[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

>       > Such thinking makes no sense to me. If one accepts their personal survival in
>       > the case one person steps out of a teleporter, why should they conclude
>       > personal death in the case someone else like them steps out of some other
>       > teleporter elsewhere?
>
>       Well, because of the split scenario. It is one proposed solution, and it depends
>       on how the teleporter works. I consider splits to be impossible,
> 
> But you seemed to accept it as possible for the AI or uploaded human on a VM.

Well, there are a couple of things here. First, an AI or a human that exists as
a software program is not a human. So when I say it is not possible, I am
referring to human beings like you and me. Second, our current state of
technology does not permit splits. So my personal position is that it is
impossible. But I do enjoy the discussion and analysis of the concept, so that
is where the confusion comes in when I say it is impossible, but I am happy to
explore the scenario as if it was. ;)

But come to think of it... what is a "split" for a VM? Let's say you have a VM,
or a virtual entity comprising a number of bits. The only split I can think of
is replicating one bit to two "containers" and afterwards deleting the original
bit.

To me, this seems different from the amoeba case. More a kind of copy actually,
than a "pure" split as in a cell dividing. A bit can't split.

What do you think?

>       so for me it is
>       not a case I need to consider. But for the sake of our discussion, assuming the
>       MWI, it is definitely a case that needs to be handled. I agree there.
> 
> Okay. And if it is handled, would you agree with my point that it makes little
> sense to say I survived the split when one of me emerged, and yet I will die
> if more than one emerge?

No, because if one emerges, it is not a split.

>       > If a theory fails for hypothetical situations it ought to handle, I think we
>       > can discount it as a failed theory without even having to do the experiment.
>
>       True, but that comes down to the point of view of what a theory ought to handle
>       vs what it does not need to handle. Since I'm not an MWI:er for instance, my
>       theory of identity would never have to deal with splits. But for an MWI:er, it
>       would have to, since I think that would be the case constantly happening
>       everywhere and for everyone if I understand it correctly.
> 
> One risks creating a fragile theory if it only works according to results made
> in areas far outside the scope of that theory.
> 
> For example, it would be like having a theory of consciousness that only works
> if dark matter happens to be X. This is why hypothetical questions and
> situations are important: "well why wouldn't the theory work if dark matter
> was Y rather than X?", "Can we modify the theory to be resilient in either
> case?" Etc.

I think it depends. If I have a theory that handles everything well at the
empirical level and day to day reality, I do not see what I would have to gain
but analyzing splits or multiple worlds? No empirical evidence has ever been
presented for it, and splits, as per human biology is not possible. So I think
in fact, that thought experiments can actually be detrimental when they take
energy and focus away from empirical reality, and lead to endless speculation.

The caveat I do add is that we are well advised to adjust our theories when new
evidence is found. But I do not think it is productive, absent evidence, to
engage in endless speculation. That energy is better spent on research and
collecting empirical evidence.


>       > For example, consider Einstein's proposed EPR experiment involving sending
>       > entangled particle pairs across space (an experiment well beyond the
>       > technology of his day), yet it highlighted the fact that Copenhagen
>       > Interpretation implied faster-than-light influences, in clear contradiction to
>       > his relativity. And some 50 years later, when we did have the technology to
>       > perform such experiments, they confirmed Einstein's point, the effect was
>       > observed, and one cannot accept CI and believe that nothing can travel faster
>       > than c.
>
>       Ah, but observation was key here. And as long as observation is possible for us,
>       I have no quarrel with theories, explorations and so on.
> 
> Presumably observations will be possible one day (should we develop mind
> uploading and transfer technology).

True. I think a case can be made for postponing a lot of speculation until the
technology is at least feasible or on the horizon. But extrapolating technology
to godlike things, and then speculating and testing theories based on those, I
only see as fun entertainment and science fiction, and not as something
productive.

> Einstein's paper is widely considered significant, even without the empirical
> result, for it showed what the assumed theory of the day predicted. To show a
> problem with a theory, one need only assume the theory is true and show what
> it predicts.
>
> So if we want to highlight problems in some theory of personal identity, for
> the most part experiments aren't needed (and experiments themselves wouldn't
> tell us much), they would only be meaningful to the person/people who
> underwent the procedure.

Well, the problem there is that there is no problem of closed individualism. It
works perfectly well for all intents and purposes. In terms of empirical
experiments, I do think there a case can be made for gaining a better
undertsanding of identity and our perception of identity through neuroscience
and investigating meditation techniques and mushrooms and interviewing people
who do have identity altering experiences etc.

> Though perhaps you can have while teams of scientists step into the same
> teleporter and then they can all publish their shared result of all
> subjectively feeling as though they survived the process. And other teams of
> scientists can replicate the result for themselves. Does that make it
> objective repeatable science? ��

Show me the teleporter and I'll show you objective repeatable science! ;)

>       > You think that you are Daniel, and no one else. What objective physical fact
>       > makes this so? Must we not consider the subjective aspect of reality when we
>       > deal with areas such as consciousness and personal subjective survival?
>
>       I don't think we can. The subjective is per definition directly inaccessible to
>       us,
> 
> No I think rather that the subjective is *the only thing* that we can access
> or have access to.

I disagree. The subjective is something we experience. It is not something we
can "access". It is basically our running process. We can of course experience
the running of our process. When it comes to reality, the only access we have is
through our senses, and I'd argue that that is plenty objective. You and I can
both agree through the evidence of our senses on the positions of furniture in
our vicinity. It does not need to be more complicated than that.

When I say that the subjective is per definition inaccessible, I mean that your
experience as experienced by you, is forever inaccessible.

> The limitation is that one person's subjective is inaccessible to others.

Yes, sorry. Better way to put it. I was being vague.

> Then we create objective models of the world, (models based formes to explain
> our subjective experiences) then we end up with a picture of the world that
> mostly sweeps under the rug the fact that in doing so we create a model that
> ignores the subjective, the model is devoid of it. This is a limitation of our
> models, but we should not take our models so seriously that we deny the
> subjective, which is the entire source and reason for existence of the very
> objective models we created to explain the subjective appearances.

Since the subjective is our own running process, there is no need to ignore it
or affirm it, it is just part of reality. As you say, others subjectivity is
forever closed of. So the only thing we have is objective, descriptive reality.
Since th subjective is not objective, I think we can safely ignore it, since by
the very way we are constructed, there no point in trying to shift it from the
subjective to the objective.

> Or as Democritus wrote thousands of years ago:
> 
> "Intellect: Ostensibly there is color, sweetness, bitterness, actually there
> is only atoms and the void.

True. Two ways to describe the same thing. And depending on the language we
choose to describe it, we can achieve different things, and predict different
things.

>       and therefore, unless it can be verified, the question should be dropped.
> 
> Everything you experience you personally verify. It is only in your objective
> models of reality that you cannot explain, and hope to sweep under the rug,
> the subjective.

No, there's nothing to sweep under the rug. The subjective is per definition the
subjective. In terms of my subjective experience, it just is, so absent someone
falsifying it, I can just accept it and move on. When we move to the objective,
where you (and in the reverse, I) exist, we have science. I think a lot of
people get trapped by language and think there is a mystery, where in fact there
is no mystery.

>       In
>       terms of physical facts, what makes me, me, is a combination of my mind and body
>       and uniqueness in space, as per my formula.
>
>       Also note that from a pragmatic point of view, our legal definitions and
>       processes for proving that I am I work perfectly fine, so that is another way to
>       discuss it based on an external point of view.
> 
> Laws are written by politicians, who I don't see as possessing any special
> wisdom on deep philosophical problems.

Well, pragmaticism is one philosophical way to look at life, and laws are also
"distilled" customs, culture, ethics and norms, and evolve throughout societies.
They can be seen, over time, as the wisdom of crowds. Are they perfect? Far from
it! Do they contain bugs? Of course! Are they useless? Of course not. They do
work, and I definitely think, from the point of view of identity, that it's an
excellent pragmatic starting point. Add to that some psychology and biology, and
I think we're off to a good start. =)

>       But subjectively understanding it, is impossible from a scientific perspective,
>       and I advocate for dropping the question until new experiments are devised.
> 
> I think we ought to recognize the limitations of our current models in
> explaining certain aspects of reality, rather than redefine reality to pretend
> those phenomenon don't exist.

But what phenomenon is there that we pretend does not exist? We can follow every
experience I have by scanning my brain activity. We have reverse engineered some
of it, and we can read through brain scans, in some situations, what a person
thinks, or which hand a person will move.

I think there is no pretending here, and a lot of progress.

>       >       >       There is not condition here, it is just an event along a long chain of causes
>       >       >       and effects. It is the same with reality. It happens to us, we have no choice. I
>       >       >       think this also shows us that probability is part of the language of math, that
>       >       >       is only meaningful for us as conscious human beings. Without human beings,
>       >       >       "speaking" the language of math and probability, the concept is meaningless.
>       >       >
>       >       > If there is no condition that determines you being in some body, and not in
>       >       > others, then that is open individualism.
>       >
>       >       I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause and effect that
>       >       resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open individualism follow from
>       >       that?
>       >
>       > Because similar cause effect paths lead to all other persons. What makes yours special?
>
>       I don't think the question is meaningful. What do you mean with "special"?
> 
> What makes Daniel special, under the closed individualism viewpoint, is that
> you will only ever experience the experiences that happen to be generated by
> Daniel's brain and its material (or psychological) continuations.

I don't understand that. It's a tautology. I will only experience what I will
experience? Or I will only experience what my brain experiences?

> What imbues Daniel's brain with this unique power?

Evolution and the human DNA?

>       >              Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through time)
>       >              OR
>       >              Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through time)
>       >              XOR
>       >              Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
>       >              = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
>       >       (Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it maps nicer with
>       >       true/false 1/0.)
>       >
>       > That is a good change.
>       >
>       >       Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of mind or body, and
>       >       since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was destroyed) we get
>       >       M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).
>       >
>       > What if we presume that the frozen duplicate was formed via a continuous copying process?
>
>       What do you mean with continuous copy process? Is it that it is "synced" live
>       with the original copy? Or that it is created while the original is alive?
> 
> For example, we inject nano bots into the blood stream which gradually
> replace, one by one, each neuron in the brain with a synthetic equivalent.
> 
> Then at time T, the synthetic neurons each divide in two, while continuing to
> operate and function in parallel. They then switch from using direct
> conduction to radio transmissions, with their two sets of neurons running on
> different radio frequencies.
> 
> The result is two independently functioning brains created via a continuous
> process from the original, each having an equal claim to being the original.

I don't see how at time T, a set of matter can spontaneously split. I can see
how it can copy, but how can it split? But leaving that aside, By applying the
formula, I get 1 OR 1 XOR 1 (copy) = 0 not me. Which kind of makes sense. It's
now, if I understand you correctly, one body, with two brains, and could no
longer be categorized as human.

>       >       If you believe all of them, then I agree.
>       >
>       > Hmm could you clarify what you are agreeing to here?
>
>       Sorry, I think I agree with either being none or all. But being a subset of one
>       of them I do not think makes any sense, if I step away from my formula and try
>       to look at it from your point of view?
> 
> 
> Okay. ��
> 
> I am of the opinion that you survive as any/all of them.
> 
> I think seeing this is perhaps one of the first steps necessary to seeing how
> open individualism could be true. For you are in a situation where the same
> person is in all the bodies, yet each is only aware of the experiences and
> memories tied to the particular brain they think they are only in.

Ok.

>       >       > Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any physical facts that
>       >       > account for him being Thomas Nagel:
>       >
>       >       I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas Nagel and say "there he
>       >       is". Do we need anything else?
>       >
>       >       I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and that is also good
>       >       evidence I think.
>       >
>       > I think you may be missing Nagel's point, which is, if I have this complete
>       > highly detailed objective description of everything in the universe, what
>       > objective physical fact accounts for the fact that his identity, and his
>       > perspective, happens to be bound up with this particular set of atoms (in the
>       > objective physical description of the universe)? I admit this is a highly
>       > subtle point which is difficult for the English language to express, but I
>       > think if you carefully read Nagel's original text on this you will see what he
>       > is getting at. Note that you cannot point and say "there he is," because he
>       > explicitly ruled out using any kind of indexical language, like pointing, or
>       > using words like this, I, here, etc.
>
>       Maybe I can express it like this:
>
>       Nagel's emphasis on the subjectivity of consciousness is due to the limitations
>       of every day language, which is unable to fully capture the complexity of conscious
>       experience. This means that the apparent subjectivity of consciousness is an
>       artifact of our linguistic and cognitive limitations, rather than a fundamental
>       feature of reality itself.
> 
> I agree that the idea of subjectivity being tied to one and only one
> particular body, is a subjective illusion and not really part of reality.

I'm sorry, that's not quite what I mean. What I mean is that the apparent
subjectivity that you refer to, is due to language and a running process. That
means, that by using a different language, it is not a mystery, but understood.
So I'm not saying that my experience does not exist, but what I am saying is
that how we talk about that experince, and how we objectively describe it is all
that matters, and also the only thing that can matter by design. If I experience
pain, the only thing that can make a difference is how I express it, and how it
shows up through the lens of science. Anything beyond that such as magic
formulas such as... "what's it like to experience Daniels pain" is just misuse
of language. So that question is an illusion, there we agree, but that fact that
I experience things, and that that experience gives rise to effects in my body
and behaviour, is plain fact and not mysterious at all.

That is what I mean when I think that a lot of qualia magic is due to misuse of
language, and in reality, doesn't even exist.

> Along with this subjective illusion (of only being one neurology), is the
> illusion of presentism (only being in one point in time), and the illusion of
> Copenhagen collapse (of only being in one branch). I call these egocentric, or
> indexical illusions. None of them are real objectively.

I have no seen any empirical evidence that indicates I am not me or that I do
not have the experience of time. So I would not agree with the subjective me
being an illusion or that I only experience one point in time.

>       So basically, our language is deceiving us. If we reformulated the question
>       based on the findings of neuroscience, that is basically the answer.
> 
> As I see it, it is the limited access of any particular conscious state, that
> leads to the wrong, but "common sense" impressions that only one time is real,
> only one branch is real, and only one neurology is mine.

Well, I'll have to remain with myself there, waiting for empirical evidence. ;)

>       >       Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are in that case
>       >       ultimately meaningless?
>       >
>       > The theories differ in the kinds of questions they can answer. Consider the
>       > question: "Why were you born as Daniel, at this point in time, on this planet,
>       > and in this universe?" Empty and Closed Individualism cannot offer any answer
>       > to that question, but open individualism can.
>
>       I think the question is not meaningful. I can answer that I was born due to my
>       parents, etc. etc. More than that is not meaningful to say from the point of
>       view of science. For instance, I can ask the question, "why was a granola bar
>       made as that specific granola bar in my kitchen a few hours ago, on this planet?"
> 
> If you found yourself to be a particular granola bar, then you would be
> justified in asking "why am I this granola bar, and not some other granola
> bar?" Especially if you see millions of other granola bars in the world. If
> you are only one particular granola bar, "why *this* one?"

I don't think that question is meaningful at all. In fact, I do not even
understand it, apart from me being me as a result of my parents having a child.

And please don't think I am being troublesome, or do not want to understand it,
but the question "why am I me" makes absolutely no sense to me, apart from the
point of view of cause and effect.

>       The answer is that my wife wanted something with our tea tonight when we're
>       watching Severance. But the question why was that granola bar created as that
>       specific granola bra, is a meaningless question.
> 
> It's meaningless when described from a third person objective viewpoint. (Note
> that this is a viewpoint that doesn't actually exist in reality).

Well, I think my answer has a lot of meaning. Why do you think it is
meaningless?

But! I think I have a better grasp of open individualism thanks to your infinite
patience and good links, so I am therefore confident that I will come to
understand your point here as well! =)

>       I think, in the best
>       Wittgensteinian tradition, that our language sometimes deceives us, and if we
>       are not alert to that fact, we can, at worst, end up wasting thousands of years
>       debating something, which is really, at the end of the day, a "bug" in our
>       language.
> 
> I think it is the models that are deceiving us here, if we take the models so
> seriously that we deny the parts of reality which the models can't
> accommodate.

This is interesting! So let's explore this. What part of reality, with my model,
would I be less equipped to handle, than if I were to adopt the open model?

The other track towards open (I don't remember if it will come further down the
post, or if this was only in our private discussion, but I'll mention it here
just to be on the safe side) that I find interesting, is the "mushroom" track.
That has a nice smell of empiricism to me! =)

>       >       Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your time,
>       >
>       > No worries, it is the fault of wikipedia here, not you.
>
>       Thank you! I have certainly learned about the limits of both wikipedia and
>       LLM:s! Usually I am in the habit of taking them at face value, when the topic is
>       not super important (just reading for fun), but I brought that bad habit with me
>       here, and it is not a good habit when it comes to discussing things. I should
>       keep my "work" mindset here, where I do not trust an LLM as far as I can throw
>       it. ;)
> 
> In these cases it can be helpful to paste in a large source, such as the text
> of Arnold Zuboff or Daniel Kolak, and then ask it to

I don't know if that is possible with my friendly free AI, duck.ai, but I'll try
to keep that in mind to see if it will work in the future. Thank you very much
for the tip! =)

>       > Consider that you have experienced many things in the life of Daniel which you
>       > no longer remember. Your 247th day of grade school, your 1,879th day of life,
>       > your 126th car ride, etc. Who had these experiences? Clearly you did, and yet
>       > yet the you (in your current vantage point right here and now) don't remember
>       > having those experiences. Whether you remember having had a particular
>       > experience or not, then, is not determinative of whether or not you had that
>       > experience.
>
>       Ok, so let me try and rephrase this, and see if I get it. Z says that all
>       experiences are experienced by an "I". An I could, just to give me something
>       tangible to wrap my mind around, be the neural process generating the experience
>       of being myself.
>
>       So, is he saying, that we are all the same, because he identifies us, not with
>       continuity of mind and body, over time, but with the neural process that gives
>       rise to the I? And since he assumes, this process or function, is the same, and
>       since this function is the "nexus" or focus of experience, we are all the same
>       I?
>
>       Is that closer?
> 
> It's closer. But I don't think he would put it that way. He would say simply
> that all experiences are experienced in a way that is immediate and
> first-person in character, and that this is the only thing that's required for
> an experience to be mine. (I.e., it will feel like it's mine, no matter in
> what brain it appears).

Ok, I think I get it. Well, I do agree with the ethical implications if people
did come to believe it (positive implications), but I do not agree that any
proof that I've seen is empirical. But it does remind me a bit about
Schopenhauer, but I did read your link about the Zuboff AMA on reddit, and it
was not quite there as well.

>       To me, it seems like saying something similar to, we all consist of the same
>       elements, therefore we are all the same.
> 
> That line of thinking has led some to open individualism, but I don't
> personally find the "one universe" argument particularly convincing.

Well, I mean from one point of view, it's just a definition, so nothing magical
about it. For me, what would be revolutionary, would be empirical proof. As we
discussed on our call, also there is the problem of many verbally accepting
open, acting as if they actually deeply believe in closed.

Oh, and I also liked our idea about open/closed being two sides of the same
coin. That's an interesting idea as well.

>       > Note that a common element, to any sensible definition of consciousness, is
>       > "having a point of view" "having an experience". In other words, there is
>       > something it is like to be that particular conscious thing. All conscious
>       > states, being conscious of something, will have some collection of
>       > immediately-felt first-hand knowledge (of that something that happens to
>       > be conscious of).
>
>       I think for the purpose of descriptions, theories and science, that first-person
>       thing, has to go, as per my argument against Nagel above.
> 
> Are you excising the first-person from reality, or merely from your
> third-person models of reality? I think that is an important distinction to
> clarify.

Depends on the context and purpose. I am not excising it in the form of denying
that I experience things. But I do excise it when it comes to us understanding
the world and each other. I do think we can understand the world, and each
other, perfectly well without getting trapped in questions about the nature of
your being you, or someone else experiencing your experiences. So the more
context, and the more refined the question and the purpose, the easier it is to
distinguish nonsense (or unknowables) from sense (or knowables).

>       I can rephrase that as persons experience things, and act, as if, they have
>       first-person experiences. Better than that I do not think we can do. For
>       ordinary day to day purposes, I do of course talk about my inner experiences,
>       but that does not mean that that is the best way to actually describe them or do
>       research them.
>
>       >       I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
>       >       being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But that is a distinct
>       >       pattern, unique for every individual.
>       >
>       > There's a distinct neural pattern not only for each individual, but for each
>       > individual in each moment in time. If "you" persist across variations in that
>       > neural pattern across moments of your life, what is the essential
>
>       True, we can go with that, or mind/body for instance.
> 
> But where important is that once we enable identification of multiple distinct
> conscious states with the "same person" the door is opened. What is it about
> any neural pattern that makes it mine vs. someone else's? Is it based on any
> intrinsic properties of the experience itself, or only extrinsic properties of
> the history or atoms etc. that happens to be involved in creating the
> experience? If you start to think about the problem from the perspective of
> only the intrinsic properties, then that tends to lead to open individualism.
> On the other hand, if you go with assuming the relevance of extrinsic
> properties, this leads to all kinds of trouble with handling various scenarios
> and thought experiments (fission, fusion, split brains, teleporters,
> duplication machines, black box closets, healing and restoring devices, mind
> uploads and backups, etc.).

I think the simplest, most pragmatic and time saving route here is to first of
all start of with the case that closed is true, as per everyones (or almost
everyones to be honest) experience.

The second point is that we have no empirical proof for closed being false. The
third point is that a lot of thought experiments are impossible, or at the god
like end of technological development, so those can be disregarded at the
moment. We need to distinguish between the impossible thought experiments, which
can be disregarded, and the likely, which are good, and the unlikely. However,
with our current technology, we cannot do mind uploading. Once we are there, I
am certain that we will have advanced science enough to give us a better grasp
on identity and consciousness, and that technology will also open up new venues
for experiences and experiments.

So based on where we are so far, and only looking at thought experiments and the
technology we have, I don't see much of a case.

The two most interesting paths for me are the empirical testing with substances,
and if there's any specific day to day life situation that cannot be handled
with the closed theory.

>       > nature/character of the pattern that must exist for you to be there in them?
>       > If it is nothing other than the sense of being an I, being a conscious living
>       > person, having an experience of some kind, then you exist in all neural
>       > patterns of all conscious beings.
>
>       I think that is too simplistic. I includes mind and body, continuous through
>       time, which also fits perfectly well with our ordinary experience. I think
>       reducing the definition of the I to having neural pattern, basically says
>       nothing. Different neural patterns correspond with different experiences, so I
>       think there is strong proof for the I being more than a general pattern existing
>       in all human beings. I can of course define I as electrical activity in the
>       brain, and thus we are all I, but that doesn't really say much.
>
>       So far, it seems to me, either to be just a matter of trivial definition to
>       which we agree, or wrong.
> 
> Theories of personal identity are largely definitional theories, but we are
> seeking a definition that is robust and consistent, and makes sense, and
> ideally can answer questions that are relevant and important to us, like which
> experiences wio I have, why are we here, and why am I me?

What I find more interesting, is if/how the definition, can cause people to
alter their beliefs and behaviours. Except saints, who experienced
enlightenment, it seems to me most people in the open camp act as if, they are
closed.

If that could be changed, I think the case for open would improve due to
pragmatic reasons! I mean... who wouldn't want a method to increase love and
empathy in all human beings? Sounds like a win/win/win to me! =)

On the other hand... there are ways to increase empathy with the closed as well
I imaginem but you see my point I hope!

>       Another thing to keep in mind is the pragmatic angle, we all act perfectly well
>       based on a closed kind, it works well, it is the "naive" first impression, and
>       at the end of the day, there seems to be no empirical evidence for anything else
>       being true, _apart_ from the way of definition.
> 
> Closed has many problems. It requires overcoming impossible odds for it to be
> true, it has conceptual difficulties with many real-world as well as

I disagree with the probability argument, since it is a single event that has
already happened, and not possible to replicate it in order to yield future,
testable predictions.

Which real-world scenarios do not work with a closed theory?

> imaginable scenarios, it requires additional unnecesssry metaphysical
> assumptions, and it is unable to give answers for certain questions, and it

I think that, like the external world, it requires no assumptions. We have no
choice but to act in the world, the way we are. That means that the only thing
that should give us cause to pause, is falsification and/or evidence for that an
I is not an I.

> also can't handle the anthropic principle in explaining the fine tuning of the
> universe. Like Newtonian physics, it largely works for most day to day things,

The anthropic principle has no predictive power, is a tautology, and could jsut
be survivorship bias. So I do not see that as a valid argument, for me at least,
that closed is wrong. Is there any way to falsify the anthropic principle?

>       I find the evolutionary argument interesting. Imagine flower-power hippies on
>       the savannah, identifying and enormously respecting and loving the lions and
>       other predators, and they won't remain alive for long.
> 
> Right. ��
>
>       Evolution being smart, said... hold it! let's make sure the guys care about
>       themselves, and thus evolved the closed "view" and it became the default, since
>       it generated humans with barriers, afraid for their own lives, thus highly
>       motivated to run away from lions.
>
>       But I guess we then run into the language barrier. We have a test, where
>       participants get to trip, and after the trip they also describe something
>       sounding like open, but does that feeling and experience prove anything? At most
>       it proves that due to the trip, they become more loving and passionate, it also
>       seems to indicate, that their own subjective experience would align, for the
>       duration of the trip, with something closer to open, than closed. But then they
>       revert.
> 
> Some revert. For others it has a lasting or permanent effect.

Do you have any references or links for lasting effects? You know I'm a sucker
for empiricism, so that would be good reading!

> That they cannot articulate the experience to others nor justify the logic of
> their realization is why theories of personal identity are important if we are
> to ever objectively establish the truth of their experience.

I think it is not possible, since the experience lies beyond the world. I do
think we can learn to generate similar experiences by chemical or neurological
means, and even though that still doesn't prove the content of the experience,
it _does_ allow us to possibly shift our own beliefs, and lead better lives for
it.

This is a good point for me at least, when it comes to investigating the path to
the open world!

>       Are expert meditators and buddhas permanently in "open" mode? Did they in fact
>       "deactivate" the closed switch?
> 
> I think that is the state that enlightenment / moksha / nirvana all describe.
> It is described as a realization in which one transcends the convenrional
> conception of self and recognizing a oneness with all other beings.

True. Transpersonal psychology might yield some interesting reading here! =)

>       Another thing came to mind as well, and that was Schopenhauer. I mentioned it to
>       you, but his starting point is the will to live. The "life force" and he argues
>       that the "spark" or life force is the same in all living things, we are after
>       all, linked by cause and effect, and through the tree of life, back to our very
>       first ancestor.
>
>       If you then define our unique "core" as this spark, that has been passed on for
>       aeons, you can then by definition argue that all life is related and the same,
>       it's the same spark.
> 
> That may be true, but it's not the primary point made by open individualism,
> which is that I am literally seeing the world through Daniel's eyes as I am
> seeing the world through Jason's eyes.

True. I read the Zuboff AMA, it was explained there.

>       Ah, so you don't buy "my" version of Occam above? ;)
> 
> No, sadly. ;-)

;)

>       > A theory of personal identity shouldn't shy away from problems just because
>       > they are rare, or edge cases.
>
>       True, but is brain damage an edge case? It's like having a theory for a machine,
>       and then complain that the theory doesn't work when the machine is broken, isn't
>       it?
> 
> I see it more like having Newtonian mechanics and finding it works pretty well
> for most things, then finding it fails for situations with very strong gravity
> or at relativistic speeds.

That is also good take on it. I see your point there.

>       >       > Open individualism says you remain present in both -- the apparent disunion is
>       >       > due only to a lack of integration between the hemispheres. Should they be
>       >       > connected in the future, they would become integrated, and again feel as one
>       >       > mind.
>       >       >
>       >       > What would closed individualism say would happen?
>       >
>       >       I think the question can be rephrased in terms of neuroscience and psychology.
>       >
>       > Neither of those subjects deal with personal identity though.
>
>       Depends on how it is defined, and in what language it is defined. Maybe that is
>       the best we can do?
> 
> I don't think neuroscience or psychology are traditionally much interested in
> questions involving teletransporters or mind uploading, etc. But perhaps that
> will change at some point, and one of those fields will try to answer
> questions of personal identity.

I think uploading is closer than teletransporter. And this is one of my points.
Once science progresses, neuroscience and psychology might surprise us with what
they find out!

>       Haha, maybe. ;) I could also adopt the approach of sticking with closed, until
>       empirical evidence of any other version, or theory presents itself. Would that
>       be agnosticism? Or actually, maybe that would be the agnostic physicalism, or
>       the physicalist agnosticism from before? ;)
> 
> Not sure.

>       It would be a great "addon" or complementary principle, I do agree with that!
>       Many people who have not thought a lot about capitalism, beyond the parody
>       presented in the popular press, become very surprised when I tell them about the
>       take on it, that it is in fact, the only system we have devised that transforms
>       our innate egoism into benefits for everyone. I think it is quite a beautiful
>       creation, or emergent phenomenon!
>
>       > converts self interest into an interest in helping and in reducing harm for
>       > all others. It could help end war, starvation, abuse, etc. as many have noted.
>       > In effect, open individualism makes the idea of "karma" / "the golden rule"
>       > vividly real.
>
>       Well, I don't know if I agree about karma, but I do agree with the golden rule.
> 
> Karma in the sense that all the good you do for others comes back to you, and
> all the harm you cause others comes back to you. This is trivially true under
> open individualism, for you are all those other people you do good for or
> harm.

Well, in psychology reciprocity is probably as close to Karma as I am willing to
go. But across births... no, not for me.

> You as well!

Thank you Jason, and let me wish you a pleasant evening!

Best regards, 
Daniel