[ExI] Open Individualism

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Jan 4, 2024, 2:29 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 4, 2024 at 11:17 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> If open individualism is not true, the chance of you being born and alive
>> as you is 1 in 200,000,000,
>>
>
> That is a logical fallacy.  You were born and alive as you, therefore, the
> chance of you having been born and alive is 1 in 1.
>


Just because someone has won the lottery does not mean it was likely that
they would have won it.

Consider the analogous situation of the fine tuning of the universe to
support life. Despite that the anthropic principle guarantees we can only
think about this from a life friendly universe, we can still marvel at the
improbability that any given universe would have all the right properties
to allow life.

Now return to the question of your birth. Did it require an exact
combination of atoms? If your mom had ordered a chicken sandwich instead of
a salad, such that different atoms were incorporated in ntk your body,
would you not exist? If you had slightly different genes, for a slightly
darker shade of hair, would you not be conscious right now? Consider the
odds that were overcome to have the exact right set of atoms and the exact
right set of genes. If only one exact set would have given you life, the
odds of your existence would be so low as to be incalculable.

But here you are, born in a universe with life friendly laws, born at a
time when the stars are still fusing, born with on a life friendly world,
with just the right genes and atoms, and you find yourself in a time within
the span of your life, rather than any of the 10^100 years this universe
will last.


> If multi-worlds is true, there may be 199,999,999 other worlds in which
> you do not exist for each world in which you do, but those are irrelevant.
> We observe the world that we are in.
>

Many worlds:
We observe the world we are in.

Externalism/Relativity:
We observe the time we are in.

Fine-tuning:
We observe the universe we are in

Universalism:
We observe the body we are in.


In each case, we overcome an illusion that some selection has been made,
that something special has happened, when the truth is all exist, and there
is no selection at all. All branches exist, all times exist, all universes
exist, all conscious perspectives exist. There is no pointer that shines on
some but not others, and makes those special. These are all what I call
"indexical illusions" they lead to the single universe view in QM, the
presentism conception of time, and the closed individualism conception of
personal identity.



>
>> and the same odds must have been win by your parents, your grand parents,
>> and so on.
>>
>
> Their odds, likewise, are 1 in 1.
>
>
>> There are massive conceptual problems with the conventional closed
>> individualism view. If you investigate these you will see why open
>> individualism is the least flawed of all the available options.
>>
>> Consider that the rational scientist would conclude a person survives a
>> star trek style destructive teletransporter, so long as an identical
>> version was created on the other side. So then material/bodily continuity
>> cannot be essential to survival.
>>
>> Consider also, that a person changes substantially over time, gaining
>> memories here, losing memories there, to the point that a 50 year old
>> person has almost nothing in common psychologically with their 3 year old
>> self.
>>
>
> A person is a process, not a discrete state.  These problems only arise by
> confusing a static state of a person for being the complete definition of
> that person over time.
>

A person is conventionally a process, but that process can be interrupted.
Anesthesia, coma, concussion, dreamless sleep, etc. What unities the person
across these discontinuities? And things don't get any easier with mind
uploading, cryogenics, etc.



> You will find, if you pull on these threads, that the conventional view of
>> personal identity (what Kolak calls "closed individualism") breaks down,
>> leaving two options:
>>
>> Empty individualism: a.k.a. no-self theory, we are each only and ever a
>> single thought moment, like the Buddhist conception of Anatta.
>>
>> Open individualism: there are no individuating borders.
>>
>
> This is another logical fallacy.  There exist more than two options.
>

There are three, and together they are comprehensive (at least one must be
true):

1. Empty individualism: individuating borders are total
2. Closed individualism: there are individuating borders, but they are not
total
3. Open individualism: there are no individuating borders


> What you here call "empty individualism" assumes that what a person is in
> a given moment is the only thing a person is.  You have defined "open
> individualism" elsewhere.  The truth appears to be neither of these, but
> something else.
>

What is your alternative?

Jason
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