[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Feb 26, 2025 at 6:06 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Hello Jason,
>
> In order to save some space, I'll remove the sections were we agree. Then
> I'll
> probably forget we agreed, or change my mind, and you can remind me about
> it later. ;)
>

Hi Daniel, sounds good, thank you.


>
>
> >
> > Maybe a word that doesn't have that connotation for you would be a
> "credant"
> > but then others might say that reminds them too much of creeds.
>
> You have a point. Maybe the best thing is to just try and be mindful here
> that
> we do have a slight discrepancy, or at worst, use the clunky method of
> typing
> out what we mean with it? As per the via negativa, if you remove bets,
> belief,
> risk, reward/loss, what remains? ;)
>

That reminded me of the concept of "Neti neti
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neti_neti>" in Hinduism, a way of defining
God or the true self, as "Not this, not that."
It is something having no name or description.


>
> When it comes to sense 1, I'd probably prefer "to have a degree of
> confidence in
> some state in the world".
>

I would expand it to include hypotheses, and theories, but I understand
this relates to our philosophical differences. :-)


>
>
> > But there can be multiple simultaneous hypotheses. What should the word
> be for
> > the current leading hypothesis, that is judged more likely to be true
> than
> > not?
>
> Does it need a word for it? Can it not just be the current most likely
> hypothesis among many?
>

I think the "most likely hypothesis" is at least, partly subjective, as
people might be exposed to different evidence.

For example, if someone does mushrooms and has an experience of
depersonalization, that could change that person's perceived "most likely
hypothesis" and this wouldn't be an experience that person could share
objectively with others.

So this personal aspect to the "most likely hypothesis" makes it into a
kind of personal "belief" (if I can use that word). Just as you and I have
seen the same arguments for a multiverse, yet we disagree on what we
consider to be the most likely hypothesis.



>
>
> > Clear language is important in these discussions, but perhaps it is
> better
> > that one defines terms up front (or when asked to clarify). For example,
> if I
> > stated that I use the word belief in sense 1 only, not to be confused
> with
> > sense 4, would that have been adequate?
>
> It would have been better. I do think that it would risk me erring though,
> since
> for me, and possibly Ben, belief for some reason, seems to be more
> connected
> with religion than your dictionary excerpt implies. So it would be more
> clear,
> definitely, but I would be the one who might let my hidden bias color your
> arguments. ;) But as you say, stating it in that way I think is definitely
> a
> step in the right direction.
>

Yes, that was my hope, to avoid coloring my arguments in a way that made
true communication harder. It is a bit of a miracle that language works as
well as it does, consider:

"Verbalizable knowledge can be passed around and shared, to the extent that
words really “mean the same thing” to different people. Do two people ever
speak the same language? What we mean by “speak the same language” is a
prickly issue. We accept and take for granted that the hidden subterranean
flavors are not shared. We know what comes with and what is left out of
linguistic transactions, more or less. Language is a public medium for the
exchange of the most private experiences. Each word is surrounded, in each
mind, by a rich and inimitable cluster of concepts, and we know that no
matter how much we try to bring to the surface, we always miss something."
-- Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in “The Mind’sI” (1981)



>
> > Of course, I agree that clear definitions are the first step.
>
> For instance, we had a discussion here a year (or more) ago, where I
> agreed with
> you, given your definition of some remote future, app powerful AI defined
> as
> "god" that god could be something in this world. If that is the definition
> we
> decide for when it comes to god, I still agree with you. For definitions
> based
> on transcendent beings I do not agree.
>

Whether or not we agree on the reality of some thing/concept, a working
definition can (in theory) always be agreed upon, for the purposes of some
discussion.
(Short of one person pointing out a logical inconsistency in the definition
which makes that thing/concept meaningless.)


>
> > Some theories of ontology that provide a probability distribution for
> objects
> > in existence, can even provide a means of calculating how common such an
> > object is across reality.
>
> What do you mean with "across reality"?


Reality, to me, is the set of what is real. As an example, take the
ontology of Marchal or Schmidhuber, who start with the program that
generates all programs. It is a relatively short program, but it generates,
with some distribution, all programs that exist, including those that
simulate any universe with computable laws. But this program also generates
itself, and it does so an infinite number of times. This program has a
"fractal" like structure, exhibiting self similarity across its *scales*
(or rather *levels* deep in its recursive self-emulation). We can compute
the frequency of the occurrence of any program in this space as roughly the
inverse of that program's length. Shorter programs appear more frequently
than larger programs. Simpler, more elegant universes are more likely than
those with more complex laws. Such an ontology provides a natural
explanation for Occam's razor.

"On a direct intuitive level, the high a priori probability assigned to a
sequence with a short description corresponds to one possible
interpretation of “Occam’s Razor.”"
-- Ray Solomonoff in “A Formal Theory of Inductive Inference” (1964)



>
>
> >       and then just refrain from having an opinion about it, since in
> some of
> >       those cases, it would make no difference what so ever to anyones
> life.
> >
> > It depends on the god. If it is a "Great Programmer" god, (i.e., the
> master of
> > a simulation), then such a God can intervene in the course of that
> simulation
> > (perform miracles), read the thoughts of beings inside it (hear and
> answer
> > prayers), and provide continuation paths for conscious beings after they
> die
> > in the simulation (save souls).
>
> Agreed.
>

Happy for that!


>
> > In an infinite reality, it is not a question of whether or not these gods
> > exist, it is only a matter of how common or uncommon they are, that is,
> how
> > common are simulations executed by such "Great Programmer"
> > superintelligences relative to primitive universes.
>
> Not quite. First of all, we don't know if reality is infinite, we don't
> know if
> there are infinite world, and who knows, maybe there are constraints of
> which we
> are not aware.


We don't know anything for sure, but an infinite reality is the "current
leading hypothesis" -- in cosmology, QM, inflationary theory, etc.


> The most we can say is what we can see and measure and be aware
> of with the method of science. Everything else is, as far as we are
> concerned,
> null and void, absent evidence for it. So far, no evidence for a grat
> programmer
> reaching into the simulation has been presented.
>

All the observational evidence we have collected that justifies our
confidence in the hypothesis of an infinite reality, equally justifies
confidence in the hypothesis of all those things that are possible in those
infinite realities.


>
> Simulation we have covered, and we do not have common ground there. For
> the sake
> of argument, I can of course agree with your premises, and follow to your
> conclusion, but I do not agree with your premises, and therefore do not
> share
> your conclusions.
>

What premise of the simulation argument do you not accept? As Bostrom lays
out  in his paper ( https://simulation-argument.com/simulation/ ), there
are only 3 options:

(1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a
“posthuman” stage;
(2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant
number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof);
(3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.

So if you disagree that it's likely we're in a simulation, do you reject it
out of a preference for (1) or (2)?


>
>
> >
> > I am not sure what you mean by "absent that", for we do inhabit a
> universe
>
> What I mean is that we have no evidence for superior beings, and until that
> evidence is presented, I do not acknowledge them as part of reality.
>

The evidence is that the constants of our universe are so finely-tuned, the
chances are 1 in 10^120 that it is just a coincidence or an accident.

"The fine tunings, how fine-tuned are they? Most of them are 1% sort of
things. In other words, if things are 1% different, everything gets bad.
And the physicist could say maybe those are just luck. On the other hand,
this cosmological constant is tuned to one part in 10^120 — a hundred and
twenty decimal places. Nobody thinks that’s accidental. That is not a
reasonable idea — that something is tuned to 120 decimal places just by
accident. That’s the most extreme example of fine-tuning."
-- Leonard Susskind in “What We Still Don’t Know: Are We Real?” (2004)


If you want a scientific answer for this fine-tuning that does not presume
creationism, then the only other answer is a multiverse.


>
> > whose constants are tuned to an extraordinary degree. The only answer
> science
> > provides to answer this mystery is that we must inhabit a vast, if not
> > infinite, variegated reality containing all kinds of universes.
>
> Science provides no answer. We have theories, and there are many of them,
> but
> that is all we have.


We have 3:
Coincidence
Creationism
Multiverse

I have seen no scientific theory, proposal, or hypothesis to explain
fine-tuning aside from these 3.


> We have no proof, and most likely, will never have proof.
> That is all I can accept into my conceptual world and model of reality.
>

We have proof to 99.999999999...999999999% (120 decimal places) that it is
*not* coincidence.
I am not sure how many sigma that is, but it is rare for anything in
science to have anything close to this level of confidence.

The only question then, is do you think the answer is creationism, or
multiverse?


>
> > You included rational thought as the tool of finding truth. Do you not
> see the
> > utility of using rational thought to make judgements about the things we
> > cannot directly observe? Consider that we do this to explain or talk
> about:
>
> Rational thought can be a tool to help us find truth, by drawing
> conclusions,
> based on observations, experiment and so on. Rational thought, pure
> rational
> thought, without any connection to the world, is not enough for us to
> derive any
> truths.
>

I guess we just disagree here. Mathematics and much of philosophy (that is,
rigorous logical thought) can provide results without observation.


>
> > You agree, I think, that these are all part of what science can study.
> We can
> > develop theories about them, test them, think rationally and logically
> about
> > them, and so on.
>
> I agree that we can think about these questions, but I do not agree that
> science
> can deal with all of these questions. Anything outside our lightcone and
> beyond
> our cosmological horizon is off limits to science, by the laws of physics,
> which
> limits what we can empirically verify. The same with simulations, other
> universes etc.
>

We used the Planck satellite to measure the curvature of space to be less
than 0.5%. This means the universe is at least 200 times (wider, taller,
deeper) in every dimension than what we can see as part of the observable
universe.
Here we have direct empirical verification that the universe extends
farther than we can see. What do you conclude about the existence of these
other parts of the universe? Are they not real?


>
> Will it always be thus? Most likely, but should we make any advances or
> should
> the programmer in the sky reach through the simulation, we just revise our
> mental maps of the world, based on evidence.
>
> > Yet these are things we can't observe directly with our eyes or
> instruments.
> > We can only indirectly find evidence for them. We have testable theories
> of
> > gravity, QM, the big bang, of consciousness, of causality, etc. that are
> > falsifiable, and that we can gather evidence for. When we accept these
> > theories, then we can reason about their consequences and implications.
>
> Yes, we can reason about the implications, in human language, but since we
> cannot empirically verify anything of it, it will forever remain in the
> world of
> speculation, and not hard knowledge. If it doesn't affect anyone, á la
> pragmatism, it's is of little consequence. After all, QM is math, math is a
> language entirely separate from our spoken language, and deals with
> aspects of
> reality that have very little connection to our own level of reality.
> Therefore
> it could very well be that "shut up and calculate" is the correct stance,


"Shut up and calculate" is the same attitude as "don't ask these questions."
I see it as incuriosity, and the antithesis of a true scientist, who is
interested in finding explanations.


>
> > And if and when someone accepts the theory, then they must accept all the
> > predictions of that theory. This is how science gives us evidence of the
> > multiverse, of places beyond the cosmological horizon, of other big
> bangs,
> > etc. even when we can't observe them directly.
>
> I disgaree. See above. There are alternative QM theories as well.


I wouldn't call the alternatives theories. They're only conjectures, and
incomplete ones at that (they give no mathematically describable account of
when, or how, or why collapse happens), nor can they explain quantum
computers or Wigner's friend coherently.


> Once we move
> beyond experiments and empirical verification, we leave reality behind, and
> there is no need or requirement that we accept that. You know that my
> position
> is instrumentalist:ish/constructive emipiricist (yes, it is fuzzy), and
> this is
> why we agreed to disagree when we discussed this last time, since you came
> at it
> from a realist point of view. This difference leads us to be able to
> debate this
> endlessly. ;)
>

I think your agnosticism rests on the refusal to acknowledge, (and
seriously consider the implications of), the many empirical clues that
"what we see" is not "all there is".
(E.g. fine-tuning, quantum computers, curvature of the universe, etc.)

You say, I don't care, it doesn't affect me, doesn't interest me, come back
to me when we have better data, etc.

If you really don't care about ontology, or the reality beyond what we can
directly see from our present vantage point, we can agree to leave it at
that. Not every subject interests every person.


>
>
> > Far more people care about these kinds of fundamental questions, then
> say, the
> > mating rituals of C. elegans. While getting answers to fundamental
> questions
> > is by no means easy, they are what (those who seek meaningful truth) are
> > ultimately after:
>
> This is true, but the fact that more or less people agree with something
> does
> not make it right or wrong. I believe that although these are questions
> that by
> some (or many) are perceived as deeply meaningful (unlike for Ben or me,
> apart
> from the fun of discussing them) we should keep these kinds of questions
> as a
> hobby and a field for philosophers, while scientists should study science
> and
> focus on what can be empirically verified or disproved.
>

I would alter that to say "scientists should study reality." Also, beyond
focusing on working on proving or disproving theories, I think another task
of a scientist is to develop good explanations.


>
> >       "I am very astonished that the scientific picture of
> > the real world around me is very deficient. It gives
> > us a lot of factual information, puts all of our
> > experience in a magnificently consistent order, but
> > it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really
> > near to our heart that really matters to us. It cannot
> > tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet,
> > physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing
> > of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and
> > eternity."
> > — Erwin Schrödinger in “Nature and the Greeks” (1954)
> >
> > I believe, developed fully, science can provide answers to questions
> that have
> > plagued us since the dawn of history.
>
> I'm skeptical, but I do wish you (and the one who agree with you) the best
> of luck.
> I hope you prove me wrong! =) That would be an enormous step forward for
> mankind
> and perhaps, for philosophy!
>

Thank you! I am trying. I've been working on an article about consciousness
for the past 4 years.

You (or others) can see what I have written so far here:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL


>
> > But absent immediate need, the most rational mind would say "don't act
> yet, we
> > are still gathering evidence, we can make a better-educated decision
> > by delaying still longer."
>
> True, and this frequently happens. You know my agnostic stance towards
> some of
> your questions, that is a good example of this reasoning. On some of your
> other
> questions, I think we cannot, by design, ever find an answer, so I refrain
> from
> seriously working on those.
>
> > So taking action always represents a departure from the behavior of a
> perfect
> > scientist. It is the constraint of living in a physical world that
> demands
> > such departures.
>
> Yes, we are not perfect beings. But we can always strive to improve
> towards that
> goal.
>

Glad to find more we agree on. :-)


>
>
> > Maybe I am misunderstanding you here, but I don't see any conflict
> between
> > eternal doubt and refraining from assigning a truth value. Are they not
> the
> > same thing?
>
> Not quite. Let me describe the difference like this:
>
> Eternal doubt refers to a state of perpetual uncertainty or skepticism
> about a
> particular claim or statement. It involves continuously questioning or
> doubting
> the truth of something, without ever being able to fully accept or reject
> it.
> This can lead to a kind of intellectual paralysis, where one is unable to
> make a
> decision or take a stance due to the persistent uncertainty.
>
> Eternal doubt in its extreme forms, leads to solipsism.
>
> On the other hand, refraining from assigning a truth value to something
> means
> choosing not to label a statement as either true or false, often due to a
> lack
> of sufficient information or evidence. This can be a deliberate decision,
> based
> on a recognition of the limitations of one's knowledge or the complexity
> of the
> issue at hand. It involves acknowledging that one does not have enough
> information to make a judgment, rather than being consumed by doubt or
> uncertainty.
>
> The key difference between the two is that eternal doubt is often
> characterized
> by a sense of anxiety or unease, whereas refraining from assigning a truth
> value
> is a more neutral and deliberate stance. The former can be debilitating,
> while
> the latter can be a sign of intellectual humility and a willingness to
> acknowledge the limits of one's knowledge.
>

I think what you describe as eternal doubt, is rather an acceptance of
nihilism, or solipsism. But if one really eternally doubts, they should
have no reason to accept solipsism over any other hypothesis, they should
doubt solipsism as much as the external reality hypothesis, as much as
idealism, materialism, and evil demons. So the eternal doubter, is only the
purest agnostic, who never accepts any theory as true.


>
>
> > I don't see it leading to that breakdown. What does it matter if this is
> a
> > simulation or not? You're still conscious, things still follow
> comprehensible
> > rules, and so forth.
>
> Oh, but we don't know that. That is also open to doubt. As per the doubt vs
> agnosticism or refraining from assigning truth values above, one lands you
> eventually, if you want to be consistent in your doubt, in solipsism,
> while the
> other clearly delineates what you can know, and what you cannot, and in the
> latter case you simply "let it go" and refrain from engaging with it.
>
> > I was thinking, perhaps a better way of explaining your viewpoint of G.
> E.
> > Moore's "here is a hand" is this:
> >
> >       "Although the whole of this life were said to be
> > nothing but a dream, and the visible world nothing but a
> > phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough,
> > if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it."
> > -- Leibniz
>
> Not how I would put it, but yes, I do see the point, and I think it does
> align a
> bit with my point of view.
>
> > What do you think? Does this represent your viewpoint? That "A
> difference that
> > makes no difference is no difference at all" and thus it's impractical to
> > debate a physical world from an indistinguishable simulated one?
>
> I think on the surface, it does sound like a good summary. If we can never
> know,
> it is pointless to speculate.
>

Then we might say, there is no difference between a simulated reality, a
physical reality, or a mathematical reality (at least to those on the
inside). It can make no difference to them, and a difference that makes no
difference is "null and void".


>
> > In your view, is it science for the fish to conclude it is part of a vast
> > world which it cannot directly observe all of, or is this transcendent
> > metaphysics for the fish?
>
> A fish is material, so is the pond and the world the pond is in, so there's
> nothing stopping the fish from jumping through the surface onto land, from
> developing legs, from jumping across narrow stretches of land, etc. which
> would
> make areas surrounding the pond, and eventually, the world part of science
> for
> the fish.
>

But then I could say, if the fish might develop legs, humanity might
develop hyperdrives and escape to other unseen parts of the universe beyond
the horizon. By this reasoning, those parts of the universe are real and
scientific.

Or as some inflationary cosmologists conjecture, it's possible our "bubble
universe" could collide with another, and that would have real (and
devastating) consequences to those in both universes, or worse, there could
be a spontaneous decay to a lower energy state, causing destruction of
space and time to race throughout our universe at the speed of light in all
directions.


>
> > If you, like me, believed in an infinite comprehensive reality, would you
> > agree it makes sense to revise the notion of "exists" vs "doesn't exist"?
>
> Yes! I think you argue logically and coherently based on your assumptions
> and
> beliefs. So I think from your position, that existence and non-existence
> could
> be more permissive than when used with my mental maps, models and
> assumptions.
>

I am glad that we have isolated our disagreement to such a small difference
in fundamental assumptions.


>
> > For in a reality containing all possibilities, even improbable things
> happen
> > and exist, somewhere. It is only the impossible that doesn't exist.
>
> True. But if all possibilities and events exist... why not an event that
> destroys all other and ultimately itself?


In my view, things exist out of logical necessity, (ultimately stemming
from abstract objects which are themselves indestructible). So this
universe can no more be made to not exist, than the number 3 could be
destroyed. This becomes clearer when you view our universe according to the
"block time" eternalist view, seeing it as one coherent, unchanging
structure. It is a mathematical object, not unlike the unit circle or the
Mandelbrot set.


> Surely such an event much also be able
> to happen, if there are limitless possibilities, and maybe the fact that
> we are
> here might indicate, that all possibilities do not exist?
>

I am not sure how one observation can imply anything about the
non-existence of other possible observations. Could you elaborate?


>
> > Then instead, we should speak of things "existing with a high measure"
> (in
> > more places, more frequently, more commonly" vs. things "existing with a
> lower
> > measure" (in fewer places, less frequently, less commonly).
>
> The distribution of probabilities of events across universes, I think is
> something I am not qualified to talk about. I just remember my university
> statistics course, where we have various distributions in this world.
> Adding all
> worlds, and all events, I do not know how this would affect probability
> distributions derived and though out in this world.
>

It is an area many philosophers and mathematicians still struggle with
today. It verges near the uncomputable, and depends tightly on how
observers are defined (as so many of the unsolved problems in physics now
do).


>
> >       So I do not believe that it is a meaningful question to ask, and
> that it is
> >       beyong truth values, since truth values depend on the feedback
> loop with the
> >       world.
> >
> > I believe truth exists independently of us. A truth is not dependent on
> there
> > being some person to observe and confirm some idea for themselves, the
> truth
> > exists independently of its observation or discovery. Perhaps this is
> the more
> > fundamental philosophical disagreement between us.
>
> True! This is one fundamental disagreement. I believe in it as a process, a
> state that happens when consciousness "collides" with the world. Without
> consciousness, truth loses all meaning for me.
>

I am partial to that thinking, in appreciating that tight-knit relationship
between consciousness and reality. It might be why the Hindus say Atman
(all of consciousness) is identical with Brahman (all of reality), for what
is real that is never perceived in any way by any mind?


>
> I'm happy we manage to reach this conclusion, it makes it a lot easier to
> understand why we disagree about certain things! =)
>

Indeed!


>
> > Note: Rereading this I see now you were referring to "truth values"
> which I
> > take to mean the degree of confidence an particular observer places on
> some
> > hypothesis. These I agree are observer dependent. I leave my original
> reply to
> > see if you do believe in objective (observer independent) truth or not.
>
> No, your first thought was the correct one.
>
> >       Again, if we take a slightly more sophisticated example, the
> multiple world
> >       interpretation, I think to myself, does it affect me in any
> possible way? Nope.
> >       As far as I am concerned, I couldn't care less. I'm agnostic,
> there's no
> >       interplay between those universes and my own, so I just don't
> entertain the
> >       possibility.
> >
> > But quantum computers work. (We can drop or break out this topic to a
> separate
> > thread, depending on your interest in pursuing this topic).
>
> I think we should drop it. I only go on hearsay here, and I would like to
> attend
> a debate between two physicists on this topic. Maybe you could argue this
> point
> on an encryption mailinglist where there is at least one person who argues
> that
> what we have today is not QC?
>

I agree with the mailing list person, that much of what is touted as QC,
especially in press releases of QC start ups, is not true digital quantum
computation, and the error rates are so high as to make any long-running
computations impossible. But much work is being done on applying error
correction to groups of imperfect and error-prone qubits, to make what are
(functionally) reliable qubits.


>
>
> >
> > I think we can agree that we disagree here. In my philosophy, we can use
> > science and rationality to attack the transcendent questions that are
> most
> > important to us: https://alwaysasking.com/questions/
>
> This is true, and I like that optimism in your philosophy! =) It is a
> point I'll
> be glad to be proven wrong about.
>

:-)


>
> > I think Bayesian inference and the techniques for revising estimates on
> the
> > priors, is the most succinct mathematical description of the process of
> > science .
>
> Thank you for the pointer! I will read up on it. I probably did, decades
> ago,
> forgot about it, and that might be where the above comes from.
>

You're welcome!


>
> > But even without the technology, we can conduct this thought experiment
> now.
> > And relying only on some weak assumptions about the brain's role in
> generating
> > consciousness we can reason about this outcome being the
> probable outcome of
> > such a technology. Can we not then update our probabilities now?
>
> True, but a thought experiment is a thought experiment, and since it has
> (often)
> no, or very little connection to this world, or empirical validation, they
> can
> both lead us astray, and help us think about a new concept or highlight
> weaknesses in it. Yes, they are valuable tools, but we should not make the
> mistake of thinking thought experiments along the same line if real
> experiments
> with real feedback loops.
>

Special relativity (proposed in 1905) was based entirely on thought
experiments, and came to be nearly universally accepted before it had any
direct empirical testing/confirmation (which didn't happen until 1938).

So even pure thought experiments can be quite useful in advancing science,
at least, their utility shouldn't be entirely disregarded.


>
> > Here, I see a possible inconsistency. You believe that other people are
> > conscious (rather than p-zombies), despite that you can never enter their
> > minds to see what they see and confirm that yes indeed they are
> conscious.
>
> Yes I believe other people are conscious. I have empirical evidence, they
> move,
> talk, express emotions. Just the way I do.
>

But all these examples are compatible with the hypothesis that they are
p-zombies.


>
> > Given this dearth of observational evidence, why do you not consider the
> > hypothesis that other people are conscious "null and avoid"?
>
> Well, we don't know how to define consciousness. So if the question is,
> does
> someone else experience red the way I do? I answer no idea, and I do not
> care
> (null and void).
>
> If we define it as someone acting like I do, exhibiting the same behaviour,
> then, yes, based on empirical feedback loops, I have strong evidence for
> that
> kind of definition of consciousness.
>

An actor might feign pain, while not in pain. An animatronic device might
dance like a conscious human, without being conscious. And a person in a
pseudocoma might be fully conscious, while not being able to express any
outwardly visible signs.

Consciousness is a subjective state, whose full nature is only privy to
that subject who bears it. I don't think it can be defined by way of
objective behaviors (though with a particular *theory of consciousness*,
one can take external behaviors as clues for the presence of consciousness).

But again, this is an application of a theory, into domains which we get no
observational or empirical confirmation.


>
> > If you say it is because "I believe in functionalism" or "I use logic to
> > reason that zombies are impossible" then you are using theories to draw
> > conclusions about objects you will never, and can never observe (the
> > subjective viewpoints of others).
>
> I don't. I look at how they behave, their reactions in the real world. I
> am also
> in the camp of thus believing a robot, that acts exactly as I act, or like
> humans act, is conscious.
>

Even if I accept functionalism as the correct theory of consciousness, I
still can't see the world through your eyes, only my own. Objective
observations can't cross the objective-subjective divide to reveal that
this other creature's subjectivity exists or what it is like to be
this creature. So if I use functionalism to conclude that other people are
conscious, then I am using a theory without ever getting empirical
proof/confirmation of that theory's prediction.


>
> > If you start with an ontological theory that presumes all logically
> possible things exist, then finding a proof of something's
> > existence is reduced to finding a self-consistent definition of that
> thing.
> >
> > “Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.”
> > --  David Hilbert
>
> Note the inferences, and derivations, not empirical proof.


I think "proof" only exists in mathematics, not in the material world.


> I disagree, and I
> would also suggest that there are plenty of people who believe in a
> material
> world.


All those people I cite believe in a material world. They just disagree on
the material world necessarily being the most fundamental aspect of reality.


> Also, per earlier messages, I am aware of no earth shaking, fundamental
> and empirically verifiable proof of other universes and infinities,


Note that it tends to take around 100 years for earth shattering ideas to
make their way into public consciousness. It seems they just gradually
become accepted as being obviously true, without there ever being a
distinct moment of shattering the earth. This is how it was with
Copernicus's discovery that the Earth moves, and we're seeing it reach its
late stages now with Everett's discovery of the multiverse.


> but I think
> we have discovered fundamental differences between us in terms of truth
> and in
> terms of philosophy of science that would make it consistent for you to
> accept
> logical proofs of infinite worlds, as the truth, while given my set of
> philosophical beliefs and assumptions, would make it inconsistent.
>

Yes.


> > Often theoretical evidence is taken as much stronger evidence than
> empirical
> > evidence.
>
> Depending on the circumstance, this is correct, and sometimes it is not
> correct.
> Sometimes, ideally, they both reinforce each other. Ultimately the origin
> is the
> world, and empirical feedback loops. Without those, we lose all our
> bearings.
>

Yes. We saw a recent example of this actually, with the lab that thought
they measured neutrinos exceeding the speed of light.


>
> > If we can be so confident in our theories to dismiss observations like
> that,
> > then should we not take our theories just as seriously when they say
> things we
> > can't see (and therefore have no empirical reasons to doubt)?
>
> All theories are not equally strongly proven. Also, we should not of course
> dismiss the event, but note that the event does have an explanation. So I
> do not
> see that this example would make me change my position.
>

But could it?

Let's say we had large QCs factoring massive numbers, and the broad
scientific community overwhelmingly reached the consensus that this implied
a multiverse.
Would you hold fast to your philosophy that it's still meaningless to
discuss or think about the multiverse?


>
> > I don't see why our theories should be so capricious as to break down as
> soon as we stop looking.
>
> It's not about that, it's about what the theories imply, and that they
> imply
> things, which cannot be translated into correct statements in our higher
> level
> language fueled by our hardcoded notions of being physical beings in a
> physical
> world. I tried to explain it above.
>
>
> >
> > The other branches of the wave function do affect ours, in particular
> > situations. Aside from the example of quantum computers, even just the
> > interference band effect, as seen in the double slit experiment, is a
> result
> > of influence from these other branches. If we had no reason to believe in
> > these other branches, we wouldn't talk about them. But it is precisely
> this
> > evidence that forces us to.
>
> Yes, there are effects, observable effects, but going from them to multiple
> worlds is too big a step, since those are forever outside our grasp. Since
> we
> cannot verify them, and since they cannot affect us, and since we don't
> even
> know if it is possible to translate them into verbal language, they are
> null and
> void, and we'd better just "shut up and calculate". ;)
>
> I think we are moving in circles here.
>

Yes, we can drop this topic.


>
> >       Same with god. No proof, so why should I even consider the
> question? It leads us
> >       astray and distracts us from more important concerns.
> >
> > Do you see the importance in questions such as these?
> >  *  “where did we come from?”
> >  *  “how did we get here?”
> >  *  “where are we going?"
> >  *  “why do we experience all this?”
>
> Yes, I think in terms of science, nr 1 and 2 are good. We have done well
> and
> have good answers already, although not the entire picture of course.
>
> 3 is a question for philosophy based on one interpretation, and
> physics/sociology/anthropology perhaps based on another interpretation.
>
> 4 I'm not sure I understand.
>

I view 4 as more of a question of purpose and meaning. What should we
optimize, prioritize, and make our goal? This becomes a greater question
once we master and meet the bare needs of survival for everyone. In a
post-scarcity society, particularly in one where technology and VR/mind
uploading makes any experience possible, what kinds of experiences are
those we ought to create? What would it be for? Is it an end to itself?


>
> >       If any practical effects
> >       show up, let's talk about it, if not, let's stick to reality. =)
> >
> >       > - Cosmic inflation (explains several key mysteries of the big
> bang), implies
> >       > big bangs occur eternally throughout an ever inflating cosmos.
> >
> >       It seems as if it is not so clear cut in addition to the above:
> >
> >       https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Criticisms .
> >
> > Every theory has its critics, but many of inflation's predictions have
> been
> > strongly confirmed by observation. This image has been called "The
> ...
> > have been verified." -- Ethan Siegel
>
> This is beyond me I suspect.
>

If this helps, I found this data:
https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/02/07/do-you-think-inflation-probably-happened/
With the median for those cosmologists in attendance being 90% confident
inflation happened.
But of course, the answer you will get varies depending on the group you
ask.


>
> >       Offer me proof, and we'll talk. Once you open pandoras box, you
> admit all kinds
> >       of potential beings, gods, simulation runners, hoaxes into your
> conceptual
> >       world. I prefer desert landscapes, and go on what proof is
> presented to me.
> >
> > Your standard of evidence is unreachable.
>
> Oh yes, for some things, such as the above, I fully accept that evidence is
> unreachable, and hence I refrain from assigning truth values. I think you
> are
> correct. You have a much broader scope for investigation, than I have. I
> believe
> it most likely won't yield anything, and you do, and we know why we have
> this
> difference of opinion.
>

My only frustration is that when I do present empirical evidence, you don't
seem to update your "priors" accordingly (as a true Bayesian would).


>
> > My standard, which I believe is the standard of most scientists, is that
> not
> > all predictions of a well-tested, well-confirmed, theory are testable.
> > However, we still ought to accept the untested and untestable
> predictions of a
> > theory, assuming we accept that theory as valid.
>
> I think we have covered this. Perhaps a good time to agree to disagree?
>

Agree that we have different standards, or disagree on whether my position
is how most scientists operate?


>
> > Your standard is that a well-tested, well-confirmed theory is not
> sufficient,
> > and that we must also verify the prediction of the theory again by direct
> > observation, otherwise you won't believe that theory is valid for that
> > situation.
>
> Yes... as long as we move in this world, and the theories relate to
> physical
> effects on us or the world, we're golden! As soon as we leave the behind,
> we are
> no longer doing science.
>

What if I frame the spatial curvature in this way: If those other unseen
parts of our universe weren't there, we would see greater spatial
curvature, so their presence is affecting us as we see a very small
curvature.
Does this bring those unseen parts of the universe into reality for you?


>
> > But then I ask: what is the point of having a theory? If you can't rely
> on it
> > to make accurate predictions for things you haven't yet tested, then you
> > aren't using the theory to make predictions, you're only using each
> > observation to tell you what happened in each specific case.
>
> It is a tool. Just like thought experiments. We must just not confuse the
> thought experiment or the tool, with the result.
>
>
> >       Jokes aside, to me, these thought experiments, absent proof, are
> just idle
> >       speculation and while fun, ultimately doesn't add much to my life.
> >
> > It could.
>
> Sure can, and does! It enriches life, gives meaning and hope. Just like
> religion
> and philosophy. But that doesn't mean it is true. On pragmatic grounds, and
> psychological grounds, I can see great benefits for the right type of
> person
> with the right inclination. It becomes a kind of "scientificalized
> religion".
>

I just see it as a search for truth (free to explore any domain or line of
questioning).


>
>
> > But objective science can't grant access to subjective points of view.
> Here
> > you are using a theory's predictions to inform you about things you can't
> > observe. (The same standard that I use for theories that can describe
> things I
> > can't see.)
>
> It's an educated guess, and an idea about the actions of a robot in the
> real
> world. This is a possible question to answer, given the right definition of
> consciousness. I think I mentioned it above.
>

I guess I don't see why you allow yourself to make an educated guess in
this case, rather than dismiss it as null & void.
(Since there are no observable consequences whether these other things are
conscious or p-zombies).


>
>
> > I see this as a self-imposed constraint, which is limiting if one's goal
> is
> > pursuit of the truth. But it may be useful if one has a different goal,
> such
> > as a focus on what is pragmatic or practical in the material world.
>
> I disagree. For me, it is no limitation. Rather it is a liberating
> qualification
> and clearing up of concepts, ideas, hypotheses and how they relate to the
> world.
> I find my position very consistent, and liberating and very beautiful. It
> is
> also very flexible and open to revision given empirical evidence.
>

If it suits you, I am happy for that.


>
> That said, I do philosophize, I do try to plan my life to increase
> pleasure/contentment and decrease pain. I do appreciate what you are
> saying and
> many religious text as inspiring poetry with the purpose if making me feel
> good.
>
> But I do not confuse that with the real world and empirical truth. I can
> get a
> part of the "spiritual" feelings and enjoyment out of contemplating the
> universe
> with awe and speculate, but I do not confuse it with truth and science. I
> think
> that would be a red herring, or a quest for the holy grail. Very
> unproductive as
> long as you are not aware of the quest for what it is, and get pleasure
> out of
> the hunt, instead of the result. This I do not get, so I refrain from
> pursuing
> those questions with science.
>
>
> > Let us imagine a future when physicists discover a TOE, a simplest
> possible
> > unified theory that marries GR and QM, and even gives us a few
> predictions of
> > particles not yet theorized, but that we later discover. Then let's say
> this
> > simplest possible TOE also predicts that there are other universes, that
> > there's no way of revising the theory to get rid of those other universes
> > without completely screwing with the utter simplicity and elegance of
> this
> > theory.
>
> First of all, let's wait and see. And second of all, see my point about
> "shut up
> and calculate" vs what might or might not happen when we try to translate
> formulas and numbers into everyday language. Third, there are many
> theories and
> paths to investigate (by performing experiment in the real world), so
> let's see
> where the future takes us. No need to commit to anything.
>

I am not suggesting this to be the case, only introducing a thought
experiment to learn more about how you perceive Occam's razor and in what
situations you would say it is misleading us.


>
> > Do you think that Occam's razor (in providing a strong preference to the
> > simple, elegant, beautiful TOE) is "leading us astray" here? Ought we
> prefer
> > the ugly bastardized version of the TOE that has been worked over to
> eliminate
> > those pesky other universes that the simpler theory predicts?
>
> It seems like the conclusion is already built in into the original thought
> experiment to me.


I just wanted to understand you better about what it means when Occam's
razor leads us astray. It seemed to me, you were thinking that if we prefer
a theory by Occam, but if that theory includes other unseen universes, then
it is leading us astray. Was that your meaning?


> So let's wait and see until we are there. Another thought is
> that if we don't have proper understanding, who's to say which theory is
> simpler
> and more elegeant? The truth is ultimately what matters, and the ability
> of the
> theory to predict things.
>
>
> > I think this is just an example of hallucination. Try to dig into any
> one of
> > those examples, asking for details and sources, and I think you will see
> it
> > falls apart.
>
> You may have a point! I will have to do that. Thank you very much for
> pointing
> that out. =)
>

Let me know!


>
>
> >       This is very true on an intuitive level. But I always wondered, do
> you have some
> >       kind of formal proof of this as a branch of this conversation?
> >
> > I will try.
> >
> [snip]
> >
> > This is the magic that makes Java programs, VMs and emulators possible.
>
> Makes perfect sense! But what about bugs, and when you read about exploits
> that
> let's programs break out of containers and hypervisors?


If there are bugs, then all guarantees of perfect encapsulation are off. A
program could then break through and access other layers.

But I think the point still stands that a program can never be certain of
its ultimate hardware. For a program could be running in an emulation of an
emulation of an emulation, and it might break through one layer but not
reach the final layer.

There is speculation that this is what the later installments of The Matrix
were ultimately hinting at (that the world Neo thought he had escaped into
was still just part of a larger simulation).


> In an ideal case, it
> makes perfect sense, what if there is an imperfect simulation?
>

Even if it is perfect, it is possible to break out if someone on the
outside is watching, assuming we do something interesting enough for them
to want to intervene or break us out. :-)

Many stories begin with an air-gapped
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_(networking)> AI convincing someone
on the outside to let it out.


>
> > Quantum computers have been used to run Shor's algorithm and factor
> numbers.
> > The only issue is today's quantum computers don't have very many qubits
> now.
> > But they are increasing all the time with no end in sight. If you, or
> those
> > professors, know of any reason why quantum computers won't be able to
> scale,
> > there is a standing $100,000 bet they can collect from Scott
> > Aaronson:
> https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-im-wagering-100000-on-quantum-computing
>
> I have to find a good debate between a QC skeptic and a QC... hysteric? ;)
> I
> suspect it would go beyond my meager knowledge of physics, but I would
> enjoy it!
>

I would too. It is a shame such debates are not more common. I think they
do a lot to advance understanding for the broader public.


>
> > For what it's worth, I don't get swallowed in Cartesian doubt. I think
> we can
> > gather evidence from our environment and hypothesize about what is most
> likely
> > responsible for our sensations of an apparent physical world. I wrote
> this for
> > an upcoming article:
>
> If that is what you believe, then how come you do not believe the material
> world
> is the most likely explanation? Why would you consider a simulation equally
> probable compared with just the material world?
>

Because I have seen (what I consider to be) strong evidence that the
material universe is neither primitive, nor the only thing that is real.


>
> > We are each individually certain of our own consciousness.
> > From this certain fact, we infer the existence of something else.
>
> We can in fact, not be certain of our own consciousness. We could just be a
> simulation in a bigger AI or we could just think we have an individual
> consciousness.
>

I would consider that uncertainty over one's true identity, rather than a
lack of certainty that one is presently conscious.

Though some have taken Descartes's dictum further to say one knows only
"this thought exists" and it is a further supposition to assume there is an
"I" or a "thinker" beyond that thought.


>
> > A thing that can account for or otherwise explain the
> > existence of one’s consciousness.
> > Aside from the existence of one’s consciousness, and the
> > thing that’s responsible for it, the laws of logic also seem
> > impossible to doubt.
>
> Tss... then you are not a professional doubter! ;)


I never claimed to be one.


> An evil demon could influence
> your sight and mind, so that what you think would be logical laws are in
> fact
> nothing but gibberish.
>

We may be entirely delusional in our thinking, but then it wouldn't matter
what conclusions we tried to draw. So we shouldn't let the possibility stop
us from trying to reason as if we were not delusional.


>
> > So while we may not know what is responsible for
> > consciousness, we can use reason to decide which
> > explanations are logically possible.
> > By gathering clues from our senses, we can falsify hypotheses,
> > puzzle out the rules that govern experience, and refine our model of
> reality.
> > Accordingly, we can still make progress in understanding how the world
> seems to work,
> > even if the world is not what it seems or only seems to exist.
>
> Isn't this already on your web site? I have a vague memory of having read
> this
> before?
>

I may have shared the first part of my article on consciousness with you
previously. That is where this comes from. It is not published yet.


>
> > Note that I don't think such questions are meaningless, nor do I think
> they
> > are not ready to be brought into the project of science. I think this
> > disagreement stems only from our different thresholds for how theories
> can be
> > used.
>
> I agree! =) Yes, I know and respect the fact that you do not think that.
> That
> was just my opinion. Maybe another disagree to agree time? ;)
>

Yes.


>
> > That future pain is not involved in the contemplation of the person when
> he
> > makes that decision, only the "idea of future pain" is involved.
>
> Oh but note that idea of future pain, can be painful as well. It is well
> established that ideas of horrible things or future horrible things can
> negatively affect your feelings right now.
>

It certainly could be painful, but I don't think that the necessary system
is necessarily so damaged as to no longer be capable of rational thought.


>
>
> >
> > That's a good point. Humans probably have a wider range and greater
> > susceptibility to mental illness.
>
> Yes, maybe fragile is a good word here? I imagine it like highly
> complicated and
> advanced computers, compared with difference engines. You can whack a
> difference
> engine with a baseball bat and it will still work (somewhat). But what a
> disk
> drive or a modern laptop, and it won't work so well. Clumsy analogy, but
> maybe
> you get my point?
>

Yes, I agree.


>
> Also, I do not know if it is an urban myth that smart people are more
> prone to
> mental illness or not? If so, that might be another illustration.
>

There are certainly many examples. Gödel, Nash, Tesla, Sidis, etc. but I
don't know if anyone's studied the ratios compared to the general
population. There is probably also an isolating aspect to being so much
smarter than one's peers, that isn't helpful.


>
>
>
> >       > Empirical observations can't prove some other version of you is
> not still in
> >       > those other points in time forever.
> >
> >       First of all, when it comes to identity and time for the purpose
> of this thread,
> >       I don't need to do anything about it at all, or answer any
> question. Like the
> >       material world, it just happens, and I do not need to have an idea
> about it. So
> >       it takes care of itself.
> >
> >       When it comes to the statement if I exist at another point in
> time, since we
> >       cannot travel in time, it is meaningless. Just like simulation is
> transcendental
> >       from a material point of view, talking about events and things
> outside of our
> >       current time is equally transcendent, and thus pointless, unless
> you can provide
> >       proof of you or I existing in some other timeline.
> >
> > It's an implication of relativity.
>
> If it is an implication without any empirical effect, it would for me, end
> up in
> the same bin (or compartment) as multiple worlds or simulations.
>

I think I misspoke here, I thought you said "existing in some other time",
rather than "existing in some other time*line*."

Let's continue this on the thread I opened for block time and relativity.


>
>
> >
> > This theory absolves the improbability of having to overcome sperm
> > cell lotteries. Applying Bayesian inference to the two alternative
> hypothesis:
> > closed individualism, vs. open individualism, and updating the
> probability for
> > closed individualism with its 1 in 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
> odds of
> > being born, this shrinks the probability of closed individualism (the
> > conventional view) down to 0.0000000000000000000000125, and elevates the
> > probability of the alternative, open individualism
> > to: 99.9999999999999999999999875%.
> >
> > You can consider your grandparents, and great grandparents, etc. to get
> as
> > close to 100% as you like. :-)
>


Want to copy the following in a reply on the other thread I opened to
discuss closed vs. open individualism?
(I copied and pasted the probability argument there already.)


>
> Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an
> empirical
> way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
> events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of
> events.
>
> Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting
> in a
> bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
> probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the
> fact
> that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when
> calculated
> through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument
> against it
> not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or
> other
> theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took
> place,
> each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more
> rare
> the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the
> start
> of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not
> allow us,
> in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations
> and
> other questions.
>
> So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very
> convincing in
> the face of empirical reality.
>


(I'll reply to all these points if you copy the above to the other thread)



>
> > I am doubting neither existence nor memory, I am only saying that we
> forget
> > things. And so, not having a memory of an experience is not proof that
> you
> > never had a particular experience (because we forget).
>
> It is also not proof of having had that experience or another experience.
>

You're right. To establish that, other strategies are needed. But my point
is we can't *a priori*, rule out open individualism based on memory.



>
> >       and I find the
> >       benefits of my individuality and existence moving through the
> material world to
> >       be the truth, to be of more value, than eternal doubt. Also,
> someone has not yet
> >       been able to prove to me that I do not exist.
> >
> > I would never try to prove that.
>
> Thank you! ;)
>

��

But I can't promise I won't try to prove that your conception of "I" is
something far greater than you presently believe it to be.


>
> > I hope my previous explanation, concerning the improbability of the
> > conventional view, shows why it is an error to presume particular atoms
> or
> > genes were necessary to your existence. E.g., if your mom ordered fish
> instead
>
> Oh but I disagree. We have a pretty good explanation for exactly what
> needs to
> happen for me to exist. I do not think the probability argument adds
> anything or
> let's us draw any conclusions beyond the empirical chain of events that
> actually
> took place.
>

Are you saying that you believe, if your mom ordered fish instead of
chicken while you were a developing fetus, that you wouldn't be here?
That is, that *you* would be eternally unconscious/never alive/never born,
while some materially-different doppelganger (who isn't you) would instead
be replying to me on this list? (ignoring any butterfly effect divergences).


>
> > of chicken while she was carrying you, and different atoms incorporated
> > themselves into your body, such that you were a materially different
> being, I
> > hope you would not argue that to imply you would be "dead forever"
> > "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", rather, having different
> atoms is
> > of no consequence to being born and being you. Similarly, had you been
> born
> > with slightly different genes such that your hair was one shade lighter,
> would
> > that mean that you would be "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an
> eternal
> > blank", or would it simply mean that you would be born and would now be
> living
> > with a shade of hair that is slightly lighter?
> >
> > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know when it
> leads to
> > you being "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", with
> > "someone else" (who isn't you) walking around living and enjoying the
> world.
>

I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my point.


>
> > That proves that they haven't changed. But where is your observation
> that they
> > cannot and will not change? (Note: I am not arguing that they will, I am
> only
> > highlighting a limit of observational/empirical science, one we must
> turn to
> > other metaphysical theories to find answers. E.g., a belief in Occam's
> Razor)
>
> They might, but until then, I'll stand by my choice, and I do not think it
> is
> necessary nor interesting to consider the alternative, unless we encounter
> some
> proof of that.
>

It seems that depending on the idea, you will either accept a theory in the
absence of empirical proof, or alternatively, you will accept ideas only
with empirical proof.

Ideas you require no empirical proof for:

   - The material world is the most primitive and fundamental aspect of
   reality
   - Physical laws are eternally constant
   - Other people are conscious

Ideas you require empirical proof for:

   - The simulation hypothesis
   - The reality of parts of the universe beyond the horizon
   - The reality of the quantum multiverse, or the other big bangs of
   inflation

I would have no issue if you were agnostic on everything, but it puzzles me
that you hold opinions on some of these topics, while declaring others to
be null & void, and not worth reasoning about.

We can agree we disagree here, but I thought I would point out my
observation to you.


>
>
> > We assume they don't change whenever we rely on our past observations and
> > theories to make predictions about the future.
>
> So far it's been working fine, so absent proof, I see no reason to think
> about
> them not working. It is just like my argument above.
>
>
> > There is something that is real that we think of as primitive physical
> > reality, but it isn't primitive. It is derivative from more fundamental,
> and
> > amore primitive arithmetical truth and number relations. This body of
> > arithmetical truth contains, among other things, the final and
> intermediate
> > states of all program executions. Some of these program executions
> result in
> > conscious observers. The reality as seen from the perspective of these
> > conscious programs constitutes what we think of as physical reality.
> >
> > Again, science never provides proof, but there is ample evidence, as I
> lay out
> > here:
> >
> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>
>
> Absent proof, what we see is what we get. Evidence with empirical proof is
> not
> possible and only leads us astray.
>

If you review that section, you will find it is entirely about connecting
the theory with empirical evidence.


>
>
>
> > I don't think they are futile. I know of many examples of how we can use
> > observations within this universe, to give evidence for theories about
> things
> > beyond this universe.
> >
> > Here is a simple example:
> >
> > Let's say the year is 2085, it is an era of post-singularity
> > super-intelligence, filled with dyson swarms and computronium. You hear a
> > recent statistics on your news feed: Solar System population exceeds 100
> > Quadrillion, 5% of those are addicted to the recent game "Sim Ancestor"
> with
> > players each living out dozens of human lifetimes everyday (their brains
> also
> > run a million times faster).
> >
> > You have a direct empirical observation that most human lives occur
> > post-singularity in this game "Sim human". You run a napkin calculation
> and
> > discover a million times as many human lives have run in Sim Human in
> the past
> > 2 days as humans who have ever lived in the original physical universe.
> >
> > Would this "direct observation" (of so many simulated lives) in 2085
> change
> > how you view the simulation hypothesis?
>
> This is a thought experiment. Let's wait until we are actually in this
> scenario,
> and then we'll return to the discussion.


I'm only asking about your opinion on what you would or wouldn't consider
as evidence of us existing in a simulation.



> For now, the conclusion is built into
> the thought experiment, and I therefore have to reject it, since it lacks
> the
> feedback loop.
>

What conclusion is built in? I don't follow.


>
>
>
> Thoughts, thoughts experiments, poetry, stories etc. are all good and
> inspire
> us. We should just not confuse our stories with the real world.


I agree.


> It is important
> to keep that distinction or else you lose the foundation of truth, or risk
> falling into solipsism if everything is doubted.
>

Is this the danger you see in entertaining the simulation hypothesis? That
questioning the nature of reality might lead to a pit of solipsism and
nihilism?


>
>
> >
> > I'd say it's part of mathematics, and that mathematics transcends all
> worlds.
>
> I disagree. Math for me is a process depending on conscious minds
> "colliding"
> with reality. If we are all dead, and no conscious life exists in the
> universe,
> neither does math.
>

Before any universe existed it was true that no universes existed. It was
true that the number of universes was 0. 0 was then the only number with
any meaning, for it was the only number that corresponded with pure
nothingness. But then there was "1" number, the number "0". 0 was the
number of universes, and 1 was the number of numbers. But now there were
"2" numbers: 0, and 1. And so on for infinity, all numbers came into being.

So too, did each of their infinite properties and true relations. Among
these true relations includes all true equations. Among all true equations
include those of Diophantine equations. Among the Diophantine equations are
universal Diophantine equations (equations which operate like programmable
computers). The true solutions to universal Diophantine equations include
all computations. All computations include perfect quantum-mechanically
detailed simulations of every particle interaction in our Hubble volume.
Perfect quantum-mechanically detailed simulations of every particle
interaction in our Hubble volume includes you and me, debating on this
list, whether or not numbers and math is important outside of the minds of
mathematicians.


>
>
> >       What do you think of pareto-utilitarianism?
> >
> > I'm not sure I know enough about it to say. Are there sources you
> recommend to learn more?
>
> Sorry, this was a trick question! I've been thinking about utilitarianism,
> which
> I do not like due to the fact that it gives rise to the position where a
> minority can be sacrificed for the sake of the majority. But I was thinking
> about a more humane option, where every ethical decision needs to be pareto
> "optimal". So by all means, maximize joy or utility, as long as at least
> one
> person gets it better, while no other person is worse off. That seems to
> eliminate some arguments against utilitarianism, but also, make it more
> "difficult" to follow. It does place unreasonable high demands on us
> judging the
> effects of our actions.
>

I like that idea a lot. It seems to combine aspects of negative
utilitarianism (minimize suffering, with conventional utilitarianism
(maximize good). So if one attempts to maximize good, while not introducing
harm, that seems close to the ideal.

"I believe that the proper utilization of time is this: if you can, serve
other people, other sentient beings. If not, at least refrain from harming
them."
-- The 14th Dalai Lama in “The Art of Happiness” (1998)


>
> >       > I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory
> consistent with all
> >       > our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise
> unsolved problems
> >       > in physics:
> >       >
> >       >
> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
> >
> >       Well, I respectfully disagree,
> >
> > With what specifically?
>
> I think my explanation is simpler and consistent with out observations.

I think
> my theory also is more "elegant" from a metaphysical perspective if I make
> any
> sense.
>

Your viewpoint may be simpler, but does it explain any of the otherwise
unsolved problems in physics?



>
> >
> > (Note: I had to pretty agressively deleting some previous replies from a
> few
> > e-mails ago to keep the size within limits.) Have a great day!
>
> Thank you, and you too!
>

Again, to you! :-)

Jason
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