we
> > could observe about the electron compared to conventional
> > QM. I would be greatly surprised to learn that it does.
> >
> >
> >       > Deutsch writes to a popular audience in his "Fabric of Reality"
> book.
> > I might recommend that if you want to see his
> >       best attempt at
> >       > explaining it.
> >
> >       Thank you Jason, I've added it to my book list.
> >
>



> >       No, I think it was the theology that triggered me here, since I
> don't
> >       play that game according to the rules of theologists, which makes
> those
> >       discussions fairly meaningless to me, unless we beforehand go
> through
> >       "the rules".
> >
> > A rational theologian, could use logic and reason in their analysis
> though,
> > could they not?
>
> Well, logic only shows us the relationship between terms, so it would be
> very convincing. It would be a game where terms, he defines at will,
> conforms to them.
>

Like mathematics, philosophy, logic, etc. :-)


>
>
> >
> >       Yes, of course. If we start to hack away at god and modify the
> concept,
> >       I am certain you can make me a believer depending on the
> definition. =)
> >
> > Then we are doing theology, hopefully not the kind that scares you. ��
>
> Well, not what I would call theology. But again, we can play by your
> definition of theology, and yes, we're doing theology. I think you
> should come up with a new term. I think keeping "theology" will close a
> lot of minds to what you have to say.
>

Hmm I never considered that.


>
>
> >       Well, here I am not in agreement with you. I did read your blog
> entry
> > on
> >       the meaning of life for instance, and I do like the way you
> structured
> >       it, but I do not buy your conclusion. But that might perhaps be
> another
> >       mega-thread? =)
> >
> > I would like that very much. I am interested to discuss the point(s) of
> > departure between our views with regards to this subject.
>
> I don't know if we should start that one now, or let this one run its
> course first?
>


Let's start it. I am not sure how much longer this one can continue. We
already seem to be recovering the same ground.



>
> >
> >       Again, I think here I do not agree. Science can of course
> investigate
> >       the phenomenon of religion from a social and psychological point of
> >       view, but it can never explain it.
> >
> > What makes you so certain?
>
> Because it is by its nature a subjective and deeply personal experience.

You run into the qualia problem of redness. You can describe of course,
> how it affects someones life, they can verbally or visually tell you
> about it, but you can never yourself know the meaning of it for the
> other person. So the external, objective side, science can deal with
> perfectly well, but the subjective, meaningful side, science cannot deal
> with.
>

We know (loosely) what physical conditions create a living, conscious,
human being.

If we can find evidence that those conditions can recur (scientifically,
using objective empirical evidence), then we are using science to
investigate/find evidence for a life after this one (an after life).

We need not introduce the incommunicability of private subjective
experience to find such evidence.


This evidence already exists, in the context of eternal inflation. It
implies you will be born infinite number of times in future universes
formed by future big bangs.


>
> >       Traditional religion as exprienced
> >       phenomenon, for me, lies outside the scope of science.
> >
> > Religion rooted in personal experience is often distinguished with the
> term
> > "mysticism." Science, concerned with the objective then,
> > would have great difficulty handling mysticism, which is based on
> subjective
> > experience.
>
> Yes, exactly my point. I think here, as with god and theology, we were
> just not careful about definitions, so I think we're very close in our
> opinions here. But let's see.
>
> >
> > This is one of the main difficulties science has with studying
> consciousness
> > (which is entirely subjective). But I feel you would not
> > say that consciousness is entirely outside the scope of science, on
> account
> > of consciousness being a subjective phenomenon.
>
> No, consciousness objectified, yes. Subjectified no.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >       >       > For example, see these sections from my articles:
> >       >       >  *
> > https://alwaysasking.com/is-the-universe-fine-tuned/#Final_Thoughts
> >       >       >  *
> >
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#8_The_Technological_Singularity_and_the_Afterlife
> >       >       >  *
> > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Room_for_God
> >       >
> >       >       I think there is no rational evidence of god.
> >       >
> >       > You think that there isn't any, or are you simply not aware of
> any?
> > The two are very different statements.
> >
> >       Depends on your definition of god. So let's start with the easy
> option
> >       and say that I believe there is not, and can not be, any rational
> >       evidence of the bearded man in the sky.
> >
> >       But I skipped ahead, and let's play with the definitions, and then
> of
> >       course, when we move away from the classical one, it gets more
> >       interesting.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >       But here already I'm a believer! My computer and current AI:s have
> >       vastly greater capacity than me in some domains, so according to
> that
> >       defintion, sir, yes sir!
> >
> >       > - Spatially infinite universes
> >       > - Mathematical Platonism
> >       > - Quantum Multiverse theories
> >       > - String theory landscapes
> >       > - Simulation Hypothesis
> >
> >       Not a fan of the above.
> >
> >       > - Technological Singularity
> >
> >       Here there is much common ground and basis for discussion about
> >       definition of god.
> >
> >
> > "Evolution moves towards greater complexity, greater elegance, greater
> > knowledge, greater intelligence, greater beauty, greater
> > creativity, and greater levels of subtle attributes such as love. In
> every
> > monotheistic tradition God is likewise described as all of
> > these qualities, only without limitation: infinite knowledge, infinite
> > intelligence, infinite beauty, infinite creativity, infinite
> > love, and so on. Of course, even the accelerating growth of evolution
> never
> > achieves an infinite level, but as it explodes
> > exponentially it certainly moves rapidly in that direction. So evolution
> > moves inexorably towards this conception of God, although
> > never quite reaching this ideal."
> > -- Ray Kurzweil in “The Singularity is Near” (2005)
> >
> >       > You many not like that conclusion, but pick any theory and I can
> > explain how it leads to beings that are superior to
> >       ourselves, and
> >
> > I don't! Unlike many others, you were open to considering other
> definitions
> > and changing your beliefs according based on the
> > different definitions. The atheists on the other hand, tend to never
> accept
> > other definitions besides the one god they chose to not
> > believe in.
>
> I think that is due to fear of losing control and predictability of the
> world perhaps. And the other kind I've read about are people who were
> abused within the framework of a religion. But I digress.
>

Yes it does seem to have some psychological basis.



>
> > I am curious but also pressed for time, so I don't know when I would
> have
> > time to read them. I will take a look though.
>
> Will send you off list, and just put them on the virtual reading list.
> ;)
>

Thank you!


>
> >
> >
> >
> >       I guess some suspend their judgement awaiting further evidence,
> and I
> > am
> >       absolutely certain that there are many who are trying but we are
> not
> >       aware of them. Last night I heard of something called the
> zero-worlds
> >       theory! I have no idea if it makes sense, but it obviously was
> inspired
> >       by the MWI.
> >
> >
> > It is explained well in this talk:
> > https://youtu.be/dEaecUuEqfc?si=PFH_UFGrvKYGQnDk
> >
> > I am quite partial to the "zero universe interpretation", it highlights
> the
> > fact that what we call universes are emergent and not
> > quite real in the sense our intuition suggests. It is quite similar to
> the
> > "many-minds interpretation". All the these theories accept
> > a plethora of stuff, where they differ is in what they consider as the
> truly
> > fundamental unit of this reality. Many-worlds would say
> > it's the material, whereas zero universe/many-minds would say it's the
> > observer-state (i.e. consciousness).
> >
> > I think this view, that consciousness is more fundamental is closer to
> the
> > truth. It is not that "worlds split" but rather that
> > "consciousness differentiates."
>
> I had a feeling you would enjoy it! =)
>
> >
> > One would think people get into physics to better understand reality,
> but
> > then, I don't know how to explain such a lack of curiosity.
>
> I asked about it, and the reason was too see the world. The fact that it
> ended up being physics was that it was just an easy subject for the
> person and led to easily achieving scholarships which led to being able
> to travel and to see the world.
>
>

Makes sense!


> >
>
> >       > Also I just found this, 25 minute mini-documentary which I
> hadn't
> > seen before, but I enjoyed it, it seems to have been
> >       made when he
> >       > was still writing Fabric of Reality:
> >       > https://youtu.be/SDZ454K_lBY?si=hpZkLsitA47U2PEd
> >
> >       Thank you very much! You do realize this will take time away from
> my
> >       current watching of Halo? And I do have to say I see similarities
> >       between Halo and The Expanse.
> >
> >
> > ��
> >
> > Is Halo airing again or is there just one season?
>
> No, just one season. Since I have never played the game I enjoy it. But
> I suspect hard core fans will most likely not enjoy it.
>

I liked it.


>
> > The first few seasons of The Expanse were quite great.
>
> Oh yes! I mentally stopped with the gate, and the rest I try to forget.
>
>
I think that was when they got a new team of writers.


>
> > Yes I think it is a guide, but it too can be overly relied upon, to our
> > detriment.
>
> Having read my fair share of philosophical debates, that has always been
> my intuition. I think it is a good tool, but also one tha can easily
> lead us astray and be misused.
>


True.


>
> >=
> > There is work to unify QM and gravity (quantum gravity theories), the
> most
> > prominent being string theory and loop quantum gravity.
> > However it should be stated that both of these are fundamentally quantum
> > theories. They don't escape any of the strangeness of QM,
> > rather they just offer a hope that we can understand both QM and GR as
> > elements of the same more-fundamental theory. My intuition is
> > that GR is more likely to be changed and modified than QM, given that in
> the
> > one resolved example where they gave different
> > predictions, (the black hole information paradox), QM won out and GR was
> > wrong.
>
> Strange! I haven't heard about string theory in a long while.
>


There hasn't been much progress. I think it has made two predictions so
far. The first is that there should be a force like gravity, and second,
that the mass of particles is something that when multiplied by zero, is
zero.


>
> >
> >
> >       Oh, that reminds me. That was one of the arguments in the realism
> vs
> >       anti-realism debate and whether the intangibles and unobservables
> have
> >       existence or not, that historically there were many unobservables
> that
> >       did exist, only to later be found to not exist. So having based
> >       decisions on unobservables historically, they would have been
> wrong.
> >       Well, just remembered, and we covered that to a certain extent
> above
> >       when I wrote about the value of theories.
> >
> >
> > Good point. We might also observe that 99.9% of scientific theories have
> been
> > proven wrong, so on this empirical basis then, we
> > should never have any high confidence in our theories. ��
>
> Aha... spoken like a true agnostic! Did I just convert you? ;)
>


Perhaps. But the other thing to note, is that when long-tested physical
theories are wrong, they're usually only "exceptionally wrong", but usually
still "approximately correct".
QM might not be the final answer, but I think much of its implications
would survive in any more-correct new theory.


>
>
> >
> > Yes it is always good to keep that in mind. As Linde reminds us:
> >
> > "We find that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most
> conveniently
> > formulated if we assume that there is some underlying
> > reality beyond our perceptions. This model of a material world obeying
> laws
> > of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our
> > starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions
> are
> > nothing but a useful tool for the description of matter.
> > This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our
> previous
> > assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the
> > description of matter. We are substituting reality of our feelings by
> the
> > successfully working theory of an independently existing
> > material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never
> think
> > about its possible limitations."
> > -- Andrei Linde in “Inflation, Quantum Cosmology, and the Anthropic
> > Principle” (2002)
>
> Good quote.
>

Thanks. It's good not to forget that subjectivity is the root of science.
Greats, like Planck, Shrodinger, Wigner, Wheeler, occasionally step in to
remind physicists of this and keep them humble.


>
> >
> > "The principal argument [against materialism] is that thought processes
> and
> > consciousness are the primary concepts, that our
> > knowledge of the external world is the content of our consciousness and
> that
> > the consciousness, therefore, cannot be denied. On the
> > contrary, logically, the external world could be denied–though it is not
> very
> > practical to do so."
> > — Eugene Wigner in “Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem” (1961)
> >
> > Great minds think alike. ��
>
> ;)
>
>
> > They do predict things about our physical universe though. The fact that
> > shadows are not perfectly crisp, but always blurry, is an
> > effect other parallel worlds have on our universe. We can see that
> shadows
> > are blurry. It may be less subtle than a punch in the
> > face, but it's there and we can see it with our own eyes.
>
> Well, if it is that simple, I am sure that the MWI will soon become
> dominant. But something tells me that the fact that shadows are blurry
> can probably be explainedin other ways, or perhaps, that we cannot
> exactly explain it yet. But, a good example nevertheless!
>


Thanks!


>
>
> >       > Do you think there is an answer?
> >       > For example would you say that exactly one of the following two
> > sentences is true:
> >       > A) the 10^1000th binary digit of Pi is 0
> >       > B) the 10^1000th binary digit of Pi is 1
> >       >
> >       > I would say yes, one of these two sentences must be true, even
> if we
> > can't know which one is true.
> >
> >       Yes, but this is not a state of the world or a scientific theory,
> so
> > I'd
> >       argue that this does not apply to our discussion of whether MWI
> can
> > ever
> >       be proven or not. Add to that, that we also don't know the answer,
> so
> > as
> >       far as we are concerned it is undefined.
> >
> >
> > Right it is not relevant to the question of MW. I asked for some
> > clarification regarding your philosophy of mathematics, which you
> > include more details on below.
>
> Sorry! Misunderstood.
>

No worries!


>
> >       > When would you say that 17 became prime?
> >       > A) it's always been prime
> >       > B) After the big bang
> >       > C) When 17-year cicadas evolved
> >       > D) When man invented numbers
> >       > E) When man first counted to 17
> >       > F) When humans defined prime numbers
> >       > G) When the first person proved 17 was prime
> >       > H) Only when a human is actively considering 17 as prime
> >       > I) Only when a human is actively thinking of the proof that 17
> is
> > prime
> >
> >       I'd say H and I. Remove all counsciousness and the concept no
> longer
> > has
> >       any existence.
> >
> >
> > The concept would not exist, but would it's truth exist?
>
> As long as there is a mind to evaluate the truth, yes. Without minds,
> just matter.
>

I think that is consistent.

I agree something has to be primitively real, but I am not as certain as
you that it must be matter. I think an even better case can be made for
math.

https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Math_Matter_Mind


>
>
> >
> > So when there is objective agreement between two subjects, why then do
> we
> > admit the chemical element as part of reality but not these
> > other objects which we can also objectively study?
>
> If you mean math, it is just have the properties of the physical world
> is thought about by the beings. Without the beings, that languages and
> its truth values, lose all meaning. Only matter is left.
>

Or maybe not even matter? ��


>
>
> >
> >       Math is a tool developed by humans, and in my opinion only has
> meaning
> >       when being interpreted by human consciousness.
> >
> > You could say the same thing about matter, could you not?
>
> Yes, if everything is doubted, of course. But as Wigner said, matter is
> the most practical way and assumption, that leads to massive benefits,
> so I don't see any reason why I should doubt matter.
>

I don't ask you to doubt matter. Only to question your belief that matter
is what is most fundamental (and not derivative of something more
primitive).


>
> >
> >
> >       Since math tries to
> >       describe aspects of nature in human form,
> >
> > Is it uniquely human, or could aliens discover the same mathematical
> truths
> > as we have discovered (despite them using different
> > notation)?
>
> Sorry my mistake. Consciousness. I am certain if we meet aliens, they
> will have math. And yes, since they are attempting to describe the same
> world of matter, their math will correspond with our math, unless they
> are better observers and develop the tool/language further.
>

��


> >
> >       it will follow that every time
> >       we use the tool, according to the internal rules of the tool,
> >
> >
> > But as Godel showed, there is no final (or finite) set of rules that
> accounts
> > for all mathematical truth. We must constantly strive
> > to develop ever more powerful theories of mathematical objects, just as
> > physicists must always strive to develop better more powerful
> > theories in physics. This again, suggests to me, that mathematical truth
> is
> > not a human invention but something infinite and beyond
> > ourselves. It is something we study, much like we study the physical
> world.
>
> Well, based on my opinions above, I do not share that point of view.


I'm not sure how is is something that can be the subject of opinion.
There's a mathematical proof (widely considered the greatest mathematical
discovery of past the century) that shows this opinion is no longer tenable.

I
> believe it is an invention only meaningful when interpreted by
> consciousness.
>

I am surprised then that you did not agree with my meaning of life article,
whose principle claim was that all meaning reduces to states of
consciousness.



> >
> >
> >       the
> >       constants will hold.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >       >       They only exist when we interpret
> >       >       them.
> >       >
> >       > This seems like idealism, only applied to  mathematical objects.
> If
> > all the mathematicians go to sleep at the same
> >       time, does the
> >       > ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter stop being
> > 3.14259... ?
> >
> >       In terms of human language and meaning yes. Those are only ideas
> in the
> >       mind. Of course you can write down the ideas and how to use the
> >       language. But the concepts are only meaningful to you, when thought
> >       about.
> >
> >       In terms of aspects in the world, that math tries to describe, no,
> > those
> >       aspects still hold, assuming an external world of some kind.
> >
> > Would you say, similarly, that this universe did not exist before there
> were
> > any conscious observers within it?
>
> I would say that it did not meaningfully exist.
>

No disagreement here.


> >
> >
> >
> >       >       This was one long email. I can tell you, this would not
> have
> > happened
> >       >       unless it was friday night, and my wife asleep! ;)
> >       >
> >       > I feel we are writing a book together. ��
> >
> >       Oh yes! What should we call it? ;) Maybe it's time to sit down
> together
> >       for a month or two and harvest the thread into a book? ;)
> >
> >
> > We've covered so much it is hard to say what the topic would be.  ☺️
> > If there is any overriding theme, it is the tension between scientific
> > realism and "empirical confirmationism" if that phrase makes
> > sense.
>
> Yes, I agree. I think that is one fundamental tension. Also we touched
> on identity and idealism vs materialism. Maybe a good title would be
> "How not to do philosophy"? ;)
>
> Best regards, Daniel


Best,

Jason
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