[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

>       > Functionalism you can think of behaviorism applied to the brain itself (asking
>       > not just what externally visible behaviors appear, but considering what kind
>       > of internal metal activity is going on).
>
>       Hmm, after spending a few minutes reading up on it, I'd say that I probably am
>       leaning towards some kind of type physicalism.
> 
> That's reasonable.
> 
> But you should know that type-physicalism would deny that robots (having brains that function and behave exactly like human brains,
> but are made of different materials (e.g., silicon-based neurons rather than carbon-based neurons)) are conscious. Type-physicalism
> says only with the right material composition, is consciousness preserved. It is then especially fortunate that evolution stumbled on
> the right neurochemistry to permit us to be non-zombies. But of course, it might be only a small subset of the population that
> actually has the right gene to have the exactly required chemistry for consciousness. For all you know (according to
> type-physicalism) you could be the sole possessor of the mutation required for this consciousness gene, and everyone you've ever
> interacted with in the world is a non-conscious philosophical zombie.
> 
> If any of this sounds unreasonable to you, note that it stems from the idea that what something is made of, is more importance than
> how something operates, in determining whether or not some entity is conscious.







>       > material thing. Think of it like the Amazon river. That river is not a
>       > particular collection of water molecules, it refers to a continuous process of
>       > water flowing across South American. Similarly, a conscious mind is a
>       > particular pattern of activity, rather than any particular set of matter.
>
>       Ok. But note that we have no proof. As far as I know, we still do not know. We
>       have theories and hunches.
> 
> I am not arguing for what is true, I am only explaining how your statement
> that "[consciousness] is a process of moving physical things" is fundamentally
> the same as what I mean when I called it an immaterial pattern. The essence of
> what it is, is found in the movement, the processes, the relations, the
> patterns. (This is the assumption of functionalism, which I don't aim to
> prove, I am only showing how functionalism, if accepted, leads to these
> conclusions).  

Got it. Maybe the best way is to settle for that consciousness is electrons
moving around in a brain? (at the moment) When you say immaterial, I understood
it to mean that it is not something physical. But I now understand that is not
what you meant. Thank you for the clarification. I think when I say a process of
moving physical things, as crude as it might sound, maybe I mean the same thing
as you? ;)

>       > Note: this is not to say that minds don't require some kind of
>       > physical/material instantiation. Only that it is a mistake to confuse the two.
>
>       Well, if it is a process, one depends on the other. At least today. In the
>       future, who knows?
> 
> But note that dependency does not imply identity. A car depends on fuel, but is not fuel.
> Likewise, a computer program can depend on a computer to run, but it is not the computer.

Well, I think this question is one where we will be able to make some scientific
progress, as long as we're not talking qualia or subjective states, which would
be outside my scope of empirical evidence. So let's see where we end up on that.

>       > For similar examples, consider that Microsoft Word, Beethoven's fifth
>       > symphony, and Moby Dick all refer to immaterial patterns, which can have
>       > material instantiations on hard drives, records, and pages of paper, but one
>       > should not confuse the drives, records, or pages with the program, the
>       > symphony or the story.
>
>       But these are not minds.
> 
> No, but you had said that "we have no empirical evidence for any immaterial
> pattern." These examples were meant to highlight that we do in fact have
> evidence of immaterial patterns. Beethoven's 5th symphony and Moby Dick are
> examples.  

This is based on my misunderstanding of your use of immaterial. Beethovens 5:th
consists on symbols on a piece of paper. It is also a process... the music is
created when played. Without consciousness there is of course neither Beethovens
5:th nor Moby dick, apart from characters printed on sheets of paper.

We have plenty of evidence for material patterns, electrons performing useful
work in our brains and in computers. If this is immaterial patterns, then of
course!

>       Today, all examples of a mind that we have, are as electrons running
>       around in our brains. Separating out the electrons from the brain, and letting
>       them run in a computer might or might not be possible. But in theory it is
>       something, an experiment, which could eventually be performed in our world. Then
>       we will know more.
> 
> We still wouldn't know.
> 
> The agnostic would say: "we only have empirical verification that the uploaded
> brain still talks like it is a functioning human, but we still have no
> evidence it is conscious." This is the vexing "Problem of Other Minds". The

I would be content with that position. Since consciousness is inherently
subjective, the only thing we can judge are actions of presumably conscious
entities. I judge those actions, I look inside the brain, see processes and
computations. That's good enough for me. If it quacks like a duck... ;)

> only possible solution to this problem is by way of rational thought (e.g.,
> using philosophical thought experiments). The agnostic who insists on
> empirical verification can never have satisfaction on the problem of other
> minds.  

All good with me! =) I don't know, and I can never know, but I still get
pleasure out of interacting with you, other humans and animals, be they
conscious or not (in the subjective sense).

>       Absent that, we just have theories, and what we are currently observing, and
>       probably no good way to conclude the matter as long as we cannot experiment and
>       see.
> 
> The only experimental verification you could hope to have would be to upload
> yourself, and see for yourself whether or not you remain conscious. But note
> that you could never convince anyone else. None of your reports would
> constitute empirical evidence of your continued consciousness for anyone other
> than yourself.

This is the truth! Also note (but we have the other thread) that consciousness
is one question, and identity another!

> Likewise with personal identity. Would you be the same person, or a clone? Is
> there a meaningful difference? Again, only philosophy can help you here (this
> question belongs on the open individualism thread).  

Different question, and a very interesting one! Yes, let's keep that to the
other thread. =)

>       > This is what I mean when I say consciousness is an immaterial pattern (it's
>       > like a story, or a program). It can supervene on particular material
>       > configurations (like brains, or computers), but it is not tied to nor defined
>       > by a particular material configuration. Moby Dick is not the particular book
>       > it is printed on.
>
>       I think perhaps an argument could be made that it actually is tied to the
>       underlying material configuration, since it is a process, running on a type of
>       hardware. The hardware determines how the software runs, and to a certain
>       extent, what it can and cannot do.
> 
> I can open a word document on one computer, save it, transfer it to another
> computer, load it, and continue working just where I left off. I can do this
> even if I start on a PC, and go to a Mac, running a PC inside a VM. The
> program continues to behave exactly as it did, despite the changes to the
> fundamental hardware. 

True. But note that we do not know what consciousness is, so thought experiments
about VM:s and software might not carry over. I'm not saying it doesn't but I'm
saying that we are fumbling around in the dark here, so maybe thought
experiments are leading us astray, depending on the thought experiment?

> Short of postulating incomputable physical laws (which we have no evidence
> for), an appropriately detailed computer emulation of all the molecules in a
> human brain would behave identically to a brain running on "native molecules".
> The Church-Turing Thesis, so fundamental in computer science, tells us that
> the hardware makes no difference in what kinds of programs can be run, the
> possible behaviors of all Turing machines is equivalent.

True. This could be tested. Before then, we can only speculate. That is why I
think we'll see progress within this area within our lifetimes.

> So while you take the lack of real-world examples as evidence against the
> possibility of uploaded brains, I take the lack of real-world examples of
> uncomputable physical laws as evidence for the possibility of uploaded brains.

Well, I'm not saying that it is 100% impossible to upload brains, or if I did, I
revise me opinion. ;) I do say that once brain are uploaded, if that will be at
all possible, we'll get more data.

>       > Would you reconsider this in light of my explanation of what I mean by immaterial pattern?
>
>       Well, this is trivial, if you define consciousness as an immaterial pattern,
>       independent of any underlying hardware,
> 
> Note: independent of any *particular* underlying hardware. It still needs
> hardware, of some kind.

True.

>       then by that definition I agree with 2,
>       assuming all science fiction of recreating it in some other medium.
>
>       But note that none of this is possible,
> 
> I think it would be better to say "we don't know if this is possible."

Fair enough!

>       and we do not know if this is what
>       consciousness is. It could very well be that the underlying hardware matters, it
>       could be that we discover that uploading is impossible. So at the moment, we
>       must remain agnostic here.
> 
> Of course those alternatives are possible. My point all along is that
> "starting from functionalism" then "all this" follows.

Yes, you make a good point that it follows from functionalism. I have a creeping
suspicion that we are somewhat in agreement, overall, assuming an equal starting
point (not sure about that) and that we have different degrees of belief about
the probability of this happening.

But if I adopt your starting point, I think you make a good argument here. No
questions about that!

> If you wish to shift the conversation to whether or not functionalism is true,
> we can do that, but note that is a separate conversation from my original
> point, which was that the dominant theory by cognitive scientists and
> philosophers of mind justifies belief in something uncannily similar to
> ancient conceptions of what souls were and could do.

Well, I think it would be ancient conceptions of what souls were, as interpreted
by modern man. If I remember correctly, the ancient conceptions do need a bit of
tweaking here and there I think, to fit them with functionalism.

>       One positive thing though, is that this could possibly be perfomred in some
>       science fiction future, and then we would know! So compared with simulations,
>       I'd say that this one is "easier" to confirm than a simulation.
> 
> Do you agree with me that you could only know uploading worked if you tried it
> yourself? Or do you see some way that a third-person could confirm that the
> person's consciousness was preserved in the new medium?  

No, I think we can never know for sure. I do think we can know that if a person
uploads, the software will behave as a conscious being. This conclusion I think
we can draw, if a person does it, if it will ever become possible. But if the
person will be "conscious" as _I_ (the subjective I) am conscious, I think is
forever beyond us.

>       > This follows from the basic materialist/physicalist assumption. That same physical causes have the same physical
>       effects. And will
>       > behave physically indistinguishably.
>
>       That does not counter my argument. Show me proof of resurrection and we shall
>       talk.
> 
> I could as easily say: Show me your proof that the brain does not follow
> physical law, and we can talk.
> 
> I was under the impression you were a materialist. The materialist assumption
> is that the brain follows physical law. This is the only assumption you need
> to make for point #2 to stand. It stands even if you subscribe to
> type-physicalism, rather than functionalism.

It is an assumption. It has not been verified. So based on my current
experience, I have never witnessed any resurrections in the strong sense (not
talking about freezing/thawing or near death experiences here). So assuming an
all powerful AI who reassembled every atom and electron of a dead body in some
live state, yes, why not? But the advantage is that this would be something
happening in the real world, so when it happens I will revise my position.

Until it happens, I consider death to be death, since I have not yet seen any
evidence to the contrary.

>       If you cannot show me proof of resurrection, resurrection is not possible,
> 
> I think you are making a logical error here. Not showing proof of something,
> does not imply something is impossible.

No, I think the error is avoided by the fact that if you show me resurrection
under scientific controlled circumstances, I will revise my position from
impossible, to possible.

Until that experiment, the position impossible seems to be confirmed by plenty
of observations (apart from the niche cases above).

Since I have no choice but to act in the world, I can safely say that it is the
only thing that exists. Within it, I can use the scientific method. Outside it,
we can never have any empirical proof, so I refrain to speculate about that
apart from poetry and for the fun of it.

>       since I have not empirically seen any proof of it, apart from near death
>       encounters, which can be explained very well by medical science. There are I
>       assume the odd unexplainable case, but that is fine, we just cannot explain it.
>
>       But if we take a hard case such as someone brain dead, this is, to the best of
>       our current knowledge impossible, and they are dead and do not come back.
> 
> As technology improves, the definition of death gets pushed back further and
> further. It is already quite blurred (for example:
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/scientists-bring-cells-in-dead-pigs-back-to-life-180980557/
> ). In the end, death is only irrecoverable data loss, and our recovery methods
> keep improving. Some have defined "information-theoretic death" as the state
> beyond which no possible technology can recover from.

This is the truth. I'll revise my opinion as said above, upon proof of
resurrection.

>       >       I'll stop here, since
>       >       everything flows from nr 1.
>       >
>       > I hope you will continue your evaluation in light of my added context.
>
>       Well, if I follow your definitions, I do not see why I woulnd't end up at your
>       destination? =)
> 
> Functionalism isn't my idea. But it does have conclusions that would surprise
> most people.
> 
> Consider, for example, that Daniel Dennett was an ardent materialist. He was
> even considered one of the "Four Horsemen" of the new atheist movement (along
> with Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens). You might then
> think, he should be the last person in the world to embrace anything like talk
> of souls, immortality, or the mind as an abstract pattern. But these are
> passages from his books on the subject:
> 
>
>       “... we explore the implications of the emerging view of the mind as
>       software or program–as an abstract sort of thing whose identity is
>       independent of any particular physical embodiment. This opens up
>       delightful prospects, such a various technologies for the transmigration
>       of souls, and Fountains of Youth but it also opens a Pandora’s box of
>       traditional metaphysical problems in untraditional costumes, which are
>       confronted in Part V.”

True. But we've dicussed implications vs empirical proof, and my position about
metaphysics. So regardless, I'm in the very comfortable position to just wait
and see, and revise once evidence turns up.

>       I do have some arguments or concerns which make me not share your definitions
>       though.
> 
> Okay, if your only contention is with my premises/definitions, and not with my
> reasoning or conclusions, let us settle the definitions and premises first.
> Let that be our focus for now.  

See above. I think we are making progress here.

>
>       >       > I didn't say it is proof, I said all this follows from the theory of
>       >       > functionalism, which is the dominant theory of consciousness by philosophers
>       >
>       >       This is the truth. I do not agree with point 1, so although it might follow from
>       >       the theory, I do not subscribe to the theory.
>       >
>       > By everything else you've said, you do. I think you just got caught up in an
>       > alternate interpretation of immaterial. Note I do not mean anything
>       > supernatural, just the distinction between a story and a book, between a
>       > program and a CD-ROM.
>
>       Do you still think I do? I tried to look a little bit deeper into the various
>       positions within the philosophy of mind.
> 
> Now that you have suggested a preference for type-physicalism, I am less sure,
> but I will see if you stick to that preference in the face of the implications
> type-physicalism carries that I have pointed out. For example, its
> implications for zombies, consciousness genes, and the complete unimportance
> of behavioral capacity in relation to consciousness, etc.  

In terms of zombies, I found the following interesting:

"Many physicalist philosophers[who?] have argued that this scenario eliminates
itself by its description; the basis of a physicalist argument is that the world
is defined entirely by physicality; thus, a world that was physically identical
would necessarily contain consciousness, as consciousness would necessarily be
generated from any set of physical circumstances identical to our own."

"Another response is the denial of the idea that qualia and related phenomenal
notions of the mind are in the first place coherent concepts. Daniel Dennett and
others argue that while consciousness and subjective experience exist in some
sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims. The experience of
pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental
life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences. Dennett
believes that consciousness is a complex series of functions and ideas. If we
all can have these experiences the idea of the p-zombie is meaningless. "

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Upon reading a bit I also found an idea called token physicalism. As I said
before, haven't delved deeply into this, so apologies for not setting the entire
table, and shifting around the cutlery as we speak. ;)

>       > You still need a computer to run software, but it makes no difference if that
>       > computer uses relays, vacuum tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, ping
>       > pong balls, or hydraulic pipes and valves.
>       >
>       > That is what functionalism says about the mind, you need something to
>       > instantiate the particular patterns, but what you use to do so, is of no
>       > consequence, so long as the same patterns and relations are preserved.
>
>       See my attempted explanation of my fairly uninformed and unresearched position
>       above.
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> I write about these two flavors of physicalism (type-physicalism) which I call
> "Strict Physicalism", and a more general "Flexible Physicalism" here:
> 
> (See page 119 of :
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y75Fx_Vd4FeNXj6AOE0sS4CdssLpULQx/view?usp=sharing 
> starting with the section "Is Physicalism True?")
> 
> This, should you be interested, should provide some more background for the
> strengths and weaknesses between type-physicalism and its alternatives.

Ahh... this was the token physicalism from above. Well, I'm afraid I have to be
a fence straddler here, while reading a bit. I think in theory this could be
investigated further once we gain a better knowledge of how our brain works.

>       > I think previously you said if they act like they are conscious, you would
>       > consider them to be conscious. If this is what you meant, then that is
>       > basically functionalism. If you mean you will only pragmatically treat them as
>       > conscious, while doubting their consciousness, that is consistent with
>       > agnosticism.
>
>       It would be the second statement, although I would not necessarily have to
>       _doubt_ their consciousness. I could just not have an opinion on it. So maybe
>       here is a part of where we diverge?
> 
> I was only trying to understand your position better.
> 
> I have, by means of philosophy, accepted arguments that permit one to overcome
> the "Problem of Other Minds", and therefore justify one's belief in the
> consciousness of others by means of demonstration of certain classes of
> behavior.
> 
> For example, see my section on "Conscious Behaviors" starting on page 59 of
> that same document I link above.

In my case... other minds is an experience I have regardless of if I want it or
not (disregarding here of course, suicide). So I can just react to the actions I
see, and act and watch the reactions. I do not think more is actually needed.

>       > There are many examples in history of people who have freezen to death, had
>       > their hearts stop for 45+ minutes while remaining under water, and are later
>       > have brought back to life.
>
>       They were frozen, and in that case, they were probably not dead, but
>       "preserved".
> 
> This gets into defining death. (an interesting topic in itself).

True.

> If we hard star-trek level medical technology, I think you would agree that
> what counts as death might be pushed back further than what it is today, just
> as how medical science today (with our breathing apparatuses and
> defibrillators) has a different definition of death compared to doctors in the
> 17th century. Many on this list, (with subscriptions to Alcor), likely hold to
> a different definition of death than current medical science.

Perfectly agree.

> All this is to say that what constitutes mortal injury changes as technology
> advances. With the ultimate healing technology, say nano-bots that capable of
> restoring any cell to the state it was in at your last check up, then there
> would be no injury you could not recover from (at least recovered to the point
> of your last check-up). Do you agree with this reasoning in principle (even
> though we have no real world demonstrated examples yet)?  

In principle, yes. Leaving aside probability and feasibility.

>       > Then there are examples of uploaded worm brains springing to life when
>       > uploaded into robot bodies. They would immediately begin to act like worms,
>       > without any human programming or training. If the original worm was conscious
>       > to any degree, I would maintain that the uploaded worm mind is as well.
>
>       These are all valid questions for science. I'm all for it! I was making the
>       interpretation above using more sinister conditions of death, than just being
>       frozen, such as being brain dead, or the body being disintegrated.
> 
> Well the uploaded worm certainly died (biologically). And was uploaded and
> resurrected: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_i1NKPzbjM

I wouldn't call it resurrected myself, but that is a matter of definition and
identity.

> Google recently finished scanning a fruit fly brain. It won't be long before
> we have uploaded flies.
> 
> Then we should see mouse brains, cat brains, chimp brains, and human brains. I
> see, and am aware of, no reason why this should just fail for any particular
> species.  

Depends on if we hit any barriers we do not know about when it comes to minds,
how they are built, the speed of hardware, the nature of computing etc.

But that's just speculation. We can actually experiment and work towards it, so
that's all we need! =)

>       > So how is my definition of a soul (that emerges out of functionalism)
>       > not like the ancient ideas I reference?
>
>       Hmm, let me dig up that and see. Probably not in the way the ancients
>       thought about the ideas, but I do think that it would not be impossible
>       for you to define it in such a way. See my example of the big bang and
>       how it can be defined as a god and just an event we have strong reasons
>       to believe happened.
> 
> Our conception for how it all works, or could work, surely is different from
> those of the ancients. On that we agree.
> 
> But what I find fascinating is that science has led us to revise, rather than
> discard, old notions about the soul.
>
>       "There is actually an astonishing similarity between the
>       mind-as-computer-program idea and the medieval Christian idea of the
>       “soul.” Both are fundamentally “immaterial”" -- Frank Tipler in "The
>       Physics of Immortality" (1994)

Oh yes... there are striking parallels between transhumanism were technology is
extrapolated to infinity, and traditional religions.

Best regards, 
Daniel


> Some more detail on what he means:
>
>       “You should  think of the human mind, the human soul, the human consciousness–as the result of a computer program being
>       run on a wet computer which is called the human brain. That we can actually quantify thoughts using the same language
>       that we use for information theory. So there is nothing in the human consciousness that is outside the laws of physics
>       and not fully capable of being described in complete detail by the laws of physics. [...]
> It’s not quite like a chair, it’s more like a word processing program. Now, it’s real. It’s immaterial, but it’s still real.
> But what is that program? It’s just a pattern on a CD. A blank CD, a CD–it’s still the same atoms. What has changed, what has
> made a word processing program valuable, why you have to pay for it, is the change in the pattern of the atoms on the CD. But
> notice the pattern is immaterial. The pattern is rearranging the atoms rather than the atoms itself. The atoms are the matter,
> the pattern is truly immaterial. The soul is the same thing."
> -- Frank Tipler in "Closer to Truth episode 1513" (2020)
> 
> 
> Jason
> 
>
>       >       > Thank you, I agree. Note that it is not the Bhagavad Gita, which is a much
>       >       > older and better known text. But when I read your sentiment, I immediately
>       >       > thought of this passage, as it fairly exactly captures your suggestion: to
>       >       > pick out only the best from all the different texts (the cherries, or the
>       >       > nectar) while leaving the rest.
>       >
>       >       Yes, exactly! I first thought it said Bhagavad Gita, when reading quickly, but
>       >       then I saw that it in fact was not. Thank you very much for this recommendation!
>       >       =)
>       >
>       > You're welcome!
>       >
>       > Jason 
>
>       Best regards,
>       Daniel
>       _______________________________________________
>       extropy-chat mailing list
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> 
> 
>