[ExI] A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Feb 22, 2025, 6:20 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, 20 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > I think the word "belief" has too many extra connotations that are
> confusing
> > and obscuring our conversation. I think it may help you re-read my email
> as if
> > you had done a find/replace to change "belief" to "something you bet is
> true".
> >
> > I don't mean anything else beyond that when I use the word.
>
> I think that is a a step in the right direction.
>
> >       But wouldn't it be stretching it a bit, saying that the robot must
> believe in
> >       its goals? The goals are hardcoded into the entity, so no belief
> is necessary.
> >
> > If it's acting strictly according to it's programming (like a
> thermostat) then
> > I would say it's not acting rationally, it's just responding
> mechanically,
> > and/or just an instrument to express the things the programmer "bets are
> > true."
>
> Hm, I think it would make sense to say that a robot might act rationally,
> in
> line with its programming. In the same way, perhaps a human can be said to
> act
> (somewhat) rationally in responding to feelings and (some) instincts,
> which are
> deeply ingrained rules, that do not require betting on them to be true.
> They are
> not even processed at the conscious level.
>

If they are instinctual, or mechanical then I think you are right, one can
act without ideas. I think I was too strong when I said the are necessary
to act in the world.

I should have qualified my statement to "act rationally in the world".

Rational thought and action are what Aristotle believed separated man from
lower animals. I don't think humans are the only species capable of
rational thought, but we are perhaps most capable of it: in allowing ideas
(rather than instinct) drive behavior.



> If I program something, I essentially code instructions about how the
> program
> (or the robots) should behave in certain situations. In the same way,
> evolution
> I guess programmed drives, instincts and some goals, into our organism.
> One day,
> self-consciousness appeared, the mind overtook the body, and changed a
> lot. I
> guess what I am saying is that there are different levels. On some level,
> a bet
> that a thing is true is not necessary, it is just a cause and an effect in
> the
> organism, such as pain for instance. If betting would be part of the
> process,
> the response would be less useful for us.
>
> On a higher level, betting things are true, can definitely be true. I
> think the
> key difference here between the scientists and the "betters" is the
> continuous
> feedback loop between reality and the bet of the scientists, that make them
> revise or change their bets, or discard their bets completely.
>

I think you are still letting your concept of belief bleed into the concept
of people acting on ideas they bet to be true. Scientists bet their ideas
are true, and ordinary people update their bets on the fact of new evidence.

A person finds the cookie jar empty and has the idea that their roommate
ate them. It is their leading hypothesis, an idea they have credence in, it
is an idea they bet to be true.

They check the nanny cam footage and find their dog figured out how to get
into the cookie jar. They updated the idea they bet was true in light of
this new evidence.

Upon closer examination they find the timestamps of the files don't line
up, and shadows of the dog appear to be shadows of a person, they then
suspect the other roommate, a computer hacker and prankster stole the
cookies and edited the footage to make the dog look guilty.

Again the hypothesis is updated in the face of evidence.

One doesn't need to be a scientist to be rational, one must only be a human
who has ideas whose degree of credence is updatable in the face of new
evidence.

(You can see how awkward language becomes without a single word for an
idea/hypothesis that one bets is true/has credence for).


> I think perhaps the essence of this discussion are these types of nuances,
> and
> depending on how you spell them out, I think some common ground can be
> found. I
> think the original choice of word, belief, maybe caused some unnecessary
> confusion?
>
> >       > It is only when an entity need never act in the world that it's
> free to
> >       > operate without any beliefs.
> >
> >       I think from a theoretical point of view, that an entity being in
> the world or
> >       not is irrelevant, I think the key word here is "act".
> >
> > Yes. Action is the key.
>
> Agreed!
>
> > A fully impotent entity is free to remain agnostic on all topics and has
> > infinite time to collect and consider new evidence to update its
> assessments
> > on probable ideas.
> >
> > For example, say there is some experimental medicine that may work or
> its side
> > effects may outweigh its benefits. If one doesn't have the disease they
> can
> > behave as a true agnostic, and continue to analyze new data as it
> continues
> > coming in. But if one gets the disease then they are forced to a decision
> > point: to make a bet on whether they think it's worth the risk or not,
> given
> > all the data presently available. It is a departure from pure
> agnosticism once
> > one takes action, by "making a bet" on what they think is true.
>
> I'd say yes and no. The reason is that in your example, there is a
> feedback loop
> between the real world and the organism and the effect of the medicine. I
> agree,
> if I do not care, I can remain agnostic on whether a specific medicine has
> an
> effect or not, if I try it, I will gain knowledge about the world, it
> either did
> or did not, and as far as that medicine goes, I am no longer agnostic, but
> have
> performed an experiment on myself.
>

But that's a future version of you who gains that information. For the
person sitting in the office, who has to make a choice on a procedure that
will either cure them or kill them, and it has an unknown, but estimated
probability of curing them, one must act accordingly to what they currently
think (or bet) to be true. I.e., is this medicine more likely to cure me,
or kill me?

Life is like poker, in that it is a partial information game. Sometimes we
are forced to decision points, and we must act on incomplete information.
Sometimes the ideas we held as probably true are revealed to have been
wrong, even when one plays l the game perfectly and considers all prior
information one had, one can still be wrong.

The rational player, or scientist is not immune to this. But they are less
susceptible to it than the dogmatic thinker, the person driven entirely by
instinct, or the irrational person, who does not form ideas they bet to be
true according to the information at hand.



> If, however, we move from a medicine to god, (and here I'm thinking of the
> classical, postulated bearded man in the sky) there is no way to ever
> prove it
> based on how it is defined, so there I would forever remain an agnostic.
>

There are ways to prove or disprove such Gods.

You can disprove them by showing the way the idea is defined to be
logically inconsistent (e.g., in showing a logical incompatibility in being
simultaneously omniscient and omnipotent).

Alternatively, you might find evidence for the existence of superior beings
beyond this universe by finding evidence that the particular constants of
this universe are fine-tuned, which implies either that this universe was
designed OR that there is a vast number of universes with different laws.

If the latter, then there are universes more suited to greater forms of
life than ours, and we get superior beings beyond our universe:

"Most sets of values would give rise to universes that, although they might
be very beautiful, would contain no one able to wonder at that beauty. One
can take this either as evidence of a divine purpose in Creation and the
choice of the laws of science or as support for the strong anthropic
principle."
-- Stephen Hawking in “A Brief History of Time” (1988)

"We can imagine universes that might be more propitious. These of course
would be potentialities far beyond the powers of our brains to conceive,
but we can’t assume in this grander cosmos that there couldn’t be other
universes displaying more complexity than ours."
-- Sir Martin Rees in “What We Still Don’t Know: Are We Real?” (2004)


I don't think you would call Hawking or Rees dogmatic thinkers.
Nevertheless they don't shy away from entertaining these hypotheses,
despite flying so near to what you might consider religious topics. So I
say, let science go anywhere, let it refine and bring closer to truth, all
our ideas, including ideas about God, souls, and places beyond this
universe.


> Another scenario, is the scenario of time. Regardless of my position as an
> agnostic or not, I have no choice but to exist in time, and to exist in the
> world. I can of course choose to end it, but barring that, I am naturally
> exposed to it regardless of if I want it or not. Time passes, the material
> world
> exist in the same way it existed yesterday. That opens avenues for the
> agnostic
> about the world. I exist in it, I don't actively cause it to happen to me,
> I
> think this is an interesting difference.
>
> I can act throughout my day, without having to bet that it is true that I
> act
> throughout my day, because I do not choose to make time pass or the world
> to
> exist.
>
> > I understand. Hopefully you have no such reservations over my new phrase.
>
> I like it much better!
>
> >       Experiencing pleasure can be measured. Pleasure is also a feeling,
> that is...
> >       pleasurable, regardless of your belief about it. I would argue,
> that I might
> >       then be said to have choosen a goal, or I might have the idea that
> this feeling
> >       should continue. But calling it a belief I think is too strong a
> word,
> >       especially since I experience it, and to some extent can measure
> it.
> >
> > True. You can imagine something like a fruit fly that mates because it
> finds
> > pleasure in it, and not for any rational consideration or weighing of
> > evidence.
> >
> > I raised this topic to answer Keith's question, of why I think humans act
> > according to things they bet to be true but can't prove. Namely, I think
> this
> > is a behavior required for rational thought generally: (developing ideas
> that
> > one would bet to be true, and while, in the face of that uncertainty,
> taking
> > action as if those ideas were known to be true).
>
> Hmm, I again get the feeling that this would align beautifully with the
> hypothesis/idea crowd. The only difference being the feedback loop with
> experience. When it comes to lacking that feedback loop, I do think people
> can
> remain agnostic about it, since it won't affect their life in anyway if
> there is
> no feedback loop of experience.
>

The feedback loops is necessary to refine one's beliefs over time. That is
the definition of science.

But my statement was limited to the times one must act accordingly to ones
present assumptions, which is not science (it is almost the opposite), for
while science acknowledges it never provides the truth, only a technique to
approach it over time, when one acts according to an assumed truth, one
acts as if one knows what the truth is.

This is a necessary compromise as beings who don't have infinite time, and
must make decisions at times when we have incomplete information.



> Eternal doubt I think has proven to be a dead end, so I personally am
> content to
> trust my senses that the real world is true, until someone proves it is
> not, or
> shows me what else would be there instead of the real world. Uncertainty,
> is a
> good thing and should be embraced.
>

I can't square the beginning of the paragraph with the end.

Shouldn't it be better to remain uncertain whether we are in a simulation
or not? What is the advantage of jumping to a conclusion?



> >       Compare that with belief in god, and finding god as a goal, and I
> think the word
> >       belief here does us a disservice.
> >
> > I don't understand God as a goal.
>
> I was thinking about finding or experiencing union with god as a goal,
> which is
> something at the core of the lives of many mystics. But I think this is
> perhaps
> a dead end, since with your revised definition, I think we'er doing much
> better.
> This example will only lead to confusion.
>


Okay thank you for that clarification.


> > Is there another more convenient word you would use for those "ideas you
> bet are true"?
>
> A testable hypothesis?
>

I don't think this captures what I am describing.

There's a difference between a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is
false, and a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is true.

Namely, that if and when someone must make a decision involving that
hypothesis, they must weigh their degree of credence in that hypothesis.
This is distinction not captured by being a hypothesis that's testable.

For this one needs a word like, assumption, position, an idea with
credence, an idea one thinks is true, an idea one bets is true.



> >       > Some beliefs may be arrived at rationally, others may be inborn,
> but any
> >       > goal-directed action requires at least one belief (that one
> outcome is
> >       > preferable to another).
> >
> >       If it is inborn, why would it be a belief and not a biological
> fact?
> >
> >       Goal-directed actions, based on biological facts, seem to me, not
> to be based on
> >       beliefs, but just on inborn hard coded preferences such as the
> will to live. In
> >       most healthy humans, the will to live is inborn, and I would find
> it strange to
> >       talk about that being a belief in life.
> >
> > For humans, the will to live is at least partially based on the bet that
> life
> > is preferable to death. For someone who is suffering, they may come to
> the
> > opposite conclusion, and that alternate bet they would make (that
> different
> > idea), could lead them to prefer to die.
>
> True. I think I mentioned it somewhere that a healthy human system has a
> will to
> live, that is hard coded. So imagine children, they just "act" and live,
> and
> enjoy life, and I would find it implausible that they consciously would
> bet on
> life being preferable to death. For many grown up humans I would argue the
> same.
>
> I do acknowledge that for sick humans, or philosophers ;) this question is
> consciously pondered from time to time. But our minds have gained control
> over
> our bodies and instincts. But my point is that there is a basic instinct
> to life
> that is hard coded, that would be an example of a "directive" that does not
> require us betting on it to be true.
>

I didn't think one needs to be sick or a philosopher. Consider a king who
is about to be captured by enemies and takes a painless poison to avoid
torture. Or someone in a burning building with no path of escape besides a
leap from a high window. These are rational decisions made by healthy
mindsin bad positions, weighing probable futures for different courses of
action and ultimately choosing to override the immediate biological
imperative to keep living. It is the essence of rational thinking (letting
thoughts and ideas drive behavior rather instinct).



> >       >       I do not see science as a tool to refine my religion. I
> have no religion. I have
> >       >       ideas about values, that are to some extent rooted in
> pleasure, as in long-term
> >       >       contentment (let me just add to avoid common
> misconceptions of hedonism).
> >       >       Science for me, is a tool that can help us promote this
> goal, and ideally, do
> >       >       that for as many people as possible.
> >       >
> >       > Surely you hold some beliefs, including those that you can't
> justify with
> >       > science or reason.
> >
> >       Sadly we are irrational creatures, so I am 100% certain of it. ;)
> >
> > Do you bet there is no afterlife?
>
> I refrain from betting. Regardless of if I want to or not, I'll get the
> answer
> eventually, so there's no need for me to think about it, and I can safely
> disregard the question. =)
>

Let's say someone offered to pay to freeze the brain of you and all your
family members when they die. Would you accept the deal or reject it?

Does your decision not (at least partially) depend on whether or not you
bet there is an afterlife?



> > Do you bet there is no God?
>
> I really don't care, since I regardless of if that were true or not,
> (ceteris
> paribus) it would make no difference what so ever in my life.
>

It could make a difference to your afterlife (which is an extension of your
life) and hence would be part of what you consider your life.



> > Do you bet there are no universes but this one?
>
> If no information can flow, and no proof ever be found, it is nothing to
> me.
>

Causal interaction is one way to find evidence, but it is not the only way.
Consider these theories, none of which are based on information flows,
nonetheless we have strong evidence for them, are accepted by most
scientists in that field, and they imply other universes:

- Cosmic inflation (explains several key mysteries of the big bang),
implies big bangs occur eternally throughout an ever inflating cosmos.

- Anthropic fine tuning (explains why the physical constants happen to fall
just within the narrow ranges that allow life to exist in this universe),
implies a great plethora of dead universes with different laws and
constants. Ours is one of the lucky few to support life.


You might say "well what do they matter to us?"

Consider: we, in our universe, are visible to those in other universes
capable of simulating ours. Just as we can, from our vantage point, peer in
to see gliders flying in the game of life universe.

As such, they could, in principle, copy you into their universe, they could
interview you, put your consciousness in a robot body to move about in
theirs, etc. And so, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself
there, in those other universes you thought could not reach you.




> > Do you bet robots could be conscious?
>
> I think robots could become conscious, depending on the definition of
> conscisousness of course. Philosophical issues aside, I believe, in time,
> that
> we'll be able to create something indistinguishavle from consciousness.
>

What observational evidence is this conclusion based on?


> > Do you bet you are not in a simulated world?
>
> Absent proof, do not care, and refrain from betting.
>

I am glad to see this stance. In the past, it had seemed to me you made a
firm commitment that we were not in a simulation.



> > These are all in the realm of religious ideas, whether you take a pro or
> con
> > stance. The only escape from having bets on these ideas is pure
> non-committal
> > agnosticism: not willing to bet one way or the other. But it is hard to
> truly
>
> I agree. I think agnosticism is a good choice here.
>

��


> > avoid taking actions that expose your having a bias or opinion one way
> or the
> > other. For example, do you choose to freeze your brain or not, do you
> oppose
> > your child marrying a robot or not, do you pray for a safe landing or
> not,
> > etc.
>
> Oh yes, we are partly irrational creatures, so bugs will always creep into
> our
> reasoning caused by hard coded instincts, that saved us ages ago, but are
> no
> longer relevant, or due to emotions, or lack of knowledge etc. But as long
> as we
> know, we can improve and change our models.
>

My point all along (e.g. to Keith) is that this is a feature not a bug.

As agents acting within a time-sensitive environment, actions must be taken
with incomplete information. Sometimes decisions will be made based on
ideas that turn out to be wrong. But being wrong doesn't make one
irrational, acting according to ideas whose credence can be updated in the
light of new information is the *essence* of rational behavior.

So to answer Keith's question of why people have beliefs (ideas that may be
right or wrong, but which we bet to be true (i.e. hypotheses we have
credence in)) my answer is that is necessary for rational action, indeed it
is how I would define rational action.



> >       > 1. A belief in an external reality beyond your consciousness
> (non solipsism)
> >
> >       No, for me that is a fact, per G.E. Moores here's a hand. I also
> like to shift
> >       the burden of proof. Since all evidence points towards and
> external world, and
> >       since no one in the history of philosophy has produced proof of
> something else,
> >       for me, the external world is what is. Should proof present
> itself, that we are
> >       in fact luminous soul beings, or simulations, I would revise my
> idea or
> >       hypothesis.
> >
> > All observations you take as evidence for the hypothesis of an external
> > reality is equally consistent as evidence for the hypothesis there are
> only
> > your conscious thoughts of external reality, or that we're in a
> simulation.
> > This includes observations of G.E. Moore's hands.
>
> I don't agree. I think a material universe, is the easiest and most natural
> explanation.


Note that here you are using a metaphysical assumption (that simpler
universes are more probable than more complex universes): Occam's razor.

I agree with this metaphysical assumption.

But note that this probability reasoning does not help escape the
simulation hypothesis or Boltzmann brains.

- The simulation hypothesis is based on the idea that one primitive
(physical) universe can spawn a vast number of (simulated) universes. So
even if the primitive universe is simpler, being simpler doesn't
necessarily make up for the huge number of simulated universes.

- The Boltzmann brain hypothesis is based on a thermodynamic model that
says it's vastly more probable for a single small object to spontaneously
pop into existence than for a vast low entropy system to pop into existence
(e.g., our big bang). In fact it is so much more probable, that it is even
more likely for a conscious human brain, with order and false memories,
etc. to pop into existence than the big bang universe we think we are in.
That's what a Boltzmann brain is.


So while I sympathize and agree with your notion that simpler explanations
are more likely, what is more or less likely depends on still further
assumptions. That is why these vexing problems remain and we haven't been
able to reach any final conclusion.

Scientists and philosophers still debate these ideas, despite the near
universal acceptance of the metaphysical principal of Occam's razor.


I have never seen or encountered anything that has shown that a
> simulation is in progress, so I'm afraid I disagree here.
>

According to the Church-Turing thesis, no program can determine its
hardware. So it is certain that if we were a simulation, and the simulators
wanted to hide that fact from us, there would be no way for us to tell.

This is the analogy: when you run Mario Brothers in a NES emulator, the
game has no way to tell it is running in an emulator, rather than kn
direct, real, original NES hardware. From the perspective of the game
software, it has no way to know.

The same is true if this simulation is closed from external interaction. No
test we can perform (from the inside) will distinguish a raw physical
universe from a simulated physical universe.


> > I thought you were agnostic. ;-)
>
> Well... maybe I'm a bad agnostic? ;) Jokes aside, I think I'm agnostic
> when it
> comes to meta-questions, "outside" reality. I am not agnostic when it
> comes to
> questions "inside" reality, because there is a feedback loop there with
> experience.
>

What about when we experience a quantum computers factor a number with
10,000 digits, a number so large all the atoms in this universe could never
factor that number given all the time from now to the heat death?

Would this then be an inside experience that justifies belief in the
outside (the quantum multiverse)?


> So depending on the frame of reference, and I guess I'm either agnostic
> (see
> above) or a type of materialist/physicalist open to revise my opinion
> about the
> world in the face of new evidence.
>
> Of course, as limited beings, there are naturally plenty of things we are
> all
> agnostic about.
>
> >       But for me _personally_ calling it belief would be the last thing
> I would do.
> >
> > Let's just say that you bet there is an external reality.
>
> I don't actually have to bet. External reality is what happens to me,
> regardless
> of if I try or not. But I have no yet encountered any proof to the
> contrary, so
> I feel justified in my agnosticism. Since external reality is the default
> that
> happens to us, from a certain point of view, the person claiming that this
> reality does not exist, instead of x, y, z, is the one who would then give
> proof. Absent that proof, I don't see how it would commit me.
>

We have access to conscious experience only. All else is an inference.

I, like you, make the bet that something beyond that conscious experience
is responsible for that conscious experience. And by gathering evidence, we
can start developing hypotheses for what that external reality might be.

But we shouldn't leap to the conclusion we already know what external
reality is, just because it seems to our senses to be a certain thing. That
is the kind of argument that justified the belief that the earth was still
while everything else moved around it "everyone can plainly see it doesn't
*feel* like the earth is moving".

We have to be willing to abandon what seems so obvious to our senses if we
are to be fully rational. We must be willing to question all assumptions,
especially those that seem so obvious.



>
> >       Then there is also the special case of the hard coded preference
> for life, which
> >       to me, is a biological fact, and does not require belief (in
> healthy cases, of
> >       course if the system gets damaged sad things can happen).
> >
> > If it were truly hard coded, rather than based on ideas, then people
> wouldn't
> > commit suicide to escape pain or for the promise of a better afterlife.
>
> That's why I said "if the system gets damaged". Sorry for being unclear.
> Instincts misfire, the mind is getting more and more power over the body,
> and
> sometimes, due to some freak mutation or illness, the system gets out of
> whack,
> and such things happen. I would argue though, that these are niche cases,
> and
> not the majority case.
>

I don't know that it's thaylt niche. I think a good majority of people
might choose an earlier death rather than a longer life filled with pain.

This is evidence that higher level thinking can and does overriding
biological imperatives.


> > I am only aware of only one other species that commits suicide,
> dolphins. To
> > me this suggests that we are species whose "ideas we would bet as being
> true,"
> > are capable of overriding biological drives.
>
> My interpretation would be that the higher the level of consciousness, the
> more
> "unstable" the system, and the more prone it is to override.
>

I don't think instability is necessary involved. But I would agree with the
principle that the more complex the system, the more failure modes it has.


> >       > 2. A belief that you will experience future events in your life
> (rather than
> >       > "you" being confined to this singular moment in time)
> >
> >       I'd call that a fact, based on empirical experience.
> >
> > We have no experience of experiencing more than one moment in time. We
> only
> > have memories of the past, with anticipation for experiencing future
> moments.
>
> I don't have to believe it, it happens without me even trying. Sorry, I do
> not
> have to bet on experiencing future states, it just happens.
>

But is it the you-now who experiences tomorrow, or is that the you-morrow
who experiences that future time?

You think that you have experienced multiple points in time, but this is
merely a deeply instilled instinctual belief/intuition.

>From your present vantage point, you have access to only a single
thought-moment.

You will think: "Ha, but I need only wait a second and then I will find
myself in another thought-moment."

But then you are again, only in a single thought moment. Are you the same
thing that experienced the thought moment from a second ago? Clearly you
have some memory of that previous time, but alas, you find you are no
longer experiencing things exactly as you were then, your conscious state
is now different.

How long does one persist in each present moment? A second, a day, a month?
If it were a billion years, would you notice? What if it was forever? Could
it then be that each conscious experience of each conscious moment exists
forever in its place in time?

Surely this is wrong. The present moment must stop existing and a new
future moment must come into existence, in order to experience the flow of
time. But then notice the error in this reasoning:

If the present moment is presumed to be the only time that exists, and no
other time (past or future) exists, then the one single present moment is
all that need exist to provide the experience of time's flow. For the
existence or non existence of other points in time in no way affects the
state of present moment nor how conscious beings within that moment feel.

So whether only on point in time exists, or all points in time exists
eternally, all the beings in all those points in time feel the same.

Empirical observations can't prove some other version of you is not still
in those other points in time forever.




> > But note that we can't empirically distinguish "empty individualism" (we
> each
> > exist as only a single moment) from closed individualism (we experience
> all
> > moments in our lives) from open individualism (we all experience all
> moments
> > of all lives).
>
> Could you elaborate? I find it pretty clear that I experience all moments
> in my
> life and not a single moment or experiences everyones lives.


Based on what? Memory?

You have no memory of that breakfast you ate 5 years ago. But someone
experienced it vividly.

Memory is not a reliable indicator of what experiences are yours. If you
can have an experience that you forget completely, how do you rule out
having previously had the experiences of all the other people that came
before you were born?

How do we know that having a particular body or brain is as unimportant to
having an experience as the shirt you happen to be wearing? You would, I
think agree, that you would still be 100% conscious of this moment weather
you put on a green shirt or a red shirt today. The shirt is an unimportant
contingency for you being conscious of this here and now.

But it could also be that wearing a particular body and having a particular
brain are similar kinds of unnecessary contingencies, which don't stand in
the way of you being conscious of those perspectives too.

So I ask, what contingencies matter for being conscious? What particular
atoms (if any) have to be around you for you to have consciousness?


Here I
> misunderstand you a bit, I'm certain.
>
> > If this question could be settled empirically, this wouldn't be an open
> > problem in the philosophy of personal identity.
>
> Maybe for some, it has? ;)
>

Here is a video that might help highlight the issue:

https://youtu.be/mTLHoWuEM5s

(Disclosure: I had a role in putting this video together)



> >       Sure, someone might come up with an iron clad proof of why this
> does not
> >       happen, we are a simulation, time is an illusion, and all events
> happen
> >       at the same time, and the arrow of time is just our way to make
> sense of
> >       them, but so far nothing has been presented to give me the idea
> that
> >       time does not exist.
> >
> > The question of what experiences are yours, I see as entirely separate
> from
> > the question of the reality or objectivity of the passage of time.
> >
> > On the topic of time, special relativity essentially proves that there
> is no
> > objective present nor any objective passage of time. Relativity proves
> the
> > notion of "block time" in the philosophy of time.
>
> This is interesting. I asked my friendly neighbourhood AI about this, and
> he
> said (duck.ai Llama 3.3 70B) that:
>
> "It's essential to note that special relativity does not entirely
> eliminate the
> concept of an objective passage of time. While the measurement of time
> intervals
> and the simultaneity of events may be relative, the theory still maintains
> a
> notion of causality, which implies that cause precedes effect in all
> inertial
> frames. This means that, despite the relativity of time, there is still an
> underlying structure to the universe that governs the sequence of events."
>
> Do you think this is true? And since I am not a physicist, I make no
> claim, but
> just wanted to bring this to your attention.
>


It is true they there remains a consistent notion of causality embedded
within the 4D structure of spacetime, but it is wrong when it says
relativity remains consistent with an objective passage of time.

See this for a more detailed explanation of why relativity is incompatible
with a passage of time:
https://philpapers.org/rec/PETITA


> >       > 3. A belief that physical laws that have held will continue to
> hold (a belief in empiricism)
> >
> >       This for me, follows the same logic as the material world. These
> are just
> >       different examples of the same thing. I do not need to believe in
> a material
> >       world, it is just a fact, as much as it is a fact that my hand is
> here, and thus
> >       there is at least one external thing.
> >
> > The world can exist as a material world that works according to laws,
> but how
> > do we empirically test whether we are in a universe whose laws say:
> >
> > 1. The speed of light is c for all time.
> > 2. The speed of light is c for the
> > first 15 billion years, then becomes 2c thereafter.
> >
> > There are no observations that prove the laws are immutable. The best we
> can
> > do is verify that they haven't changed from the last time we measured
> them.
>
> Good enough for me. Show me the proof, and we'll revise to 2c. If that
> situation
> can never be achieved, and if we can never prove it, for me, it's nothing.
>

I think you're missing my argument. I am not saying it is 2c, I am saying
there is no empirical evidence that laws remain constant.

We can base such beliefs only by way of metaphysical assumptions regarding
the higher probability of universes having simpler laws. But not by way of
empirical (scientific/observational) evidence.


> >       Prove me wrong, or even better, prove a different dimension and
> I'll gladly
> >       revise my position.
> >
> > Your example proves only that there is an experience of a hand. But you
> can't
> > know if it's the result of a material hand, a dream of a hand, a virtual
> > reality game, a simulated reality, an implanted memory of a hand, an
> Boltzmann
> > brain false experience of a hand, etc.
>
> I'm entirely satisfied with my conclusion and experience of the material
> world
> supported by my body and empirical experience.
>


Consider this analogy:

Evertt sees the double slit experiment and says "See, the electron ended up
here, this is evidence the universe split, and we ended up in the branch
where the electron went left rather than right."

Bohr sees the same outcome, and says "See, the electron ended up here, this
is evidence the wave function collapsed at random and the electron went
left rather than right."

When the same observation is compatible with both theories, you can't count
it as evidence only supporting the theory you favor.

I think when you say I see my hand, therefore external reality is a
primitive physical reality and not a simulation, and not a Boltzmann brain
experience, you are ignoring the fact that such observations can also be
found in simulations and Boltzmann brains.

If you want to justify your belief in primitive physical reality as the
more likely account of your experience, not sophisticated evidence or
arguments are needed, I think. For example, showing why one of those cases
is more or less probable.


> If you have proof of simulation, by all means... until then, I continue to
> act,
> and regardless of my ideas or bets, the world still happens, and science
> marches
> along.
>
> > If you think you can know with (near) certainty which of these
> explanations is
> > true, I would like to know how. You could answer the simulation
> hypothesis,
> > for example, using that method.
>
> My answer, is that I don't need to. ;) Reality and the material world
> happens to
> me. Science works, my stuff is in the same place when I wake up. So I only
> need
> to continue my life, as planned, and should someone present me a proof
> that the
> world is a simulation, I will calmly check it (if I can) and then I'd be
> living
> in a simulated world.
>

Ontology is a subject that doesn't interest everyone, but I see it as
important because so many other questions depend on it:

"It is possible to think that one cannot answer any question if one cannot
answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing. How can
we know why something is (or should be) a certain way if we don’t know why
there is anything at all? Surely this is the first philosophical question
that has to be answered."
-- Robert Nozick in “Philosophical Explanations” (1981)

What exists and why, relates to our deepest questions concerning our place
and role in reality.

You think: I can flip a switch, and the light turns on, so what does it
matter if this is a physical universe or a simulation?

But if it is a simulation, we can ask still deeper questions: is this a
special time or place, is this a life I chose to live for some reason, is
this a pivotal historic moment that is being studied or gamed out? What
will I awaken to (or as) when this simulation is over? Am I a descendant of
humanity or an alien that came upon a barren earth in 1,000,000 A.D.?

Many scientific theories point to an infinite cosmos where all
possibilities are realized somewhere and somewhen. I think the that these
possibilities are worth considering.

Consider: even if only 1 instance of you in a billion is due to a
simulation, then when you die the 999,999,999 copies of you living as
primitive physical version will die, but the one that lives will be the one
in the simulation. It is the only thing you can experience as your next
conscious experience, so it is the only thing you will experience after you
die.

Again, that justifies thinking about the simulation hypothesis.




> At the end of the day, anything could be, god could exist, this world
> could be a
> simulation, or none of us could exist, the words you write, might be a
> childrens
> book etc. This ends up in solipsism which I think is a philosophical dead
> end,
> which can safely be disregarded.
>
> So my agnostic point of view, as far as meta-questions go, is that I let
> the
> world happen to me, just as time is something that happens to me, without
> any
> beliefs, or bets. Moores hand proof, for me, is beautiful in its
> simplicity, and
> that is why for me, the materialist view is the correct one, until proof
> to the
> contrary appears.
>
> But don't misunderstand me... from a philosophical point, I love the
> concepts
> and the ideas, I find them creative and inspirational. But in terms of
> reality,
> I find them unconvincing, as I also find doubting the most common sense
> interpretations until proof shows up.
>

I ask only that you try to remain as equally unconvinced of all those
hypotheses, so you don't close yourself off from considering some of these
other fascinating possibilities.



> >       No one with a radical belief in god let's proof get in the way. I
> think
> >       for me, that is a good illustration of my uses of the word belief
> on the
> >       one hand, and hypothesis, idea, stance, goal on the other.
> >
> >
> > I think in your mind you link the word belief together with notions of
> being dogmatic and unshakable.
>
> True. It was a good call to change the word.
>
> > Hypothesis and idea are too neutral for what I am referring to which is
> why I
> > introduce the notion of betting (as in, you have a generally acceptance
> of
> > that hypothesis or idea being true). Stance is closer. Position is
> another
> > that might do. I think goal is distinct, since it is too tied in with
> action,
> > purpose, and perceived utility.
>
> Why don't you like it being neutral? That is why those came to me.


Only because I wanted a word for "an idea you bet to be true", "a
hypothesis you consider as having over 50% chance of being correct".

Utility is an
> honorable thing in the philosophy of pragmatism. Many swear by it! ;)
>

Utility is fine, I am a utilitarian, but my point is that "goal" has a
different connotation than "an idea you have credence in"


> >       For brevity I removed the rest of the examples.
> >
> >       > You choose to not call these religious beliefs, but they are
> nonetheless
> >       > beliefs you accept as true and operate according to the
> assumption of their
> >       > truth. An assumption not justified by science.
> >
> >       I think I have to disagree. They are not beliefs. I don't have to
> assume
> >       anything about acting, the future or the material world. Since it
> is "the"
> >       material world, it happens regardless of what I assume or do.
> >
> > To save money for retirement, one must bet that they'll one day
> experience
> > life as their future retired self. And if someone got a diagnosis of a
> > terminal disease that changed that bet, then they might start
> withdrawing from
> > their retirement account. The fundamental ideas we hold dear and would
> bet on,
> > are instrumental to explaining our actions.
>
> Those are events in the world, and in the world, one set of behaviours,
> tools
> and processes make sense. Simulation arguments, are arguments from
> "outside" the
> world, and I think it is a mistake to mix the two.
>
> >       Instead I reverse the burden of proof, and let it rest on the
> person who
> >       argues the point to show that something else exists, or how I am
> wrong.
> >
> > I'm not sure what idea you are asking to shift the burden on.
>
> Sorry. What I mean is that given the fact that reality happens to me, if
> someone
> wants to argue in favour of it being a simulation, I shift the burden of
> proof
> to them, to prove that that is the case. If not, I do not see why I should
> entertain the possibility, other than it being a fascinating idea, and a
> pleasure to discuss or a cool plot device in movies.
>
> >       > These beliefs are instilled so deeply in us that most of the
> time we don't
> >       > even realize them, but they form the operating system underlying
> nearly all
> >       > human action.
> >
> >       If there is something instilled so deeply we do not notice them,
> and or even
> >       worse, never do, then as far as we are concerned, they do not
> exist.
> >
> > We can notice them, as I highlighted a few such examples. It's just that
> in
> > the day to day, we make decisions without thinking about the assumptions
> we
> > make which underly the rational basis for our actions.
>
> Well, I tried to explain myself a bit better, regarding those examples.
> Let's
> see where it will take us.
>
> >       I get the feeling that this might be heading towards the same
> territory.
> >
> >       It is perfectly reasonable to be agnostic about a lot of this, and
> to act in the
> >       real world, and to wait for proof of something else, while
> maintaining a
> >       position of a real world, without having a belief in the real
> world.
> >
> >       After all, if belief would be so strong as you claim it to be, it
> "eats up"
> >       everything, and we just end up with no truth, and beliefs about
> everything, even
> >       the words on our screen, so I do not think this strong doubt and
> definition of
> >       beliefs is really useful.
> >
> > The word to me sets no emphasis on the degree of confidence. It just has
> to be
> > assessed as having a greater than 50% chance of being
> > true.
>
> Degrees of confidence I think is a useful tool for everything inside this
> material world. For questions outside this world, I think statistical
> thinking,
> infinities and doubts easily leads us astray.
>
> >       Thank you. I disagree with the wording, and the strength of the
> statements, but
> >       I do agree with you about science as a tool or a process, that
> let's us learn
> >       about the world.
> >
> >       I disagree that belief or religion is necessary for this, and that
> an
> >       all-encompassing, deep seated definition of belief becomes
> untenable and "eats
> >       up" all truth, and then all discussion beacomes meaningless.
> >
> > I'm not sure I follow the breakdown you describe, but I am glad you
> found my
> > interpretation clarifying.
>
> I meant that if you doubt all of reality, you can also doubt meta-reality,
> and
> eventually there is nothing but doubt, and this is not a productive way to
> proceed.
>

I agree. I believe in an external reality. Indeed I believe in an infinite,
comprehensive reality containing all logically possible universes, objects,
and minds.

I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory consistent with
all our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise unsolved
problems in physics:

https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory


> >       I must also thank you Jason. I really enjoy your ideas and
> discussing them. Even
> >       though you just stole 30 minutes of planned sleep from me, it was
> still worth
> >       it. ;)
> >
> > My apologies! I appreciate your very thoughtful and engaging emails as
> well!
>
> No worries! Today is weekend, so now the pressure is off! ;)
>
> > Sleep well.
>
> You too!
>


I hope this email fits within the size limits. ��

Jason
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