[ExI] teachers

[efc at swisscows.email]

Hello Jason,

I think slowly we've reached the point where the energy of this thread has 
exhausted itself. It has been very valuable and I thank you for all the 
examples and things you taught me! =)

I'll make a few concluding remarks below, and then I think we'll get 
started on solving the problem of "The Meaning of Life (C)" once and for 
all! ;)

On Sun, 24 Sep 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

>       > Then I don't think our positions are too far off. I don't ask for any belief
>       > or acceptance of some idea as some final truth. Rather,
>       > I see all ideas as having some probability/confidence we might ascribe to
>       > them. And even in such cases when an idea happens to be
>       > true we can never know it is true.
>
>       Yes, it does seem like we're not that far apart. One difference is our
>       subjective probabilities, and the other is the realism/anti-realism
>       aspect, although, I don't have a fixed position and am somewhere between
>       the two anti-realism positions. Probably an interesting topic for
>       another thread to try and decide on a position there. =)
> 
> Isn't anti-realism a kind of idealism? And previously you seemed to have a strong objection to idealism.

Sorry, what I mean to say was instrumentalism or constructive
empiricism, I was thinking "not realism" as in scientific realism, sorry
for the confusion.

>       > I think a nice way to think about theories (especially if one comes from a
>       > computing background) is to think of them as functions.
>       > A prediction then, is equivalent to evaluating a function for some situation
>       > x: y = F(x).
>       > Then "y", the output of the function, is what we might call that function's
>       > "prediction".
>       > The only thing we have assumed (or postulated) here is the validity of F()
>       > for the situation x.
>
>       Well, if we decouple it from the real world, and treat it as a function
>       (pure mathematics) then yes, I think that's valid. If a part of the
>       function is verification, then sometimes the function in this reality
>       doesn't compute. Or do I misunderstand you?
> 
> I am not sure how to parse that exactly, but I will try to restate it in another way.
> We assume theories and their validity for certain domains.
> A theory is a mathematical abstraction, not unlike a particular function in mathematics.
> We test theories by using them to make predictions (but plugging an input 'x' into the function, and seeing it's output 'y', which is
> what that theory says we should see), and then we make an observation of reality and compare that observation O with the prediction
> y. If they disagree, either there was some experimental error, or the theory is invalid. If they agree, then the theory has passed a
> test, and we can increase our confidence in the validity of the theory.
> 
> We can always compute the function for any given "x" value to get a prediction. However, not all x values are practical or possible
> to test. For instance, testing whether a 1-ton diamond falls with the same acceleration predicted by the theory. Or testing whether
> antimatter falls. It is too difficult/expensive to gather enough antimatter and contain it reliably, to perform this "drop test." In
> other cases, the "y" is an observation we are unable to make, so we cannot compare the prediction of a theory to reality. For
> example, observing the insides of black holes (and making it back out again to report what was seen), or observing the electron go
> through the other slit (that the person in the other branch would have seen).
> 
> Any theory you might imagine, even something universally accepted like "F = ma" will have limitations on our ability to test (for
> example, testing this theory for masses greater than the mass of the observable universe is impossible in principle), and it remains
> uncertain whether this function has any validity for negative or imaginary masses.
> 
> So this is why I don't find it especially troubling when a theory has portions of its domain or range that are unverifiable. As long
> as there are portions of its range that do intersect with observable reality, then we can establish some confidence in the validity
> of the theory (even though there may always remain an infinite number of untested or untestable predictions of that theory).

Ah, got it. Yes, that makes sense.

>       I do agree, with the difference that the prediction is about our
>       space, which we theoretically could explore, as physical beings moving
>       through space. So my probability of belief does assign some value to it
>       and that value is higher than for predictions generating ideas outside
>       of our universe.
> 
> But those places beyond the horizon *are outside* our universe, because space is expanding faster than light, these places will
> forever be causally disconnected and isolated from our local observable universe. We can never affect them, nor they ever affect us.
> They are causally empty/impotent predictions of relativity.

Agreed. Without putting nr on it, I wonder if it makes sense to rank
"beyond the observable horizon of this universe" ahead in the confidence
league, of MWI? Both are definitely at the fringes, but ahead of our
observable horizons, is still part of this universe at least, but yes,
low scores non the less.

>  
> 
>
>       >
>       > Can a true agnostic (who neither accepts or rejects any theory) even do
>       > physics? If you give a theory-agnostic physicist a physics
>       > problem to solve, how does he or she decide which theory to use to make a
>       > prediction? If the  theory-agnostic physicist chooses a
>       > particular theory to use to make a prediction, is that not a form of
>       > acceptance of the theory? It seems to me the true agnostic must
>       > refuse to take any action or make any prediction.
>
>       I think that depends on what the agnostic believes the theory to be. If
>       it is a tool with the purpose of making predictions and navigating our
>       world, the agnostic can freely use any tools, since the tool is not the
>       world itself. It's just a thought construct that takes input and
>       generates output.
> 
> But what motivates the agnostic to believe a theory will work, unless that theory describes something that is real?

If the theory doesn't describe anything real, a true agnostic I guess
could only be motivated by the simple pleasure and intellectual
challenge of playing around with the theory. It couldbe aesthetical
reasons, or pure income related reasons for doing it.

>       If that output can be verfied, it is elevated to
>       something close to knowledge and stops being belief. Those theories do
>       yield extrapolations when they are interpreted in certain ways, that go
>       beyond our world, and the true agnostic ignores those extrapolations. HE
>       might engage in them in order to try and prove them, but if they are per
>       definition outside our world, I do not think he would waste his time and
>       let nobler creatures fight those battles.
>
>       What is interesting though is the decision to ignore the "extra" for the
>       time being, or assign it some probability. But then the question is, if
>       it is meaningful to play with probabilities when it comes to things
>       outside our world or if that only risks trapping you in the theory.
> 
> I don't see any risk of becoming trapped in a theory. A theory we can accept as a tentative description of reality (which may be true
> or false).
> We can ask what a theory (which may be widely regarded as true) says about a larger reality (which we may or may not be in a position
> to see). At least, I see no reason we should not be able to ask these things of otherwise well-tested, well-accepted, well-confirmed,
> theories. General Relativity fits this category, and I see no reason we can't ask this theory what it says about the minimum size of
> the universe compared to our observable part of the universe.

I think your key word here is "tentative". I was thinking about more
dogmatic people who mistake the theory for the real thing and thus get
trapped. As long as it is tentative, and ones mind is open, I agree that
any questions may be asked. Then I guess it comes down to ones
individual beliefs about our world and what knowledge we can (or cannot)
possess about it, that determine if one chooses to ask those questions
or not.

My feeling is after reading more skeptical threads about MWI and
interpretations in general, that there exists a set of physicists who do
not like or enjoy to engage in what they think is "idle speculation".

But I think, like we discussed earlier, that what is impossible today,
might be possible tomorrow, so to dogmatically just refuse might risk us
not stumbling upon something which will unlock new secrets of nature.

>       > There are three categories of
>       > predictions: https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Untitled-presentation-4.jpg
>       > 1. Tested
>       > 2. Testable but not yet tested
>       > 3. Not testable
>       > #1 of course deserves our greatest credence, but I see no reason to
>       > distinguish credence between #2 and #3.
>
>       I think 3 is definitely below 2, since it loses any grounding in the
>       world, and is of no use.
> 
> I don't see utility as having any bearing on veracity.

Well, that's a philosophical question and position. I'd say that the
pragmatists out there very much embrace the notion that utility and
veracity are related.

>       > Empirical evidence concerns what is observable. I would agree, that if for
>       > example, there was a theory that made no observable
>       > predictions whatsoever, it would not be a scientific theory and would not be
>       > worthy of our time to discuss. But this is not the case
>       > concerning any of these theories (QM, GR, Inflation, etc.) They all make
>       > predictions we can, and have, tested empirically.
>
>       Yes, but as you say, the empirical is a non-problem. When
>       interpretations try and "cross over", that's when the fun starts.
> 
> I think we need an agreed upon definition for "interpretation".

I think one definition I saw in a thread is that an interpretation is an
attempt to explain the theory in terms of human language, in a way that
does not add anything to the underlying theory. That person argued that
MWI does not add anything to QM, so thus is an interpretation of the QM
theory (the pure math). That was his definition among many.

>       Maybe this is an additional point of confusion and difference? The
>       status of theory vs interpretation?
> 
> Let me make an attempt at definitions:
> 
> 1. Theory: A framework (usually mathematical) for making predictions concerning future observations, given an initial starting state
> or configuration.
> 
> 2. Interpretation: A particular way of understanding, explaining, or conceptualizing the underlying pure mathematics of a theory.
> 
> 
> Do these seem good to you? Do you have any suggested changes or improvements?

No, I think that's a good starting point.

>       To give you another example "In fact, the only claim made by this
>       interpretation is that there is no collapse of the wavefunction. There
>       is just a universal wavefunction that evolves unitarily. The rest is for
>       future physicists and philosophers to try to understand".
>
>       (https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/653331/how-real-are-the-worlds-of-the-many-worlds-interpretation)
>
>       I tried to find the text where the author did not like the fact that it
>       is interpretation and not theory but couldn't find it. The quote above
>       kind of touches on the spirit of that text at least.
> 
> Yes, I think in that sense, neither CI, nor MWI are interpretations. They are, properly speaking, different theories. Where MW is the
> conventionally accepted math of existing QM, and Copenhagen is some other (not yet defined) mathematics that describes when/how the
> Shrodinger equation stops being followed.

Wouldn't you say that MWI is then an interpretation while CI is a new
theory?

> Then, the things that you might call "interpretations" would relate to things like "Is the wave function physically real or just some
> non-real mathematical abstraction". They are two different ways of interpreting the same equation, which have no mathematical
> difference, and are only different on account of the different language and words we surround those mathematical entities with.

That makes sense to me.

> 
> 
> We know what the equations of QM say, and all interpretations say the same thing:
> We get a massive superposition of, let's say, billions of simultaneous simulations of the brain, each experiencing a different input.
>  *  CI says: while all these billions of brain simulations exist and were simulated, once we interact with the quantum computer all
>     but 1 disappears. (but it does not deny that they billions of separate brain computations *did* exist)
>  *  MW says: while all these billions of brain simulations exist and were simulated, once we interact with the quantum computer, we
>     entangle our state with the superposition and become superposed ourself, such that we get a corresponding copy of ourself
>     corresponding to each of the billions of individual simulated brain states.
> There is no mystery, question, or disagreement between MW and CI until such time that we measure/interact with the quantum computer,
> because before such time, there is no wave function collapse.
> 
>  
>       What
>       you say is hand waving, I interpret as many view points, the agnostic
>       one being one of them like the quote above.
> 
> 
> If you think any part of what I said is hand waving, simply ask for clarification on any point and I would be happy to delve deeper.

No, in terms of MWI there has been no hand waving. What I mean to say is
the other interpretations. I think some source said they are hand waving
away things, while MWI actually tries to explain them. My interpretation
is that the other explain things in their way, that MWI:ers find
unsatisfactory, and I am sure that they find things about MWI
unsatisfactory. That is what I meant to say above.

>       >       Among the many ways it
>       >       could be explained, MWI is one theoretical interpretation of how it
>       >       could work.
>       >
>       > Look at the explanations the AI gave under different assumed interpretations.
>       > Did you find the explanation assuming CI satisfactory?
>
>       Due to my lack of the underlying equations, I would not trust myself to
>       judge, except for the fact, that I do feel more inclinved to believe
>       theories which do not postulate multiple worlds.
> 
> The theory does not postulate multiple worlds.
> 
> We postulate the theory itself, which in this case is QM.
> 
> The multiple worlds are predictions of this theory. This is true both in CI and MW.

Got it! So at the moment, I would then be closer to the theory itself,
and still in a state of suspended judgement, or small or unknown
probabilities of belief when it comes to the interpretations.

But I think it is a key thing here to keep in mind that the theory
itself does not postulate multiple worlds. Sometimes it feels as if this
is exactly what some people think, but in reality, multiple worlds is an
interpretation of the theory.

> The only difference between CI and MW concerns what happens to these worlds when a measurement is made. CI says all but one
> disappear, MW says they continue to exist.
> 
> The quantum computer is particularly useful to highlight this difference, because quantum computers permit us to delay the
> measurement/collapse for arbitrarily long times, and to perform arbitrarily complex computations/operations, completely free of
> measurement/collapse.

And I do agree that the collapse does seem arbitrary, and I do agree,
that from an aesthetic point of view, getting rid of arbitrariness is
nice. At the same time, perhaps it can be explained by a follower of CI
in a way that makes it just as elegant, but I do not, based on our
discussion, see how that could be.

>       >       Here is one example:
>       >
>       >       https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Broglie%E2%80%93Bohm_theory#Experiments
>       >
>       > I don't think anything there is specific to Bohm's interpretation. I see
>       > Bohm's interpretation as entirely philosophical. It admits
>       > the existence of all the parallel histories, it just says that only one of
>       > them is "really real" and that the unfortunate souls in
>       > the branches that aren't really real are not really conscious.
>
>       Well, that's one example that shows that the various interpretations
>       have their own ways of believing they can prove one or the other.
>       Correctly or incorrectly, they do exist.
> 
> Hmm. I am not sure how to resolve this. It seems incompatible with what is said here (which was my understanding), that BM gives
> identical predictions to QM:
>  *  https://www.reddit.com/r/AskPhysics/comments/78x6e0/ive_heard_that_bohmian_mechanics_aka_pilot_wave/
> I do not understand the intricacies of BM well enough to say whether or not that is true, but perhaps you can find some BM expert who
> claims the theory does make different predictions, in which case it would not be an interpretation, but its own theory.

I'd love to find a BM expert, but like you, I am forced to "shrug my
shoulders". =(

>       > I would like that very much. I am interested to discuss the point(s) of
>       > departure between our views with regards to this subject.
>
>       I don't know if we should start that one now, or let this one run its
>       course first?
> 
> Let's start it. I am not sure how much longer this one can continue. We already seem to be recovering the same ground.

Agreed! =) One meaning of life coming up! ;)

>
>       > I am curious but also pressed for time, so I don't know when I would have
>       > time to read them. I will take a look though.
>
>       Will send you off list, and just put them on the virtual reading list.
>       ;)
> 
> 
> Thank you!

You're welcome! =)

>       > Is Halo airing again or is there just one season?
>
>       No, just one season. Since I have never played the game I enjoy it. But
>       I suspect hard core fans will most likely not enjoy it.
> 
> I liked it.

Me too! Was positively surprised, since I thought it would be difficult
to make movies out of first person shooter games.

I'm not a big fan of computer games (I was, but somehow after university
when life got in the way, computer game playing stopped) but was
pleasantly surprised!

I wonder if they will make a series based on monkey island next? ;)

> I think that was when they got a new team of writers.

I wonder when we'll see the first purely AI written super hit series? =)

>       Strange! I haven't heard about string theory in a long while.
> 
> There hasn't been much progress. I think it has made two predictions so far. The first is that there should be a force like gravity,
> and second, that the mass of particles is something that when multiplied by zero, is zero.

Well, we'll see what the string guys will come up with. Maybe there will
be some surprises yet!

>       > Good point. We might also observe that 99.9% of scientific theories have been
>       > proven wrong, so on this empirical basis then, we
>       > should never have any high confidence in our theories. ��
>
>       Aha... spoken like a true agnostic! Did I just convert you? ;)
> 
> Perhaps. But the other thing to note, is that when long-tested physical theories are wrong, they're usually only "exceptionally
> wrong", but usually still "approximately correct".
> QM might not be the final answer, but I think much of its implications would survive in any more-correct new theory.

A good point!

>       > The concept would not exist, but would it's truth exist?
>
>       As long as there is a mind to evaluate the truth, yes. Without minds,
>       just matter.
> 
> 
> I think that is consistent.
> 
> I agree something has to be primitively real, but I am not as certain as you that it must be matter. I think an even better case can
> be made for math.

Well, at least we can camp out in the monist camp together! ;)

>       > So when there is objective agreement between two subjects, why then do we
>       > admit the chemical element as part of reality but not these
>       > other objects which we can also objectively study?
>
>       If you mean math, it is just have the properties of the physical world
>       is thought about by the beings. Without the beings, that languages and
>       its truth values, lose all meaning. Only matter is left.
> 
> Or maybe not even matter? ��

Good point! Perhaps not even matter.

>       >
>       >       Math is a tool developed by humans, and in my opinion only has meaning
>       >       when being interpreted by human consciousness.
>       >
>       > You could say the same thing about matter, could you not?
>
>       Yes, if everything is doubted, of course. But as Wigner said, matter is
>       the most practical way and assumption, that leads to massive benefits,
>       so I don't see any reason why I should doubt matter.
> 
> I don't ask you to doubt matter. Only to question your belief that matter is what is most fundamental (and not derivative of
> something more primitive).

Well, perhaps I come off as more certain than I am. Rest assured, that
you make me think a lot about why I believe the things I believe. ;)

One of the valuable benefits of thing long discussion!

>       > But as Godel showed, there is no final (or finite) set of rules that accounts
>       > for all mathematical truth. We must constantly strive
>       > to develop ever more powerful theories of mathematical objects, just as
>       > physicists must always strive to develop better more powerful
>       > theories in physics. This again, suggests to me, that mathematical truth is
>       > not a human invention but something infinite and beyond
>       > ourselves. It is something we study, much like we study the physical world.
>
>       Well, based on my opinions above, I do not share that point of view.
> 
> I'm not sure how is is something that can be the subject of opinion. There's a mathematical proof (widely considered the greatest
> mathematical discovery of past the century) that shows this opinion is no longer tenable.

No, the proof I agree with, it is the interpretation I do not agree
with.

>       I
>       believe it is an invention only meaningful when interpreted by
>       consciousness.
> 
> I am surprised then that you did not agree with my meaning of life article, whose principle claim was that all meaning reduces to
> states of consciousness.

We'll see. Maybe I was too quick when reading it.

>       > We've covered so much it is hard to say what the topic would be.  ☺️
>       > If there is any overriding theme, it is the tension between scientific
>       > realism and "empirical confirmationism" if that phrase makes
>       > sense.
>
>       Yes, I agree. I think that is one fundamental tension. Also we touched
>       on identity and idealism vs materialism. Maybe a good title would be
>       "How not to do philosophy"? ;)
>
>       Best regards, Daniel
> 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Jason 

Thank you for this very rewarding discussion! =)

Best regards, 
Daniel