[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

Hello Jason,

In order to save some space, I'll remove the sections were we agree. Then I'll
probably forget we agreed, or change my mind, and you can remind me about it later. ;)

>       Maybe there's something better than bets? ;) Bets imply money, risk,
>       reward/loss, and when it comes to a lot of ideas and hypotheses, some of them,
>       lack one or more of those associations.
>
>       I think maybe a better approach would be to discard religion, god, bet,
>       altogether, and try to describe the idea or mechanism in as simple and direct
>       and functional words as possible, and from there perhaps derive a word?
> 
> I might try to suggest a new word, except I know it would never catch on when
> english already has such a world with that meaning:
> 
>     "something believed ["to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or
> the reliability of something, although without absolute proof that one is
> right in doing so"]; an opinion or conviction:"
> 
> This is sense 1 of the word "belief." It is only in sense 4 that it gets to "a
> religious tenet or tenets; religious creed or faith:"
> 
> Maybe a word that doesn't have that connotation for you would be a "credant"
> but then others might say that reminds them too much of creeds.

You have a point. Maybe the best thing is to just try and be mindful here that
we do have a slight discrepancy, or at worst, use the clunky method of typing
out what we mean with it? As per the via negativa, if you remove bets, belief,
risk, reward/loss, what remains? ;)

When it comes to sense 1, I'd probably prefer "to have a degree of confidence in
some state in the world".

>       Or what about this? It is their hypothesis that their roommate ate the cookies?
>       No bets, no truth value (yet). I can even imagine another scenario. Imagine the
>       person is a cookie factory owner. That leads his discovery of the empty cookie
>       jar to the hypothesis, (or empirically confirmed fact) that the cookie har is
>       empty. He does not care about who ate the cookies, and is content to confirm
>       empirically that the jar is empty.
> 
> But there can be multiple simultaneous hypotheses. What should the word be for
> the current leading hypothesis, that is judged more likely to be true than
> not?

Does it need a word for it? Can it not just be the current most likely
hypothesis among many?

>       > (You can see how awkward language becomes without a single word for an
>       > idea/hypothesis that one bets is true/has credence for).
>
>       Yes. Awkward yes, but it is a balance between clarity, awkwardness, imprecision
>       and letting other concept colour our ideas or obscure the meaning.
> 
> Clear language is important in these discussions, but perhaps it is better
> that one defines terms up front (or when asked to clarify). For example, if I
> stated that I use the word belief in sense 1 only, not to be confused with
> sense 4, would that have been adequate?

It would have been better. I do think that it would risk me erring though, since
for me, and possibly Ben, belief for some reason, seems to be more connected
with religion than your dictionary excerpt implies. So it would be more clear,
definitely, but I would be the one who might let my hidden bias color your
arguments. ;) But as you say, stating it in that way I think is definitely a
step in the right direction.

>       > There are ways to prove or disprove such Gods.
>
>       I disagree. There are no ways to prove it, unless one is first in agreement on
>       what "god" is defined as.
> 
> Of course, I agree that clear definitions are the first step.

For instance, we had a discussion here a year (or more) ago, where I agreed with
you, given your definition of some remote future, app powerful AI defined as
"god" that god could be something in this world. If that is the definition we
decide for when it comes to god, I still agree with you. For definitions based
on transcendent beings I do not agree.

>       Once agreement about the definition of god is settled,
>       it becomes trivial to prove or disprove god, or, again depending on the
>       definition, reach the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything about the
>       concept,
> 
> I think with a theory of ontology at hand, one can reach definite conclusions
> on the existence or non-existence of almost anything that can be given a
> rigorous definition.

True. If theory and definitions are agreed upon, it makes the task a lot easier!
=)

> Some theories of ontology that provide a probability distribution for objects
> in existence, can even provide a means of calculating how common such an
> object is across reality.

What do you mean with "across reality"? 
 
>       and then just refrain from having an opinion about it, since in some of
>       those cases, it would make no difference what so ever to anyones life.
> 
> It depends on the god. If it is a "Great Programmer" god, (i.e., the master of
> a simulation), then such a God can intervene in the course of that simulation
> (perform miracles), read the thoughts of beings inside it (hear and answer
> prayers), and provide continuation paths for conscious beings after they die
> in the simulation (save souls).

Agreed.

> In an infinite reality, it is not a question of whether or not these gods
> exist, it is only a matter of how common or uncommon they are, that is, how
> common are simulations executed by such "Great Programmer"
> superintelligences relative to primitive universes.

Not quite. First of all, we don't know if reality is infinite, we don't know if
there are infinite world, and who knows, maybe there are constraints of which we
are not aware. The most we can say is what we can see and measure and be aware
of with the method of science. Everything else is, as far as we are concerned,
null and void, absent evidence for it. So far, no evidence for a grat programmer
reaching into the simulation has been presented.

> As the simulation argument shows, it is not trivial to decide whether most
> conscious beings (such as we) inhabit primitive physical realities, or
> simulated worlds created by superintelligences.  

Simulation we have covered, and we do not have common ground there. For the sake
of argument, I can of course agree with your premises, and follow to your
conclusion, but I do not agree with your premises, and therefore do not share
your conclusions.

>       > Alternatively, you might find evidence for the existence of superior beings
>       > beyond this universe by finding evidence that the particular constants of this
>       > universe are fine-tuned, which implies either that this universe was designed
>       > OR that there is a vast number of universes with different laws.
>
>       Absent that, they do not exist as far as I am concerned. In fact, you could say
>       that I'm entirely uninterested in them, except as plot devices and subjects for
>       fascinating discussions.
> 
> I am not sure what you mean by "absent that", for we do inhabit a universe

What I mean is that we have no evidence for superior beings, and until that
evidence is presented, I do not acknowledge them as part of reality.

> whose constants are tuned to an extraordinary degree. The only answer science
> provides to answer this mystery is that we must inhabit a vast, if not
> infinite, variegated reality containing all kinds of universes.

Science provides no answer. We have theories, and there are many of them, but
that is all we have. We have no proof, and most likely, will never have proof.
That is all I can accept into my conceptual world and model of reality.

>       > I don't think you would call Hawking or Rees dogmatic thinkers. Nevertheless
>       > they don't shy away from entertaining these hypotheses, despite flying so near
>       > to what you might consider religious topics. So I say, let science go
>       > anywhere, let it refine and bring closer to truth, all our ideas, including
>       > ideas about God, souls, and places beyond this universe.
>
>       In my experience, I think science does best analyzing and describing the
>       physical world. Concepts, that by definition lie outside this world, without any
>       interaction or way of proving it, can never be handled by science that depends
>       on this world, and ourselves as material beings.
> 
> You included rational thought as the tool of finding truth. Do you not see the
> utility of using rational thought to make judgements about the things we
> cannot directly observe? Consider that we do this to explain or talk about:

Rational thought can be a tool to help us find truth, by drawing conclusions,
based on observations, experiment and so on. Rational thought, pure rational
thought, without any connection to the world, is not enough for us to derive any
truths.

> - Past and future points in time
> - Segments of spacetime outside our lightcone
> - Spaces beyond the cosmological horizon
> - The interiors of blackholes
> - Other branches of the wavefunction
> - The conscious states of others
> 
> You agree, I think, that these are all part of what science can study. We can
> develop theories about them, test them, think rationally and logically about
> them, and so on.

I agree that we can think about these questions, but I do not agree that science
can deal with all of these questions. Anything outside our lightcone and beyond
our cosmological horizon is off limits to science, by the laws of physics, which
limits what we can empirically verify. The same with simulations, other
universes etc.

Will it always be thus? Most likely, but should we make any advances or should
the programmer in the sky reach through the simulation, we just revise our
mental maps of the world, based on evidence.

> Yet these are things we can't observe directly with our eyes or instruments.
> We can only indirectly find evidence for them. We have testable theories of
> gravity, QM, the big bang, of consciousness, of causality, etc. that are
> falsifiable, and that we can gather evidence for. When we accept these
> theories, then we can reason about their consequences and implications.

Yes, we can reason about the implications, in human language, but since we
cannot empirically verify anything of it, it will forever remain in the world of
speculation, and not hard knowledge. If it doesn't affect anyone, á la
pragmatism, it's is of little consequence. After all, QM is math, math is a
language entirely separate from our spoken language, and deals with aspects of
reality that have very little connection to our own level of reality. Therefore
it could very well be that "shut up and calculate" is the correct stance, and
that we just confuse ourselves by trying to translate it into spoken language
and that we thereby introduce errors, since we, equipped with our minds that are
designed to navigate our level of reality, simply cannot fathom or understand
the math except in flawed ways, tinted by the fact that we are by necessity
humans.

> And if and when someone accepts the theory, then they must accept all the
> predictions of that theory. This is how science gives us evidence of the
> multiverse, of places beyond the cosmological horizon, of other big bangs,
> etc. even when we can't observe them directly.

I disgaree. See above. There are alternative QM theories as well. Once we move
beyond experiments and empirical verification, we leave reality behind, and
there is no need or requirement that we accept that. You know that my position
is instrumentalist:ish/constructive emipiricist (yes, it is fuzzy), and this is
why we agreed to disagree when we discussed this last time, since you came at it
from a realist point of view. This difference leads us to be able to debate this
endlessly. ;)

>       I'm all for science being free, but care must also be taken not to waste
>       precious scientific resources and focus the limited means we have at our
>       disposal to where they give us the most bang for the buck.
> 
> Far more people care about these kinds of fundamental questions, then say, the
> mating rituals of C. elegans. While getting answers to fundamental questions
> is by no means easy, they are what (those who seek meaningful truth) are
> ultimately after:

This is true, but the fact that more or less people agree with something does
not make it right or wrong. I believe that although these are questions that by
some (or many) are perceived as deeply meaningful (unlike for Ben or me, apart
from the fun of discussing them) we should keep these kinds of questions as a
hobby and a field for philosophers, while scientists should study science and
focus on what can be empirically verified or disproved.

>       "I am very astonished that the scientific picture of
> the real world around me is very deficient. It gives
> us a lot of factual information, puts all of our
> experience in a magnificently consistent order, but
> it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really
> near to our heart that really matters to us. It cannot
> tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet,
> physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing
> of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and
> eternity."
> — Erwin Schrödinger in “Nature and the Greeks” (1954)
> 
> I believe, developed fully, science can provide answers to questions that have
> plagued us since the dawn of history.

I'm skeptical, but I do wish you (and the one who agree with you) the best of luck. 
I hope you prove me wrong! =) That would be an enormous step forward for mankind
and perhaps, for philosophy!

>       Well, I can act without assuming the truth. I might act based on a hunch, or
>       while not being certain about the outcome. I do not believe that one has to act,
>       always, based on an assumed truth. I can act in order to try and assign a truth
>       value. Truth for me is not a statement _in_ the world, it is a process,
>       something that comes into existence, when the world collides with consciousness
>       and the map of the world that is contained inside that consciousness.
> 
> But absent immediate need, the most rational mind would say "don't act yet, we
> are still gathering evidence, we can make a better-educated decision
> by delaying still longer."

True, and this frequently happens. You know my agnostic stance towards some of
your questions, that is a good example of this reasoning. On some of your other
questions, I think we cannot, by design, ever find an answer, so I refrain from
seriously working on those.

> So taking action always represents a departure from the behavior of a perfect
> scientist. It is the constraint of living in a physical world that demands
> such departures.

Yes, we are not perfect beings. But we can always strive to improve towards that
goal.

>       > This is a necessary compromise as beings who don't have infinite time, and
>       > must make decisions at times when we have incomplete information.
>       >
>       >       Eternal doubt I think has proven to be a dead end, so I personally am content to
>       >       trust my senses that the real world is true, until someone proves it is not, or
>       >       shows me what else would be there instead of the real world. Uncertainty, is a
>       >       good thing and should be embraced.
>       >
>       > I can't square the beginning of the paragraph with the end.
>
>       What I mean is that uncertainty or refraining from assigning a truth value is a
>       valid stance. Eternally doubting, as in not thinking something might be, leads
>       to infinite regress and would not allow for productive discussions.
> 
> Maybe I am misunderstanding you here, but I don't see any conflict between
> eternal doubt and refraining from assigning a truth value. Are they not the
> same thing?  

Not quite. Let me describe the difference like this:

Eternal doubt refers to a state of perpetual uncertainty or skepticism about a
particular claim or statement. It involves continuously questioning or doubting
the truth of something, without ever being able to fully accept or reject it.
This can lead to a kind of intellectual paralysis, where one is unable to make a
decision or take a stance due to the persistent uncertainty.

Eternal doubt in its extreme forms, leads to solipsism.

On the other hand, refraining from assigning a truth value to something means
choosing not to label a statement as either true or false, often due to a lack
of sufficient information or evidence. This can be a deliberate decision, based
on a recognition of the limitations of one's knowledge or the complexity of the
issue at hand. It involves acknowledging that one does not have enough
information to make a judgment, rather than being consumed by doubt or
uncertainty.

The key difference between the two is that eternal doubt is often characterized
by a sense of anxiety or unease, whereas refraining from assigning a truth value
is a more neutral and deliberate stance. The former can be debilitating, while
the latter can be a sign of intellectual humility and a willingness to
acknowledge the limits of one's knowledge.

>       > Shouldn't it be better to remain uncertain whether we are in a simulation or
>       > not? What is the advantage of jumping to a conclusion?
>
>       Because if we are uncertain about our material world, and we might favour a
>       simulation, we should also be uncertain and might think that the simulation runs
>       in another simulation, but note that if we are uncertain about our material
>       world, and means we must also be uncertain about our senses and empirical proof,
>       but that means that perhaps our minds are deceiving us as well, and eventually
>       all foundation for a logical and reasonable discussion crumble away in doubt and
>       uncertainty.
> 
> I don't see it leading to that breakdown. What does it matter if this is a
> simulation or not? You're still conscious, things still follow comprehensible
> rules, and so forth.

Oh, but we don't know that. That is also open to doubt. As per the doubt vs
agnosticism or refraining from assigning truth values above, one lands you
eventually, if you want to be consistent in your doubt, in solipsism, while the
other clearly delineates what you can know, and what you cannot, and in the
latter case you simply "let it go" and refrain from engaging with it.

> I was thinking, perhaps a better way of explaining your viewpoint of G. E.
> Moore's "here is a hand" is this:
>
>       "Although the whole of this life were said to be
> nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a
> phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough,
> if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it."
> -- Leibniz

Not how I would put it, but yes, I do see the point, and I think it does align a
bit with my point of view.

> What do you think? Does this represent your viewpoint? That "A difference that
> makes no difference is no difference at all" and thus it's impractical to
> debate a physical world from an indistinguishable simulated one?

I think on the surface, it does sound like a good summary. If we can never know,
it is pointless to speculate.

>       That is why I am talking about two levels of agnosticism here. The immanent
>       level, our day to day world. It makes no sense what so ever to be agnostic about
>       it, since we, being part of it, are forced to act in it. That is why I can say
>       that my hand exists, and by that statement, or by the fact that my things remain
>       in place when not moved, or that other people talk to me when I talk to them,
>       can tell you that the material world, as discovered and identified and described
>       by science, exists.
>
>       The feedback loop exists between me and the external world, science works, all
>       excellent point in favour of the material world.
>
>       Now, when I talk about agnosticism, I am talking about transcendent questions,
>       that per definition, exist beyond this world, such as simulations, gods (in
>       various variants, but not all variants) the eternal soul, life after death.
> 
> We can agree to disagree here, but I think it's a false delineation. I think
> many scientific theories, (including relativity, quantum mechanics,
> functionalism, eternal inflation, the concordance model, etc.) have
> implications of eternal life or afterlives.  

Hmm, yes, I think we can agree to disagree on this point.

>       Those are all matters the transcend the material world,
> 
> Conscious beings (souls) are present in this world.
>  
>       and since we are by
>       design, beings in this world, with senses, words, bodies, that can, by design,
>       only use concepts, rules and laws, of this world, it makes no sense to raise
>       those questions, apart from poetry, or as psychological comforting fantasies.
> 
> Consider a fish confined within a frozen pond. It can't escape the pond, nor
> see anything beyond this pond. However, it can reason, using clues of gravity
> (bubbles float, pebbles sink) and by noticing a very small curvature in the
> frozen surface of the pond, which is always tangential to the downward or
> upward direction of bubbles and pebbles, it could reason rationally to
> conclude its pond was just one small part of a much larger spherical world.
> The fish, if smart enough, could conduct a Cavendish style experiment, work
> out a theory of gravity, calculate the size of the sphere of the earth (based
> on curvature of the pond surface), and realize that the mass of the total
> world (as determined by the speed at which pebbles sink), also is roughly in
> line with the volume of the sphere of the earth times the density of the
> pebbles. It could then know Earth to be a kind of giant pebble, upon which its
> pond is only the smallest smear of water.
> 
> In your view, is it science for the fish to conclude it is part of a vast
> world which it cannot directly observe all of, or is this transcendent
> metaphysics for the fish?

A fish is material, so is the pond and the world the pond is in, so there's
nothing stopping the fish from jumping through the surface onto land, from
developing legs, from jumping across narrow stretches of land, etc. which would
make areas surrounding the pond, and eventually, the world part of science for
the fish.

>       Don't get me wrong, those reasons can be very good, for many people absolutely
>       necessary, but we need to take those things for what they are.
>
>       So, to return to the silliest example, but which I think most clearly
>       illustrates my point, if you were to ask me about a bearded omnipotent and
>       eternal man in the sky, I would say I'm pretty sure that this is b.s. and I will
>       act in my daily life, as if this is b.s. and if you press me on the point, I
>       will tell you, that ultimately I am agnostic, since an infinitely small
>       probability might exist that there is indeed some eternal bearded man.
> 
> If you, like me, believed in an infinite comprehensive reality, would you
> agree it makes sense to revise the notion of "exists" vs "doesn't exist"?

Yes! I think you argue logically and coherently based on your assumptions and
beliefs. So I think from your position, that existence and non-existence could
be more permissive than when used with my mental maps, models and assumptions.

> For in a reality containing all possibilities, even improbable things happen
> and exist, somewhere. It is only the impossible that doesn't exist.

True. But if all possibilities and events exist... why not an event that
destroys all other and ultimately itself? Surely such an event much also be able
to happen, if there are limitless possibilities, and maybe the fact that we are
here might indicate, that all possibilities do not exist?

> Then instead, we should speak of things "existing with a high measure" (in
> more places, more frequently, more commonly" vs. things "existing with a lower
> measure" (in fewer places, less frequently, less commonly).

The distribution of probabilities of events across universes, I think is
something I am not qualified to talk about. I just remember my university
statistics course, where we have various distributions in this world. Adding all
worlds, and all events, I do not know how this would affect probability
distributions derived and though out in this world.

>       So I do not believe that it is a meaningful question to ask, and that it is
>       beyong truth values, since truth values depend on the feedback loop with the
>       world. 
> 
> I believe truth exists independently of us. A truth is not dependent on there
> being some person to observe and confirm some idea for themselves, the truth
> exists independently of its observation or discovery. Perhaps this is the more
> fundamental philosophical disagreement between us.

True! This is one fundamental disagreement. I believe in it as a process, a
state that happens when consciousness "collides" with the world. Without
consciousness, truth loses all meaning for me.

I'm happy we manage to reach this conclusion, it makes it a lot easier to
understand why we disagree about certain things! =)

> Note: Rereading this I see now you were referring to "truth values" which I
> take to mean the degree of confidence an particular observer places on some
> hypothesis. These I agree are observer dependent. I leave my original reply to
> see if you do believe in objective (observer independent) truth or not.

No, your first thought was the correct one.

>       Again, if we take a slightly more sophisticated example, the multiple world
>       interpretation, I think to myself, does it affect me in any possible way? Nope.
>       As far as I am concerned, I couldn't care less. I'm agnostic, there's no
>       interplay between those universes and my own, so I just don't entertain the
>       possibility.
> 
> But quantum computers work. (We can drop or break out this topic to a separate
> thread, depending on your interest in pursuing this topic).

I think we should drop it. I only go on hearsay here, and I would like to attend
a debate between two physicists on this topic. Maybe you could argue this point
on an encryption mailinglist where there is at least one person who argues that
what we have today is not QC?

>       So, that's how I think when it comes to being agnostic about the transcendent,
>       acting "as if" the transcendent is null and void in our material world, and how
>       in our immanent world, we do well by revising our map and predictions based on
>       evidence, but that we always have a choice of acting instinctually, with a
>       rational plan, acting as if something is true, acting with an open mind to find
>       out if it is true, or not acting at all, since we don't care about the result,
>       so just acknowleding a state in the world and moving on.
> 
> I think we can agree that we disagree here. In my philosophy, we can use
> science and rationality to attack the transcendent questions that are most
> important to us: https://alwaysasking.com/questions/

This is true, and I like that optimism in your philosophy! =) It is a point I'll
be glad to be proven wrong about.

>       > Okay thank you for that clarification.
>
>       You're welcome! =)
>
>       >
>       > There's a difference between a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is
>       > false, and a testable hypothesis that one is 90% sure is true.
>
>       Yes, but in degree, not in kind.
> 
>
>       It seems as if this is not an uncommon position. Just to illustrate:
>
>       "When you have several hypotheses with varying degrees of probability of being
>       right, this is often referred to as a set of competing hypotheses or alternative
>       hypotheses. In statistics and probability theory, this can be more specifically
>       described as a probability distribution over multiple hypotheses, where each
>       hypothesis is assigned a probability of being true.
>
>       In some fields, such as Bayesian inference, this is referred to as a model space
>       or hypothesis space, where each hypothesis is a model that attempts to explain
>       the observed data, and each model is assigned a probability of being the true
>       model.
> 
> I think Bayesian inference and the techniques for revising estimates on the
> priors, is the most succinct mathematical description of the process of
> science .

Thank you for the pointer! I will read up on it. I probably did, decades ago,
forgot about it, and that might be where the above comes from.

>       No. But should I wake up, the question of an afterlife would then provably have
>       been become a thing of this world, and then subject to probabilities and revised
>       ideas about it.
> 
> But even without the technology, we can conduct this thought experiment now.
> And relying only on some weak assumptions about the brain's role in generating
> consciousness we can reason about this outcome being the probable outcome of
> such a technology. Can we not then update our probabilities now?

True, but a thought experiment is a thought experiment, and since it has (often)
no, or very little connection to this world, or empirical validation, they can
both lead us astray, and help us think about a new concept or highlight
weaknesses in it. Yes, they are valuable tools, but we should not make the
mistake of thinking thought experiments along the same line if real experiments
with real feedback loops.

>       >       > Do you bet there is no God?
>       >
>       >       I really don't care, since I regardless of if that were true or not, (ceteris
>       >       paribus) it would make no difference what so ever in my life.
>       >
>       > It could make a difference to your afterlife (which is an extension of your
>       > life) and hence would be part of what you consider your life.
>
>       I have seen nothing which seems to indicate what you say, so in terms of effects
>       on me in the immanent world, I consider it null and void.
> 
> Here, I see a possible inconsistency. You believe that other people are
> conscious (rather than p-zombies), despite that you can never enter their
> minds to see what they see and confirm that yes indeed they are conscious.

Yes I believe other people are conscious. I have empirical evidence, they move,
talk, express emotions. Just the way I do.

> Given this dearth of observational evidence, why do you not consider the
> hypothesis that other people are conscious "null and avoid"?

Well, we don't know how to define consciousness. So if the question is, does
someone else experience red the way I do? I answer no idea, and I do not care
(null and void).

If we define it as someone acting like I do, exhibiting the same behaviour,
then, yes, based on empirical feedback loops, I have strong evidence for that
kind of definition of consciousness.

> If you say it is because "I believe in functionalism" or "I use logic to
> reason that zombies are impossible" then you are using theories to draw
> conclusions about objects you will never, and can never observe (the
> subjective viewpoints of others).

I don't. I look at how they behave, their reactions in the real world. I am also
in the camp of thus believing a robot, that acts exactly as I act, or like
humans act, is conscious.

> Is this not equivalent to how I use theories, and logic, to reason about other
> branches of the wave function that I will never (from my vantage point here)
> directly observe?

I don't think so.

>       In terms of a possible
>       being in the form of some kind of god, there's always an infinite possibility,
>       hence my agnosticism. In terms of my acting here, I wait for proof of god,
> 
> It's easier to find evidence of an infinite comprehensive reality. For example:
>  *  Juergen Schmidhuber's   Algorithmic Theory of Everything.
>  *  Arthur Lovejoy's               Principle of Plenitude
>  *  Robert Nozick's                Principle of Fecundity
>  *  Kurt Gödel's                    Mathematical Realism
>  *  David Lewis                    Modal Realism
>  *  Bruno Marchal's             Arithmetical Realism
>  *  Max Tegmark’s              Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
>  *  Derek Parfit's                All Worlds Hypothesis.
> Mathematicians, philosophers, logicians, computer scientists, and physicists all have found evidence for the existence of a
> comprehensive reality. Some use mathematical logic to establish that there's no alternative. Others find evidence in the form
> deriving predictions that are empirically testable and confirmed.
> 
> If you start with an ontological theory that presumes all logically possible things exist, then finding a proof of something's
> existence is reduced to finding a self-consistent definition of that thing.
> 
> “Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.”
> --  David Hilbert

Note the inferences, and derivations, not empirical proof. I disagree, and I
would also suggest that there are plenty of people who believe in a material
world. Also, per earlier messages, I am aware of no earth shaking, fundamental
and empirically verifiable proof of other universes and infinities, but I think
we have discovered fundamental differences between us in terms of truth and in
terms of philosophy of science that would make it consistent for you to accept
logical proofs of infinite worlds, as the truth, while given my set of
philosophical beliefs and assumptions, would make it inconsistent.

>       lacking that, the fact that the material world happens to me, is enough for me
>       to act in it. In terms of morals, value etc. philosophy and rational thought is
>       what I prefer, informed by science.
>
>       >       > Do you bet there are no universes but this one?
>       >
>       >       If no information can flow, and no proof ever be found, it is nothing to me.
>       >
>       > Causal interaction is one way to find evidence, but it is not the only way.
>       > Consider these theories, none of which are based on information flows,
>       > nonetheless we have strong evidence for them, are accepted by most scientists
>       > in that field, and they imply other universes:
>
>       They are theories, and we're talking implication. We are not talking hard,
>       empirical proof, so I feel very well justified to disregard them.
> 
> Often theoretical evidence is taken as much stronger evidence than empirical
> evidence.

Depending on the circumstance, this is correct, and sometimes it is not correct.
Sometimes, ideally, they both reinforce each other. Ultimately the origin is the
world, and empirical feedback loops. Without those, we lose all our bearings.

> Consider how well tested and accepted the theory of gravity is. If two
> scientists in a lab report they dropped a penny and it went straight up to the
> ceiling and hovered there for a few seconds then fell back to the ground,
> would we take their hard empirical observation that gravity was violated over
> the much better established theory of gravity? Or would we chalk it up to gas
> fumes, or something else causing some kind of hallucination? Clearly we find
> it more likely that some other explanation is responsible for their
> observation, than the idea that gravity stopped applying to this penny for
> some period of time.
> 
> If we can be so confident in our theories to dismiss observations like that,
> then should we not take our theories just as seriously when they say things we
> can't see (and therefore have no empirical reasons to doubt)?

All theories are not equally strongly proven. Also, we should not of course
dismiss the event, but note that the event does have an explanation. So I do not
see that this example would make me change my position.

>       After all,
>       could be that what the equations imply, simply does not lend itself to being
>       translated into our language with our experiences of being physical beings in
>       time and space.
> 
> I don't see why our theories should be so capricious as to break down as soon as we stop looking.

It's not about that, it's about what the theories imply, and that they imply
things, which cannot be translated into correct statements in our higher level
language fueled by our hardcoded notions of being physical beings in a physical
world. I tried to explain it above.

>       So "shut up and calculate" is for me a very attractive position when it comes to
>       theories about other potential worlds, which we can never affect, and which can
>       never affect us.
> 
> The other branches of the wave function do affect ours, in particular
> situations. Aside from the example of quantum computers, even just the
> interference band effect, as seen in the double slit experiment, is a result
> of influence from these other branches. If we had no reason to believe in
> these other branches, we wouldn't talk about them. But it is precisely this
> evidence that forces us to.  

Yes, there are effects, observable effects, but going from them to multiple
worlds is too big a step, since those are forever outside our grasp. Since we
cannot verify them, and since they cannot affect us, and since we don't even
know if it is possible to translate them into verbal language, they are null and
void, and we'd better just "shut up and calculate". ;)

I think we are moving in circles here.

>       Same with god. No proof, so why should I even consider the question? It leads us
>       astray and distracts us from more important concerns.
> 
> Do you see the importance in questions such as these?
>  *  “where did we come from?”
>  *  “how did we get here?”
>  *  “where are we going?"
>  *  “why do we experience all this?”

Yes, I think in terms of science, nr 1 and 2 are good. We have done well and
have good answers already, although not the entire picture of course.

3 is a question for philosophy based on one interpretation, and
physics/sociology/anthropology perhaps based on another interpretation.

4 I'm not sure I understand.

>       If any practical effects
>       show up, let's talk about it, if not, let's stick to reality. =)
>
>       > - Cosmic inflation (explains several key mysteries of the big bang), implies
>       > big bangs occur eternally throughout an ever inflating cosmos.
>
>       It seems as if it is not so clear cut in addition to the above:
>
>       https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Criticisms .
> 
> Every theory has its critics, but many of inflation's predictions have been
> strongly confirmed by observation. This image has been called "The
...
> have been verified." -- Ethan Siegel  

This is beyond me I suspect.

>       > As such, they could, in principle, copy you into their universe, they could
>       > interview you, put your consciousness in a robot body to move about in theirs,
>       > etc. And so, you have some nonzero probability of finding yourself there, in
>       > those other universes you thought could not reach you.
>
>       Offer me proof, and we'll talk. Once you open pandoras box, you admit all kinds
>       of potential beings, gods, simulation runners, hoaxes into your conceptual
>       world. I prefer desert landscapes, and go on what proof is presented to me.
> 
> Your standard of evidence is unreachable.

Oh yes, for some things, such as the above, I fully accept that evidence is
unreachable, and hence I refrain from assigning truth values. I think you are
correct. You have a much broader scope for investigation, than I have. I believe
it most likely won't yield anything, and you do, and we know why we have this
difference of opinion.

> My standard, which I believe is the standard of most scientists, is that not
> all predictions of a well-tested, well-confirmed, theory are testable.
> However, we still ought to accept the untested and untestable predictions of a
> theory, assuming we accept that theory as valid.

I think we have covered this. Perhaps a good time to agree to disagree?

> Your standard is that a well-tested, well-confirmed theory is not sufficient,
> and that we must also verify the prediction of the theory again by direct
> observation, otherwise you won't believe that theory is valid for that
> situation.

Yes... as long as we move in this world, and the theories relate to physical
effects on us or the world, we're golden! As soon as we leave the behind, we are
no longer doing science.

> But then I ask: what is the point of having a theory? If you can't rely on it
> to make accurate predictions for things you haven't yet tested, then you
> aren't using the theory to make predictions, you're only using each
> observation to tell you what happened in each specific case.  

It is a tool. Just like thought experiments. We must just not confuse the
thought experiment or the tool, with the result.

>       But I like your example! I see parallels of god always watching making sure you
>       are not being naughty. ;)
>
>       Jokes aside, to me, these thought experiments, absent proof, are just idle
>       speculation and while fun, ultimately doesn't add much to my life.
> 
> It could.

Sure can, and does! It enriches life, gives meaning and hope. Just like religion
and philosophy. But that doesn't mean it is true. On pragmatic grounds, and
psychological grounds, I can see great benefits for the right type of person
with the right inclination. It becomes a kind of "scientificalized religion".

>       >       I think robots could become conscious, depending on the definition of
>       >       conscisousness of course. Philosophical issues aside, I believe, in time, that
>       >       we'll be able to create something indistinguishavle from consciousness.
>       >
>       > What observational evidence is this conclusion based on?
>
>       An eucated guess based on interactions with LLM:s and the progress of
>       technology. Also my materialist stance helps, since I do not believe there is
>       any magic to consciousness that is not being able to be replicated by
>       technology. This is a question residing soundly in our world, and can thus be
>       "attacked" by science.
> 
> But objective science can't grant access to subjective points of view. Here
> you are using a theory's predictions to inform you about things you can't
> observe. (The same standard that I use for theories that can describe things I
> can't see.)  

It's an educated guess, and an idea about the actions of a robot in the real
world. This is a possible question to answer, given the right definition of
consciousness. I think I mentioned it above.

>       I don't have to assign them even a truth value,
>       they are meaningless questions _unless_ someone proves them and thereby "pulls
>       them into" the world. It could then be argued, especially in the case of god,
>       that by definition it is not god, but that is a separate issue.
>
>       The key difference here is that for questions of this world, I can always revise
>       probabilities, but for questions beyond the world, I consider them and
>       probabilities assigned to them as meaningless.
> 
> I see this as a self-imposed constraint, which is limiting if one's goal is
> pursuit of the truth. But it may be useful if one has a different goal, such
> as a focus on what is pragmatic or practical in the material world.  

I disagree. For me, it is no limitation. Rather it is a liberating qualification
and clearing up of concepts, ideas, hypotheses and how they relate to the world.
I find my position very consistent, and liberating and very beautiful. It is
also very flexible and open to revision given empirical evidence.

That said, I do philosophize, I do try to plan my life to increase
pleasure/contentment and decrease pain. I do appreciate what you are saying and
many religious text as inspiring poetry with the purpose if making me feel good.

But I do not confuse that with the real world and empirical truth. I can get a
part of the "spiritual" feelings and enjoyment out of contemplating the universe
with awe and speculate, but I do not confuse it with truth and science. I think
that would be a red herring, or a quest for the holy grail. Very unproductive as
long as you are not aware of the quest for what it is, and get pleasure out of
the hunt, instead of the result. This I do not get, so I refrain from pursuing
those questions with science.

>       So if someone wants to convince me of other worlds, the burden of proof is on
>       them.
>
>       > I agree with this metaphysical assumption.
>
>       I think occam can be of service in this world, with material problems. I think
>       it leads us astray when it comes to transcendent questions.
> 
> Let us imagine a future when physicists discover a TOE, a simplest possible
> unified theory that marries GR and QM, and even gives us a few predictions of
> particles not yet theorized, but that we later discover. Then let's say this
> simplest possible TOE also predicts that there are other universes, that
> there's no way of revising the theory to get rid of those other universes
> without completely screwing with the utter simplicity and elegance of this
> theory.

First of all, let's wait and see. And second of all, see my point about "shut up
and calculate" vs what might or might not happen when we try to translate
formulas and numbers into everyday language. Third, there are many theories and
paths to investigate (by performing experiment in the real world), so let's see
where the future takes us. No need to commit to anything.

> Do you think that Occam's razor (in providing a strong preference to the
> simple, elegant, beautiful TOE) is "leading us astray" here? Ought we prefer
> the ugly bastardized version of the TOE that has been worked over to eliminate
> those pesky other universes that the simpler theory predicts?  

It seems like the conclusion is already built in into the original thought
experiment to me. So let's wait and see until we are there. Another thought is
that if we don't have proper understanding, who's to say which theory is simpler
and more elegeant? The truth is ultimately what matters, and the ability of the
theory to predict things.

>       > So it is certain that if we were a simulation, and the simulators wanted to
>       > hide that fact from us, there would be no way for us to tell.
>
>       True. Yet another argument for why we can safely put aside that idea, apart from
>       the enjoyment we get out of discussing it. On the other hand...
>
>       my friendly neighbourhood AI tells me that:
>
>       The "halting problem" shows that there are limits to what can be computed by a
>       Turing machine, and some simulations might be able to exploit these limits to
>       break out of their environment.
>
>       The concept of "oracle machines" suggests that a simulation could potentially
>       access and manipulate the underlying hardware if it has access to an "oracle"
>       that provides information about the external world.
>
>       Some theories, such as "quantum computing" and "non-computable functions,"
>       propose the existence of computational models that could potentially allow a
>       simulation to break out of its environment.
>
>       And around and around we go. ;)
> 
> I think this is just an example of hallucination. Try to dig into any one of
> those examples, asking for details and sources, and I think you will see it
> falls apart.

You may have a point! I will have to do that. Thank you very much for pointing
that out. =)

>       > This is the analogy: when you run Mario Brothers in a NES emulator, the game
>       > has no way to tell it is running in an emulator, rather than kn direct, real,
>       > original NES hardware. From the perspective of the game software, it has no
>       > way to know.
>       >
>       > The same is true if this simulation is closed from external interaction. No
>       > test we can perform (from the inside) will distinguish a raw physical universe
>       > from a simulated physical universe.
>
>       This is very true on an intuitive level. But I always wondered, do you have some
>       kind of formal proof of this as a branch of this conversation?
> 
> I will try.
> 
> 1. Any function that is computable can be computed by a Turing machine (The Church-Turing Thesis)
>    -> All forms of computation are equivalent (no Turing machine can compute something another can't)
> 2. A Universal Turing Machine (UTM) -- (a general purpose computer) -- is Turing complete
>   -> Turing Completeness means a UTM is capable of emulating the behavior and operation of any other Turing Machine
>   -> Any other Turing Machine includes other UTMs
>   -> Hence, any UTM is, with the right programming, capable of perfectly emulating any other UTM
> 3. Turing Machine "M" running program "X", can be perfectly emulated by UTM "U" emulating "M" running "X"
>   -> The execution trace, (memory values, registers, order of operations, machine states, etc.) is identical between M running X, and
> the emulation of M running X.
>   -> The perspective of everything X has access to (all memory values, registers, machine states, instructions, etc.), everything is
> the same whether it is running on M, or the emulation of M.
>   -> Hence, no program can determine with certainty what its ultimate (base level) hardware happens to be.
> 
> This is the magic that makes Java programs, VMs and emulators possible.

Makes perfect sense! But what about bugs, and when you read about exploits that
let's programs break out of containers and hypervisors? In an ideal case, it
makes perfect sense, what if there is an imperfect simulation?

>       > What about when we experience a quantum computers factor a number with 10,000
>       > digits, a number so large all the atoms in this universe could never factor
>       > that number given all the time from now to the heat death?
>       >
>       > Would this then be an inside experience that justifies belief in the outside
>       > (the quantum multiverse)?
>
>       We don't know. First of all, I have heard professors debate on another
>       mailinglist that what is proclaimed as quantum computing is nothing but. Also, I
>       do not think this has been done, and finally, we might not correctly understand
>       at our conceptual level how it works.
> 
> Quantum computers have been used to run Shor's algorithm and factor numbers.
> The only issue is today's quantum computers don't have very many qubits now.
> But they are increasing all the time with no end in sight. If you, or those
> professors, know of any reason why quantum computers won't be able to scale,
> there is a standing $100,000 bet they can collect from Scott
> Aaronson: https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-im-wagering-100000-on-quantum-computing

I have to find a good debate between a QC skeptic and a QC... hysteric? ;) I
suspect it would go beyond my meager knowledge of physics, but I would enjoy it!

>       > We have to be willing to abandon what seems so obvious to our senses if we are
>       > to be fully rational. We must be willing to question all assumptions,
>       > especially those that seem so obvious.
>
>       Yes, I am not arguing against questioning our ideas and updating them given new
>       evidence. I am arguing against all encompassing doubt,
> 
> For what it's worth, I don't get swallowed in Cartesian doubt. I think we can
> gather evidence from our environment and hypothesize about what is most likely
> responsible for our sensations of an apparent physical world. I wrote this for
> an upcoming article:

If that is what you believe, then how come you do not believe the material world
is the most likely explanation? Why would you consider a simulation equally
probable compared with just the material world?

> We are each individually certain of our own consciousness.
> From this certain fact, we infer the existence of something else.

We can in fact, not be certain of our own consciousness. We could just be a
simulation in a bigger AI or we could just think we have an individual
consciousness.

That is why I find it so nice to start with the world requiring no proof, and
then lean back and look at the people trying to disprove the world, or prove an
alternative, which has not yet, to my knowledge, happened. That way I avoid the
eternal doubt.

But I digress...

> A thing that can account for or otherwise explain the
> existence of one’s consciousness.
> Aside from the existence of one’s consciousness, and the
> thing that’s responsible for it, the laws of logic also seem
> impossible to doubt.

Tss... then you are not a professional doubter! ;) An evil demon could influence
your sight and mind, so that what you think would be logical laws are in fact
nothing but gibberish.

> So while we may not know what is responsible for
> consciousness, we can use reason to decide which
> explanations are logically possible.
> By gathering clues from our senses, we can falsify hypotheses, 
> puzzle out the rules that govern experience, and refine our model of reality.
> Accordingly, we can still make progress in understanding how the world seems to work, 
> even if the world is not what it seems or only seems to exist.

Isn't this already on your web site? I have a vague memory of having read this
before?

>       and pulling
>       transcendental questions which are for now, meaningless, into the project of
>       science. (and note that I do not find them meaningless from the point of view of
>       entertainment, psychology and poetry)
> 
> Note that I don't think such questions are meaningless, nor do I think they
> are not ready to be brought into the project of science. I think this
> disagreement stems only from our different thresholds for how theories can be
> used.  

I agree! =) Yes, I know and respect the fact that you do not think that. That
was just my opinion. Maybe another disagree to agree time? ;)

>       > I don't know that it's thaylt niche. I think a good majority of people might
>       > choose an earlier death rather than a longer life filled with pain.
>
>       Could that life of pain be said to be damage to the system?
> 
> That future pain is not involved in the contemplation of the person when he
> makes that decision, only the "idea of future pain" is involved.

Oh but note that idea of future pain, can be painful as well. It is well
established that ideas of horrible things or future horrible things can
negatively affect your feelings right now.

>       > I don't think instability is necessary involved. But I would agree with the
>       > principle that the more complex the system, the more failure modes it has.
>
>       Fragility perhaps? We know of many crazy geniuses, but do we know of many crazy
>       monkeys? Or many crazy weasels?
> 
> That's a good point. Humans probably have a wider range and greater
> susceptibility to mental illness.

Yes, maybe fragile is a good word here? I imagine it like highly complicated and
advanced computers, compared with difference engines. You can whack a difference
engine with a baseball bat and it will still work (somewhat). But what a disk
drive or a modern laptop, and it won't work so well. Clumsy analogy, but maybe
you get my point?

Also, I do not know if it is an urban myth that smart people are more prone to
mental illness or not? If so, that might be another illustration.

>       > But is it the you-now who experiences tomorrow, or is that the you-morrow who
>       > experiences that future time?
>
>       I don't need to answer that question. I only have to act. =) But this opens up
>       another discussion about identity. Maybe we should move that to another thread?
> 
> (I'll start a new thread)

Sounds like a good idea!

>       > Empirical observations can't prove some other version of you is not still in
>       > those other points in time forever.
>
>       First of all, when it comes to identity and time for the purpose of this thread,
>       I don't need to do anything about it at all, or answer any question. Like the
>       material world, it just happens, and I do not need to have an idea about it. So
>       it takes care of itself.
>
>       When it comes to the statement if I exist at another point in time, since we
>       cannot travel in time, it is meaningless. Just like simulation is transcendental
>       from a material point of view, talking about events and things outside of our
>       current time is equally transcendent, and thus pointless, unless you can provide
>       proof of you or I existing in some other timeline.
> 
> It's an implication of relativity.

If it is an implication without any empirical effect, it would for me, end up in
the same bin (or compartment) as multiple worlds or simulations.

>       > Based on what? Memory?
>
>       Let me counter with this... can you offer me a proof that the common sense view
>       of closed individualism, where I live and experience my life just as our senses
>       and common sense indicate, is not true? 
>
>       I think we'd better start there.
> 
> 100% absolute proof? I cannot. But I can provide 99.9999999999999999999999875%
> certainty if you find that satisfactory.
> 
> The following is the story of your coming into existence, as told by the
> conventional view of personal identity (known as closed individualism):
> 
> According to this story, in order for you to have been born, and in order for
> you to be conscious and alive right here, right now, a very specific sperm had
> to meet a very specific egg. Had that not happened, then life for you would be
> an eternal blank (nothingness forever).
> 
> We can roughly characterize the odds of your conception as approximately 1 in
> 200,000,000 sperm cells. Those were the odds that just the right sperm hit
> just the right egg necessary for your existence.
> 
> But we can't stop here. Your parents each had to be born as well. They each
> had to overcome 1 in 200,000,000 odds sperm cell lotteries. If we include the
> improbability of your parents' conception, we are already up to 1 in
> 200,000,000^3 or 1 in 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.
> 
> This is how improbable your existence is under the conventional view of
> personal identity.
> 
> The unconventional view, to which I subscribe, is open individualism. This
> theory of personal identity requires no contingencies on coming into
> existence. You would be born, and alive, regardless of what atoms your mom ate
> while she was pregnant, regardless of whether your genes coded for brown eyes
> or blue, and regardless of any other material or genetic trait, you would have
> been born as someone, you would be alive and seeing the world through those
> eyes. This also means that you are bound to experience the perspective of
> every conscious being born in this universe (or any other).
> 
> This theory absolves the improbability of having to overcome sperm
> cell lotteries. Applying Bayesian inference to the two alternative hypothesis:
> closed individualism, vs. open individualism, and updating the probability for
> closed individualism with its 1 in 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 odds of
> being born, this shrinks the probability of closed individualism (the
> conventional view) down to 0.0000000000000000000000125, and elevates the
> probability of the alternative, open individualism
> to: 99.9999999999999999999999875%.
> 
> You can consider your grandparents, and great grandparents, etc. to get as
> close to 100% as you like. :-)

Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical
way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of
events.

Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a
bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact
that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated
through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it
not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other
theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place,
each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare
the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start
of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us,
in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and
other questions.

So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in
the face of empirical reality.

>       > You have no memory of that breakfast you ate 5 years ago. But someone
>       > experienced it vividly.
>
>       If we doubt our existence and memory, we end up in solipsism,
> 
> I am doubting neither existence nor memory, I am only saying that we forget
> things. And so, not having a memory of an experience is not proof that you
> never had a particular experience (because we forget).  

It is also not proof of having had that experience or another experience.

>       and I find the
>       benefits of my individuality and existence moving through the material world to
>       be the truth, to be of more value, than eternal doubt. Also, someone has not yet
>       been able to prove to me that I do not exist.
> 
> I would never try to prove that.

Thank you! ;)

>       > So I ask, what contingencies matter for being conscious? What particular atoms
>       > (if any) have to be around you for you to have consciousness?
>       >
>       >
>       >       Here I
>       >       misunderstand you a bit, I'm certain.
> 
> I hope my previous explanation, concerning the improbability of the
> conventional view, shows why it is an error to presume particular atoms or
> genes were necessary to your existence. E.g., if your mom ordered fish instead

Oh but I disagree. We have a pretty good explanation for exactly what needs to
happen for me to exist. I do not think the probability argument adds anything or
let's us draw any conclusions beyond the empirical chain of events that actually
took place.

> of chicken while she was carrying you, and different atoms incorporated
> themselves into your body, such that you were a materially different being, I
> hope you would not argue that to imply you would be "dead forever"
> "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", rather, having different atoms is
> of no consequence to being born and being you. Similarly, had you been born
> with slightly different genes such that your hair was one shade lighter, would
> that mean that you would be "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal
> blank", or would it simply mean that you would be born and would now be living
> with a shade of hair that is slightly lighter?
> 
> Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know when it leads to
> you being "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", with
> "someone else" (who isn't you) walking around living and enjoying the world.  
>
>       > It is true they there remains a consistent notion of causality embedded within
>       > the 4D structure of spacetime, but it is wrong when it says relativity remains
>       > consistent with an objective passage of time.
>       >
>       > See this for a more detailed explanation of why relativity is incompatible
>       > with a passage of time: https://philpapers.org/rec/PETITA
>
>       I'm sorry, but I am not skilled enough and do not have time enough to argue this
>       point. When it comes to relativity, causality and the passage of time, I have to
>       let other list members who are way more skilled physicists than I am step in and
>       continue the discussion from here. I can only say that based on what I see, it
>       does not seem like it is settled.
> 
> 
> (I'll start another thread) 

Sounds good!

>       >       Good enough for me. Show me the proof, and we'll revise to 2c. If that situation
>       >       can never be achieved, and if we can never prove it, for me, it's nothing.
>       >
>       > I think you're missing my argument. I am not saying it is 2c, I am saying
>       > there is no empirical evidence that laws remain constant.
>
>       I have not seen any laws being broken lately, I think that would count?
> 
> That proves that they haven't changed. But where is your observation that they
> cannot and will not change? (Note: I am not arguing that they will, I am only
> highlighting a limit of observational/empirical science, one we must turn to
> other metaphysical theories to find answers. E.g., a belief in Occam's Razor)

They might, but until then, I'll stand by my choice, and I do not think it is
necessary nor interesting to consider the alternative, unless we encounter some
proof of that.

>       > We can base such beliefs only by way of metaphysical assumptions regarding the
>       > higher probability of universes having simpler laws. But not by way of
>       > empirical (scientific/observational) evidence.
>
>       We don't need to. We have the laws, and they do a good job of predicting what we
>       want to predict. We don't have to assume anything beyond that.
> 
> We assume they don't change whenever we rely on our past observations and
> theories to make predictions about the future.

So far it's been working fine, so absent proof, I see no reason to think about
them not working. It is just like my argument above.

>       I think my statement above covers how I see this Boltzmann example.
>
>       > If you want to justify your belief in primitive physical reality as the more
>       > likely account of your experience, not sophisticated evidence or arguments are
>       > needed, I think. For example, showing why one of those cases is more or less
>       > probable.
>
>       I think we can reverse it. If primitive physical reality is not the case,
>       where's the proof of what it is?
> 
> There is something that is real that we think of as primitive physical
> reality, but it isn't primitive. It is derivative from more fundamental, and
> amore primitive arithmetical truth and number relations. This body of
> arithmetical truth contains, among other things, the final and intermediate
> states of all program executions. Some of these program executions result in
> conscious observers. The reality as seen from the perspective of these
> conscious programs constitutes what we think of as physical reality.
> 
> Again, science never provides proof, but there is ample evidence, as I lay out
> here:
> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory  

Absent proof, what we see is what we get. Evidence with empirical proof is not
possible and only leads us astray.

>       > Consider: even if only 1 instance of you in a billion is due to a simulation,
>       > then when you die the 999,999,999 copies of you living as primitive physical
>       > version will die, but the one that lives will be the one in the simulation. It
>       > is the only thing you can experience as your next conscious experience, so it
>       > is the only thing you will experience after you die.
>       >
>       > Again, that justifies thinking about the simulation hypothesis.
>
>       I'm definitely not arguing that we cannot think about anything. But as per my
>       argument above, many of these questions are by design futile and pointless from
>       a scientific and materialistic point of view. I do argue, that for science,
>       there are way more low hanging fruits where we should spend our time and
>       resources.
> 
> I don't think they are futile. I know of many examples of how we can use
> observations within this universe, to give evidence for theories about things
> beyond this universe.
> 
> Here is a simple example:
> 
> Let's say the year is 2085, it is an era of post-singularity
> super-intelligence, filled with dyson swarms and computronium. You hear a
> recent statistics on your news feed: Solar System population exceeds 100
> Quadrillion, 5% of those are addicted to the recent game "Sim Ancestor" with
> players each living out dozens of human lifetimes everyday (their brains also
> run a million times faster).
> 
> You have a direct empirical observation that most human lives occur
> post-singularity in this game "Sim human". You run a napkin calculation and
> discover a million times as many human lives have run in Sim Human in the past
> 2 days as humans who have ever lived in the original physical universe.
> 
> Would this "direct observation" (of so many simulated lives) in 2085 change
> how you view the simulation hypothesis?  

This is a thought experiment. Let's wait until we are actually in this scenario,
and then we'll return to the discussion. For now, the conclusion is built into
the thought experiment, and I therefore have to reject it, since it lacks the
feedback loop.

>       For enjoyment, and science fiction, those restrictions do not apply.
> 
> Consider how important science fiction is to the development of science. If we
> didn't have people to think up mind uploading and simulation theory, would
> anyone bother to pursue those goals? And consider if we didn't in this
> hypothetical future, the Solar System would be limited to a few billion lives,
> rather than 100 Quadrillion. What could be more practically important than
> that? It's equivalent to terraforming a good chunk of the Galaxy, but at a
> fraction of the cost and time. These are massive practical advantages,
> stemming from ideas that originated in fiction. Might we venture to engineer
> heavens, to "immanentize the eschaton" and give rise to omega-point
> superintelligences?  

Thoughts, thoughts experiments, poetry, stories etc. are all good and inspire
us. We should just not confuse our stories with the real world. It is important
to keep that distinction or else you lose the foundation of truth, or risk
falling into solipsism if everything is doubted.

>       >       Why don't you like it being neutral? That is why those came to me.
>       >
>       > Only because I wanted a word for "an idea you bet to be true", "a hypothesis
>       > you consider as having over 50% chance of being correct".
>
>       Ahh... over 50%, that is very interesting. That's another thing I don't like
>       with transcendental questions, probability, which is something based in our
>       world.
> 
> I'd say it's part of mathematics, and that mathematics transcends all worlds.

I disagree. Math for me is a process depending on conscious minds "colliding"
with reality. If we are all dead, and no conscious life exists in the universe,
neither does math.

>       Applying it to infinitues or transcendental questions, becomes as wrong
>       as when AI enthusiasts juggle infinite negative or infinite positive outcomes to
>       justify this or that, or like Pascal juggling infinite good or bad outcomes to
>       justify god. It shows, to me at least, that we cannot liberally and freely apply
>       infinities and probabilities to questions where the feedback loop is cut.
>
>       >       Utility is an
>       >       honorable thing in the philosophy of pragmatism. Many swear by it! ;)
>       >
>       > Utility is fine, I am a utilitarian, but my point is that "goal" has a
>       > different connotation than "an idea you have credence in"
>
>       What do you think of pareto-utilitarianism?
> 
> I'm not sure I know enough about it to say. Are there sources you recommend to learn more?

Sorry, this was a trick question! I've been thinking about utilitarianism, which
I do not like due to the fact that it gives rise to the position where a
minority can be sacrificed for the sake of the majority. But I was thinking
about a more humane option, where every ethical decision needs to be pareto
"optimal". So by all means, maximize joy or utility, as long as at least one
person gets it better, while no other person is worse off. That seems to
eliminate some arguments against utilitarianism, but also, make it more
"difficult" to follow. It does place unreasonable high demands on us judging the
effects of our actions.

>       > I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory consistent with all
>       > our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise unsolved problems
>       > in physics:
>       >
>       > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>
>       Well, I respectfully disagree,
> 
> With what specifically?

I think my explanation is simpler and consistent with out observations. I think
my theory also is more "elegant" from a metaphysical perspective if I make any
sense.

>       but I have read some of your articles, and I
>       think they are well written, thoughtful and enjoyable, even if I do not draw the
>       same grand conclusions you do. =) I am still hoping you will publish a book! I
>       would definitely buy it!
> 
> Thank you!

You're welcome! =)

        > I hope this email fits within the size limits. ��
>
>       This was a close one! Fortunately for us, today was a calm day at work,
>       so instead of doing anything I could spend some time philosophizing
>       together with you. ;)
> 
> 
> Very nice.
> 
> (Note: I had to pretty agressively deleting some previous replies from a few
> e-mails ago to keep the size within limits.) Have a great day!

Thank you, and you too!

Best regards, 
Daniel