[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Feb 24, 2025 at 10:39 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Sun, 23 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Rational thought and action are what Aristotle believed separated man
> from
> > lower animals. I don't think humans are the only species capable of
> rational
> > thought, but we are perhaps most capable of it: in allowing ideas
> (rather than
> > instinct) drive behavior.
>
> Yes. I view it as a continuum. Animals are mostly instincts, in some
> higher animals
> animals we are seeing the lights of consciousness and deliberate
> rationality,
> and in the "highest" animal, us, we are perhaps more rational than
> instinct. But
> there are always variation. Some individuals are more controlled by their
> impulses and instincts, while others are more guided by rational thought.
> But
> I think it is not so controversial, that at some level, we all do obey
> instincts, and that some of those very basic ones, are very, very
> difficult to
> override.
>

Agree.


>
>
> >
> > I think you are still letting your concept of belief bleed into the
> concept of
> > people acting on ideas they bet to be true. Scientists bet their ideas
> are
> > true, and ordinary people update their bets on the fact of new evidence.
>
> Maybe there's something better than bets? ;) Bets imply money, risk,
> reward/loss, and when it comes to a lot of ideas and hypotheses, some of
> them,
> lack one or more of those associations.
>
> I think maybe a better approach would be to discard religion, god, bet,
> altogether, and try to describe the idea or mechanism in as simple and
> direct
> and functional words as possible, and from there perhaps derive a word?
>


I might try to suggest a new word, except I know it would never catch on
when english already has such a world with that meaning:

    "something believed <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/believe> ["to
have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the reliability of
something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing so"];
an opinion or conviction:"

This is sense 1 of the word "belief
<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/belief>." It is only in sense 4 that it
gets to "a religious tenet or tenets; religious creed or faith:"

Maybe a word that doesn't have that connotation for you would be a
"credant" but then others might say that reminds them too much of creeds.



>
> Or what about this? It is their hypothesis that their roommate ate the
> cookies?
> No bets, no truth value (yet). I can even imagine another scenario.
> Imagine the
> person is a cookie factory owner. That leads his discovery of the empty
> cookie
> jar to the hypothesis, (or empirically confirmed fact) that the cookie har
> is
> empty. He does not care about who ate the cookies, and is content to
> confirm
> empirically that the jar is empty.
>

But there can be multiple simultaneous hypotheses. What should the word be
for the current leading hypothesis, that is judged more likely to be true
than not?


>
>
> > (You can see how awkward language becomes without a single word for an
> > idea/hypothesis that one bets is true/has credence for).
>
> Yes. Awkward yes, but it is a balance between clarity, awkwardness,
> imprecision
> and letting other concept colour our ideas or obscure the meaning.
>

Clear language is important in these discussions, but perhaps it is better
that one defines terms up front (or when asked to clarify). For example, if
I stated that I use the word belief in sense 1 only, not to be confused
with sense 4, would that have been adequate?


>
>
> > The rational player, or scientist is not immune to this. But they are
> less
> > susceptible to it than the dogmatic thinker, the person driven entirely
> by
> > instinct, or the irrational person, who does not form ideas they bet to
> be
> > true according to the information at hand.
>
> I think all people on this list would agree that rational analysis and
> reasoning
> and science is the best way to handle and make decisions in this world.
>

I do, for one.


>
> >       If, however, we move from a medicine to god, (and here I'm
> thinking of the
> >       classical, postulated bearded man in the sky) there is no way to
> ever prove it
> >       based on how it is defined, so there I would forever remain an
> agnostic.
> >
> > There are ways to prove or disprove such Gods.
>
> I disagree. There are no ways to prove it, unless one is first in
> agreement on
> what "god" is defined as.


Of course, I agree that clear definitions are the first step.


> Once agreement about the definition of god is settled,
> it becomes trivial to prove or disprove god, or, again depending on the
> definition, reach the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything
> about the
> concept,


I think with a theory of ontology at hand, one can reach definite
conclusions on the existence or non-existence of almost anything that can
be given a rigorous definition.

Some theories of ontology that provide a probability distribution for
objects in existence, can even provide a means of calculating how common
such an object is across reality.


> and then just refrain from having an opinion about it, since in some of
> those cases, it would make no difference what so ever to anyones life.
>

It depends on the god. If it is a "Great Programmer" god, (i.e., the master
of a simulation), then such a God can intervene in the course of that
simulation (perform miracles), read the thoughts of beings inside it (hear
and answer prayers), and provide continuation paths for conscious beings
after they die in the simulation (save souls).

In an infinite reality, it is not a question of whether or not these gods
exist, it is only a matter of how common or uncommon they are, that is, how
common are simulations executed by such "Great Programmer"
superintelligences relative to primitive universes.

As the simulation argument shows, it is not trivial to decide whether most
conscious beings (such as we) inhabit primitive physical realities, or
simulated worlds created by superintelligences.


>
>
> > Alternatively, you might find evidence for the existence of superior
> beings
> > beyond this universe by finding evidence that the particular constants
> of this
> > universe are fine-tuned, which implies either that this universe was
> designed
> > OR that there is a vast number of universes with different laws.
>
> Absent that, they do not exist as far as I am concerned. In fact, you
> could say
> that I'm entirely uninterested in them, except as plot devices and
> subjects for
> fascinating discussions.
>

I am not sure what you mean by "absent that", for we do inhabit a universe
whose constants are tuned to an extraordinary degree. The only answer
science provides to answer this mystery is that we must inhabit a vast, if
not infinite, variegated reality containing all kinds of universes.



>
> > I don't think you would call Hawking or Rees dogmatic thinkers.
> Nevertheless
> > they don't shy away from entertaining these hypotheses, despite flying
> so near
> > to what you might consider religious topics. So I say, let science go
> > anywhere, let it refine and bring closer to truth, all our ideas,
> including
> > ideas about God, souls, and places beyond this universe.
>
> In my experience, I think science does best analyzing and describing the
> physical world. Concepts, that by definition lie outside this world,
> without any
> interaction or way of proving it, can never be handled by science that
> depends
> on this world, and ourselves as material beings.
>

You included rational thought as the tool of finding truth. Do you not see
the utility of using rational thought to make judgements about the things
we cannot directly observe? Consider that we do this to explain or talk
about:

- Past and future points in time
- Segments of spacetime outside our lightcone
- Spaces beyond the cosmological horizon
- The interiors of blackholes
- Other branches of the wavefunction
- The conscious states of others

You agree, I think, that these are all part of what science can study. We
can develop theories about them, test them, think rationally and logically
about them, and so on.

Yet these are things we can't observe directly with our eyes or
instruments. We can only indirectly find evidence for them. We have
testable theories of gravity, QM, the big bang, of consciousness, of
causality, etc. that are falsifiable, and that we can gather evidence for.
When we accept these theories, then we can reason about their consequences
and implications.

And if and when someone accepts the theory, then they must accept all the
predictions of that theory. This is how science gives us evidence of the
multiverse, of places beyond the cosmological horizon, of other big bangs,
etc. even when we can't observe them directly.


>
> I'm all for science being free, but care must also be taken not to waste
> precious scientific resources and focus the limited means we have at our
> disposal to where they give us the most bang for the buck.
>

Far more people care about these kinds of fundamental questions, then say,
the mating rituals of C. elegans. While getting answers to fundamental
questions is by no means easy, they are what (those who seek meaningful
truth) are ultimately after:

"I am very astonished that the scientific picture of
the real world around me is very deficient. It gives
us a lot of factual information, puts all of our
experience in a magnificently consistent order, but
it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really
near to our heart that really matters to us. It cannot
tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet,
physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing
of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and
eternity."
— Erwin Schrödinger in “Nature and the Greeks” (1954)


I believe, developed fully, science can provide answers to questions that
have plagued us since the dawn of history.


>
> Well, I can act without assuming the truth. I might act based on a hunch,
> or
> while not being certain about the outcome. I do not believe that one has
> to act,
> always, based on an assumed truth. I can act in order to try and assign a
> truth
> value. Truth for me is not a statement _in_ the world, it is a process,
> something that comes into existence, when the world collides with
> consciousness
> and the map of the world that is contained inside that consciousness.
>

But absent immediate need, the most rational mind would say "don't act yet,
we are still gathering evidence, we can make a better-educated decision
by delaying still longer."

So taking action always represents a departure from the behavior of a
perfect scientist. It is the constraint of living in a physical world that
demands such departures.


>
> > This is a necessary compromise as beings who don't have infinite time,
> and
> > must make decisions at times when we have incomplete information.
> >
> >       Eternal doubt I think has proven to be a dead end, so I personally
> am content to
> >       trust my senses that the real world is true, until someone proves
> it is not, or
> >       shows me what else would be there instead of the real world.
> Uncertainty, is a
> >       good thing and should be embraced.
> >
> > I can't square the beginning of the paragraph with the end.
>
> What I mean is that uncertainty or refraining from assigning a truth value
> is a
> valid stance. Eternally doubting, as in not thinking something might be,
> leads
> to infinite regress and would not allow for productive discussions.
>

Maybe I am misunderstanding you here, but I don't see any conflict between
eternal doubt and refraining from assigning a truth value. Are they not the
same thing?


>
> > Shouldn't it be better to remain uncertain whether we are in a
> simulation or
> > not? What is the advantage of jumping to a conclusion?
>
> Because if we are uncertain about our material world, and we might favour a
> simulation, we should also be uncertain and might think that the
> simulation runs
> in another simulation, but note that if we are uncertain about our material
> world, and means we must also be uncertain about our senses and empirical
> proof,
> but that means that perhaps our minds are deceiving us as well, and
> eventually
> all foundation for a logical and reasonable discussion crumble away in
> doubt and
> uncertainty.
>

I don't see it leading to that breakdown. What does it matter if this is a
simulation or not? You're still conscious, things still follow
comprehensible rules, and so forth.

I was thinking, perhaps a better way of explaining your viewpoint of G. E.
Moore's "here is a hand" is this:

"Although the whole of this life were said to be
nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a
phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough,
if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it."
-- Leibniz
<https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.218341/page/n17/mode/2up?q=%22nothing+but+a+dream%22>


What do you think? Does this represent your viewpoint? That
<https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/8079220-a-difference-which-makes-no-difference-is-no-difference-at>
"A difference that makes no difference is no difference at all" and thus
it's impractical to debate a physical world from an indistinguishable
simulated one?


> That is why I am talking about two levels of agnosticism here. The immanent
> level, our day to day world. It makes no sense what so ever to be agnostic
> about
> it, since we, being part of it, are forced to act in it. That is why I can
> say
> that my hand exists, and by that statement, or by the fact that my things
> remain
> in place when not moved, or that other people talk to me when I talk to
> them,
> can tell you that the material world, as discovered and identified and
> described
> by science, exists.
>
> The feedback loop exists between me and the external world, science works,
> all
> excellent point in favour of the material world.
>
> Now, when I talk about agnosticism, I am talking about transcendent
> questions,
> that per definition, exist beyond this world, such as simulations, gods (in
> various variants, but not all variants) the eternal soul, life after death.
>

We can agree to disagree here, but I think it's a false delineation. I
think many scientific theories, (including relativity, quantum mechanics,
functionalism, eternal inflation, the concordance model, etc.) have
implications of eternal life or afterlives.


>
> Those are all matters the transcend the material world,


Conscious beings (souls) are present in this world.


> and since we are by
> design, beings in this world, with senses, words, bodies, that can, by
> design,
> only use concepts, rules and laws, of this world, it makes no sense to
> raise
> those questions, apart from poetry, or as psychological comforting
> fantasies.
>

Consider a fish confined within a frozen pond. It can't escape the pond,
nor see anything beyond this pond. However, it can reason, using clues of
gravity (bubbles float, pebbles sink) and by noticing a very small
curvature in the frozen surface of the pond, which is always tangential to
the downward or upward direction of bubbles and pebbles, it could reason
rationally to conclude its pond was just one small part of a much larger
spherical world. The fish, if smart enough, could conduct a Cavendish style
experiment, work out a theory of gravity, calculate the size of the sphere
of the earth (based on curvature of the pond surface), and realize that the
mass of the total world (as determined by the speed at which pebbles sink),
also is roughly in line with the volume of the sphere of the earth times
the density of the pebbles. It could then know Earth to be a kind of giant
pebble, upon which its pond is only the smallest smear of water.

In your view, is it science for the fish to conclude it is part of a vast
world which it cannot directly observe all of, or is this transcendent
metaphysics for the fish?




> Don't get me wrong, those reasons can be very good, for many people
> absolutely
> necessary, but we need to take those things for what they are.
>
> So, to return to the silliest example, but which I think most clearly
> illustrates my point, if you were to ask me about a bearded omnipotent and
> eternal man in the sky, I would say I'm pretty sure that this is b.s. and
> I will
> act in my daily life, as if this is b.s. and if you press me on the point,
> I
> will tell you, that ultimately I am agnostic, since an infinitely small
> probability might exist that there is indeed some eternal bearded man.
>

If you, like me, believed in an infinite comprehensive reality, would you
agree it makes sense to revise the notion of "exists" vs "doesn't exist"?

For in a reality containing all possibilities, even improbable things
happen and exist, somewhere. It is only the impossible that doesn't exist.

Then instead, we should speak of things "existing with a high measure
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Measure_(mathematics)>" (in more places,
more frequently, more commonly" vs. things "existing with a lower measure"
(in fewer places, less frequently, less commonly).


>
> So I do not believe that it is a meaningful question to ask, and that it is
> beyong truth values, since truth values depend on the feedback loop with
> the
> world.
>

I believe truth exists independently of us. A truth is not dependent on
there being some person to observe and confirm some idea for themselves,
the truth exists independently of its observation or discovery.
Perhaps this is the more fundamental philosophical disagreement between us.

Note: Rereading this I see now you were referring to "truth values" which I
take to mean the degree of confidence an particular observer places on some
hypothesis. These I agree are observer dependent. I leave my original reply
to see if you do believe in objective (observer independent) truth or not.


>
> Again, if we take a slightly more sophisticated example, the multiple world
> interpretation, I think to myself, does it affect me in any possible way?
> Nope.
> As far as I am concerned, I couldn't care less. I'm agnostic, there's no
> interplay between those universes and my own, so I just don't entertain the
> possibility.
>

But quantum computers work. (We can drop or break out this topic to a
separate thread, depending on your interest in pursuing this topic).


>
> So, that's how I think when it comes to being agnostic about the
> transcendent,
> acting "as if" the transcendent is null and void in our material world,
> and how
> in our immanent world, we do well by revising our map and predictions
> based on
> evidence, but that we always have a choice of acting instinctually, with a
> rational plan, acting as if something is true, acting with an open mind to
> find
> out if it is true, or not acting at all, since we don't care about the
> result,
> so just acknowleding a state in the world and moving on.
>

I think we can agree that we disagree here. In my philosophy, we can use
science and rationality to attack the transcendent questions that are most
important to us: https://alwaysasking.com/questions/



> > Okay thank you for that clarification.
>
> You're welcome! =)
>
>
> >
> > There's a difference between a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure
> is
> > false, and a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is true.
>
> Yes, but in degree, not in kind.
>
>
> It seems as if this is not an uncommon position. Just to illustrate:
>
> "When you have several hypotheses with varying degrees of probability of
> being
> right, this is often referred to as a set of competing hypotheses or
> alternative
> hypotheses. In statistics and probability theory, this can be more
> specifically
> described as a probability distribution over multiple hypotheses, where
> each
> hypothesis is assigned a probability of being true.
>
> In some fields, such as Bayesian inference, this is referred to as a model
> space
> or hypothesis space, where each hypothesis is a model that attempts to
> explain
> the observed data, and each model is assigned a probability of being the
> true
> model.
>

I think Bayesian inference and the techniques for revising estimates on the
priors, is the most succinct mathematical description of the process of
science .


>
>
> No. But should I wake up, the question of an afterlife would then provably
> have
> been become a thing of this world, and then subject to probabilities and
> revised
> ideas about it.
>

But even without the technology, we can conduct this thought experiment now.
And relying only on some weak assumptions about the brain's role in
generating consciousness we can reason about this outcome being the
probable outcome of such a technology. Can we not then update our
probabilities now?


>
> >       > Do you bet there is no God?
> >
> >       I really don't care, since I regardless of if that were true or
> not, (ceteris
> >       paribus) it would make no difference what so ever in my life.
> >
> > It could make a difference to your afterlife (which is an extension of
> your
> > life) and hence would be part of what you consider your life.
>
> I have seen nothing which seems to indicate what you say, so in terms of
> effects
> on me in the immanent world, I consider it null and void.


Here, I see a possible inconsistency. You believe that other people are
conscious (rather than p-zombies), despite that you can never enter their
minds to see what they see and confirm that yes indeed they are conscious.

Given this dearth of observational evidence, why do you not consider the
hypothesis that other people are conscious "null and avoid"?

If you say it is because "I believe in functionalism" or "I use logic to
reason that zombies are impossible" then you are using theories to draw
conclusions about objects you will never, and can never observe (the
subjective viewpoints of others).

Is this not equivalent to how I use theories, and logic, to reason about
other branches of the wave function that I will never (from my vantage
point here) directly observe?


> In terms of a possible
> being in the form of some kind of god, there's always an infinite
> possibility,
> hence my agnosticism. In terms of my acting here, I wait for proof of god,
>

It's easier to find evidence of an infinite comprehensive reality. For
example:

   - Juergen Schmidhuber's
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Schmidhuber>  *Algorithmic
   Theory of Everything* <https://people.idsia.ch/~juergen/everythingtalk/>.
   - Arthur Lovejoy's <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Oncken_Lovejoy>
              *Principle of Plenitude
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_plenitude>*
   - Robert Nozick's <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Nozick>
         *Principle of Fecundity
   <https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780674664791/page/90/mode/2up?q=%22principle+of+fecundity%22>*
   - Kurt Gödel's <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_G%C3%B6del>
             *Mathematical Realism*
   <https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/wp-content/uploads/Godel-Basic-Theorems-and-Their-Implications-1.pdf>
   - David Lewis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher)>
                     *Modal Realism
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher)>*
   - Bruno Marchal's <https://independent.academia.edu/MarchalBruno>
        *Arithmetical Realism*
   <https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf>
   - Max Tegmark’s <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_Tegmark>
     *Mathematical
   Universe Hypothesis
   <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis>*
   - Derek Parfit's <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derek_Parfit>
       *All Worlds Hypothesis <http://www.sfu.ca/~rpyke/cafe/parfit.pdf>*.

Mathematicians, philosophers, logicians, computer scientists, and
physicists all have found evidence for the existence of a comprehensive
reality. Some use mathematical logic to establish that there's no
alternative. Others find evidence in the form deriving predictions that are
empirically testable and confirmed.

If you start with an ontological theory that presumes all logically
possible things exist, then finding a proof of something's existence is
reduced to finding a self-consistent definition of that thing.

“Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.”
--  David Hilbert



> lacking that, the fact that the material world happens to me, is enough
> for me
> to act in it. In terms of morals, value etc. philosophy and rational
> thought is
> what I prefer, informed by science.
>
> >       > Do you bet there are no universes but this one?
> >
> >       If no information can flow, and no proof ever be found, it is
> nothing to me.
> >
> > Causal interaction is one way to find evidence, but it is not the only
> way.
> > Consider these theories, none of which are based on information flows,
> > nonetheless we have strong evidence for them, are accepted by most
> scientists
> > in that field, and they imply other universes:
>
> They are theories, and we're talking implication. We are not talking hard,
> empirical proof, so I feel very well justified to disregard them.


Often theoretical evidence is taken as much stronger evidence than
empirical evidence.

Consider how well tested and accepted the theory of gravity is. If two
scientists in a lab report they dropped a penny and it went straight up to
the ceiling and hovered there for a few seconds then fell back to the
ground, would we take their hard empirical observation that gravity was
violated over the much better established theory of gravity? Or would we
chalk it up to gas fumes, or something else causing some kind of
hallucination? Clearly we find it more likely that some other explanation
is responsible for their observation, than the idea that gravity stopped
applying to this penny for some period of time.

If we can be so confident in our theories to dismiss observations like
that, then should we not take our theories just as seriously when they say
things we can't see (and therefore have no empirical reasons to doubt)?



> After all,
> could be that what the equations imply, simply does not lend itself to
> being
> translated into our language with our experiences of being physical beings
> in
> time and space.
>

I don't see why our theories should be so capricious as to break down as
soon as we stop looking.


>
> So "shut up and calculate" is for me a very attractive position when it
> comes to
> theories about other potential worlds, which we can never affect, and
> which can
> never affect us.
>

The other branches of the wave function do affect ours, in particular
situations. Aside from the example of quantum computers, even just the
interference band effect, as seen in the double slit experiment, is a
result of influence from these other branches. If we had no reason to
believe in these other branches, we wouldn't talk about them. But it is
precisely this evidence that forces us to.


>
> Same with god. No proof, so why should I even consider the question? It
> leads us
> astray and distracts us from more important concerns.


Do you see the importance in questions such as these?

   - “where did we come from?”
   - “how did we get here?”
   - “where are we going?"
   - “why do we experience all this?”




> If any practical effects
> show up, let's talk about it, if not, let's stick to reality. =)
>
> > - Cosmic inflation (explains several key mysteries of the big bang),
> implies
> > big bangs occur eternally throughout an ever inflating cosmos.
>
> It seems as if it is not so clear cut in addition to the above:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Criticisms .
>

Every theory has its critics, but many of inflation's predictions have been
strongly confirmed by observation. This image has been called "The
Cosmological Mona Lisa" for the beautiful correspondence between prediction
and observation:
https://resonaances.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-universe-after-planck.html

Before inflation, the scalar spectral index was assumed to be exactly 1
Inflation said it should be less than 1. The Planck data shows it to be
0.968±0.006.

An analysis of the cosmic microwave background confirms the temperature
during the big bang never exceeded absolute hot, confirming another
prediction of inflation.

The paper publishing the Plank data is among the most highly cited
<https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C40&q=Planck+2015+results.+XIII.+Cosmological+parameters&btnG=>
papers
in the history of science. The WMAP and Planck results confirmed all 3
predictions cosmic inflation made for the properties of density variations:

   - All particle types were affected equally (they are adiabatic)
   - Variations exist at all sizes, including super-horizon scales
   - As predicted, variations are less than perfectly scale invariant

The 5th prediction, that the spatial curvature is less than 0.01% is beyond
our ability to verify. The best data from Planck allows us to conclude
curvature is less than 0.5%. This prediction is neither violated nor
confirmed at this time.

"Inflation has literally met every threshold that science demands, with
clever new tests becoming possible with improved observations and
instrumentation. Whenever the data has been capable of being collected,
inflation's predictions have been verified."
-- Ethan Siegel
<https://medium.com/starts-with-a-bang/how-does-cosmic-inflation-fare-when-put-to-the-ultimate-test-d7883969954d>


>
>
> > As such, they could, in principle, copy you into their universe, they
> could
> > interview you, put your consciousness in a robot body to move about in
> theirs,
> > etc. And so, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself
> there, in
> > those other universes you thought could not reach you.
>
> Offer me proof, and we'll talk. Once you open pandoras box, you admit all
> kinds
> of potential beings, gods, simulation runners, hoaxes into your conceptual
> world. I prefer desert landscapes, and go on what proof is presented to me.
>

Your standard of evidence is unreachable.

My standard, which I believe is the standard of most scientists, is that
not all predictions of a well-tested, well-confirmed, theory are testable.
However, we still ought to accept the untested and untestable predictions
of a theory, assuming we accept that theory as valid.

Your standard is that a well-tested, well-confirmed theory is not
sufficient, and that we must also verify the prediction of the theory again
by direct observation, otherwise you won't believe that theory is valid for
that situation.

But then I ask: what is the point of having a theory? If you can't rely on
it to make accurate predictions for things you haven't yet tested, then you
aren't using the theory to make predictions, you're only using each
observation to tell you what happened in each specific case.


>
> But I like your example! I see parallels of god always watching making
> sure you
> are not being naughty. ;)
>
> Jokes aside, to me, these thought experiments, absent proof, are just idle
> speculation and while fun, ultimately doesn't add much to my life.
>

It could.

"Confession: if I love [this theory], it is because it entails the
existence of many things not “physically present”, notably those incredible
deep universal dreamers which keep [losing] themselves in an incredible
labyrinth of partially sharable dreams, meeting ladders and ladders of
surprises, self-multiplying and self-fusing, and which are partially
terrestrial and partially divine creatures."
-- Bruno Marchal (speaking of his theory of computationalism+arithmetical
realism)

There's so much more to reality than what we can see. This universe is like
that fish pond.



>
>
> >       I think robots could become conscious, depending on the definition
> of
> >       conscisousness of course. Philosophical issues aside, I believe,
> in time, that
> >       we'll be able to create something indistinguishavle from
> consciousness.
> >
> > What observational evidence is this conclusion based on?
>
> An eucated guess based on interactions with LLM:s and the progress of
> technology. Also my materialist stance helps, since I do not believe there
> is
> any magic to consciousness that is not being able to be replicated by
> technology. This is a question residing soundly in our world, and can thus
> be
> "attacked" by science.
>


But objective science can't grant access to subjective points of view. Here
you are using a theory's predictions to inform you about things you can't
observe. (The same standard that I use for theories that can describe
things I can't see.)


>
> >       > Do you bet you are not in a simulated world?
> >
> >       Absent proof, do not care, and refrain from betting.
> >
> > I am glad to see this stance. In the past, it had seemed to me you made
> a firm
> > commitment that we were not in a simulation.
>
> Not quite. I think I might have been unclear. I'm sorry about that. This
> is an
> example of transcendent questions vs immanent questions. The world, and
> acting
> in the world is of an immanent nature. What we see is what we get. I have
> no
> choice but to act in it, "it" happens to me. Hence I am 100% convinced
> that what
> I see exists and that we exist in a material world.
>
> However!
>


I believe we, as conscious beings, we never inhabit any single material
world. Rather, our brain states are infinitely distributed across the
infinite reality, such that in any single moment, your brain-state and
conscious-state exists across infinite similar (subjectively
indistinguishable) universes.

This explains why we experience what we call quantum mechanics. It is a
meta-effect following from the fact that no mind state exists in a single
universe. I have a diagram that shows this here:
https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Irreducible_Randomness


>
> A simulation is a transcendente question beyond our world. It can never be
> ruled
> out 100%, just like god cannot, pink unicorns and any other fantasy
> beings, how
> absurd they might be. Since I live in the physical world, I simply refuse
> to
> engage with those questions.





> I don't have to assign them even a truth value,
> they are meaningless questions _unless_ someone proves them and thereby
> "pulls
> them into" the world. It could then be argued, especially in the case of
> god,
> that by definition it is not god, but that is a separate issue.
>
> The key difference here is that for questions of this world, I can always
> revise
> probabilities, but for questions beyond the world, I consider them and
> probabilities assigned to them as meaningless.
>

I see this as a self-imposed constraint, which is limiting if one's goal is
pursuit of the truth. But it may be useful if one has a different goal,
such as a focus on what is pragmatic or practical in the material world.


>
>
> >
> > So to answer Keith's question of why people have beliefs (ideas that may
> be
> > right or wrong, but which we bet to be true (i.e. hypotheses we have
> credence
> > in)) my answer is that is necessary for rational action, indeed it is
> how I
> > would define rational action.
>
> I agree. Developing hypotheses and ideas, testing them, to guide action is
> rational. But there are cases where instinct overrides, such as when in
> danger,
> of when simply not caring about the outcome.
>
> But from a scientific point of view, yes, that's how they work, I imagine.
>



>
>
> > Note that here you are using a metaphysical assumption (that simpler
> universes
> > are more probable than more complex universes): Occam's razor.
>
> No, not quite. I think that given the evidence of my senses and my hand,
> and the
> fact that no one has proven another universe, there is no point for me to
> abandon the view of a material world. Since I have no choice but to act in
> it, I
> actually don't need to prove anything. I can just act in it. In fact, I
> have no
> other choice.
>
> So if someone wants to convince me of other worlds, the burden of proof is
> on
> them.
>
> > I agree with this metaphysical assumption.
>
> I think occam can be of service in this world, with material problems. I
> think
> it leads us astray when it comes to transcendent questions.



Let us imagine a future when physicists discover a TOE, a simplest possible
unified theory that marries GR and QM, and even gives us a few predictions
of particles not yet theorized, but that we later discover.
Then let's say this simplest possible TOE also predicts that there are
other universes, that there's no way of revising the theory to get rid of
those other universes without completely screwing with the utter simplicity
and elegance of this theory.

Do you think that Occam's razor (in providing a strong preference to the
simple, elegant, beautiful TOE) is "leading us astray" here? Ought we
prefer the ugly bastardized version of the TOE that has been worked over to
eliminate those pesky other universes that the simpler theory predicts?


I do appreciate him
> though, even in case of transcendent question from an aesthetical point of
> view.
>
>
> >
> > Scientists and philosophers still debate these ideas, despite the near
> > universal acceptance of the metaphysical principal of Occam's razor.
>
> See my answer above. I don't see these ideas as problems or something that
> need
> to be debated, absent proof. Regardless of boltzmann is correct or not, at
> the
> end of the day we have no choice but to act "as if" the material universe
> is the
> truth.
>
> Boltzmann might be the truth, but show me the proof, and let's talk about
> it. =)
>

Well astronomers/cosmologists do spend a significant amount of time
describing how/why Boltzmann brains aren't an issue in their theorized
cosmologies.

Personally I think the argument for the higher probability of Boltzmann
brains stems from an incorrect theory of what constitutes a low entropy
state in the early universe.
For example:
https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/layzer/
provides an alternative mechanism, wherein the early universe was high
entropy initially, but as the universe expands, it creates room for entropy
to grow.



>
>
> > So it is certain that if we were a simulation, and the simulators wanted
> to
> > hide that fact from us, there would be no way for us to tell.
>
> True. Yet another argument for why we can safely put aside that idea,
> apart from
> the enjoyment we get out of discussing it. On the other hand...
>
> my friendly neighbourhood AI tells me that:
>
> The "halting problem" shows that there are limits to what can be computed
> by a
> Turing machine, and some simulations might be able to exploit these limits
> to
> break out of their environment.
>
> The concept of "oracle machines" suggests that a simulation could
> potentially
> access and manipulate the underlying hardware if it has access to an
> "oracle"
> that provides information about the external world.
>
> Some theories, such as "quantum computing" and "non-computable functions,"
> propose the existence of computational models that could potentially allow
> a
> simulation to break out of its environment.
>
> And around and around we go. ;)
>

I think this is just an example of hallucination. Try to dig into any one
of those examples, asking for details and sources, and I think you will see
it falls apart.



>
> > This is the analogy: when you run Mario Brothers in a NES emulator, the
> game
> > has no way to tell it is running in an emulator, rather than kn direct,
> real,
> > original NES hardware. From the perspective of the game software, it has
> no
> > way to know.
> >
> > The same is true if this simulation is closed from external interaction.
> No
> > test we can perform (from the inside) will distinguish a raw physical
> universe
> > from a simulated physical universe.
>
> This is very true on an intuitive level. But I always wondered, do you
> have some
> kind of formal proof of this as a branch of this conversation?
>

I will try.

1. Any function that is computable can be computed by a Turing machine (The
Church-Turing Thesis)
   -> All forms of computation are equivalent (no Turing machine can
compute something another can't)
2. A Universal Turing Machine (UTM) -- (a general purpose computer) -- is
Turing complete
  -> Turing Completeness means a UTM is capable of emulating the behavior
and operation of any other Turing Machine
  -> Any other Turing Machine includes other UTMs
  -> Hence, any UTM is, with the right programming, capable of perfectly
emulating any other UTM
3. Turing Machine "M" running program "X", can be perfectly emulated by UTM
"U" emulating "M" running "X"
  -> The execution trace, (memory values, registers, order of operations,
machine states, etc.) is identical between M running X, and the emulation
of M running X.
  -> The perspective of everything X has access to (all memory values,
registers, machine states, instructions, etc.), everything is the same
whether it is running on M, or the emulation of M.
  -> Hence, no program can determine with certainty what its ultimate (base
level) hardware happens to be.

This is the magic that makes Java programs, VMs and emulators possible.




>
> > What about when we experience a quantum computers factor a number with
> 10,000
> > digits, a number so large all the atoms in this universe could never
> factor
> > that number given all the time from now to the heat death?
> >
> > Would this then be an inside experience that justifies belief in the
> outside
> > (the quantum multiverse)?
>
> We don't know. First of all, I have heard professors debate on another
> mailinglist that what is proclaimed as quantum computing is nothing but.
> Also, I
> do not think this has been done, and finally, we might not correctly
> understand
> at our conceptual level how it works.
>

Quantum computers have been used to run Shor's algorithm and factor
numbers. The only issue is today's quantum computers don't have very many
qubits now. But they are increasing all the time with no end in sight.
If you, or those professors, know of any reason why quantum computers won't
be able to scale, there is a standing $100,000 bet they can collect from
Scott Aaronson:
https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-im-wagering-100000-on-quantum-computing


>
> I remember this example from our previous long form discussion about 1
> year (?)
> ago or more.
>
>
> >
> > We have to be willing to abandon what seems so obvious to our senses if
> we are
> > to be fully rational. We must be willing to question all assumptions,
> > especially those that seem so obvious.
>
> Yes, I am not arguing against questioning our ideas and updating them
> given new
> evidence. I am arguing against all encompassing doubt,


For what it's worth, I don't get swallowed in Cartesian doubt. I think we
can gather evidence from our environment and hypothesize about what is most
likely responsible for our sensations of an apparent physical world. I
wrote this for an upcoming article:

We are each individually certain of our own consciousness.
>From this certain fact, we infer the existence of something else.
A thing that can account for or otherwise explain the
existence of one’s consciousness.
Aside from the existence of one’s consciousness, and the
thing that’s responsible for it, the laws of logic also seem
impossible to doubt.
So while we may not know what is responsible for
consciousness, we can use reason to decide which
explanations are logically possible.
By gathering clues from our senses, we can falsify hypotheses,
puzzle out the rules that govern experience, and refine our model of
reality.
Accordingly, we can still make progress in understanding how the world *seems
to work*,
even if the world is not *what it seems* or only *seems to exist*.



> and pulling
> transcendental questions which are for now, meaningless, into the project
> of
> science. (and note that I do not find them meaningless from the point of
> view of
> entertainment, psychology and poetry)
>

Note that I don't think such questions are meaningless, nor do I think they
are not ready to be brought into the project of science.
I think this disagreement stems only from our different thresholds for how
theories can be used.


>
>
> > I don't know that it's thaylt niche. I think a good majority of people
> might
> > choose an earlier death rather than a longer life filled with pain.
>
> Could that life of pain be said to be damage to the system?
>

That future pain is not involved in the contemplation of the person when he
makes that decision, only the "idea of future pain" is involved.


>
> > This is evidence that higher level thinking can and does overriding
> biological
> > imperatives.
>
> This I agree fully with. Different beings can override more or less, or
> none of
> their biological imperatives, depending on the power of their conscisous
> brain.
>
> We have yogis who can influence the autonomous nervous system to a
> remarkable
> degree.
>
> >
> >
> > I don't think instability is necessary involved. But I would agree with
> the
> > principle that the more complex the system, the more failure modes it
> has.
>
> Fragility perhaps? We know of many crazy geniuses, but do we know of many
> crazy
> monkeys? Or many crazy weasels?
>

That's a good point. Humans probably have a wider range and greater
susceptibility to mental illness.


>
>
> >
> > But is it the you-now who experiences tomorrow, or is that the
> you-morrow who
> > experiences that future time?
>
> I don't need to answer that question. I only have to act. =) But this
> opens up
> another discussion about identity. Maybe we should move that to another
> thread?
>

(I'll start a new thread)


>
>
> >
> > Empirical observations can't prove some other version of you is not
> still in
> > those other points in time forever.
>
> First of all, when it comes to identity and time for the purpose of this
> thread,
> I don't need to do anything about it at all, or answer any question. Like
> the
> material world, it just happens, and I do not need to have an idea about
> it. So
> it takes care of itself.
>
> When it comes to the statement if I exist at another point in time, since
> we
> cannot travel in time, it is meaningless. Just like simulation is
> transcendental
> from a material point of view, talking about events and things outside of
> our
> current time is equally transcendent, and thus pointless, unless you can
> provide
> proof of you or I existing in some other timeline.
>

It's an implication of relativity.


>
> >       > But note that we can't empirically distinguish "empty
> individualism" (we each
> >       > exist as only a single moment) from closed individualism (we
> experience all
> >       > moments in our lives) from open individualism (we all experience
> all moments
> >       > of all lives).
> >
> >       Could you elaborate? I find it pretty clear that I experience all
> moments in my
> >       life and not a single moment or experiences everyones lives.
> >
> > Based on what? Memory?
>
> Let me counter with this... can you offer me a proof that the common sense
> view
> of closed individualism, where I live and experience my life just as our
> senses
> and common sense indicate, is not true?


> I think we'd better start there.
>


100% absolute proof? I cannot.
But I can provide 99.9999999999999999999999875% certainty if you find that
satisfactory.


The following is the story of your coming into existence, as told by the
conventional view of personal identity (known as closed individualism):

According to this story, in order for you to have been born, and in order
for you to be conscious and alive right here, right now, a very specific
sperm had to meet a very specific egg. Had that not happened, then life for
you would be an eternal blank (nothingness forever).

We can roughly characterize the odds of your conception as approximately 1
in 200,000,000 sperm cells. Those were the odds that just the right sperm
hit just the right egg necessary for your existence.

But we can't stop here. Your parents each had to be born as well. They each
had to overcome 1 in 200,000,000 odds sperm cell lotteries. If we include
the improbability of your parents' conception, we are already up to 1 in
200,000,000^3 or 1 in 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

This is how improbable your existence is under the conventional view of
personal identity.

The unconventional view, to which I subscribe, is open individualism. This
theory of personal identity requires no contingencies on coming into
existence. You would be born, and alive, regardless of what atoms your mom
ate while she was pregnant, regardless of whether your genes coded for
brown eyes or blue, and regardless of any other material or genetic trait,
you would have been born as someone, you would be alive and seeing the
world through those eyes. This also means that you are bound to experience
the perspective of every conscious being born in this universe (or any
other).

This theory absolves the improbability of having to overcome sperm
cell lotteries. Applying Bayesian inference to the two alternative
hypothesis: closed individualism, vs. open individualism, and updating the
probability for closed individualism with its 1 in
8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 odds of being born, this shrinks the
probability of closed individualism (the conventional view) down to
0.0000000000000000000000125, and elevates the probability of the
alternative, open individualism to: 99.9999999999999999999999875%.

You can consider your grandparents, and great grandparents, etc. to get as
close to 100% as you like. :-)




>
> > You have no memory of that breakfast you ate 5 years ago. But someone
> > experienced it vividly.
>
> If we doubt our existence and memory, we end up in solipsism,


I am doubting neither existence nor memory, I am only saying that we forget
things. And so, not having a memory of an experience is not proof that you
never had a particular experience (because we forget).


> and I find the
> benefits of my individuality and existence moving through the material
> world to
> be the truth, to be of more value, than eternal doubt. Also, someone has
> not yet
> been able to prove to me that I do not exist.
>

I would never try to prove that.


>
>
> >
> > So I ask, what contingencies matter for being conscious? What particular
> atoms
> > (if any) have to be around you for you to have consciousness?
> >
> >
> >       Here I
> >       misunderstand you a bit, I'm certain.
>

I hope my previous explanation, concerning the improbability of the
conventional view, shows why it is an error to presume particular atoms or
genes were necessary to your existence. E.g., if your mom ordered fish
instead of chicken while she was carrying you, and different atoms
incorporated themselves into your body, such that you were a materially
different being, I hope you would not argue that to imply you would be
"dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", rather, having
different atoms is of no consequence to being born and being you.
Similarly, had you been born with slightly different genes such that your
hair was one shade lighter, would that mean that you would be "dead
forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", or would it simply mean
that you would be born and would now be living with a shade of hair that is
slightly lighter?

Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know when it leads
to you being "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", with
"someone else" (who isn't you) walking around living and enjoying the world.


>
> > It is true they there remains a consistent notion of causality embedded
> within
> > the 4D structure of spacetime, but it is wrong when it says relativity
> remains
> > consistent with an objective passage of time.
> >
> > See this for a more detailed explanation of why relativity is
> incompatible
> > with a passage of time: https://philpapers.org/rec/PETITA
>
> I'm sorry, but I am not skilled enough and do not have time enough to
> argue this
> point. When it comes to relativity, causality and the passage of time, I
> have to
> let other list members who are way more skilled physicists than I am step
> in and
> continue the discussion from here. I can only say that based on what I
> see, it
> does not seem like it is settled.
>

(I'll start another thread)


> >
> >       Good enough for me. Show me the proof, and we'll revise to 2c. If
> that situation
> >       can never be achieved, and if we can never prove it, for me, it's
> nothing.
> >
> > I think you're missing my argument. I am not saying it is 2c, I am saying
> > there is no empirical evidence that laws remain constant.
>
> I have not seen any laws being broken lately, I think that would count?
>

That proves that they haven't changed. But where is your observation that
they cannot and will not change?
(Note: I am not arguing that they will, I am only highlighting a limit of
observational/empirical science, one we must turn to other metaphysical
theories to find answers. E.g., a belief in Occam's Razor)


>
> > We can base such beliefs only by way of metaphysical assumptions
> regarding the
> > higher probability of universes having simpler laws. But not by way of
> > empirical (scientific/observational) evidence.
>
> We don't need to. We have the laws, and they do a good job of predicting
> what we
> want to predict. We don't have to assume anything beyond that.
>

We assume they don't change whenever we rely on our past observations and
theories to make predictions about the future.


>
>
> I think my statement above covers how I see this Boltzmann example.
>
> > If you want to justify your belief in primitive physical reality as the
> more
> > likely account of your experience, not sophisticated evidence or
> arguments are
> > needed, I think. For example, showing why one of those cases is more or
> less
> > probable.
>
> I think we can reverse it. If primitive physical reality is not the case,
> where's the proof of what it is?
>

There is something that is real that we think of as primitive physical
reality, but it isn't primitive. It is derivative from more fundamental,
and amore primitive arithmetical truth and number relations. This body of
arithmetical truth contains, among other things, the final and intermediate
states of all program executions. Some of these program executions result
in conscious observers. The reality as seen from the perspective of these
conscious programs constitutes what we think of as physical reality.

Again, science never provides proof, but there is ample evidence, as I lay
out here:
https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory


>
>
> > Consider: even if only 1 instance of you in a billion is due to a
> simulation,
> > then when you die the 999,999,999 copies of you living as primitive
> physical
> > version will die, but the one that lives will be the one in the
> simulation. It
> > is the only thing you can experience as your next conscious experience,
> so it
> > is the only thing you will experience after you die.
> >
> > Again, that justifies thinking about the simulation hypothesis.
>
> I'm definitely not arguing that we cannot think about anything. But as per
> my
> argument above, many of these questions are by design futile and pointless
> from
> a scientific and materialistic point of view. I do argue, that for science,
> there are way more low hanging fruits where we should spend our time and
> resources.
>

I don't think they are futile. I know of many examples of how we can use
observations within this universe, to give evidence for theories about
things beyond this universe.

Here is a simple example:

Let's say the year is 2085, it is an era of post-singularity
super-intelligence, filled with dyson swarms and computronium. You hear a
recent statistics on your news feed: Solar System population exceeds 100
Quadrillion, 5% of those are addicted to the recent game "Sim Ancestor"
with players each living out dozens of human lifetimes everyday (their
brains also run a million times faster).

You have a direct empirical observation that most human lives occur
post-singularity in this game "Sim human". You run a napkin calculation and
discover a million times as many human lives have run in Sim Human in the
past 2 days as humans who have ever lived in the original physical universe.

Would this "direct observation" (of so many simulated lives) in 2085 change
how you view the simulation hypothesis?


>
> For enjoyment, and science fiction, those restrictions do not apply.
>

Consider how important science fiction is to the development of science. If
we didn't have people to think up mind uploading and simulation theory,
would anyone bother to pursue those goals? And consider if we didn't in
this hypothetical future, the Solar System would be limited to a few
billion lives, rather than 100 Quadrillion. What could be more practically
important than that? It's equivalent to terraforming a good chunk of the
Galaxy, but at a fraction of the cost and time. These are massive practical
advantages, stemming from ideas that originated in fiction. Might we
venture to engineer heavens, to "immanentize the eschaton" and give rise to
omega-point superintelligences?


>
>
> >
> >
> >       Why don't you like it being neutral? That is why those came to me.
> >
> > Only because I wanted a word for "an idea you bet to be true", "a
> hypothesis
> > you consider as having over 50% chance of being correct".
>
> Ahh... over 50%, that is very interesting. That's another thing I don't
> like
> with transcendental questions, probability, which is something based in our
> world.


I'd say it's part of mathematics, and that mathematics transcends all
worlds.


> Applying it to infinitues or transcendental questions, becomes as wrong
> as when AI enthusiasts juggle infinite negative or infinite positive
> outcomes to
> justify this or that, or like Pascal juggling infinite good or bad
> outcomes to
> justify god. It shows, to me at least, that we cannot liberally and freely
> apply
> infinities and probabilities to questions where the feedback loop is cut.
>
> >       Utility is an
> >       honorable thing in the philosophy of pragmatism. Many swear by it!
> ;)
> >
> > Utility is fine, I am a utilitarian, but my point is that "goal" has a
> > different connotation than "an idea you have credence in"
>
> What do you think of pareto-utilitarianism?
>

I'm not sure I know enough about it to say. Are there sources you recommend
to learn more?


>
>
> >
> > I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory consistent
> with all
> > our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise unsolved
> problems
> > in physics:
> >
> >
> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>
> Well, I respectfully disagree,


With what specifically?


> but I have read some of your articles, and I
> think they are well written, thoughtful and enjoyable, even if I do not
> draw the
> same grand conclusions you do. =) I am still hoping you will publish a
> book! I
> would definitely buy it!
>

Thank you!


>
> >       >       I must also thank you Jason. I really enjoy your ideas and
> discussing them. Even
> >       >       though you just stole 30 minutes of planned sleep from me,
> it was still worth
> >       >       it. ;)
> >       >
> >       > My apologies! I appreciate your very thoughtful and engaging
> emails as well!
> >
> >       No worries! Today is weekend, so now the pressure is off! ;)
> >
> >       > Sleep well.
> >
> >       You too!
> >
> > I hope this email fits within the size limits. ��
>
> This was a close one! Fortunately for us, today was a calm day at work, so
> instead of doing anything I could spend some time philosophizing together
> with
> you. ;)
>

Very nice.

(Note: I had to pretty agressively deleting some previous replies from a
few e-mails ago to keep the size within limits.) Have a great day!

Jason
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