[ExI] Open Individualism

[Ben Zaiboc]

Jason Resch wrote:

Various things about uploading and duplication...

It seems we agree on the various duplication scenarios, we just prefer 
to use different terminology, but this started as a discussion about 
'Open Individualism', which I'm still no closer to understanding.

 >>> Boiled down to one sentence, it is the idea that: "There is only 
one person."

 >> Ok, well that is demonstrably not true. There are at least two 
people, you and me

 > Can you use the fact that you are only presently aware of "now" to 
refute eternalism?

 From what I can understand, eternalism is the view that the future, as 
well as the past, is fixed. I don't think that's likely to be true, but 
wouldn't know how to refute it through what I'm presently aware of.

 > Can you use the fact that you are only presently aware of "this 
branch" to refute many-worlds?

I don't have any interest in many-worlds, it may or may not be true, but 
don't really see the point in agonising about it. It has the same 
status, in my mind, as the simulation argument. Can't be proven or 
disproven, so maybe it's true, maybe not, and either way, what can we do 
about it? Nothing.

 > If not, then I would argue that neither can you use the fact that you 
are only presently aware of "Ben Zaiboc's POV" to refute open individualism.

I don't see how that follows, but anyway, I'm not trying to refute it, 
I'm trying to understand what it means. "There is only one person" can't 
mean what it seems to mean, as it's clearly not true. There are lots of 
people. So what does it mean?

"There is only one person in this room at this moment" is true. "There 
is only one person in this town" is not. Clearly 'one person' in Open 
Individualism has some special meaning that people don't ordinarily use, 
or are even aware of. Can you explain what this special meaning is?

 > You can experience great pain and you can experience great joy. Those 
two experiences couldn't be more different from one another, but they 
are both experiences you are capable of having. I would argue then that 
your experience of eating an apple is not so different from the 
experience of that New Zealander eating an apple 200 years ago, at least 
the two experiences are more similar than the two extremes of 
consciousness experience you are capable of having. All conscious 
experiences have in common, the feeling of immediacy, and that is all 
that is required for it to feel like it is your experience.

I've no argument with the idea that two humans, no matter how different, 
have lots in common. Just because two things have lots in common, 
doesn't mean they are the same thing, though. Two grains of sand have 
much more in common with each other than I do with some New Zealander 
200 years ago, but they still aren't the same grain of sand. Nobody 
claims "there is only one grain of sand".

I can't make any sense of this 'one person' thing at all.


Ben
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