[ExI] A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Mar 1, 2025 at 1:48 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, 28 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >       Well, as I said... this is a "definition game". If we agree to
> define god as
> >       super intelligence as expressed in this physical world by a very
> powerful AI,
> >       I have no quarrel with saying that gods may walk among us after a
> possible
> >       singularity.
> >
> > Okay. ��
> >
> >       If you change the definition to something else like 1, 2 and 3
> above, I would
> >       probably disagree and say that those are "beyond" our physical
> world, so I
> >       refrain from having an opinion and consider them null and void.
> >
> > Makes sense.
> >
> >       > Given that you think robots could be conscious based on
> behavioral capacity,
> >       > this suggests to me that you are operating from some kind of
> belief (sorry to
> >       > use that word) in functionalism.
> >
> >       ;)
> >
> >       I'm not quite sure to be honest. I'd immediately say that I'm some
> kind of
> >       mix of behaviourist or verificationist. I don't think I have read
> enough about
> >       functionalism in order to say that that is what I think.
> >
> > Functionalism you can think of behaviorism applied to the brain itself
> (asking
> > not just what externally visible behaviors appear, but considering what
> kind
> > of internal metal activity is going on).
>
> Hmm, after spending a few minutes reading up on it, I'd say that I
> probably am
> leaning towards some kind of type physicalism.
>

That's reasonable.

But you should know that type-physicalism would deny that robots (having
brains that function and behave exactly like human brains, but are made of
different materials (e.g., silicon-based neurons rather than carbon-based
neurons)) are conscious. Type-physicalism says only with the right material
composition, is consciousness preserved. It is then especially fortunate
that evolution stumbled on the right neurochemistry to permit us to be
non-zombies. But of course, it might be only a small subset of the
population that actually has the right gene to have the exactly required
chemistry for consciousness. For all you know (according to
type-physicalism) you could be the sole possessor of the mutation required
for this consciousness gene, and everyone you've ever interacted with in
the world is a non-conscious philosophical zombie.

If any of this sounds unreasonable to you, note that it stems from the idea
that what something is made of, is more importance than how something
operates, in determining whether or not some entity is conscious.


>
> > I am not sure what verificationist could mean in the context of
> philosophy of
> > mind.
>
> Me neither. I was just trying to grasp at what I might believe about what
> you
> said. Just disregard it.
>
> >       > All the things I mention below follow logically, and
> constructively, out of
> >       > functionalism. If you have any doubt or question about any
> particular
> >       > statement I have made, and how it follows directly from
> functionalism, then
> >       > please ask and I will explain further.
> >       >
> >       >       > 1. Consciousness is an immaterial pattern, not a
> particular physical thing.
> >
> >       I disagree. It is a process of moving physical things as much as
> electrons are
> >       physical entities in the physical world.
> >
> > As a process, it is better thought of as a pattern than any particular
> > material thing. Think of it like the Amazon river. That river is not a
> > particular collection of water molecules, it refers to a continuous
> process of
> > water flowing across South American. Similarly, a conscious mind is a
> > particular pattern of activity, rather than any particular set of matter.
>
> Ok. But note that we have no proof. As far as I know, we still do not
> know. We
> have theories and hunches.
>

I am not arguing for what is true, I am only explaining how your statement
that "[consciousness] is a process of moving physical things" is
fundamentally the same as what I mean when I called it an immaterial
pattern. The essence of what it is, is found in the movement, the
processes, the relations, the patterns. (This is the assumption of
functionalism, which I don't aim to prove, I am only showing how
functionalism, if accepted, leads to these conclusions).


>
> >       Consciousness arose from our material
> >       world and exists in the material world. We have no evidence for
> that it is not a
> >       physical thing or an immaterial pattern, in fact, we have no
> empirical evidence
> >       for any immaterial pattern, since that is not verifiable by
> empiric means.
> >
> > Note: this is not to say that minds don't require some kind of
> > physical/material instantiation. Only that it is a mistake to confuse
> the two.
>
> Well, if it is a process, one depends on the other. At least today. In the
> future, who knows?
>

But note that dependency does not imply identity. A car depends on fuel,
but is not fuel.
Likewise, a computer program can depend on a computer to run, but it is not
the computer.


>
> > For similar examples, consider that Microsoft Word, Beethoven's fifth
> > symphony, and Moby Dick all refer to immaterial patterns, which can have
> > material instantiations on hard drives, records, and pages of paper, but
> one
> > should not confuse the drives, records, or pages with the program, the
> > symphony or the story.
>
> But these are not minds.


No, but you had said that "we have no empirical evidence for any immaterial
pattern."
These examples were meant to highlight that we do in fact have evidence of
immaterial patterns. Beethoven's 5th symphony and Moby Dick are examples.


> Since we have a very bad grasp of minds, what
> consciousness is, I am very reluctant to generalize from books or
> Beethoven, to
> minds.


That's fine.


> Today, all examples of a mind that we have, are as electrons running
> around in our brains. Separating out the electrons from the brain, and
> letting
> them run in a computer might or might not be possible. But in theory it is
> something, an experiment, which could eventually be performed in our
> world. Then
> we will know more.
>

We still wouldn't know.

The agnostic would say: "we only have empirical verification that the
uploaded brain still talks like it is a functioning human, but we still
have no evidence it is conscious."
This is the vexing "Problem of Other Minds". The only possible solution to
this problem is by way of rational thought (e.g., using philosophical
thought experiments).
The agnostic who insists on empirical verification can never have
satisfaction on the problem of other minds.


>
> Absent that, we just have theories, and what we are currently observing,
> and
> probably no good way to conclude the matter as long as we cannot
> experiment and
> see.
>

The only experimental verification you could hope to have would be to
upload yourself, and see for yourself whether or not you remain conscious.
But note that you could never convince anyone else. None of your reports
would constitute empirical evidence of your continued consciousness for
anyone other than yourself.

Likewise with personal identity. Would you be the same person, or a clone?
Is there a meaningful difference? Again, only philosophy can help you here
(this question belongs on the open individualism thread).


>
> > This is what I mean when I say consciousness is an immaterial pattern
> (it's
> > like a story, or a program). It can supervene on particular material
> > configurations (like brains, or computers), but it is not tied to nor
> defined
> > by a particular material configuration. Moby Dick is not the particular
> book
> > it is printed on.
>
> I think perhaps an argument could be made that it actually is tied to the
> underlying material configuration, since it is a process, running on a
> type of
> hardware. The hardware determines how the software runs, and to a certain
> extent, what it can and cannot do.
>

I can open a word document on one computer, save it, transfer it to another
computer, load it, and continue working just where I left off. I can do
this even if I start on a PC, and go to a Mac, running a PC inside a VM.
The program continues to behave exactly as it did, despite the changes to
the fundamental hardware.

Short of postulating incomputable physical laws (which we have no evidence
for), an appropriately detailed computer emulation of all the molecules in
a human brain would behave identically to a brain running on "native
molecules". The Church-Turing Thesis, so fundamental in computer science,
tells us that the hardware makes no difference in what kinds of programs
can be run, the possible behaviors of all Turing machines is equivalent.

So while you take the lack of real-world examples as evidence against the
possibility of uploaded brains, I take the lack of real-world examples of
uncomputable physical laws as evidence for the possibility of uploaded
brains.


>
> >       >       > 2. After death or destruction of the body, consciousness
> can be restored, i.e. returned to life, or
> >       resurrected by
> >       >       remaking the same
> >       >       > body and brain (e.g. by mind uploading, restoring from a
> backup)
> >
> >       Disagree due to point 1.
> >
> > Would you reconsider this in light of my explanation of what I mean by
> immaterial pattern?
>
> Well, this is trivial, if you define consciousness as an immaterial
> pattern,
> independent of any underlying hardware,


Note: independent of any *particular* underlying hardware. It still needs
hardware, of some kind.


> then by that definition I agree with 2,
> assuming all science fiction of recreating it in some other medium.
>
> But note that none of this is possible,


I think it would be better to say "we don't know if this is possible."


> and we do not know if this is what
> consciousness is. It could very well be that the underlying hardware
> matters, it
> could be that we discover that uploading is impossible. So at the moment,
> we
> must remain agnostic here.
>

Of course those alternatives are possible. My point all along is that
"starting from functionalism" then "all this" follows.

If you wish to shift the conversation to whether or not functionalism is
true, we can do that, but note that is a separate conversation from my
original point, which was that the dominant theory by cognitive scientists
and philosophers of mind justifies belief in something uncannily similar to
ancient conceptions of what souls were and could do.


>
> One positive thing though, is that this could possibly be perfomred in some
> science fiction future, and then we would know! So compared with
> simulations,
> I'd say that this one is "easier" to confirm than a simulation.
>

Do you agree with me that you could only know uploading worked if you tried
it yourself? Or do you see some way that a third-person could confirm that
the person's consciousness was preserved in the new medium?


>
> >       Also, we have no evidence of consciousness ever having
> >       been restored after the destruction of the body.
> >
> > This follows from the basic materialist/physicalist assumption. That
> same physical causes have the same physical effects. And will
> > behave physically indistinguishably.
>
> That does not counter my argument. Show me proof of resurrection and we
> shall
> talk.


I could as easily say: Show me your proof that the brain does not follow
physical law, and we can talk.

I was under the impression you were a materialist. The materialist
assumption is that the brain follows physical law.
This is the only assumption you need to make for point #2 to stand. It
stands even if you subscribe to type-physicalism, rather than functionalism.



> If you cannot show me proof of resurrection, resurrection is not possible,
>

I think you are making a logical error here. Not showing proof of
something, does not imply something is impossible.


> since I have not empirically seen any proof of it, apart from near death
> encounters, which can be explained very well by medical science. There are
> I
> assume the odd unexplainable case, but that is fine, we just cannot
> explain it.
>
> But if we take a hard case such as someone brain dead, this is, to the
> best of
> our current knowledge impossible, and they are dead and do not come back.
>

As technology improves, the definition of death gets pushed back further
and further. It is already quite blurred (for example:
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/scientists-bring-cells-in-dead-pigs-back-to-life-180980557/
).
In the end, death is only irrecoverable data loss, and our recovery methods
keep improving. Some have defined "information-theoretic death
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_death>" as the state
beyond which no possible technology can recover from.


> I think this is a good example of not confusing thought experiments with
> real
> experiments, and an example of how that can lead us astray and make us
> (possibly) waste time and resources chasing ghosts instead of focusing on
> hard
> science.
>

It is hard science that tells us the laws of physics operate as well in the
brain as anywhere else in the universe.


>
> > Unless you are positing the involvement of something like a magical
> dualistic
> > soul, creating an atom-for-atom replica of a person's body and brain will
> > produce a living and conscious brain.
>
> Leaving aside the question of identity, and the fact that this is currently
> impossible (as per above), yes.
>

Okay, I am glad we agree on this point.


>
> >       I'll stop here, since
> >       everything flows from nr 1.
> >
> > I hope you will continue your evaluation in light of my added context.
>
> Well, if I follow your definitions, I do not see why I woulnd't end up at
> your
> destination? =)
>

Functionalism isn't my idea. But it does have conclusions that would
surprise most people.

Consider, for example, that Daniel Dennett was an ardent materialist. He
was even considered one of the "Four Horsemen" of the new atheist
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Atheism> movement (along with Richard
Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens). You might then think,
he should be the last person in the world to embrace anything like talk of
souls, immortality, or the mind as an abstract pattern. But these are
passages from his books on the subject:


“... we explore the implications of the emerging view of the mind as
software or program–as an abstract sort of thing whose identity is
independent of any particular physical embodiment. This opens up delightful
prospects, such a various technologies for the transmigration of souls, and
Fountains of Youth but it also opens a Pandora’s box of traditional
metaphysical problems in untraditional costumes, which are confronted in
Part V.”
– Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in "The Mind’s I" (1981)


“The idea that the Self–or the Soul–is really just an abstraction strikes
many people as simply a negative idea, a denial rather than anything
positive. But in fact it has a lot going for it, including–if it matters to
you–a somewhat more robustly conceived version of potential immortality
than anything to be found in traditional ideas of a soul,”
– Daniel Dennett in “Consciousness Explained” (1991)


"And if you were a pearl of material substance, some spectacularly special
group of atoms in your brain, your mortality would depend on the physical
forces holding them together (we might ask the physicists what the
"half-life" of a self is). If you think of yourself as a center of
narrative gravity, on the other hand, your existence depends on the
persistence of that narrative (rather like the Thousand and One Arabian
Nights, but all a single tale), which could theoretically survive
indefinitely many switches of medium, be teleported as readily (in
principle) as the evening news, and stored indefinitely as sheer
information. If what you are is that organization of information that has
structured your body's control system (or, to put it in its more usual
provocative for, if what you are is the program that runs your brain's
computer), then you could in principle survive the death of your body as
intact as a program can survive the destruction of the computer on which it
was created and first run."
– Daniel Dennett in “Consciousness Explained” (1991)






>
> I do have some arguments or concerns which make me not share your
> definitions
> though.
>

Okay, if your only contention is with my premises/definitions, and not with
my reasoning or conclusions, let us settle the definitions and premises
first.
Let that be our focus for now.


>
> >       > I didn't say it is proof, I said all this follows from the
> theory of
> >       > functionalism, which is the dominant theory of consciousness by
> philosophers
> >
> >       This is the truth. I do not agree with point 1, so although it
> might follow from
> >       the theory, I do not subscribe to the theory.
> >
> > By everything else you've said, you do. I think you just got caught up
> in an
> > alternate interpretation of immaterial. Note I do not mean anything
> > supernatural, just the distinction between a story and a book, between a
> > program and a CD-ROM.
>
> Do you still think I do? I tried to look a little bit deeper into the
> various
> positions within the philosophy of mind.
>

Now that you have suggested a preference for type-physicalism, I am less
sure, but I will see if you stick to that preference in the face of the
implications type-physicalism carries that I have pointed out. For example,
its implications for zombies, consciousness genes, and the complete
unimportance of behavioral capacity in relation to consciousness, etc.


>
> >       But note that it also could be
> >       that I do not understand it, but point 1 does make me think that I
> won't
> >       subscribe to that theory.
> >
> >       > and cognitive scientists. You can retreat to agnosticism if you
> want to deny
> >       > this theory and its implication, but given you think robots are
> conscious (you
> >
> >       It is a theory and not a fact, so there is nothing to deny here.
> >
> > True, but it is a well-established and leading theory.
>
> I saw the figure 33% somewhere, which means there are 67% who have other
> theories. This of course means nothing, but it is hardly the only theory
> out
> there.
>

Here is a chart I of a survey based on over 100 philosophers of cognitive
science: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5010?aos=39

While there are many theories that make an appearance, functionalism enjoys
a dominant, and majority position.

The 33% appears when you include responses from other philosophers whose
focus is not on philosophy of mind. And note, that the next most popular
option when you include everyone, becomes dualism.

The percentages appear to be higher among cognitive scientists and AI
researchers, where it is considered almost an "orthodoxy." Here is what a
philosopher and biophysicist wrote about the state of functionalism
(computationalism) in the field of cognitive science:

"Over the last six decades, computationalism—in its various classicist,
connectionist, and neurocomputational incarnations—has been the mainstream
theory of cognition. Many cognitive scientists consider it commonsensical
to say that neural activity is computation and that computation explains
cognition."
-- Gualtiero Piccinini and Sonya Bahar in "Neural Computation and the
Computational Theory of Cognition" (2012)


(Note that computationalism is merely a digitized version of functionalism.
It is a subset of functionalism that believes the functions necessary for
consciousness are, ultimately, computable functions.)

In a survey ( https://emerj.com/media/conscious-ai/index.html ) of 33 AI
researchers, only one thought AI would "likely never" be conscious. In
other words, 32/33 or 97% thought it believe it will eventually happen. To
think this requires a belief that all it takes for consciousness is for a
machine to "run the right program" -- this is what functionalism says.

Minsky raises a key insight for why computationalism is so important in the
field that studies the mind, because the study of computation, is really, a
study of processes:

"Computer science is not really about computers at all, but about ways to
describe processes. As soon as those computers appeared, this became an
urgent need. Soon after that we recognized that this was also what we'd
need to describe the processes that might be involved in human thinking,
reasoning, memory, and pattern recognition, etc."
-- Marvin Minsky "Consciousness is a Big Suitcase" (1998)


Here is how the inventor of functionalism, Hilary Putnam, describes the
thinking that got him there:

"The computational view was itself a reaction against the idea that our
matter is more important than our function, that our what is more important
than our how. My "functionalism" insisted that, in principle, a machine
(say, one of Isaac Asimov's robots), a human being, a creature with a
silicon chemistry, and a disembodied spirit could all work much the same
way when described at the relevant level of abstraction, and that it is
just wrong to think that the essence of our minds is our "hardware.""
-- Hilary Putnam in "Representation and Reality" (1988)



>
> >       > don't think minds need to be made out of squishy neurons) that
> is a tacit
> >       > acceptance of functionalism.
> >
> >       I disagree. I believe minds are "material" in nature.
> >
> > I am not saying that minds don't need material instantiations, I am
> saying
> > they don't need to be made of particular materials.
>
> Yes, you explained that better. I agree.
>

Thank you, I am happy that helped to clarify my position.


>
> > You still need a computer to run software, but it makes no difference if
> that
> > computer uses relays, vacuum tubes, transistors, integrated circuits,
> ping
> > pong balls, or hydraulic pipes and valves.
> >
> > That is what functionalism says about the mind, you need something to
> > instantiate the particular patterns, but what you use to do so, is of no
> > consequence, so long as the same patterns and relations are preserved.
>
> See my attempted explanation of my fairly uninformed and unresearched
> position
> above.
>

Thank you.

I write about these two flavors of physicalism (type-physicalism) which I
call "Strict Physicalism", and a more general "Flexible Physicalism" here:

(See page 119 of :
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y75Fx_Vd4FeNXj6AOE0sS4CdssLpULQx/view?usp=sharing
starting with the section "*Is Physicalism True?*")

This, should you be interested, should provide some more background for the
strengths and weaknesses between type-physicalism and its alternatives.


>
> >       As for consciousness I
> >       make no claims about it. I made the claim that if someone acts _as
> if_ they have
> >       consciousness, I'll treat them as if they have consciousness.
> That's all I said
> >       (I think).
> >
> > I think previously you said if they act like they are conscious, you
> would
> > consider them to be conscious. If this is what you meant, then that is
> > basically functionalism. If you mean you will only pragmatically treat
> them as
> > conscious, while doubting their consciousness, that is consistent with
> > agnosticism.
>
> It would be the second statement, although I would not necessarily have to
> _doubt_ their consciousness. I could just not have an opinion on it. So
> maybe
> here is a part of where we diverge?
>

I was only trying to understand your position better.

I have, by means of philosophy, accepted arguments that permit one to
overcome the "Problem of Other Minds", and therefore justify one's belief
in the consciousness of others by means of demonstration of certain classes
of behavior.

For example, see my section on "Conscious Behaviors" starting on page 59 of
that same document I link above.



>
> >       >       I refrain from assigning truth values and remain
> >       >       agnostic. When it comes to human beings and their minds in
> this world, when they
> >       >       die they die and that's (sadly) it. If something else is
> proven, I'm all ears.
> >       >
> >       >
> >       > Now you are simultaneously claiming to remain agnostic, while
> reaching a conclusion on the issue.
> >
> >       No, remember my agnosticism is about things beyond the physical
> world. I am not
> >       an agnostic about things which exist in the world and can be
> empirically
> >       verified. As for my statement, this is backed by experience. To my
> knowledge, no
> >       one has died and come back to life. That is why I claim certainty
> on this point.
> >
> > As Sagan would say, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And
> again,
> > this is just assuming the laws of physics apply to human bodies and
> brains. If
> > you believe this, then restoring the atoms in a dead brain will restore
> it to
> > life. You have to be assuming something non physical is going on in the
> brain
> > to deny this.
>
> See above.
>
> >       However!
> >
> >       Should someone die and come back to life, then we of course have
> to revise our
> >       idea of death.
> >
> > There are many examples in history of people who have freezen to death,
> had
> > their hearts stop for 45+ minutes while remaining under water, and are
> later
> > have brought back to life.
>
> They were frozen, and in that case, they were probably not dead, but
> "preserved".
>

This gets into defining death. (an interesting topic in itself).

If we hard star-trek level medical technology, I think you would agree that
what counts as death might be pushed back further than what it is today,
just as how medical science today (with our breathing apparatuses and
defibrillators) has a different definition of death compared to doctors in
the 17th century. Many on this list, (with subscriptions to Alcor), likely
hold to a different definition of death than current medical science.

All this is to say that what constitutes mortal injury changes as
technology advances. With the ultimate healing technology, say nano-bots
that capable of restoring any cell to the state it was in at your last
check up, then there would be no injury you could not recover from (at
least recovered to the point of your last check-up). Do you agree with this
reasoning in principle (even though we have no real world demonstrated
examples yet)?


>
> > Scientists have also completely frozen mice to death, and brought them
> back to
> > life by thawing them with a microwave (this is actually how the
> microwave oven
> > was invented).
> >
> > It is thought that this could work for larger mammals if only we could
> thaw
> > their whole body equally and at once. Mice are just small enough where
> this
> > thawing can be accomplished with microwaves.
> >
> > Then there are examples of uploaded worm brains springing to life when
> > uploaded into robot bodies. They would immediately begin to act like
> worms,
> > without any human programming or training. If the original worm was
> conscious
> > to any degree, I would maintain that the uploaded worm mind is as well.
>
> These are all valid questions for science. I'm all for it! I was making the
> interpretation above using more sinister conditions of death, than just
> being
> frozen, such as being brain dead, or the body being disintegrated.
>

Well the uploaded worm certainly died (biologically). And was uploaded and
resurrected: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_i1NKPzbjM

Google recently finished scanning a fruit fly brain. It won't be long
before we have uploaded flies.

Then we should see mouse brains, cat brains, chimp brains, and human
brains. I see, and am aware of, no reason why this should just fail for any
particular species.


>
> But how this relates to someone being dead (frozen) or not, I'm sure we
> have
> some doctors on this list who can answer way better than I can, and they
> probably know all the science behind it, so I'll let them speak. =)
>
> >       > Do you see a flaw in my reasoning, or do you have an argument of
> your own?
> >
> >       Not in the reasoning, only in the definitions, as per our previous
> discussions.
> >
> > So how is my definition of a soul (that emerges out of functionalism)
> not like
> > the ancient ideas I reference?
>
> Hmm, let me dig up that and see. Probably not in the way the ancients
> thought
> about the ideas, but I do think that it would not be impossible for you to
> define it in such a way. See my example of the big bang and how it can be
> defined as a god and just an event we have strong reasons to believe
> happened.
>

Our conception for how it all works, or could work, surely is different
from those of the ancients. On that we agree.

But what I find fascinating is that science has led us to revise, rather
than discard, old notions about the soul.

"There is actually an astonishing similarity between the
mind-as-computer-program idea and the medieval Christian idea of the
“soul.” Both are fundamentally “immaterial”"
-- Frank Tipler in "The Physics of Immortality" (1994)


Some more detail on what he means:

“You should  think of the human mind, the human soul, the human
consciousness–as the result of a computer program being run on a wet
computer which is called the human brain. That we can actually quantify
thoughts using the same language that we use for information theory. So
there is nothing in the human consciousness that is outside the laws of
physics and not fully capable of being described in complete detail by the
laws of physics. [...]
It’s not quite like a chair, it’s more like a word processing program. Now,
it’s real. It’s immaterial, but it’s still real. But what is that program?
It’s just a pattern on a CD. A blank CD, a CD–it’s still the same atoms.
What has changed, what has made a word processing program valuable, why you
have to pay for it, is the change in the pattern of the atoms on the CD.
But notice the pattern is immaterial. The pattern is rearranging the atoms
rather than the atoms itself. The atoms are the matter, the pattern is
truly immaterial. The soul is the same thing."
-- Frank Tipler in "Closer to Truth episode 1513
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ske-PYBCq54>" (2020)


Jason


> >       > Thank you, I agree. Note that it is not the Bhagavad Gita, which
> is a much
> >       > older and better known text. But when I read your sentiment, I
> immediately
> >       > thought of this passage, as it fairly exactly captures
> your suggestion: to
> >       > pick out only the best from all the different texts (the
> cherries, or the
> >       > nectar) while leaving the rest.
> >
> >       Yes, exactly! I first thought it said Bhagavad Gita, when reading
> quickly, but
> >       then I saw that it in fact was not. Thank you very much for this
> recommendation!
> >       =)
> >
> > You're welcome!
> >
> > Jason
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
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>
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