[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

On Fri, 28 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

>       Well, as I said... this is a "definition game". If we agree to define god as
>       super intelligence as expressed in this physical world by a very powerful AI,
>       I have no quarrel with saying that gods may walk among us after a possible
>       singularity.
> 
> Okay. ��
>
>       If you change the definition to something else like 1, 2 and 3 above, I would
>       probably disagree and say that those are "beyond" our physical world, so I
>       refrain from having an opinion and consider them null and void.
> 
> Makes sense.
>
>       > Given that you think robots could be conscious based on behavioral capacity,
>       > this suggests to me that you are operating from some kind of belief (sorry to
>       > use that word) in functionalism.
>
>       ;)
>
>       I'm not quite sure to be honest. I'd immediately say that I'm some kind of
>       mix of behaviourist or verificationist. I don't think I have read enough about
>       functionalism in order to say that that is what I think.
> 
> Functionalism you can think of behaviorism applied to the brain itself (asking
> not just what externally visible behaviors appear, but considering what kind
> of internal metal activity is going on).

Hmm, after spending a few minutes reading up on it, I'd say that I probably am
leaning towards some kind of type physicalism.

> I am not sure what verificationist could mean in the context of philosophy of
> mind.

Me neither. I was just trying to grasp at what I might believe about what you
said. Just disregard it.

>       > All the things I mention below follow logically, and constructively, out of
>       > functionalism. If you have any doubt or question about any particular
>       > statement I have made, and how it follows directly from functionalism, then
>       > please ask and I will explain further.  
>       >
>       >       > 1. Consciousness is an immaterial pattern, not a particular physical thing.
>
>       I disagree. It is a process of moving physical things as much as electrons are
>       physical entities in the physical world.
> 
> As a process, it is better thought of as a pattern than any particular
> material thing. Think of it like the Amazon river. That river is not a
> particular collection of water molecules, it refers to a continuous process of
> water flowing across South American. Similarly, a conscious mind is a
> particular pattern of activity, rather than any particular set of matter.

Ok. But note that we have no proof. As far as I know, we still do not know. We
have theories and hunches.

>       Consciousness arose from our material
>       world and exists in the material world. We have no evidence for that it is not a
>       physical thing or an immaterial pattern, in fact, we have no empirical evidence
>       for any immaterial pattern, since that is not verifiable by empiric means.
> 
> Note: this is not to say that minds don't require some kind of
> physical/material instantiation. Only that it is a mistake to confuse the two.

Well, if it is a process, one depends on the other. At least today. In the
future, who knows?

> For similar examples, consider that Microsoft Word, Beethoven's fifth
> symphony, and Moby Dick all refer to immaterial patterns, which can have
> material instantiations on hard drives, records, and pages of paper, but one
> should not confuse the drives, records, or pages with the program, the
> symphony or the story.

But these are not minds. Since we have a very bad grasp of minds, what
consciousness is, I am very reluctant to generalize from books or Beethoven, to
minds. Today, all examples of a mind that we have, are as electrons running
around in our brains. Separating out the electrons from the brain, and letting
them run in a computer might or might not be possible. But in theory it is
something, an experiment, which could eventually be performed in our world. Then
we will know more.

Absent that, we just have theories, and what we are currently observing, and
probably no good way to conclude the matter as long as we cannot experiment and
see.

> This is what I mean when I say consciousness is an immaterial pattern (it's
> like a story, or a program). It can supervene on particular material
> configurations (like brains, or computers), but it is not tied to nor defined
> by a particular material configuration. Moby Dick is not the particular book
> it is printed on.

I think perhaps an argument could be made that it actually is tied to the
underlying material configuration, since it is a process, running on a type of
hardware. The hardware determines how the software runs, and to a certain
extent, what it can and cannot do.

>       >       > 2. After death or destruction of the body, consciousness can be restored, i.e. returned to life, or
>       resurrected by
>       >       remaking the same
>       >       > body and brain (e.g. by mind uploading, restoring from a backup)
>
>       Disagree due to point 1.
> 
> Would you reconsider this in light of my explanation of what I mean by immaterial pattern?

Well, this is trivial, if you define consciousness as an immaterial pattern,
independent of any underlying hardware, then by that definition I agree with 2,
assuming all science fiction of recreating it in some other medium.

But note that none of this is possible, and we do not know if this is what
consciousness is. It could very well be that the underlying hardware matters, it
could be that we discover that uploading is impossible. So at the moment, we
must remain agnostic here.

One positive thing though, is that this could possibly be perfomred in some
science fiction future, and then we would know! So compared with simulations,
I'd say that this one is "easier" to confirm than a simulation.

>       Also, we have no evidence of consciousness ever having
>       been restored after the destruction of the body.
> 
> This follows from the basic materialist/physicalist assumption. That same physical causes have the same physical effects. And will
> behave physically indistinguishably.

That does not counter my argument. Show me proof of resurrection and we shall
talk. If you cannot show me proof of resurrection, resurrection is not possible,
since I have not empirically seen any proof of it, apart from near death
encounters, which can be explained very well by medical science. There are I
assume the odd unexplainable case, but that is fine, we just cannot explain it.

But if we take a hard case such as someone brain dead, this is, to the best of
our current knowledge impossible, and they are dead and do not come back.

I think this is a good example of not confusing thought experiments with real
experiments, and an example of how that can lead us astray and make us
(possibly) waste time and resources chasing ghosts instead of focusing on hard
science.

> Unless you are positing the involvement of something like a magical dualistic
> soul, creating an atom-for-atom replica of a person's body and brain will
> produce a living and conscious brain.

Leaving aside the question of identity, and the fact that this is currently
impossible (as per above), yes.

>       I'll stop here, since
>       everything flows from nr 1.
> 
> I hope you will continue your evaluation in light of my added context.

Well, if I follow your definitions, I do not see why I woulnd't end up at your
destination? =)

I do have some arguments or concerns which make me not share your definitions
though.

>       > I didn't say it is proof, I said all this follows from the theory of
>       > functionalism, which is the dominant theory of consciousness by philosophers
>
>       This is the truth. I do not agree with point 1, so although it might follow from
>       the theory, I do not subscribe to the theory.
> 
> By everything else you've said, you do. I think you just got caught up in an
> alternate interpretation of immaterial. Note I do not mean anything
> supernatural, just the distinction between a story and a book, between a
> program and a CD-ROM.

Do you still think I do? I tried to look a little bit deeper into the various
positions within the philosophy of mind.

>       But note that it also could be
>       that I do not understand it, but point 1 does make me think that I won't
>       subscribe to that theory.
>
>       > and cognitive scientists. You can retreat to agnosticism if you want to deny
>       > this theory and its implication, but given you think robots are conscious (you
>
>       It is a theory and not a fact, so there is nothing to deny here.
> 
> True, but it is a well-established and leading theory.

I saw the figure 33% somewhere, which means there are 67% who have other
theories. This of course means nothing, but it is hardly the only theory out
there.

>       > don't think minds need to be made out of squishy neurons) that is a tacit
>       > acceptance of functionalism.  
>
>       I disagree. I believe minds are "material" in nature.
> 
> I am not saying that minds don't need material instantiations, I am saying
> they don't need to be made of particular materials.

Yes, you explained that better. I agree.

> You still need a computer to run software, but it makes no difference if that
> computer uses relays, vacuum tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, ping
> pong balls, or hydraulic pipes and valves.
> 
> That is what functionalism says about the mind, you need something to
> instantiate the particular patterns, but what you use to do so, is of no
> consequence, so long as the same patterns and relations are preserved.

See my attempted explanation of my fairly uninformed and unresearched position
above.

>       As for consciousness I
>       make no claims about it. I made the claim that if someone acts _as if_ they have
>       consciousness, I'll treat them as if they have consciousness. That's all I said
>       (I think).
> 
> I think previously you said if they act like they are conscious, you would
> consider them to be conscious. If this is what you meant, then that is
> basically functionalism. If you mean you will only pragmatically treat them as
> conscious, while doubting their consciousness, that is consistent with
> agnosticism.

It would be the second statement, although I would not necessarily have to
_doubt_ their consciousness. I could just not have an opinion on it. So maybe
here is a part of where we diverge?

>       >       I refrain from assigning truth values and remain
>       >       agnostic. When it comes to human beings and their minds in this world, when they
>       >       die they die and that's (sadly) it. If something else is proven, I'm all ears.
>       >
>       >
>       > Now you are simultaneously claiming to remain agnostic, while reaching a conclusion on the issue.
>
>       No, remember my agnosticism is about things beyond the physical world. I am not
>       an agnostic about things which exist in the world and can be empirically
>       verified. As for my statement, this is backed by experience. To my knowledge, no
>       one has died and come back to life. That is why I claim certainty on this point.
> 
> As Sagan would say, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And again,
> this is just assuming the laws of physics apply to human bodies and brains. If
> you believe this, then restoring the atoms in a dead brain will restore it to
> life. You have to be assuming something non physical is going on in the brain
> to deny this.

See above.

>       However!
>
>       Should someone die and come back to life, then we of course have to revise our
>       idea of death.
> 
> There are many examples in history of people who have freezen to death, had
> their hearts stop for 45+ minutes while remaining under water, and are later
> have brought back to life.

They were frozen, and in that case, they were probably not dead, but
"preserved".

> Scientists have also completely frozen mice to death, and brought them back to
> life by thawing them with a microwave (this is actually how the microwave oven
> was invented).
> 
> It is thought that this could work for larger mammals if only we could thaw
> their whole body equally and at once. Mice are just small enough where this
> thawing can be accomplished with microwaves.
> 
> Then there are examples of uploaded worm brains springing to life when
> uploaded into robot bodies. They would immediately begin to act like worms,
> without any human programming or training. If the original worm was conscious
> to any degree, I would maintain that the uploaded worm mind is as well.

These are all valid questions for science. I'm all for it! I was making the
interpretation above using more sinister conditions of death, than just being
frozen, such as being brain dead, or the body being disintegrated.

But how this relates to someone being dead (frozen) or not, I'm sure we have
some doctors on this list who can answer way better than I can, and they
probably know all the science behind it, so I'll let them speak. =)

>       > Do you see a flaw in my reasoning, or do you have an argument of your own?
>
>       Not in the reasoning, only in the definitions, as per our previous discussions.
> 
> So how is my definition of a soul (that emerges out of functionalism) not like
> the ancient ideas I reference?

Hmm, let me dig up that and see. Probably not in the way the ancients thought
about the ideas, but I do think that it would not be impossible for you to
define it in such a way. See my example of the big bang and how it can be
defined as a god and just an event we have strong reasons to believe happened.

>       > Thank you, I agree. Note that it is not the Bhagavad Gita, which is a much
>       > older and better known text. But when I read your sentiment, I immediately
>       > thought of this passage, as it fairly exactly captures your suggestion: to
>       > pick out only the best from all the different texts (the cherries, or the
>       > nectar) while leaving the rest.
>
>       Yes, exactly! I first thought it said Bhagavad Gita, when reading quickly, but
>       then I saw that it in fact was not. Thank you very much for this recommendation!
>       =)
> 
> You're welcome!
> 
> Jason 

Best regards, 
Daniel