[ExI] Open Individualism

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 5:20 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, 7 Jan 2024, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >       Could you expand here? My interpretation would be that all future
> events
> >       have a probability of occuring and are validated by them actually
> >       occuring. But this is not what you mean I think.
> >
> > Let's define the absolutist instrumentalist as someone who only
> > accepts and believes in *only* such things that they can observe
> > directly, either with their senses or their instruments.
>
> This is one definition out of many. Also note, that
> since instruments are ultimately dependent on senses, I think your
> definition could exclude instruments, since instruments give rise to
> sense impressions.
>

The reason I included instruments is to cover cases like X-rays or
ultrasound, which the instrumentalist will accept exist even if his own
senses can't directly apprehend them.


> > Then consider: each of us is only ever aware of some instantaneous
> > point in time, a single moment of the present, perhaps containing some
> > recollection of past memories.
>
> Without time and awareness of time, thought is not possible since
> thought is a sequence of events, so it seems to me that this collapses
> into some solipsism.
>

Here the instrumentalist would be assuming some theory of consciousness
(that time is necessary to create conscious experiences). The absolutist
instrumentalist I define would not make such a leap.


>
> > To thrive in the world, we have to make (and act according to),
> > theories about reality that we cannot prove with our senses. In this
>
> If we require a 100% foundation of everything, we end up as solipsists,
> which no one who argues about it seriously beliefs. The fact of arguing
> in favour of the position weakens it of itself.
>

The absolutist instrumentalist need not be a solipsist, as he can see other
people who have their own thoughts. Though if you asked him whether he knew
they were zombies or not, he (like anyone else) would have to confess he
has no direct evidence one way or the other (we can only escape this only
by assuming some theory of consciousness).


>
> The best foundation we have is materialism, what we can see, experience,
> and the best way to knowledge that we have is science.
>

The absolutist instrumentalist assumes neither materialism, nor idealism,
nor any kind of monism or dualism. These are all metaphysics outside the
domain of what he can measure or discriminate between. Note the positions
of Bohr and Heinsenberg who often doubted the existence of material reality
outside of their own consciousness.

We can no longer talk of the behavior of the particle apart from the
process of observation. In consequence, we are finally led to believe that
the laws of nature which we formulate mathematically in quantum theory deal
no longer with the particles themselves but with our knowledge of the
elementary particles.
— Werner Heisenberg in “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026454>Physics
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20026454>” (1958)

This is more in line with what an absolute instrumentalist would say about
quantum physics, than what a materialist who makes an ontological
commitment to a material reality might presume.


>
> Now here's the thing. Other ways may be possible, other worlds may be
> possible, but I'd say that it's fair to shift the burden of proof onto
> them.
>

What evidence do you possess that favors materialism, over idealism,
simulation hypothesis, a mathematical reality, neutral monism, existence in
the mind of God, or any of a myriad of other subjectively indistinguishable
possibilities?


>
> So nothing can be proven with 100% certainty, as you say, but we have a
> pretty close second place in the form of the assumption that we exist
> and matter exists and science and so on.
>

All we know for certain is that our present state of consciousness exists.

"Admittedly our sense perceptions constitute our sole knowledge about
things. This objective world remains a hypothesis, however natural."
— Erwin Schrödinger in “Mind and Matter
<https://archive.org/details/mindmatter0000schr/page/76/mode/2up?q=%22This+objective+world+remains+a+hypothesis%22>”
(1958)


>
> > will experience it. This assumptions is important for our survival,
> > but it doesn't mean it is true. Empty individualism is consistent with
>
> We have no proof to the contrary. At least no proof which has been
> accepted by the world at large.
>
> > The absolutist instrumentalist is forced to assume no more than empty
> > individualism.
>
> But I think we're getting back to old MWI-ground. I'll stop for now, and
> let's see if someone else will jump back in and I hope I'll learn
> something new. =)
>

I don't see the connection to MWI. When I argued for MWI I did it from
assuming theories we have evidence for are true.

Here I am taking the opposite approach, showing what someone who doubts all
theories could believe about the world, from the basis and vantage point of
his singular "current moment of experience".

Admittedly, it is not very much.

Jason
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