[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Apr 5, 2025, 6:31 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> >       > Such thinking makes no sense to me. If one accepts their
> personal survival in
> >       > the case one person steps out of a teleporter, why should they
> conclude
> >       > personal death in the case someone else like them steps out of
> some other
> >       > teleporter elsewhere?
> >
> >       Well, because of the split scenario. It is one proposed solution,
> and it depends
> >       on how the teleporter works. I consider splits to be impossible,
> >
> > But you seemed to accept it as possible for the AI or uploaded human on
> a VM.
>
> Well, there are a couple of things here. First, an AI or a human that
> exists as
> a software program is not a human. So when I say it is not possible, I am
> referring to human beings like you and me. Second, our current state of
> technology does not permit splits. So my personal position is that it is
> impossible. But I do enjoy the discussion and analysis of the concept, so
> that
> is where the confusion comes in when I say it is impossible, but I am
> happy to
> explore the scenario as if it was. ;)
>
> But come to think of it... what is a "split" for a VM? Let's say you have
> a VM,
> or a virtual entity comprising a number of bits. The only split I can
> think of
> is replicating one bit to two "containers" and afterwards deleting the
> original
> bit.
>
> To me, this seems different from the amoeba case. More a kind of copy
> actually,
> than a "pure" split as in a cell dividing. A bit can't split.
>
> What do you think?
>

Pause the VM, then transfer it's state, simultaneously, over TCP/IP to two
other host machines, which simultaneously resume the VM upon completion of
the transfer.

This is what I mean by a split (a forking path in the evolution of a mind).
It poses a seemingly insurmountable problem for continuity based theories
of personal identity, at least those that maintain you become one (but not
both, or neither).



> >       so for me it is
> >       not a case I need to consider. But for the sake of our discussion,
> assuming the
> >       MWI, it is definitely a case that needs to be handled. I agree
> there.
> >
> > Okay. And if it is handled, would you agree with my point that it makes
> little
> > sense to say I survived the split when one of me emerged, and yet I will
> die
> > if more than one emerge?
>
> No, because if one emerges, it is not a split.
>

Ignoring use of the word split, do you think it makes sense to say you
survive a teleporter trip when you appear in the intended location, but
that you die if you appear in the intended location and unbeknownst to you,
an identical copy emerges elsewhere at a different location?

I agree the concept of having "one single identity" evaporates in this
case, but if we focus only on the question of survive vs. die: Would you
expect to die in the case where an extra receiving teleporter builds a
version of you in a place that wasn't intended, but not die in the case you
appear in a single location?

It is answering "yes" to this question that makes no sense to me.


> >       > If a theory fails for hypothetical situations it ought to
> handle, I think we
> >       > can discount it as a failed theory without even having to do the
> experiment.
> >
> >       True, but that comes down to the point of view of what a theory
> ought to handle
> >       vs what it does not need to handle. Since I'm not an MWI:er for
> instance, my
> >       theory of identity would never have to deal with splits. But for
> an MWI:er, it
> >       would have to, since I think that would be the case constantly
> happening
> >       everywhere and for everyone if I understand it correctly.
> >
> > One risks creating a fragile theory if it only works according to
> results made
> > in areas far outside the scope of that theory.
> >
> > For example, it would be like having a theory of consciousness that only
> works
> > if dark matter happens to be X. This is why hypothetical questions and
> > situations are important: "well why wouldn't the theory work if dark
> matter
> > was Y rather than X?", "Can we modify the theory to be resilient in
> either
> > case?" Etc.
>
> I think it depends. If I have a theory that handles everything well at the
> empirical level and day to day reality, I do not see what I would have to
> gain
> but analyzing splits or multiple worlds?


Because I see it as needlessly setting up the theory to fail, should some
breakthrough in QM come about that established many-worlds. Why add a
weakness to a theory if you don't have to?


No empirical evidence has ever been
> presented for it,


Grok 3 estimated the probability of many-worlds being true at 99.99% after
I had it consider some old and new arguments.


and splits, as per human biology is not possible. So I think
> in fact, that thought experiments can actually be detrimental when they
> take
> energy and focus away from empirical reality, and lead to endless
> speculation.
>
> The caveat I do add is that we are well advised to adjust our theories
> when new
> evidence is found. But I do not think it is productive, absent evidence, to
> engage in endless speculation. That energy is better spent on research and
> collecting empirical evidence.
>
>
> >       > For example, consider Einstein's proposed EPR experiment
> involving sending
> >       > entangled particle pairs across space (an experiment well beyond
> the
> >       > technology of his day), yet it highlighted the fact that
> Copenhagen
> >       > Interpretation implied faster-than-light influences, in clear
> contradiction to
> >       > his relativity. And some 50 years later, when we did have the
> technology to
> >       > perform such experiments, they confirmed Einstein's point, the
> effect was
> >       > observed, and one cannot accept CI and believe that nothing can
> travel faster
> >       > than c.
> >
> >       Ah, but observation was key here. And as long as observation is
> possible for us,
> >       I have no quarrel with theories, explorations and so on.
> >
> > Presumably observations will be possible one day (should we develop mind
> > uploading and transfer technology).
>
> True. I think a case can be made for postponing a lot of speculation until
> the
> technology is at least feasible or on the horizon. But extrapolating
> technology
> to godlike things, and then speculating and testing theories based on
> those, I
> only see as fun entertainment and science fiction, and not as something
> productive.
>


They trace back to having real-world consequences for today's decision
makers. For instance: should one sign up to Alcor or not? Whether it is
worth it or not depends to a large extent on whether you think it is
possible to be resurrected from a frozen copy of your brainz and moreover,
whether you believe such a resurrected instance would be you.

So reasoning through these consequences and considering these (admittedly
far out) thought experiments, is productive, because having a correct
theory of personal identity is important for making correct and informed
decisions today.



> > Einstein's paper is widely considered significant, even without the
> empirical
> > result, for it showed what the assumed theory of the day predicted. To
> show a
> > problem with a theory, one need only assume the theory is true and show
> what
> > it predicts.
> >
> > So if we want to highlight problems in some theory of personal identity,
> for
> > the most part experiments aren't needed (and experiments themselves
> wouldn't
> > tell us much), they would only be meaningful to the person/people who
> > underwent the procedure.
>
> Well, the problem there is that there is no problem of closed
> individualism. It
> works perfectly well for all intents and purposes.



I would maintain it is inadequate for many scenarios that happen today:
split brains, amnesia, dementia, ageing & metabolism, coma patients, brain
surgery patients, falling asleep and waking, altered states of
consciousness, traumatic brain injury, choosing to freeze one's brain, etc.


In terms of empirical
> experiments, I do think there a case can be made for gaining a better
> undertsanding of identity and our perception of identity through
> neuroscience
> and investigating meditation techniques and mushrooms and interviewing
> people
> who do have identity altering experiences etc.
>
> > Though perhaps you can have while teams of scientists step into the same
> > teleporter and then they can all publish their shared result of all
> > subjectively feeling as though they survived the process. And other
> teams of
> > scientists can replicate the result for themselves. Does that make it
> > objective repeatable science? ��
>
> Show me the teleporter and I'll show you objective repeatable science! ;)
>

A train is a teleporter (just without the momentary atomic rearrangement
step). If you can survive momentarily atomic rearrangement, and if you can
survive a train ride, then you can survive both together, thus you can
survive a teleporter.


> >       > You think that you are Daniel, and no one else. What objective
> physical fact
> >       > makes this so? Must we not consider the subjective aspect of
> reality when we
> >       > deal with areas such as consciousness and personal subjective
> survival?
> >
> >       I don't think we can. The subjective is per definition directly
> inaccessible to
> >       us,
> >
> > No I think rather that the subjective is *the only thing* that we can
> access
> > or have access to.
>
> I disagree. The subjective is something we experience. It is not something
> we
> can "access".


Do you not have access to your own thoughts and feelings? This is all I
mean by access. That you are aware of them.


It is basically our running process. We can of course experience
> the running of our process. When it comes to reality, the only access we
> have is
> through our senses, and I'd argue that that is plenty objective. You and I
> can
> both agree through the evidence of our senses on the positions of
> furniture in
> our vicinity. It does not need to be more complicated than that.
>
> When I say that the subjective is per definition inaccessible, I mean that
> your
> experience as experienced by you, is forever inaccessible.
>

I agree my experience is inaccessible to you, and vice-versa. I meant only
that each of our own experiences is accessible to ourselves individually,
and it is the only thing one can know directly (one's own experience).



> > The limitation is that one person's subjective is inaccessible to others.
>
> Yes, sorry. Better way to put it.


Glad we agree on this.

I was being vague.
>
> > Then we create objective models of the world, (models based formes to
> explain
> > our subjective experiences) then we end up with a picture of the world
> that
> > mostly sweeps under the rug the fact that in doing so we create a model
> that
> > ignores the subjective, the model is devoid of it. This is a limitation
> of our
> > models, but we should not take our models so seriously that we deny the
> > subjective, which is the entire source and reason for existence of the
> very
> > objective models we created to explain the subjective appearances.
>
> Since the subjective is our own running process, there is no need to
> ignore it
> or affirm it, it is just part of reality. As you say, others subjectivity
> is
> forever closed of. So the only thing we have is objective, descriptive
> reality.
> Since th subjective is not objective, I think we can safely ignore it,
> since by
> the very way we are constructed, there no point in trying to shift it from
> the
> subjective to the objective.
>

We can sweep it under the rug, but I don't think we can totally ignore it,
if we are honest with ourselves.

Many of the outstanding problems in physics can be traced to the fact that
we have ignored the question the subjective and what constitutes an
observer.


> > Or as Democritus wrote thousands of years ago:
> >
> > "Intellect: Ostensibly there is color, sweetness, bitterness, actually
> there
> > is only atoms and the void.
>
> True. Two ways to describe the same thing. And depending on the language we
> choose to describe it, we can achieve different things, and predict
> different
> things.
>

I don't think they are the same thing. One may derive from the other, or
supervene on the other, but I think it is a mistake to equate sensations
with particles. Having the "feeling of jealousy" isn't a property of any
particle, it is, however, a potential property of some minds.



> >       and therefore, unless it can be verified, the question should be
> dropped.
> >
> > Everything you experience you personally verify. It is only in your
> objective
> > models of reality that you cannot explain, and hope to sweep under the
> rug,
> > the subjective.
>
> No, there's nothing to sweep under the rug. The subjective is per
> definition the
> subjective. In terms of my subjective experience, it just is, so absent
> someone
> falsifying it, I can just accept it and move on. When we move to the
> objective,
> where you (and in the reverse, I) exist, we have science. I think a lot of
> people get trapped by language and think there is a mystery, where in fact
> there
> is no mystery.
>

For deep theoretical physicists the mystery reappears. For example:

"Well as you understand, consciousness is not
exactly my profession, but doing quantum
cosmology requires us to think about this. Let me give you an example. […]
Quantum mechanics is supposed to be universally applicable, so let’s apply
it to the universe, so to everything. […]
I just cannot cut me observing it out of the
equation, and ‘my observations’ is my consciousness.
Without me recording it, all the rest of the universe will be dead. Well
then of course it is kind of strange, right? Because it presumes that
consciousness may have some independent importance, or maybe not, I do not
know. But the thing is that if I want to study quantum cosmology, I want to
have an answer to these questions."
— Andrei Linde in “Is Consciousness Fundamental” (2021)

"The scientific world-picture vouchsafes a very
complete understanding of all that happens–it
makes it just a little too understandable. It allows you to imagine the
total display as that of a mechanical clockwork which, for all that science
knows, could go on just the same as it does, without there being
consciousness, will, endeavor, pain and delight and responsibility
connected with it–though they actually are. And the reason for this
disconcerting situation is just this: that for the purpose of constructing
the picture of the external world, we have used the greatly simplifying
device of cutting our own personality out, removing it; hence it is gone,
it has evaporated, it is ostensibly not needed."
— Erwin Schrödinger in “Nature and the Greeks” (1954)

"We can no longer talk of the behavior of the
particle apart from the process of observation. In consequence, we are
finally led to believe that the laws of nature which we formulate
mathematically in quantum theory deal no longer with the particles
themselves but with our knowledge of the elementary particles."
— Werner Heisenberg in “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary
Physics” (1958)



> >       In
> >       terms of physical facts, what makes me, me, is a combination of my
> mind and body
> >       and uniqueness in space, as per my formula.
> >
> >       Also note that from a pragmatic point of view, our legal
> definitions and
> >       processes for proving that I am I work perfectly fine, so that is
> another way to
> >       discuss it based on an external point of view.
> >
> > Laws are written by politicians, who I don't see as possessing any
> special
> > wisdom on deep philosophical problems.
>
> Well, pragmaticism is one philosophical way to look at life, and laws are
> also
> "distilled" customs, culture, ethics and norms, and evolve throughout
> societies.
> They can be seen, over time, as the wisdom of crowds. Are they perfect?
> Far from
> it! Do they contain bugs? Of course! Are they useless? Of course not. They
> do
> work, and I definitely think, from the point of view of identity, that
> it's an
> excellent pragmatic starting point. Add to that some psychology and
> biology, and
> I think we're off to a good start. =)
>

Crowds have never excelled at inventing new technologies, forming new
scientific theories, developing mathematical proofs, etc. This is not to
say crowds have no wisdom: they drive markets, evolve language and culture,
form consensuses, etc. But if what one is after is the truth (rather than a
pragmatic law or principle for organizing society) I would turn to an
individual analysis and deep consideration of all the facts and arguments.

Socrates, Hypatia, Bruno, Galileo all stood up against irrational crowds.
It didn't turn out well for them.


> >       But subjectively understanding it, is impossible from a scientific
> perspective,
> >       and I advocate for dropping the question until new experiments are
> devised.
> >
> > I think we ought to recognize the limitations of our current models in
> > explaining certain aspects of reality, rather than redefine reality to
> pretend
> > those phenomenon don't exist.
>
> But what phenomenon is there that we pretend does not exist? We can follow
> every
> experience I have by scanning my brain activity. We have reverse
> engineered some
> of it, and we can read through brain scans, in some situations, what a
> person
> thinks, or which hand a person will move.
>
> I think there is no pretending here, and a lot of progress.
>

There is a lot to be learned about qualia of other people and other species
even when it can't be experienced directly.

For example:

"Using these methods, we might even get some
insight into what it is like to be a bat! Functional
organization can tell us much about the kind of
information that a bat has access to–the kinds of discriminations it can
make, the way it categorizes things, the most salient properties in its
perceptual field, and so on–and about the way in which it uses it.
Eventually we should be able to build up a detailed picture about the
structure of awareness in a bat’s cognitive system."
— Kathleen Akins in “A Bat Without Qualities” (1993)

We would not be able to reach this degree of understanding if we write off
qualia "unstudiable."



> >       >       >       There is not condition here, it is just an event
> along a long chain of causes
> >       >       >       and effects. It is the same with reality. It
> happens to us, we have no choice. I
> >       >       >       think this also shows us that probability is part
> of the language of math, that
> >       >       >       is only meaningful for us as conscious human
> beings. Without human beings,
> >       >       >       "speaking" the language of math and probability,
> the concept is meaningless.
> >       >       >
> >       >       > If there is no condition that determines you being in
> some body, and not in
> >       >       > others, then that is open individualism.
> >       >
> >       >       I don't see how that follows. We can trace a path of cause
> and effect that
> >       >       resulted in me sitting in my chair. How does open
> individualism follow from
> >       >       that?
> >       >
> >       > Because similar cause effect paths lead to all other persons.
> What makes yours special?
> >
> >       I don't think the question is meaningful. What do you mean with
> "special"?
> >
> > What makes Daniel special, under the closed individualism viewpoint, is
> that
> > you will only ever experience the experiences that happen to be
> generated by
> > Daniel's brain and its material (or psychological) continuations.
>
> I don't understand that. It's a tautology. I will only experience what I
> will
> experience? Or I will only experience what my brain experiences?
>

Rather than a tautology, I see it as an assumption that is so deeply
ingrained (in most people) that many cannot even recognize it as an
assumption, or recognize it as something in need of further explanation.

Hmm, I wonder if perhaps this is the main obstacle in coming to see open
individualism?

These questions are rhetorical (no need to answer them) but I list them
with the hope one might show you the problem I am getting at:

- Why is your brain Daniel's brain?
- What prevents you from inhabiting anyone else's brain, or experiencing
their perspective?
- What ties and confines all your future experiences to the body/brain
known as Daniel?
- What conditions had to be met for you to come into the world?
- If you could come into the world once what principle prevents it from
happening again?





> > What imbues Daniel's brain with this unique power?
>
> Evolution and the human DNA?
>

I think you may not be seeing the question I am asking (admittedly it is
subtle and existing English pronouns seen inadequate).

You are, right now, having a particular experience as a particular human
being. Of all the billions of perspectives out there's you are aware of
just one. Why this one? Why Daniel?

Of course there is a straight forward answer: This question is reaching
Daniel's computer and Daniel's eyes and Daniel's brain which only has
access to Daniel's memories, so of course he only remembers being Daniel.

But note that my message is being sent to a list, and reaching other
people's eyes and other people's brains, each of whom also have their own
memories. All those people are equally conscious as you are.

So what in physics or nature singles out your perspective as uniquely
special from all these equally extant experiences? Are they not just as
equally and directly and personally experienced as Daniel's experience is?

If there's nothing special or unique about Daniel's body or brain, then it
is not privileged in being the only experience or perspective created from
this email. All the people who read these words are equally present and
alive and (probably) all opereting under the (ego) illusion that their
perspective is somehow special as being the only one directly felt by "I",
when they are all felt by an "I".

I am not sure if any of this helps but I am hopeful that it will.




> >       >              Mind -----------> (1 = continuity of mind through
> time)
> >       >              OR
> >       >              Body -----------> (1 = continuity of body through
> time)
> >       >              XOR
> >       >              Copy (0 = unique, 1 = copy)
> >       >              = 1 (me) or 0 (not me)
> >       >       (Note! I changed from unique in space to copy, since it
> maps nicer with
> >       >       true/false 1/0.)
> >       >
> >       > That is a good change.
> >       >
> >       >       Since the original is destroyed, there is no continuity of
> mind or body, and
> >       >       since we're talking about a unique copy (the original was
> destroyed) we get
> >       >       M(0) OR B(0) XOR C(0) = 0 (not me).
> >       >
> >       > What if we presume that the frozen duplicate was formed via a
> continuous copying process?
> >
> >       What do you mean with continuous copy process? Is it that it is
> "synced" live
> >       with the original copy? Or that it is created while the original
> is alive?
> >
> > For example, we inject nano bots into the blood stream which gradually
> > replace, one by one, each neuron in the brain with a synthetic
> equivalent.
> >
> > Then at time T, the synthetic neurons each divide in two, while
> continuing to
> > operate and function in parallel. They then switch from using direct
> > conduction to radio transmissions, with their two sets of neurons
> running on
> > different radio frequencies.
> >
> > The result is two independently functioning brains created via a
> continuous
> > process from the original, each having an equal claim to being the
> original.
>
> I don't see how at time T, a set of matter can spontaneously split. I can
> see
> how it can copy, but how can it split?


Just like an amoeba does.


>  But leaving that aside, By applying the
> formula, I get 1 OR 1 XOR 1 (copy) = 0 not me. Which kind of makes sense.
> It's
> now, if I understand you correctly, one body, with two brains, and could no
> longer be categorized as human.
>

But I am asking you to justify the formula. Why does having a foot cause
death/non-existence?

Also note that split brains and conjoined twins are examples of two brains
in one body.



> >       >       If you believe all of them, then I agree.
> >       >
> >       > Hmm could you clarify what you are agreeing to here?
> >
> >       Sorry, I think I agree with either being none or all. But being a
> subset of one
> >       of them I do not think makes any sense, if I step away from my
> formula and try
> >       to look at it from your point of view?
> >
> >
> > Okay. ��
> >
> > I am of the opinion that you survive as any/all of them.
> >
> > I think seeing this is perhaps one of the first steps necessary to
> seeing how
> > open individualism could be true. For you are in a situation where the
> same
> > person is in all the bodies, yet each is only aware of the experiences
> and
> > memories tied to the particular brain they think they are only in.
>
> Ok.
>
> >       >       > Consider what Thomas Nagel says about the absence of any
> physical facts that
> >       >       > account for him being Thomas Nagel:
> >       >
> >       >       I disagree. From my perspective, I can point to Thomas
> Nagel and say "there he
> >       >       is". Do we need anything else?
> >       >
> >       >       I can also ask Thomas Nagel if he is Thomas Nagel, and
> that is also good
> >       >       evidence I think.
> >       >
> >       > I think you may be missing Nagel's point, which is, if I have
> this complete
> >       > highly detailed objective description of everything in the
> universe, what
> >       > objective physical fact accounts for the fact that his identity,
> and his
> >       > perspective, happens to be bound up with this particular set of
> atoms (in the
> >       > objective physical description of the universe)? I admit this is
> a highly
> >       > subtle point which is difficult for the English language to
> express, but I
> >       > think if you carefully read Nagel's original text on this you
> will see what he
> >       > is getting at. Note that you cannot point and say "there he is,"
> because he
> >       > explicitly ruled out using any kind of indexical language, like
> pointing, or
> >       > using words like this, I, here, etc.
> >
> >       Maybe I can express it like this:
> >
> >       Nagel's emphasis on the subjectivity of consciousness is due to
> the limitations
> >       of every day language, which is unable to fully capture the
> complexity of conscious
> >       experience. This means that the apparent subjectivity of
> consciousness is an
> >       artifact of our linguistic and cognitive limitations, rather than
> a fundamental
> >       feature of reality itself.
> >
> > I agree that the idea of subjectivity being tied to one and only one
> > particular body, is a subjective illusion and not really part of reality.
>
> I'm sorry, that's not quite what I mean. What I mean is that the apparent
> subjectivity that you refer to, is due to language and a running process.
> That
> means, that by using a different language, it is not a mystery, but
> understood.
> So I'm not saying that my experience does not exist, but what I am saying
> is
> that how we talk about that experince, and how we objectively describe it
> is all
> that matters, and also the only thing that can matter by design. If I
> experience
> pain, the only thing that can make a difference is how I express it, and
> how it
> shows up through the lens of science. Anything beyond that such as magic
> formulas such as... "what's it like to experience Daniels pain" is just
> misuse
> of language. So that question is an illusion, there we agree, but that
> fact that
> I experience things, and that that experience gives rise to effects in my
> body
> and behaviour, is plain fact and not mysterious at all.
>
> That is what I mean when I think that a lot of qualia magic is due to
> misuse of
> language, and in reality, doesn't even exist.
>
> > Along with this subjective illusion (of only being one neurology), is the
> > illusion of presentism (only being in one point in time), and the
> illusion of
> > Copenhagen collapse (of only being in one branch). I call these
> egocentric, or
> > indexical illusions. None of them are real objectively.
>
> I have no seen any empirical evidence that indicates I am not me


You are Daniel, that part is not an illusion. The illusion is that you are
only Daniel.

or that I do
> not have the experience of time.


You do experience the passage of time, but time's passage is a subjective
phenomenon that has no basis in reality according to relativity.

The illusion is that you only exist is one "now" when the reality is you
exist in all times that span your lifetime.

Likewise "collapse of the wave function" is a subjective phenomenon without
a basis in objective reality. You subjectively feel as though you
experience only one outcome in one possible branch of the wave function,
when in reality you experience and exist in all of the branches.

So I would not agree with the subjective me
> being an illusion or that I only experience one point in time.
>
> >       So basically, our language is deceiving us. If we reformulated the
> question
> >       based on the findings of neuroscience, that is basically the
> answer.
> >
> > As I see it, it is the limited access of any particular conscious state,
> that
> > leads to the wrong, but "common sense" impressions that only one time is
> real,
> > only one branch is real, and only one neurology is mine.
>
> Well, I'll have to remain with myself there, waiting for empirical
> evidence. ;)
>

Relativity, QM have substantial empirical evidence.

Open individualism has empirical evidence too, but you're uncomfortable
with the statistical reasoning that justifies use of that empirical
evidence.

I might suggest reviewing this problem and seeing if you have an opinion
one way or the other. Depending on your position on the problem, it may
suggest whether or not you would accept the statistical arguments for open
individualism:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem



> >       >       Then maybe that is the reason? Maybe the two positions are
> in that case
> >       >       ultimately meaningless?
> >       >
> >       > The theories differ in the kinds of questions they can answer.
> Consider the
> >       > question: "Why were you born as Daniel, at this point in time,
> on this planet,
> >       > and in this universe?" Empty and Closed Individualism cannot
> offer any answer
> >       > to that question, but open individualism can.
> >
> >       I think the question is not meaningful. I can answer that I was
> born due to my
> >       parents, etc. etc. More than that is not meaningful to say from
> the point of
> >       view of science. For instance, I can ask the question, "why was a
> granola bar
> >       made as that specific granola bar in my kitchen a few hours ago,
> on this planet?"
> >
> > If you found yourself to be a particular granola bar, then you would be
> > justified in asking "why am I this granola bar, and not some other
> granola
> > bar?" Especially if you see millions of other granola bars in the world.
> If
> > you are only one particular granola bar, "why *this* one?"
>
> I don't think that question is meaningful at all. In fact, I do not even
> understand it, apart from me being me as a result of my parents having a
> child.
>

It's because you are explaining the situation objectively from a
non-existent and imagined purely objective viewpoint. I agree from that
vantage point there is no mystery to be had.

It is only when you consider it from the standpoint of having a particular
subjective viewpoint that the mystery arises: why am I seeing the world
from *this* particular view?


> And please don't think I am being troublesome, or do not want to
> understand it,
> but the question "why am I me" makes absolutely no sense to me, apart from
> the
> point of view of cause and effect.
>

Here is a case where ignoring the subjective might leave you blind to a
certain class of problems.

Yes Daniel exists because his parents had him. Yet many other parents had
many other kids.

Is there anything special about Daniel?

If not, I propose this suggests open individualism. "You" (I use this term
not to refer to Daniel but to "the experiencer") are then not limited to
any particular body or brain, but exist equally within all.


Daniel:

>
> >       The answer is that my wife wanted something with our tea tonight
> when we're
> >       watching Severance. But the question why was that granola bar
> created as that
> >       specific granola bra, is a meaningless question.
> >


Jason reply:


> > It's meaningless [the question, not your answer]  when described from a
> third person objective viewpoint. (Note
> > that this is a viewpoint that doesn't actually exist in reality).
>



> Well, I think my answer has a lot of meaning. Why do you think it is
> meaningless?
>

I was referring to what you said was a meaningless question, not to your
answer. �� I added some notation above to try to clarify my admittedly
ambiguous reply.




> But! I think I have a better grasp of open individualism thanks to your
> infinite
> patience and good links, so I am therefore confident that I will come to
> understand your point here as well! =)
>

Wonderful to hear. I do feel as though we are converging to a common
understanding!


> >       I think, in the best
> >       Wittgensteinian tradition, that our language sometimes deceives
> us, and if we
> >       are not alert to that fact, we can, at worst, end up wasting
> thousands of years
> >       debating something, which is really, at the end of the day, a
> "bug" in our
> >       language.
> >
> > I think it is the models that are deceiving us here, if we take the
> models so
> > seriously that we deny the parts of reality which the models can't
> > accommodate.
>
> This is interesting! So let's explore this. What part of reality, with my
> model,
> would I be less equipped to handle, than if I were to adopt the open model?
>

I think I was more thinking of denying or ignoring the subjective, rather
than open vs. closed. In particular, this quote expresses the issue better
than I can:

"We find that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most
conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality
beyond our perceptions. This model of a material world obeying laws of
physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and
say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are nothing but a
useful tool for the description of matter. This assumption is almost as
natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only
a mathematical tool for the description of matter. We are substituting
reality of our feelings by the successfully working theory of an
independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that
we almost never think about its possible limitations."
-- Andrei Linde in “Inflation, Quantum Cosmology, and the Anthropic
Principle” (2002)

Which is the same error Democritus highlighted when he used his sensations
to build a model of reality that denied the existence of the very
sensations he relied upon to build his model of reality in the first place.

This is the error I refer to when we take our models so seriously that we
can no longer account for things we know to exist within reality (like our
subjective experiences).


> The other track towards open (I don't remember if it will come further
> down the
> post, or if this was only in our private discussion, but I'll mention it
> here
> just to be on the safe side) that I find interesting, is the "mushroom"
> track.
> That has a nice smell of empiricism to me! =)
>

But is it reliable? Many people report encounters with "machine elves" on
DMT. But should we infer from their common experience their reality?

But perhaps if such experiences open or broaden people's minds, or cause
them to question previously unquestionable assumptions/beliefs, it could
make them more receptive to other philosophical ideas.



> >       >       Apologies, this I fully accept. Sorry to have wasted your
> time,
> >       >
> >       > No worries, it is the fault of wikipedia here, not you.
> >
> >       Thank you! I have certainly learned about the limits of both
> wikipedia and
> >       LLM:s! Usually I am in the habit of taking them at face value,
> when the topic is
> >       not super important (just reading for fun), but I brought that bad
> habit with me
> >       here, and it is not a good habit when it comes to discussing
> things. I should
> >       keep my "work" mindset here, where I do not trust an LLM as far as
> I can throw
> >       it. ;)
> >
> > In these cases it can be helpful to paste in a large source, such as the
> text
> > of Arnold Zuboff or Daniel Kolak, and then ask it to
>
> I don't know if that is possible with my friendly free AI, duck.ai, but
> I'll try
> to keep that in mind to see if it will work in the future. Thank you very
> much
> for the tip! =)
>


I believe Grok 3 is free (with sign up).


> >       > Consider that you have experienced many things in the life of
> Daniel which you
> >       > no longer remember. Your 247th day of grade school, your 1,879th
> day of life,
> >       > your 126th car ride, etc. Who had these experiences? Clearly you
> did, and yet
> >       > yet the you (in your current vantage point right here and now)
> don't remember
> >       > having those experiences. Whether you remember having had a
> particular
> >       > experience or not, then, is not determinative of whether or not
> you had that
> >       > experience.
> >
> >       Ok, so let me try and rephrase this, and see if I get it. Z says
> that all
> >       experiences are experienced by an "I". An I could, just to give me
> something
> >       tangible to wrap my mind around, be the neural process generating
> the experience
> >       of being myself.
> >
> >       So, is he saying, that we are all the same, because he identifies
> us, not with
> >       continuity of mind and body, over time, but with the neural
> process that gives
> >       rise to the I? And since he assumes, this process or function, is
> the same, and
> >       since this function is the "nexus" or focus of experience, we are
> all the same
> >       I?
> >
> >       Is that closer?
> >
> > It's closer. But I don't think he would put it that way. He would say
> simply
> > that all experiences are experienced in a way that is immediate and
> > first-person in character, and that this is the only thing that's
> required for
> > an experience to be mine. (I.e., it will feel like it's mine, no matter
> in
> > what brain it appears).
>
> Ok, I think I get it. Well, I do agree with the ethical implications if
> people
> did come to believe it (positive implications), but I do not agree that any
> proof that I've seen is empirical. But it does remind me a bit about
> Schopenhauer, but I did read your link about the Zuboff AMA on reddit, and
> it
> was not quite there as well.
>
> >       To me, it seems like saying something similar to, we all consist
> of the same
> >       elements, therefore we are all the same.
> >
> > That line of thinking has led some to open individualism, but I don't
> > personally find the "one universe" argument particularly convincing.
>
> Well, I mean from one point of view, it's just a definition, so nothing
> magical
> about it. For me, what would be revolutionary, would be empirical proof.


I am curious now to know your stance on the sleeping beauty problem.

I can't remember if I pasted it already or not, but in case I forgot:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sleeping_Beauty_problem


As we
> discussed on our call, also there is the problem of many verbally accepting
> open, acting as if they actually deeply believe in closed.
>
> Oh, and I also liked our idea about open/closed being two sides of the same
> coin. That's an interesting idea as well.
>

Yes it might be something like Copenhagen vs MW, or presentism vs. block
time. Both can be seen as consistent interpretations of the same data, with
the difference being mainly in conceptual simplicity vs. ontological
simplicity.


> >       > Note that a common element, to any sensible definition of
> consciousness, is
> >       > "having a point of view" "having an experience". In other words,
> there is
> >       > something it is like to be that particular conscious thing. All
> conscious
> >       > states, being conscious of something, will have some collection
> of
> >       > immediately-felt first-hand knowledge (of that something that
> happens to
> >       > be conscious of).
> >
> >       I think for the purpose of descriptions, theories and science,
> that first-person
> >       thing, has to go, as per my argument against Nagel above.
> >
> > Are you excising the first-person from reality, or merely from your
> > third-person models of reality? I think that is an important distinction
> to
> > clarify.
>
> Depends on the context and purpose. I am not excising it in the form of
> denying
> that I experience things. But I do excise it when it comes to us
> understanding
> the world and each other. I do think we can understand the world, and each
> other, perfectly well without getting trapped in questions about the
> nature of
> your being you, or someone else experiencing your experiences. So the more
> context, and the more refined the question and the purpose, the easier it
> is to
> distinguish nonsense (or unknowables) from sense (or knowables).
>

Thanks that is clarifying.


> >       I can rephrase that as persons experience things, and act, as if,
> they have
> >       first-person experiences. Better than that I do not think we can
> do. For
> >       ordinary day to day purposes, I do of course talk about my inner
> experiences,
> >       but that does not mean that that is the best way to actually
> describe them or do
> >       research them.
> >
> >       >       I can see how a credible case can be made that every human
> >       >       being has a neuron pattern that gives rise to an I. But
> that is a distinct
> >       >       pattern, unique for every individual.
> >       >
> >       > There's a distinct neural pattern not only for each individual,
> but for each
> >       > individual in each moment in time. If "you" persist across
> variations in that
> >       > neural pattern across moments of your life, what is the essential
> >
> >       True, we can go with that, or mind/body for instance.
> >
> > But where important is that once we enable identification of multiple
> distinct
> > conscious states with the "same person" the door is opened. What is it
> about
> > any neural pattern that makes it mine vs. someone else's? Is it based on
> any
> > intrinsic properties of the experience itself, or only extrinsic
> properties of
> > the history or atoms etc. that happens to be involved in creating the
> > experience? If you start to think about the problem from the perspective
> of
> > only the intrinsic properties, then that tends to lead to open
> individualism.
> > On the other hand, if you go with assuming the relevance of extrinsic
> > properties, this leads to all kinds of trouble with handling various
> scenarios
> > and thought experiments (fission, fusion, split brains, teleporters,
> > duplication machines, black box closets, healing and restoring devices,
> mind
> > uploads and backups, etc.).
>
> I think the simplest, most pragmatic and time saving route here is to
> first of
> all start of with the case that closed is true, as per everyones (or almost
> everyones to be honest) experience.
>

Our experience provides no special evidence favoring closed over open
individualism. They have identical predictions for what we will feel.

Just like both heliocentricism and geocentrism predict the earth will not
feel like it's moving.

Just like both presentism and eternalism predict you will feel like you are
in a single now.

Just like CI and MW predict you will feel like the wave function collapsed.

Both Closed and Open predict each "I" will feel like it is confined to the
neurology of a single creature.

Direct experience carries no weight in any of these examples because their
predictions for your experience is the same.


> The second point is that we have no empirical proof for closed being
> false.


Thought experiments reveal closed leads to logical inconsistencies.

That you're now having any experience at all is itself strong empirical
evidence for the truth of open individualism (closed is, by comparison, so
improbable that it can be dismissed out of hand) -- Much like the
improbability of the universe being fine tuned by luck.

But I know you don't like using inference so this argument probably won't
change your mind.

Nevertheless, I will provide you with this brief proof by Zuboff, and if
you have any objections, or can meet his challenge, I would be most happy
to engage on that:

https://youtu.be/dlVpRncWz8o

Or for more detail:
https://youtu.be/wjjh5tl3fcI




The
> third point is that a lot of thought experiments are impossible, or at the
> god
> like end of technological development, so those can be disregarded at the
> moment.


The utility of thought experiments is they they don't need to be done to be
valuable or instructive.

If you won't consider thought experiments, or accept logical inferences, or
believe probability arguments, you leave little room for further progress
on these problems. Perhaps 90% of philosophy is done using at least one of
these tools.


We need to distinguish between the impossible thought experiments, which
> can be disregarded, and the likely, which are good, and the unlikely.
> However,
> with our current technology, we cannot do mind uploading. Once we are
> there, I
> am certain that we will have advanced science enough to give us a better
> grasp
> on identity and consciousness, and that technology will also open up new
> venues
> for experiences and experiments.
>

Even with mind uploading technology at hand, these same problems will
persist. There's no reason not to reason about them now, since even with
mind uploading technology, we will still have to reason about these
situations. The existence of the technology doesn't itself provide any
further information or answers on these problems. The only question it
would answer is that mind uploading is indeed possible (which we can accept
now if we accept (as 99% of scientists do today) that the brain follows
computable physical laws.

So let's go with the 99% of scientists, assume uploading is physically
possible, and reason about the implications of that possibility so we can
test today's theories and hopefully obtain answers and act on them today
(like deciding whether to freeze one's brain or not).


> So based on where we are so far, and only looking at thought experiments
> and the
> technology we have, I don't see much of a case.
>

A case for what?



> The two most interesting paths for me are the empirical testing with
> substances,
> and if there's any specific day to day life situation that cannot be
> handled
> with the closed theory.
>

Split brains?

The Wada test?

(
https://jcblackmon.com/2018/02/02/the-wada-test-for-philosophers-what-is-it-like-to-be-a-proper-part-of-your-own-brain-losing-and-regaining-other-proper-parts-of-your-brain/
)


> >       > nature/character of the pattern that must exist for you to be
> there in them?
> >       > If it is nothing other than the sense of being an I, being a
> conscious living
> >       > person, having an experience of some kind, then you exist in all
> neural
> >       > patterns of all conscious beings.
> >
> >       I think that is too simplistic. I includes mind and body,
> continuous through
> >       time, which also fits perfectly well with our ordinary experience.
> I think
> >       reducing the definition of the I to having neural pattern,
> basically says
> >       nothing. Different neural patterns correspond with different
> experiences, so I
> >       think there is strong proof for the I being more than a general
> pattern existing
> >       in all human beings. I can of course define I as electrical
> activity in the
> >       brain, and thus we are all I, but that doesn't really say much.
> >
> >       So far, it seems to me, either to be just a matter of trivial
> definition to
> >       which we agree, or wrong.
> >
> > Theories of personal identity are largely definitional theories, but we
> are
> > seeking a definition that is robust and consistent, and makes sense, and
> > ideally can answer questions that are relevant and important to us, like
> which
> > experiences wio I have, why are we here, and why am I me?
>
> What I find more interesting, is if/how the definition, can cause people to
> alter their beliefs and behaviours. Except saints, who experienced
> enlightenment, it seems to me most people in the open camp act as if, they
> are
> closed.
>
> If that could be changed, I think the case for open would improve due to
> pragmatic reasons! I mean... who wouldn't want a method to increase love
> and
> empathy in all human beings? Sounds like a win/win/win to me! =)
>
> On the other hand... there are ways to increase empathy with the closed as
> well
> I imaginem but you see my point I hope!
>

Yes you bring up another important practical aspect of why it is important
to find answers to these problems.



> >       Another thing to keep in mind is the pragmatic angle, we all act
> perfectly well
> >       based on a closed kind, it works well, it is the "naive" first
> impression, and
> >       at the end of the day, there seems to be no empirical evidence for
> anything else
> >       being true, _apart_ from the way of definition.
> >
> > Closed has many problems. It requires overcoming impossible odds for it
> to be
> > true, it has conceptual difficulties with many real-world as well as
>
> I disagree with the probability argument, since it is a single event that
> has
> already happened, and not possible to replicate it in order to yield
> future,
> testable predictions.
>

I had two boxes of 1,000 coins, and accidentally spilled one of them. This
event already happened, and only happened once. It won't be replicated.

You look at the pile of coins and see they all landed heads up.

You have to decide between two possibilities:
A) I spilled the box that was filled with 1,000 double-headed coins.
B) I spilled the box with 1,000 fair coins and by some stroke of incredible
(1 in 2^1024) luck, all happened to land heads up.

Are you justified in concluding it is overwhelmingly more probable that
hypothesis A explains your observations compared to hypothesis B?





> Which real-world scenarios do not work with a closed theory?
>

The cases that fail depend on whether you use bodily or psychological
continuity.



> > imaginable scenarios, it requires additional unnecesssry metaphysical
> > assumptions, and it is unable to give answers for certain questions, and
> it
>
> I think that, like the external world, it requires no assumptions. We have
> no
> choice but to act in the world, the way we are. That means that the only
> thing
> that should give us cause to pause, is falsification and/or evidence for
> that an
> I is not an I.
>

You can say "we have no choice but to act in the world" in reply to any
statement. If I argued in Copernicus's day, that the earth went around the
sun, and you said what does it matter, we have no choice but to act in this
world, and whether the sun goes around the earth or the earth spins makes
no difference to me. I can grow the crops and sell them in the market.

But you see this just avoids the question. It is not a refutation or
argument.


> > also can't handle the anthropic principle in explaining the fine tuning
> of the
> > universe. Like Newtonian physics, it largely works for most day to day
> things,
>
> The anthropic principle has no predictive power, is a tautology, and could
> jsut
> be survivorship bias.


It is a survivorship bias.

So I do not see that as a valid argument, for me at least,
> that closed is wrong. Is there any way to falsify the anthropic principle?
>

It's not about falsifying it. It's that the anthropic principle (or
survivorship bias) doesn't work at all under closed individualism.

In order to say "I will be in whatever universe there is life" is to reason
as if open individualism is true. For it is only open individualism that
puts you anywhere and everywhere there is life.


> >       I find the evolutionary argument interesting. Imagine flower-power
> hippies on
> >       the savannah, identifying and enormously respecting and loving the
> lions and
> >       other predators, and they won't remain alive for long.
> >
> > Right. ��
> >
> >       Evolution being smart, said... hold it! let's make sure the guys
> care about
> >       themselves, and thus evolved the closed "view" and it became the
> default, since
> >       it generated humans with barriers, afraid for their own lives,
> thus highly
> >       motivated to run away from lions.
> >
> >       But I guess we then run into the language barrier. We have a test,
> where
> >       participants get to trip, and after the trip they also describe
> something
> >       sounding like open, but does that feeling and experience prove
> anything? At most
> >       it proves that due to the trip, they become more loving and
> passionate, it also
> >       seems to indicate, that their own subjective experience would
> align, for the
> >       duration of the trip, with something closer to open, than closed.
> But then they
> >       revert.
> >
> > Some revert. For others it has a lasting or permanent effect.
>
> Do you have any references or links for lasting effects? You know I'm a
> sucker
> for empiricism, so that would be good reading!
>

This is just from some casual googling:

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3537171/

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0149763417303019?via%3Dihub#
!

https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/235232


> > That they cannot articulate the experience to others nor justify the
> logic of
> > their realization is why theories of personal identity are important if
> we are
> > to ever objectively establish the truth of their experience.
>
> I think it is not possible, since the experience lies beyond the world. I
> do
> think we can learn to generate similar experiences by chemical or
> neurological
> means, and even though that still doesn't prove the content of the
> experience,
> it _does_ allow us to possibly shift our own beliefs, and lead better
> lives for
> it.
>
> This is a good point for me at least, when it comes to investigating the
> path to
> the open world!
>

��


> >       Are expert meditators and buddhas permanently in "open" mode? Did
> they in fact
> >       "deactivate" the closed switch?
> >
> > I think that is the state that enlightenment / moksha / nirvana all
> describe.
> > It is described as a realization in which one transcends the convenrional
> > conception of self and recognizing a oneness with all other beings.
>
> True. Transpersonal psychology might yield some interesting reading here!
> =)
>
> >       Another thing came to mind as well, and that was Schopenhauer. I
> mentioned it to
> >       you, but his starting point is the will to live. The "life force"
> and he argues
> >       that the "spark" or life force is the same in all living things,
> we are after
> >       all, linked by cause and effect, and through the tree of life,
> back to our very
> >       first ancestor.
> >
> >       If you then define our unique "core" as this spark, that has been
> passed on for
> >       aeons, you can then by definition argue that all life is related
> and the same,
> >       it's the same spark.
> >
> > That may be true, but it's not the primary point made by open
> individualism,
> > which is that I am literally seeing the world through Daniel's eyes as I
> am
> > seeing the world through Jason's eyes.
>
> True. I read the Zuboff AMA, it was explained there.
>


Nice! That is good feedback that you found his AMA helpful in understanding
his views.


> >       Ah, so you don't buy "my" version of Occam above? ;)
> >
> > No, sadly. ;-)
>
> ;)
>
> >       > A theory of personal identity shouldn't shy away from problems
> just because
> >       > they are rare, or edge cases.
> >
> >       True, but is brain damage an edge case? It's like having a theory
> for a machine,
> >       and then complain that the theory doesn't work when the machine is
> broken, isn't
> >       it?
> >
> > I see it more like having Newtonian mechanics and finding it works
> pretty well
> > for most things, then finding it fails for situations with very strong
> gravity
> > or at relativistic speeds.
>
> That is also good take on it. I see your point there.
>
> >       >       > Open individualism says you remain present in both --
> the apparent disunion is
> >       >       > due only to a lack of integration between the
> hemispheres. Should they be
> >       >       > connected in the future, they would become integrated,
> and again feel as one
> >       >       > mind.
> >       >       >
> >       >       > What would closed individualism say would happen?
> >       >
> >       >       I think the question can be rephrased in terms of
> neuroscience and psychology.
> >       >
> >       > Neither of those subjects deal with personal identity though.
> >
> >       Depends on how it is defined, and in what language it is defined.
> Maybe that is
> >       the best we can do?
> >
> > I don't think neuroscience or psychology are traditionally much
> interested in
> > questions involving teletransporters or mind uploading, etc. But perhaps
> that
> > will change at some point, and one of those fields will try to answer
> > questions of personal identity.
>
> I think uploading is closer than teletransporter. And this is one of my
> points.
> Once science progresses, neuroscience and psychology might surprise us
> with what
> they find out!
>

I think mind uploading gets us (effective) transporters pretty quickly.
Once we can upload then "e-mail" or FTP becomes a way to teleport our
uploaded minds from one system to another (or from one robot body to
another).


> >       Haha, maybe. ;) I could also adopt the approach of sticking with
> closed, until
> >       empirical evidence of any other version, or theory presents
> itself. Would that
> >       be agnosticism? Or actually, maybe that would be the agnostic
> physicalism, or
> >       the physicalist agnosticism from before? ;)
> >
> > Not sure.
>
> >       It would be a great "addon" or complementary principle, I do agree
> with that!
> >       Many people who have not thought a lot about capitalism, beyond
> the parody
> >       presented in the popular press, become very surprised when I tell
> them about the
> >       take on it, that it is in fact, the only system we have devised
> that transforms
> >       our innate egoism into benefits for everyone. I think it is quite
> a beautiful
> >       creation, or emergent phenomenon!
> >
> >       > converts self interest into an interest in helping and in
> reducing harm for
> >       > all others. It could help end war, starvation, abuse, etc. as
> many have noted.
> >       > In effect, open individualism makes the idea of "karma" / "the
> golden rule"
> >       > vividly real.
> >
> >       Well, I don't know if I agree about karma, but I do agree with the
> golden rule.
> >
> > Karma in the sense that all the good you do for others comes back to
> you, and
> > all the harm you cause others comes back to you. This is trivially true
> under
> > open individualism, for you are all those other people you do good for or
> > harm.
>
> Well, in psychology reciprocity is probably as close to Karma as I am
> willing to
> go. But across births... no, not for me.
>
> > You as well!
>
> Thank you Jason, and let me wish you a pleasant evening!
>


Thanks so much Daniel. This was a long one! Finally made it to the end. ��

Have a good night.

Jason
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