[ExI] The Problem of Mental Causation

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 3:06 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 2:14 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 30, 2025 at 1:35 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> If you were just an automaton not responsible for your actions or
>>> beliefs, you would not be having the thought that you were not responsible.
>>>
>>
>> What distinguishes an automaton from a human brain operating according to
>> deterministic physics? I think that is another important question. Is it
>> the capacity for thought?
>>
>
> What is thought?
>

That's perhaps the deepest question of all.


>
> Some human brains express, through language, an attitude that they are
> automatons.
>

Could you define what you mean by an automaton? Do you mean something that
is not conscious?


> If one chooses to act like an automaton, what - besides lack of skill at
> the imitation - can distinguish such a person from an automaton?
>

The answer to this comes down to the definition of automaton, but if by
automaton you mean something that is not conscious, then distinguishing an
automaton from something that is conscious requires the existence and
identification of behaviors for which consciousness is necessary for their
reliable performance.

Below is a list of potential examples that I have considered:

   - Noticing
   - Paying attention
   - Dreaming
   - Becoming anesthetized
   - Hallucinating
   - Giving in to torture
   - Describing how one feels
   - Making phenomenal judgements
   <https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Conscious_Mind/0fZZQHOfdAAC?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PA176&printsec=frontcover&dq=%22I%E2%80%99m%20having%20a%20red%20sensation%20now.%22>
   - Inventing a new theory of consciousness

Jason
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