[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

On Sun, 23 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

>       Hm, I think it would make sense to say that a robot might act rationally, in
>       line with its programming. In the same way, perhaps a human can be said to act
>       (somewhat) rationally in responding to feelings and (some) instincts, which are
>       deeply ingrained rules, that do not require betting on them to be true. They are
>       not even processed at the conscious level.
> 
> If they are instinctual, or mechanical then I think you are right, one can act
> without ideas. I think I was too strong when I said the are necessary to act
> in the world.

I think, given this, and given the shift of nomenclature from belief to "bets"
that we might be converging towards something here.

> I should have qualified my statement to "act rationally in the world".
> 
> Rational thought and action are what Aristotle believed separated man from
> lower animals. I don't think humans are the only species capable of rational
> thought, but we are perhaps most capable of it: in allowing ideas (rather than
> instinct) drive behavior.

Yes. I view it as a continuum. Animals are mostly instincts, in some higher animals 
animals we are seeing the lights of consciousness and deliberate rationality,
and in the "highest" animal, us, we are perhaps more rational than instinct. But
there are always variation. Some individuals are more controlled by their
impulses and instincts, while others are more guided by rational thought. But
I think it is not so controversial, that at some level, we all do obey
instincts, and that some of those very basic ones, are very, very difficult to
override.

>       If I program something, I essentially code instructions about how the program
>       (or the robots) should behave in certain situations. In the same way, evolution
>       I guess programmed drives, instincts and some goals, into our organism. One day,
>       self-consciousness appeared, the mind overtook the body, and changed a lot. I
>       guess what I am saying is that there are different levels. On some level, a bet
>       that a thing is true is not necessary, it is just a cause and an effect in the
>       organism, such as pain for instance. If betting would be part of the process,
>       the response would be less useful for us.
>
>       On a higher level, betting things are true, can definitely be true. I think the
>       key difference here between the scientists and the "betters" is the continuous
>       feedback loop between reality and the bet of the scientists, that make them
>       revise or change their bets, or discard their bets completely.
> 
> I think you are still letting your concept of belief bleed into the concept of
> people acting on ideas they bet to be true. Scientists bet their ideas are
> true, and ordinary people update their bets on the fact of new evidence.

Maybe there's something better than bets? ;) Bets imply money, risk,
reward/loss, and when it comes to a lot of ideas and hypotheses, some of them,
lack one or more of those associations.

I think maybe a better approach would be to discard religion, god, bet,
altogether, and try to describe the idea or mechanism in as simple and direct
and functional words as possible, and from there perhaps derive a word?

Yes, I think I am influenced both by the original belief (although we are trying
to rectify that) and that betting could very well have led to other assumptions
coloring my understanding of the concept as used by you.

> A person finds the cookie jar empty and has the idea that their roommate ate
> them. It is their leading hypothesis, an idea they have credence in, it is an
> idea they bet to be true.

Or what about this? It is their hypothesis that their roommate ate the cookies?
No bets, no truth value (yet). I can even imagine another scenario. Imagine the
person is a cookie factory owner. That leads his discovery of the empty cookie
jar to the hypothesis, (or empirically confirmed fact) that the cookie har is
empty. He does not care about who ate the cookies, and is content to confirm
empirically that the jar is empty.

> They check the nanny cam footage and find their dog figured out how to get
> into the cookie jar. They updated the idea they bet was true in light of this
> new evidence.
> 
> Upon closer examination they find the timestamps of the files don't line up,
> and shadows of the dog appear to be shadows of a person, they then suspect the
> other roommate, a computer hacker and prankster stole the cookies and edited
> the footage to make the dog look guilty.
> 
> Again the hypothesis is updated in the face of evidence.
> 
> One doesn't need to be a scientist to be rational, one must only be a human
> who has ideas whose degree of credence is updatable in the face of new
> evidence.
> 
> (You can see how awkward language becomes without a single word for an
> idea/hypothesis that one bets is true/has credence for).

Yes. Awkward yes, but it is a balance between clarity, awkwardness, imprecision
and letting other concept colour our ideas or obscure the meaning.

>       > A fully impotent entity is free to remain agnostic on all topics and has
>       > infinite time to collect and consider new evidence to update its assessments
>       > on probable ideas.
>       >
>       > For example, say there is some experimental medicine that may work or its side
>       > effects may outweigh its benefits. If one doesn't have the disease they can
>       > behave as a true agnostic, and continue to analyze new data as it continues
>       > coming in. But if one gets the disease then they are forced to a decision
>       > point: to make a bet on whether they think it's worth the risk or not, given
>       > all the data presently available. It is a departure from pure agnosticism once
>       > one takes action, by "making a bet" on what they think is true.
>
>       I'd say yes and no. The reason is that in your example, there is a feedback loop
>       between the real world and the organism and the effect of the medicine. I agree,
>       if I do not care, I can remain agnostic on whether a specific medicine has an
>       effect or not, if I try it, I will gain knowledge about the world, it either did
>       or did not, and as far as that medicine goes, I am no longer agnostic, but have
>       performed an experiment on myself.
> 
> But that's a future version of you who gains that information. For the person
> sitting in the office, who has to make a choice on a procedure that will
> either cure them or kill them, and it has an unknown, but estimated
> probability of curing them, one must act accordingly to what they currently
> think (or bet) to be true. I.e., is this medicine more likely to cure me, or
> kill me?

Yes, depending on the circumstance, and goals of the organism, one either acts,
does not act, or if one doesn't care, or will never be able to ascertain the
result or "learn" refrains from acting, or simply does not care. Many options
are available. I think that as long as the act and event takes place in the
world, where it can be empirically proven, due to a nice feedback loop, it makes
sense. When the question is transcendent, it becomes nonsense, or at best
"poetry". To take god, or a simulation, speculating about it, and believing (and
here I think belief is a good word) can serve the purpose of making one less
afraid of death. Therefore the belief can be grounded pragmatically, although it
would probably, from the point of view of a philosopher, contain a bit of
self-deception. At least in my case. ;)

> Life is like poker, in that it is a partial information game. Sometimes we are
> forced to decision points, and we must act on incomplete information.
> Sometimes the ideas we held as probably true are revealed to have been wrong,
> even when one plays l the game perfectly and considers all prior information
> one had, one can still be wrong.
> 
> The rational player, or scientist is not immune to this. But they are less
> susceptible to it than the dogmatic thinker, the person driven entirely by
> instinct, or the irrational person, who does not form ideas they bet to be
> true according to the information at hand.

I think all people on this list would agree that rational analysis and reasoning
and science is the best way to handle and make decisions in this world.

>       If, however, we move from a medicine to god, (and here I'm thinking of the
>       classical, postulated bearded man in the sky) there is no way to ever prove it
>       based on how it is defined, so there I would forever remain an agnostic.
> 
> There are ways to prove or disprove such Gods.

I disagree. There are no ways to prove it, unless one is first in agreement on
what "god" is defined as. Once agreement about the definition of god is settled,
it becomes trivial to prove or disprove god, or, again depending on the
definition, reach the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything about the
concept, and then just refrain from having an opinion about it, since in some of
those cases, it would make no difference what so ever to anyones life.

> You can disprove them by showing the way the idea is defined to be logically
> inconsistent (e.g., in showing a logical incompatibility in being
> simultaneously omniscient and omnipotent).
> 
> Alternatively, you might find evidence for the existence of superior beings
> beyond this universe by finding evidence that the particular constants of this
> universe are fine-tuned, which implies either that this universe was designed
> OR that there is a vast number of universes with different laws.

Absent that, they do not exist as far as I am concerned. In fact, you could say
that I'm entirely uninterested in them, except as plot devices and subjects for
fascinating discussions.

> I don't think you would call Hawking or Rees dogmatic thinkers. Nevertheless
> they don't shy away from entertaining these hypotheses, despite flying so near
> to what you might consider religious topics. So I say, let science go
> anywhere, let it refine and bring closer to truth, all our ideas, including
> ideas about God, souls, and places beyond this universe.

In my experience, I think science does best analyzing and describing the
physical world. Concepts, that by definition lie outside this world, without any
interaction or way of proving it, can never be handled by science that depends
on this world, and ourselves as material beings.

I'm all for science being free, but care must also be taken not to waste
precious scientific resources and focus the limited means we have at our
disposal to where they give us the most bang for the buck.

>       > I raised this topic to answer Keith's question, of why I think humans act
>       > according to things they bet to be true but can't prove. Namely, I think this
>       > is a behavior required for rational thought generally: (developing ideas that
>       > one would bet to be true, and while, in the face of that uncertainty, taking
>       > action as if those ideas were known to be true).
>
>       Hmm, I again get the feeling that this would align beautifully with the
>       hypothesis/idea crowd. The only difference being the feedback loop with
>       experience. When it comes to lacking that feedback loop, I do think people can
>       remain agnostic about it, since it won't affect their life in anyway if there is
>       no feedback loop of experience.
> 
> The feedback loops is necessary to refine one's beliefs over time. That is the definition of science.
> 
> But my statement was limited to the times one must act accordingly to ones
> present assumptions, which is not science (it is almost the opposite), for
> while science acknowledges it never provides the truth, only a technique to
> approach it over time, when one acts according to an assumed truth, one acts
> as if one knows what the truth is.

Well, I can act without assuming the truth. I might act based on a hunch, or
while not being certain about the outcome. I do not believe that one has to act,
always, based on an assumed truth. I can act in order to try and assign a truth
value. Truth for me is not a statement _in_ the world, it is a process,
something that comes into existence, when the world collides with consciousness
and the map of the world that is contained inside that consciousness.

> This is a necessary compromise as beings who don't have infinite time, and
> must make decisions at times when we have incomplete information.
>
>       Eternal doubt I think has proven to be a dead end, so I personally am content to
>       trust my senses that the real world is true, until someone proves it is not, or
>       shows me what else would be there instead of the real world. Uncertainty, is a
>       good thing and should be embraced.
> 
> I can't square the beginning of the paragraph with the end.

What I mean is that uncertainty or refraining from assigning a truth value is a
valid stance. Eternally doubting, as in not thinking something might be, leads
to infinite regress and would not allow for productive discussions.

> Shouldn't it be better to remain uncertain whether we are in a simulation or
> not? What is the advantage of jumping to a conclusion?

Because if we are uncertain about our material world, and we might favour a
simulation, we should also be uncertain and might think that the simulation runs
in another simulation, but note that if we are uncertain about our material
world, and means we must also be uncertain about our senses and empirical proof,
but that means that perhaps our minds are deceiving us as well, and eventually
all foundation for a logical and reasonable discussion crumble away in doubt and
uncertainty.

That is why I am talking about two levels of agnosticism here. The immanent
level, our day to day world. It makes no sense what so ever to be agnostic about
it, since we, being part of it, are forced to act in it. That is why I can say
that my hand exists, and by that statement, or by the fact that my things remain
in place when not moved, or that other people talk to me when I talk to them,
can tell you that the material world, as discovered and identified and described
by science, exists.

The feedback loop exists between me and the external world, science works, all
excellent point in favour of the material world.

Now, when I talk about agnosticism, I am talking about transcendent questions,
that per definition, exist beyond this world, such as simulations, gods (in
various variants, but not all variants) the eternal soul, life after death.

Those are all matters the transcend the material world, and since we are by
design, beings in this world, with senses, words, bodies, that can, by design,
only use concepts, rules and laws, of this world, it makes no sense to raise
those questions, apart from poetry, or as psychological comforting fantasies.
Don't get me wrong, those reasons can be very good, for many people absolutely
necessary, but we need to take those things for what they are.

So, to return to the silliest example, but which I think most clearly
illustrates my point, if you were to ask me about a bearded omnipotent and
eternal man in the sky, I would say I'm pretty sure that this is b.s. and I will
act in my daily life, as if this is b.s. and if you press me on the point, I
will tell you, that ultimately I am agnostic, since an infinitely small
probability might exist that there is indeed some eternal bearded man.

So I do not believe that it is a meaningful question to ask, and that it is
beyong truth values, since truth values depend on the feedback loop with the
world.

Again, if we take a slightly more sophisticated example, the multiple world
interpretation, I think to myself, does it affect me in any possible way? Nope.
As far as I am concerned, I couldn't care less. I'm agnostic, there's no
interplay between those universes and my own, so I just don't entertain the
possibility.

So, that's how I think when it comes to being agnostic about the transcendent,
acting "as if" the transcendent is null and void in our material world, and how
in our immanent world, we do well by revising our map and predictions based on
evidence, but that we always have a choice of acting instinctually, with a
rational plan, acting as if something is true, acting with an open mind to find
out if it is true, or not acting at all, since we don't care about the result,
so just acknowleding a state in the world and moving on.

>       >       Compare that with belief in god, and finding god as a goal, and I think the word
>       >       belief here does us a disservice.
>       >
>       > I don't understand God as a goal.
>
>       I was thinking about finding or experiencing union with god as a goal, which is
>       something at the core of the lives of many mystics. But I think this is perhaps
>       a dead end, since with your revised definition, I think we'er doing much better.
>       This example will only lead to confusion.
> 
> Okay thank you for that clarification.

You're welcome! =)

>       > Is there another more convenient word you would use for those "ideas you bet are true"?
>
>       A testable hypothesis?
> 
> I don't think this captures what I am describing. 
> 
> There's a difference between a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is
> false, and a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is true.

Yes, but in degree, not in kind.

> Namely, that if and when someone must make a decision involving that
> hypothesis, they must weigh their degree of credence in that hypothesis. This
> is distinction not captured by being a hypothesis that's testable.
> 
> For this one needs a word like, assumption, position, an idea with credence,
> an idea one thinks is true, an idea one bets is true.

It seems as if this is not an uncommon position. Just to illustrate:

"When you have several hypotheses with varying degrees of probability of being
right, this is often referred to as a set of competing hypotheses or alternative
hypotheses. In statistics and probability theory, this can be more specifically
described as a probability distribution over multiple hypotheses, where each
hypothesis is assigned a probability of being true.

In some fields, such as Bayesian inference, this is referred to as a model space
or hypothesis space, where each hypothesis is a model that attempts to explain
the observed data, and each model is assigned a probability of being the true
model.

In general, having multiple hypotheses with varying degrees of probability is a
common situation in many fields, including science, philosophy, and
decision-making, where it is often necessary to weigh the evidence for and
against each hypothesis and assign probabilities to each one based on the
available data and knowledge."

>       >       Sadly we are irrational creatures, so I am 100% certain of it.
>       >;)
>       >
>       > Do you bet there is no afterlife?
>
>       I refrain from betting. Regardless of if I want to or not, I'll get the
>       answer eventually, so there's no need for me to think about it, and I
>       can safely disregard the question. =)
> 
> Let's say someone offered to pay to freeze the brain of you and all your
> family members when they die. Would you accept the deal or reject it?

Depending on the circumstances, that is, if it did not mean any restrictions on
the timing or location of my death, why not? If it would make the other guy
happy, I'm all for it! =) When it comes to my family members, that would be up
to them.

My motivation would not be seeking some kind of immortality, or even a belief
that it is possible. Since worst case, I'd not be aware of what someone wants to
do with my dead body, I say, go for it!

> Does your decision not (at least partially) depend on whether or not you bet
> there is an afterlife?

No. But should I wake up, the question of an afterlife would then provably have
been become a thing of this world, and then subject to probabilities and revised
ideas about it.

>       > Do you bet there is no God?
>
>       I really don't care, since I regardless of if that were true or not, (ceteris
>       paribus) it would make no difference what so ever in my life.
> 
> It could make a difference to your afterlife (which is an extension of your
> life) and hence would be part of what you consider your life.

I have seen nothing which seems to indicate what you say, so in terms of effects
on me in the immanent world, I consider it null and void. In terms of a possible
being in the form of some kind of god, there's always an infinite possibility,
hence my agnosticism. In terms of my acting here, I wait for proof of god,
lacking that, the fact that the material world happens to me, is enough for me
to act in it. In terms of morals, value etc. philosophy and rational thought is
what I prefer, informed by science.

>       > Do you bet there are no universes but this one?
>
>       If no information can flow, and no proof ever be found, it is nothing to me.
> 
> Causal interaction is one way to find evidence, but it is not the only way.
> Consider these theories, none of which are based on information flows,
> nonetheless we have strong evidence for them, are accepted by most scientists
> in that field, and they imply other universes:

They are theories, and we're talking implication. We are not talking hard,
empirical proof, so I feel very well justified to disregard them. After all,
could be that what the equations imply, simply does not lend itself to being
translated into our language with our experiences of being physical beings in
time and space.

So "shut up and calculate" is for me a very attractive position when it comes to
theories about other potential worlds, which we can never affect, and which can
never affect us.

Same with god. No proof, so why should I even consider the question? It leads us
astray and distracts us from more important concerns. If any practical effects
show up, let's talk about it, if not, let's stick to reality. =)

> - Cosmic inflation (explains several key mysteries of the big bang), implies
> big bangs occur eternally throughout an ever inflating cosmos.

It seems as if it is not so clear cut in addition to the above:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Criticisms .

> You might say "well what do they matter to us?"
> 
> Consider: we, in our universe, are visible to those in other universes capable
> of simulating ours. Just as we can, from our vantage point, peer in to see
> gliders flying in the game of life universe.
> 
> As such, they could, in principle, copy you into their universe, they could
> interview you, put your consciousness in a robot body to move about in theirs,
> etc. And so, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself there, in
> those other universes you thought could not reach you.

Offer me proof, and we'll talk. Once you open pandoras box, you admit all kinds
of potential beings, gods, simulation runners, hoaxes into your conceptual
world. I prefer desert landscapes, and go on what proof is presented to me.

But I like your example! I see parallels of god always watching making sure you
are not being naughty. ;)

Jokes aside, to me, these thought experiments, absent proof, are just idle
speculation and while fun, ultimately doesn't add much to my life.

>       > Do you bet robots could be conscious?
>
>       I think robots could become conscious, depending on the definition of
>       conscisousness of course. Philosophical issues aside, I believe, in time, that
>       we'll be able to create something indistinguishavle from consciousness.
> 
> What observational evidence is this conclusion based on?

An eucated guess based on interactions with LLM:s and the progress of
technology. Also my materialist stance helps, since I do not believe there is
any magic to consciousness that is not being able to be replicated by
technology. This is a question residing soundly in our world, and can thus be
"attacked" by science.

>       > Do you bet you are not in a simulated world?
>
>       Absent proof, do not care, and refrain from betting.
> 
> I am glad to see this stance. In the past, it had seemed to me you made a firm
> commitment that we were not in a simulation.

Not quite. I think I might have been unclear. I'm sorry about that. This is an
example of transcendent questions vs immanent questions. The world, and acting
in the world is of an immanent nature. What we see is what we get. I have no
choice but to act in it, "it" happens to me. Hence I am 100% convinced that what
I see exists and that we exist in a material world.

However!

A simulation is a transcendente question beyond our world. It can never be ruled
out 100%, just like god cannot, pink unicorns and any other fantasy beings, how
absurd they might be. Since I live in the physical world, I simply refuse to
engage with those questions. I don't have to assign them even a truth value,
they are meaningless questions _unless_ someone proves them and thereby "pulls
them into" the world. It could then be argued, especially in the case of god,
that by definition it is not god, but that is a separate issue.

The key difference here is that for questions of this world, I can always revise
probabilities, but for questions beyond the world, I consider them and
probabilities assigned to them as meaningless.

>       > These are all in the realm of religious ideas, whether you take a pro or con
>       > stance. The only escape from having bets on these ideas is pure non-committal
>       > agnosticism: not willing to bet one way or the other. But it is hard to truly
>
>       I agree. I think agnosticism is a good choice here.
> 
> ��
>
>       > avoid taking actions that expose your having a bias or opinion one way or the
>       > other. For example, do you choose to freeze your brain or not, do you oppose
>       > your child marrying a robot or not, do you pray for a safe landing or not,
>       > etc.
>
>       Oh yes, we are partly irrational creatures, so bugs will always creep into our
>       reasoning caused by hard coded instincts, that saved us ages ago, but are no
>       longer relevant, or due to emotions, or lack of knowledge etc. But as long as we
>       know, we can improve and change our models.
> 
> My point all along (e.g. to Keith) is that this is a feature not a bug.
> 
> As agents acting within a time-sensitive environment, actions must be taken
> with incomplete information. Sometimes decisions will be made based on ideas
> that turn out to be wrong. But being wrong doesn't make one irrational, acting
> according to ideas whose credence can be updated in the light of new
> information is the *essence* of rational behavior.
> 
> So to answer Keith's question of why people have beliefs (ideas that may be
> right or wrong, but which we bet to be true (i.e. hypotheses we have credence
> in)) my answer is that is necessary for rational action, indeed it is how I
> would define rational action.

I agree. Developing hypotheses and ideas, testing them, to guide action is
rational. But there are cases where instinct overrides, such as when in danger,
of when simply not caring about the outcome.

But from a scientific point of view, yes, that's how they work, I imagine.

>       > All observations you take as evidence for the hypothesis of an external
>       > reality is equally consistent as evidence for the hypothesis there are only
>       > your conscious thoughts of external reality, or that we're in a simulation.
>       > This includes observations of G.E. Moore's hands.
>
>       I don't agree. I think a material universe, is the easiest and most natural
>       explanation.
> 
> Note that here you are using a metaphysical assumption (that simpler universes
> are more probable than more complex universes): Occam's razor.

No, not quite. I think that given the evidence of my senses and my hand, and the
fact that no one has proven another universe, there is no point for me to
abandon the view of a material world. Since I have no choice but to act in it, I
actually don't need to prove anything. I can just act in it. In fact, I have no
other choice.

So if someone wants to convince me of other worlds, the burden of proof is on
them.

> I agree with this metaphysical assumption.

I think occam can be of service in this world, with material problems. I think
it leads us astray when it comes to transcendent questions. I do appreciate him
though, even in case of transcendent question from an aesthetical point of view.

> But note that this probability reasoning does not help escape the simulation
> hypothesis or Boltzmann brains.
> 
> - The simulation hypothesis is based on the idea that one primitive (physical)
> universe can spawn a vast number of (simulated) universes. So even if the
> primitive universe is simpler, being simpler doesn't necessarily make up for
> the huge number of simulated universes.
> 
> - The Boltzmann brain hypothesis is based on a thermodynamic model that says
> it's vastly more probable for a single small object to spontaneously pop into
> existence than for a vast low entropy system to pop into existence (e.g., our
> big bang). In fact it is so much more probable, that it is even more likely
> for a conscious human brain, with order and false memories, etc. to pop into
> existence than the big bang universe we think we are in. That's what a
> Boltzmann brain is.
> 
> 
> So while I sympathize and agree with your notion that simpler explanations are
> more likely, what is more or less likely depends on still further assumptions.
> That is why these vexing problems remain and we haven't been able to reach any
> final conclusion.
> 
> Scientists and philosophers still debate these ideas, despite the near
> universal acceptance of the metaphysical principal of Occam's razor.

See my answer above. I don't see these ideas as problems or something that need
to be debated, absent proof. Regardless of boltzmann is correct or not, at the
end of the day we have no choice but to act "as if" the material universe is the
truth.

Boltzmann might be the truth, but show me the proof, and let's talk about it. =)

>       I have never seen or encountered anything that has shown that a
>       simulation is in progress, so I'm afraid I disagree here.
> 
> According to the Church-Turing thesis, no program can determine its hardware.
> So it is certain that if we were a simulation, and the simulators wanted to
> hide that fact from us, there would be no way for us to tell.

True. Yet another argument for why we can safely put aside that idea, apart from
the enjoyment we get out of discussing it. On the other hand...

my friendly neighbourhood AI tells me that:

The "halting problem" shows that there are limits to what can be computed by a
Turing machine, and some simulations might be able to exploit these limits to
break out of their environment.

The concept of "oracle machines" suggests that a simulation could potentially
access and manipulate the underlying hardware if it has access to an "oracle"
that provides information about the external world.

Some theories, such as "quantum computing" and "non-computable functions,"
propose the existence of computational models that could potentially allow a
simulation to break out of its environment.

And around and around we go. ;)

> This is the analogy: when you run Mario Brothers in a NES emulator, the game
> has no way to tell it is running in an emulator, rather than kn direct, real,
> original NES hardware. From the perspective of the game software, it has no
> way to know.
> 
> The same is true if this simulation is closed from external interaction. No
> test we can perform (from the inside) will distinguish a raw physical universe
> from a simulated physical universe.

This is very true on an intuitive level. But I always wondered, do you have some
kind of formal proof of this as a branch of this conversation?

>       > I thought you were agnostic. ;-)
>
>       Well... maybe I'm a bad agnostic? ;) Jokes aside, I think I'm agnostic when it
>       comes to meta-questions, "outside" reality. I am not agnostic when it comes to
>       questions "inside" reality, because there is a feedback loop there with
>       experience.
> 
> What about when we experience a quantum computers factor a number with 10,000
> digits, a number so large all the atoms in this universe could never factor
> that number given all the time from now to the heat death?
> 
> Would this then be an inside experience that justifies belief in the outside
> (the quantum multiverse)?

We don't know. First of all, I have heard professors debate on another
mailinglist that what is proclaimed as quantum computing is nothing but. Also, I
do not think this has been done, and finally, we might not correctly understand
at our conceptual level how it works.

I remember this example from our previous long form discussion about 1 year (?)
ago or more.

>       >       But for me _personally_ calling it belief would be the last thing I would do.
>       >
>       > Let's just say that you bet there is an external reality.
>
>       I don't actually have to bet. External reality is what happens to me, regardless
>       of if I try or not. But I have no yet encountered any proof to the contrary, so
>       I feel justified in my agnosticism. Since external reality is the default that
>       happens to us, from a certain point of view, the person claiming that this
>       reality does not exist, instead of x, y, z, is the one who would then give
>       proof. Absent that proof, I don't see how it would commit me.
> 
> We have access to conscious experience only. All else is an inference.
> 
> I, like you, make the bet that something beyond that conscious experience is
> responsible for that conscious experience. And by gathering evidence, we can
> start developing hypotheses for what that external reality might be.
> 
> But we shouldn't leap to the conclusion we already know what external reality
> is, just because it seems to our senses to be a certain thing. That is the
> kind of argument that justified the belief that the earth was still while
> everything else moved around it "everyone can plainly see it doesn't *feel*
> like the earth is moving".
> 
> We have to be willing to abandon what seems so obvious to our senses if we are
> to be fully rational. We must be willing to question all assumptions,
> especially those that seem so obvious.

Yes, I am not arguing against questioning our ideas and updating them given new
evidence. I am arguing against all encompassing doubt, and pulling
transcendental questions which are for now, meaningless, into the project of
science. (and note that I do not find them meaningless from the point of view of
entertainment, psychology and poetry)

>       > If it were truly hard coded, rather than based on ideas, then people wouldn't
>       > commit suicide to escape pain or for the promise of a better afterlife.
>
>       That's why I said "if the system gets damaged". Sorry for being unclear.
>       Instincts misfire, the mind is getting more and more power over the body, and
>       sometimes, due to some freak mutation or illness, the system gets out of whack,
>       and such things happen. I would argue though, that these are niche cases, and
>       not the majority case.
> 
> I don't know that it's thaylt niche. I think a good majority of people might
> choose an earlier death rather than a longer life filled with pain.

Could that life of pain be said to be damage to the system?

> This is evidence that higher level thinking can and does overriding biological
> imperatives.

This I agree fully with. Different beings can override more or less, or none of
their biological imperatives, depending on the power of their conscisous brain.

We have yogis who can influence the autonomous nervous system to a remarkable
degree.

>
>       > I am only aware of only one other species that commits suicide, dolphins. To
>       > me this suggests that we are species whose "ideas we would bet as being true,"
>       > are capable of overriding biological drives.
>
>       My interpretation would be that the higher the level of consciousness, the more
>       "unstable" the system, and the more prone it is to override.
> 
> I don't think instability is necessary involved. But I would agree with the
> principle that the more complex the system, the more failure modes it has.

Fragility perhaps? We know of many crazy geniuses, but do we know of many crazy
monkeys? Or many crazy weasels?

>
>       >       > 2. A belief that you will experience future events in your life (rather than
>       >       > "you" being confined to this singular moment in time)
>       >
>       >       I'd call that a fact, based on empirical experience.
>       >
>       > We have no experience of experiencing more than one moment in time. We only
>       > have memories of the past, with anticipation for experiencing future moments.
>
>       I don't have to believe it, it happens without me even trying. Sorry, I do not
>       have to bet on experiencing future states, it just happens.
> 
> But is it the you-now who experiences tomorrow, or is that the you-morrow who
> experiences that future time?

I don't need to answer that question. I only have to act. =) But this opens up
another discussion about identity. Maybe we should move that to another thread?

> You think that you have experienced multiple points in time, but this is
> merely a deeply instilled instinctual belief/intuition.
> 
> From your present vantage point, you have access to only a single
> thought-moment.
> 
> You will think: "Ha, but I need only wait a second and then I will find myself
> in another thought-moment."
> 
> But then you are again, only in a single thought moment. Are you the same
> thing that experienced the thought moment from a second ago? Clearly you have
> some memory of that previous time, but alas, you find you are no longer
> experiencing things exactly as you were then, your conscious state is now
> different.
> 
> How long does one persist in each present moment? A second, a day, a month? If
> it were a billion years, would you notice? What if it was forever? Could it
> then be that each conscious experience of each conscious moment exists forever
> in its place in time?
> 
> Surely this is wrong. The present moment must stop existing and a new future
> moment must come into existence, in order to experience the flow of time. But
> then notice the error in this reasoning:
> 
> If the present moment is presumed to be the only time that exists, and no
> other time (past or future) exists, then the one single present moment is all
> that need exist to provide the experience of time's flow. For the existence or
> non existence of other points in time in no way affects the state of present
> moment nor how conscious beings within that moment feel.
> 
> So whether only on point in time exists, or all points in time exists
> eternally, all the beings in all those points in time feel the same.
> 
> Empirical observations can't prove some other version of you is not still in
> those other points in time forever.

First of all, when it comes to identity and time for the purpose of this thread,
I don't need to do anything about it at all, or answer any question. Like the
material world, it just happens, and I do not need to have an idea about it. So
it takes care of itself.

When it comes to the statement if I exist at another point in time, since we
cannot travel in time, it is meaningless. Just like simulation is transcendental
from a material point of view, talking about events and things outside of our
current time is equally transcendent, and thus pointless, unless you can provide
proof of you or I existing in some other timeline.

>       > But note that we can't empirically distinguish "empty individualism" (we each
>       > exist as only a single moment) from closed individualism (we experience all
>       > moments in our lives) from open individualism (we all experience all moments
>       > of all lives).
>
>       Could you elaborate? I find it pretty clear that I experience all moments in my
>       life and not a single moment or experiences everyones lives.
> 
> Based on what? Memory?

Let me counter with this... can you offer me a proof that the common sense view
of closed individualism, where I live and experience my life just as our senses
and common sense indicate, is not true?

I think we'd better start there.

> You have no memory of that breakfast you ate 5 years ago. But someone
> experienced it vividly.

If we doubt our existence and memory, we end up in solipsism, and I find the
benefits of my individuality and existence moving through the material world to
be the truth, to be of more value, than eternal doubt. Also, someone has not yet
been able to prove to me that I do not exist.

> Memory is not a reliable indicator of what experiences are yours. If you can
> have an experience that you forget completely, how do you rule out having
> previously had the experiences of all the other people that came before you
> were born?
>
> How do we know that having a particular body or brain is as unimportant to
> having an experience as the shirt you happen to be wearing? You would, I think
> agree, that you would still be 100% conscious of this moment weather you put
> on a green shirt or a red shirt today. The shirt is an unimportant contingency
> for you being conscious of this here and now.
> 
> But it could also be that wearing a particular body and having a particular
> brain are similar kinds of unnecessary contingencies, which don't stand in the
> way of you being conscious of those perspectives too.
> 
> So I ask, what contingencies matter for being conscious? What particular atoms
> (if any) have to be around you for you to have consciousness?
> 
>
>       Here I
>       misunderstand you a bit, I'm certain.
>
>       > If this question could be settled empirically, this wouldn't be an open
>       > problem in the philosophy of personal identity.
>
>       Maybe for some, it has? ;)
> 
> 
> Here is a video that might help highlight the issue:
> 
> https://youtu.be/mTLHoWuEM5s
> 
> (Disclosure: I had a role in putting this video together)
> 
> 
>
>       >       Sure, someone might come up with an iron clad proof of why this does not
>       >       happen, we are a simulation, time is an illusion, and all events happen
>       >       at the same time, and the arrow of time is just our way to make sense of
>       >       them, but so far nothing has been presented to give me the idea that
>       >       time does not exist.
>       >
>       > The question of what experiences are yours, I see as entirely separate from
>       > the question of the reality or objectivity of the passage of time.
>       >
>       > On the topic of time, special relativity essentially proves that there is no
>       > objective present nor any objective passage of time. Relativity proves the
>       > notion of "block time" in the philosophy of time.
>
>       This is interesting. I asked my friendly neighbourhood AI about this, and he
>       said (duck.ai Llama 3.3 70B) that:
>
>       "It's essential to note that special relativity does not entirely eliminate the
>       concept of an objective passage of time. While the measurement of time intervals
>       and the simultaneity of events may be relative, the theory still maintains a
>       notion of causality, which implies that cause precedes effect in all inertial
>       frames. This means that, despite the relativity of time, there is still an
>       underlying structure to the universe that governs the sequence of events."
>
>       Do you think this is true? And since I am not a physicist, I make no claim, but
>       just wanted to bring this to your attention.
> 
> It is true they there remains a consistent notion of causality embedded within
> the 4D structure of spacetime, but it is wrong when it says relativity remains
> consistent with an objective passage of time.
> 
> See this for a more detailed explanation of why relativity is incompatible
> with a passage of time: https://philpapers.org/rec/PETITA

I'm sorry, but I am not skilled enough and do not have time enough to argue this
point. When it comes to relativity, causality and the passage of time, I have to
let other list members who are way more skilled physicists than I am step in and
continue the discussion from here. I can only say that based on what I see, it
does not seem like it is settled.

>
>       >       > 3. A belief that physical laws that have held will continue to hold (a belief in empiricism)
>       >
>       >       This for me, follows the same logic as the material world. These are just
>       >       different examples of the same thing. I do not need to believe in a material
>       >       world, it is just a fact, as much as it is a fact that my hand is here, and thus
>       >       there is at least one external thing.
>       >
>       > The world can exist as a material world that works according to laws, but how
>       > do we empirically test whether we are in a universe whose laws say:
>       >
>       > 1. The speed of light is c for all time.
>       > 2. The speed of light is c for the
>       > first 15 billion years, then becomes 2c thereafter.
>       >
>       > There are no observations that prove the laws are immutable. The best we can
>       > do is verify that they haven't changed from the last time we measured them.
>
>       Good enough for me. Show me the proof, and we'll revise to 2c. If that situation
>       can never be achieved, and if we can never prove it, for me, it's nothing.
> 
> I think you're missing my argument. I am not saying it is 2c, I am saying
> there is no empirical evidence that laws remain constant.

I have not seen any laws being broken lately, I think that would count?

> We can base such beliefs only by way of metaphysical assumptions regarding the
> higher probability of universes having simpler laws. But not by way of
> empirical (scientific/observational) evidence.

We don't need to. We have the laws, and they do a good job of predicting what we
want to predict. We don't have to assume anything beyond that.

>       >       Prove me wrong, or even better, prove a different dimension and I'll gladly
>       >       revise my position.
>       >
>       > Your example proves only that there is an experience of a hand. But you can't
>       > know if it's the result of a material hand, a dream of a hand, a virtual
>       > reality game, a simulated reality, an implanted memory of a hand, an Boltzmann
>       > brain false experience of a hand, etc.
>
>       I'm entirely satisfied with my conclusion and experience of the material world
>       supported by my body and empirical experience.
> 
> Consider this analogy:
> 
> Evertt sees the double slit experiment and says "See, the electron ended up
> here, this is evidence the universe split, and we ended up in the branch where
> the electron went left rather than right."
> 
> Bohr sees the same outcome, and says "See, the electron ended up here, this is
> evidence the wave function collapsed at random and the electron went left
> rather than right."
> 
> When the same observation is compatible with both theories, you can't count it
> as evidence only supporting the theory you favor.
> 
> I think when you say I see my hand, therefore external reality is a primitive
> physical reality and not a simulation, and not a Boltzmann brain experience,
> you are ignoring the fact that such observations can also be found in
> simulations and Boltzmann brains.

I think my statement above covers how I see this Boltzmann example.

> If you want to justify your belief in primitive physical reality as the more
> likely account of your experience, not sophisticated evidence or arguments are
> needed, I think. For example, showing why one of those cases is more or less
> probable.

I think we can reverse it. If primitive physical reality is not the case,
where's the proof of what it is?

>       If you have proof of simulation, by all means... until then, I continue to act,
>       and regardless of my ideas or bets, the world still happens, and science marches
>       along.
>
>       > If you think you can know with (near) certainty which of these explanations is
>       > true, I would like to know how. You could answer the simulation hypothesis,
>       > for example, using that method.
>
>       My answer, is that I don't need to. ;) Reality and the material world happens to
>       me. Science works, my stuff is in the same place when I wake up. So I only need
>       to continue my life, as planned, and should someone present me a proof that the
>       world is a simulation, I will calmly check it (if I can) and then I'd be living
>       in a simulated world.
> 
> Ontology is a subject that doesn't interest everyone, but I see it as
> important because so many other questions depend on it:
> 
> "It is possible to think that one cannot answer any question if one cannot
> answer the question of why there is something rather than nothing. How can we
> know why something is (or should be) a certain way if we don’t know why there
> is anything at all? Surely this is the first philosophical question that has
> to be answered." -- Robert Nozick in “Philosophical Explanations” (1981)
> 
> What exists and why, relates to our deepest questions concerning our place and
> role in reality.
> 
> You think: I can flip a switch, and the light turns on, so what does it matter
> if this is a physical universe or a simulation?
> 
> But if it is a simulation, we can ask still deeper questions: is this a
> special time or place, is this a life I chose to live for some reason, is this
> a pivotal historic moment that is being studied or gamed out? What will I
> awaken to (or as) when this simulation is over? Am I a descendant of humanity
> or an alien that came upon a barren earth in 1,000,000 A.D.?
> 
> Many scientific theories point to an infinite cosmos where all possibilities
> are realized somewhere and somewhen. I think the that these possibilities are
> worth considering.
> 
> Consider: even if only 1 instance of you in a billion is due to a simulation,
> then when you die the 999,999,999 copies of you living as primitive physical
> version will die, but the one that lives will be the one in the simulation. It
> is the only thing you can experience as your next conscious experience, so it
> is the only thing you will experience after you die.
> 
> Again, that justifies thinking about the simulation hypothesis.

I'm definitely not arguing that we cannot think about anything. But as per my
argument above, many of these questions are by design futile and pointless from
a scientific and materialistic point of view. I do argue, that for science,
there are way more low hanging fruits where we should spend our time and
resources.

For enjoyment, and science fiction, those restrictions do not apply.

>       At the end of the day, anything could be, god could exist, this world could be a
>       simulation, or none of us could exist, the words you write, might be a childrens
>       book etc. This ends up in solipsism which I think is a philosophical dead end,
>       which can safely be disregarded.
>
>       So my agnostic point of view, as far as meta-questions go, is that I let the
>       world happen to me, just as time is something that happens to me, without any
>       beliefs, or bets. Moores hand proof, for me, is beautiful in its simplicity, and
>       that is why for me, the materialist view is the correct one, until proof to the
>       contrary appears.
>
>       But don't misunderstand me... from a philosophical point, I love the concepts
>       and the ideas, I find them creative and inspirational. But in terms of reality,
>       I find them unconvincing, as I also find doubting the most common sense
>       interpretations until proof shows up.
> 
> I ask only that you try to remain as equally unconvinced of all those
> hypotheses, so you don't close yourself off from considering some of these
> other fascinating possibilities.

Oh, I like my closing off. If there's no evidence, I won't consider them
seriously from a scientific point of view. But, I am a philosopher by training,
so I am most certainly _not_ closing myself off from them when it comes to
enjoyable and thoughtful discussions.

>       >       No one with a radical belief in god let's proof get in the way. I think
>       >       for me, that is a good illustration of my uses of the word belief on the
>       >       one hand, and hypothesis, idea, stance, goal on the other.
>       >
>       >
>       > I think in your mind you link the word belief together with notions of being dogmatic and unshakable.
>
>       True. It was a good call to change the word.
>
>       > Hypothesis and idea are too neutral for what I am referring to which is why I
>       > introduce the notion of betting (as in, you have a generally acceptance of
>       > that hypothesis or idea being true). Stance is closer. Position is another
>       > that might do. I think goal is distinct, since it is too tied in with action,
>       > purpose, and perceived utility.
>
>       Why don't you like it being neutral? That is why those came to me.
> 
> Only because I wanted a word for "an idea you bet to be true", "a hypothesis
> you consider as having over 50% chance of being correct".

Ahh... over 50%, that is very interesting. That's another thing I don't like
with transcendental questions, probability, which is something based in our
world. Applying it to infinitues or transcendental questions, becomes as wrong
as when AI enthusiasts juggle infinite negative or infinite positive outcomes to
justify this or that, or like Pascal juggling infinite good or bad outcomes to
justify god. It shows, to me at least, that we cannot liberally and freely apply
infinities and probabilities to questions where the feedback loop is cut.

>       Utility is an
>       honorable thing in the philosophy of pragmatism. Many swear by it! ;)
> 
> Utility is fine, I am a utilitarian, but my point is that "goal" has a
> different connotation than "an idea you have credence in"

What do you think of pareto-utilitarianism?

>       >       Thank you. I disagree with the wording, and the strength of the statements, but
>       >       I do agree with you about science as a tool or a process, that let's us learn
>       >       about the world.
>       >
>       >       I disagree that belief or religion is necessary for this, and that an
>       >       all-encompassing, deep seated definition of belief becomes untenable and "eats
>       >       up" all truth, and then all discussion beacomes meaningless.
>       >
>       > I'm not sure I follow the breakdown you describe, but I am glad you found my
>       > interpretation clarifying.
>
>       I meant that if you doubt all of reality, you can also doubt meta-reality, and
>       eventually there is nothing but doubt, and this is not a productive way to
> 
> I agree. I believe in an external reality. Indeed I believe in an infinite,
> comprehensive reality containing all logically possible universes, objects,
> and minds.
> 
> I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory consistent with all
> our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise unsolved problems
> in physics:
> 
> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory

Well, I respectfully disagree, but I have read some of your articles, and I
think they are well written, thoughtful and enjoyable, even if I do not draw the
same grand conclusions you do. =) I am still hoping you will publish a book! I
would definitely buy it!

>       >       I must also thank you Jason. I really enjoy your ideas and discussing them. Even
>       >       though you just stole 30 minutes of planned sleep from me, it was still worth
>       >       it. ;)
>       >
>       > My apologies! I appreciate your very thoughtful and engaging emails as well!
>
>       No worries! Today is weekend, so now the pressure is off! ;)
>
>       > Sleep well.
>
>       You too!
> 
> I hope this email fits within the size limits. ��

This was a close one! Fortunately for us, today was a calm day at work, so
instead of doing anything I could spend some time philosophizing together with
you. ;)

Best regards, 
Daniel


> Jason 
> 
>