[ExI] A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Mar 5, 2025 at 11:18 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> >       > Functionalism you can think of behaviorism applied to the brain
> itself (asking
> >       > not just what externally visible behaviors appear, but
> considering what kind
> >       > of internal metal activity is going on).
> >
> >       Hmm, after spending a few minutes reading up on it, I'd say that I
> probably am
> >       leaning towards some kind of type physicalism.
> >
> > That's reasonable.
> >
> > But you should know that type-physicalism would deny that robots (having
> brains that function and behave exactly like human brains,
> > but are made of different materials (e.g., silicon-based neurons rather
> than carbon-based neurons)) are conscious. Type-physicalism
> > says only with the right material composition, is consciousness
> preserved. It is then especially fortunate that evolution stumbled on
> > the right neurochemistry to permit us to be non-zombies. But of course,
> it might be only a small subset of the population that
> > actually has the right gene to have the exactly required chemistry for
> consciousness. For all you know (according to
> > type-physicalism) you could be the sole possessor of the mutation
> required for this consciousness gene, and everyone you've ever
> > interacted with in the world is a non-conscious philosophical zombie.
> >
> > If any of this sounds unreasonable to you, note that it stems from the
> idea that what something is made of, is more importance than
> > how something operates, in determining whether or not some entity is
> conscious.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >       > material thing. Think of it like the Amazon river. That river is
> not a
> >       > particular collection of water molecules, it refers to a
> continuous process of
> >       > water flowing across South American. Similarly, a conscious mind
> is a
> >       > particular pattern of activity, rather than any particular set
> of matter.
> >
> >       Ok. But note that we have no proof. As far as I know, we still do
> not know. We
> >       have theories and hunches.
> >
> > I am not arguing for what is true, I am only explaining how your
> statement
> > that "[consciousness] is a process of moving physical things" is
> fundamentally
> > the same as what I mean when I called it an immaterial pattern. The
> essence of
> > what it is, is found in the movement, the processes, the relations, the
> > patterns. (This is the assumption of functionalism, which I don't aim to
> > prove, I am only showing how functionalism, if accepted, leads to these
> > conclusions).
>
> Got it. Maybe the best way is to settle for that consciousness is electrons
> moving around in a brain? (at the moment) When you say immaterial, I
> understood
> it to mean that it is not something physical. But I now understand that is
> not
> what you meant. Thank you for the clarification. I think when I say a
> process of
> moving physical things, as crude as it might sound, maybe I mean the same
> thing
> as you? ;)
>

Insofar as we both mean consciousness is a process, then I think we are in
agreement.

"Consciousness, as [William] James pointed out, is a process not a thing."
— Gerald Edelman in “Consciousness: A Process Not a Thing” (2005)

I would, however, go further than you, in saying that it need not be
composed of electrons or atoms or anything of our physical universe.

So if there were another universe, having a different class of particles,
but which nevertheless enabled the same sorts of computational processes,
then consciousness could exist in such universes.

And to go still further, even if the computational relations were
instantiated by pure mathematical objects, I think those too could
instantiate a conscious mind.


>
> >       > Note: this is not to say that minds don't require some kind of
> >       > physical/material instantiation. Only that it is a mistake to
> confuse the two.
> >
> >       Well, if it is a process, one depends on the other. At least
> today. In the
> >       future, who knows?
> >
> > But note that dependency does not imply identity. A car depends on fuel,
> but is not fuel.
> > Likewise, a computer program can depend on a computer to run, but it is
> not the computer.
>
> Well, I think this question is one where we will be able to make some
> scientific
> progress, as long as we're not talking qualia or subjective states, which
> would
> be outside my scope of empirical evidence. So let's see where we end up on
> that.
>
>
> > No, but you had said that "we have no empirical evidence for any
> immaterial
> > pattern." These examples were meant to highlight that we do in fact have
> > evidence of immaterial patterns. Beethoven's 5th symphony and Moby Dick
> are
> > examples.
>
> This is based on my misunderstanding of your use of immaterial. Beethovens
> 5:th
> consists on symbols on a piece of paper.


Some scribblings on paper are only one possible physical instantiation of
Beethoven's 5th. But it is not the same as Beethoven's 5th, which is
informational, in its core essence.

Consider: identity relationships are transitive, if A = B, and A = C, then
B = C.

But that doesn't work here, we can't say the scribblings on paper are
identical with Beethoven's 5th.

The reasoning is as follows. Let's say:

A = Beethoven's 5th
B = Scribblings of the notes of Beethoven's 5th on paper
C = An orchestral rendition Beethoven's 5th

If there were a true identity, if the scribblings on paper are identical
to Beethoven's 5th, then A = B.
Likewise, if there is an identity between the orchestral rendition
and Beethoven's 5th, then A = C.

But then, by the transitive nature of identity, then B ought to be
identical with C, yet the scribblings on paper are not identical with the
orchestral rendition. B ≠ C.

Somewhere along the way an error was made. Can you spot it?



> It is also a process... the music is
> created when played. Without consciousness there is of course neither
> Beethovens
> 5:th nor Moby dick, apart from characters printed on sheets of paper.
>
> We have plenty of evidence for material patterns, electrons performing
> useful
> work in our brains and in computers. If this is immaterial patterns, then
> of
> course!
>

:-)


>
>
> > The agnostic would say: "we only have empirical verification that the
> uploaded
> > brain still talks like it is a functioning human, but we still have no
> > evidence it is conscious." This is the vexing "Problem of Other Minds".
> The
>
> I would be content with that position. Since consciousness is inherently
> subjective, the only thing we can judge are actions of presumably conscious
> entities. I judge those actions, I look inside the brain, see processes and
> computations. That's good enough for me. If it quacks like a duck... ;)
>

Okay!


>
> > only possible solution to this problem is by way of rational thought
> (e.g.,
> > using philosophical thought experiments). The agnostic who insists on
> > empirical verification can never have satisfaction on the problem of
> other
> > minds.
>
> All good with me! =) I don't know, and I can never know, but I still get
> pleasure out of interacting with you, other humans and animals, be they
> conscious or not (in the subjective sense).
>

Would you feel any more content with some further confidence (provided by
philosophical thought experiments) to know there are reasons we can be
quite sure these other beings are conscious?


>
> >       Absent that, we just have theories, and what we are currently
> observing, and
> >       probably no good way to conclude the matter as long as we cannot
> experiment and
> >       see.
> >
> > The only experimental verification you could hope to have would be to
> upload
> > yourself, and see for yourself whether or not you remain conscious. But
> note
> > that you could never convince anyone else. None of your reports would
> > constitute empirical evidence of your continued consciousness for anyone
> other
> > than yourself.
>
> This is the truth! Also note (but we have the other thread) that
> consciousness
> is one question, and identity another!
>

Very true!


>
> > Likewise with personal identity. Would you be the same person, or a
> clone? Is
> > there a meaningful difference? Again, only philosophy can help you here
> (this
> > question belongs on the open individualism thread).
>
> Different question, and a very interesting one! Yes, let's keep that to the
> other thread. =)
>
>
> >
> > I can open a word document on one computer, save it, transfer it to
> another
> > computer, load it, and continue working just where I left off. I can do
> this
> > even if I start on a PC, and go to a Mac, running a PC inside a VM. The
> > program continues to behave exactly as it did, despite the changes to the
> > fundamental hardware.
>
> True. But note that we do not know what consciousness is, so thought
> experiments
> about VM:s and software might not carry over. I'm not saying it doesn't
> but I'm
> saying that we are fumbling around in the dark here, so maybe thought
> experiments are leading us astray, depending on the thought experiment?
>

I think the thought experiments are quite solid, and rest on very modest
assumptions (the same all physicalists/materialists make about the brain
and physical law).


>
> > Short of postulating incomputable physical laws (which we have no
> evidence
> > for), an appropriately detailed computer emulation of all the molecules
> in a
> > human brain would behave identically to a brain running on "native
> molecules".
> > The Church-Turing Thesis, so fundamental in computer science, tells us
> that
> > the hardware makes no difference in what kinds of programs can be run,
> the
> > possible behaviors of all Turing machines is equivalent.
>
> True. This could be tested. Before then, we can only speculate.


By speculating here, note that you mean the same thing scientists do when
they plan how to launch a rocket into orbit. But are rocket scientists
"only speculating" when they launch a new rocket, or are they merely
applying the well-understood principles of the laws of gravity, the laws of
motion, and their universal applicability?

If you would use the word speculation to cover the behavior of the rocket
scientists in designing a rocket, then you are consistent. As I am
suggesting, no more than what the same laws of physics tell us ought to
happen and am assuming only that the laws apply everywhere to all physical
things in this universe. If that requires speculation, then everything
everyone ever does is speculation.


> That is why I
> think we'll see progress within this area within our lifetimes.
>
> > So while you take the lack of real-world examples as evidence against the
> > possibility of uploaded brains, I take the lack of real-world examples of
> > uncomputable physical laws as evidence for the possibility of uploaded
> brains.
>
> Well, I'm not saying that it is 100% impossible to upload brains, or if I
> did, I
> revise me opinion. ;) I do say that once brain are uploaded, if that will
> be at
> all possible, we'll get more data.
>
> >       > Would you reconsider this in light of my explanation of what I
> mean by immaterial pattern?
> >
> >       Well, this is trivial, if you define consciousness as an
> immaterial pattern,
> >       independent of any underlying hardware,
> >
> > Note: independent of any *particular* underlying hardware. It still needs
> > hardware, of some kind.
>
> True.
>
> >       then by that definition I agree with 2,
> >       assuming all science fiction of recreating it in some other medium.
> >
> >       But note that none of this is possible,
> >
> > I think it would be better to say "we don't know if this is possible."
>
> Fair enough!
>
> >       and we do not know if this is what
> >       consciousness is. It could very well be that the underlying
> hardware matters, it
> >       could be that we discover that uploading is impossible. So at the
> moment, we
> >       must remain agnostic here.
> >
> > Of course those alternatives are possible. My point all along is that
> > "starting from functionalism" then "all this" follows.
>
> Yes, you make a good point that it follows from functionalism. I have a
> creeping
> suspicion that we are somewhat in agreement, overall, assuming an equal
> starting
> point (not sure about that) and that we have different degrees of belief
> about
> the probability of this happening.
>

I think there is a way of thinking that you seem less comfortable than I am
with using. Examples are:

A mathematician starting from some axioms, and working out a proof that
follows logically from them.
A philosopher starting from a premise and working out the consequences that
follow logically from that premise.
A physicist defining the state of a physical system and predicting what the
laws of physics predict the future evolution of that system to be.

I think this may be another core difference between us, which seems to
relate to our different base ideas around the validity or reliability of
deductive reasoning.


> But if I adopt your starting point, I think you make a good argument here.
> No
> questions about that!
>

I am happy to hear that!


>
> > If you wish to shift the conversation to whether or not functionalism is
> true,
> > we can do that, but note that is a separate conversation from my original
> > point, which was that the dominant theory by cognitive scientists and
> > philosophers of mind justifies belief in something uncannily similar to
> > ancient conceptions of what souls were and could do.
>
> Well, I think it would be ancient conceptions of what souls were, as
> interpreted
> by modern man. If I remember correctly, the ancient conceptions do need a
> bit of
> tweaking here and there I think, to fit them with functionalism.
>

I agree they are not identical. I don't know that any two ideas held by any
two persons are ever truly the same, and this is all the more so for
objects that can't be seen or held.


>
> > Do you agree with me that you could only know uploading worked if you
> tried it
> > yourself? Or do you see some way that a third-person could confirm that
> the
> > person's consciousness was preserved in the new medium?
>
> No, I think we can never know for sure. I do think we can know that if a
> person
> uploads, the software will behave as a conscious being. This conclusion I
> think
> we can draw, if a person does it, if it will ever become possible. But if
> the
> person will be "conscious" as _I_ (the subjective I) am conscious, I think
> is
> forever beyond us.
>

I think we agree here. But I would add there are powerful,
non-empirical justifications.


>
> > I was under the impression you were a materialist. The materialist
> assumption
> > is that the brain follows physical law. This is the only assumption you
> need
> > to make for point #2 to stand. It stands even if you subscribe to
> > type-physicalism, rather than functionalism.
>
> It is an assumption. It has not been verified.


Could we?


> So based on my current
> experience, I have never witnessed any resurrections in the strong sense
> (not
> talking about freezing/thawing or near death experiences here). So
> assuming an
> all powerful AI who reassembled every atom and electron of a dead body in
> some
> live state, yes, why not? But the advantage is that this would be something
> happening in the real world, so when it happens I will revise my position.
>
> Until it happens, I consider death to be death, since I have not yet seen
> any
> evidence to the contrary.
>

But note that this conclusion contravenes your materialist assumption.


>
> >       If you cannot show me proof of resurrection, resurrection is not
> possible,
> >
> > I think you are making a logical error here. Not showing proof of
> something,
> > does not imply something is impossible.
>
> No, I think the error is avoided by the fact that if you show me
> resurrection
> under scientific controlled circumstances, I will revise my position from
> impossible, to possible.
>
> Until that experiment, the position impossible seems to be confirmed by
> plenty
> of observations (apart from the niche cases above).
>

I think I may see the problem here.

I believe you are using the word "possible" to mean "currently technically
feasible."
Whereas I use "possible" to mean "possible in principle" (i.e. nomological
possibile).

But please correct me if my interpretation is wrong.


> > In the end, death is only irrecoverable data loss, and our recovery
> methods
> > keep improving. Some have defined "information-theoretic death" as the
> state
> > beyond which no possible technology can recover from.
>
> This is the truth. I'll revise my opinion as said above, upon proof of
> resurrection.
>
> > Consider, for example, that Daniel Dennett was an ardent materialist. He
> was
> > even considered one of the "Four Horsemen" of the new atheist movement
> (along
> > with Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens). You might
> then
> > think, he should be the last person in the world to embrace anything
> like talk
> > of souls, immortality, or the mind as an abstract pattern. But these are
> > passages from his books on the subject:
> >
> [snip]
>


> True. But we've dicussed implications vs empirical proof, and my position
> about
> metaphysics. So regardless, I'm in the very comfortable position to just
> wait
> and see, and revise once evidence turns up.
>
> >       I do have some arguments or concerns which make me not share your
> definitions
> >       though.
> >
> > Okay, if your only contention is with my premises/definitions, and not
> with my
> > reasoning or conclusions, let us settle the definitions and premises
> first.
> > Let that be our focus for now.
>
> See above. I think we are making progress here.
>

Yes, I think you accept the reasoning that follows from the premise.

Since my intention was not to prove the premise (functionalism) only to
show that functionalism justifies a conception of consciousness that's not
wholly unlike ancient conceptions of the soul, then perhaps there is no
need to pursue this thread any further, unless others on the list want to
debate the reasoning, or the premise of functionalism itself.


> >
> >       Do you still think I do? I tried to look a little bit deeper into
> the various
> >       positions within the philosophy of mind.
> >
> > Now that you have suggested a preference for type-physicalism, I am less
> sure,
> > but I will see if you stick to that preference in the face of the
> implications
> > type-physicalism carries that I have pointed out. For example, its
> > implications for zombies, consciousness genes, and the complete
> unimportance
> > of behavioral capacity in relation to consciousness, etc.
>
> In terms of zombies, I found the following interesting:
>
> "Many physicalist philosophers[who?] have argued that this scenario
> eliminates
> itself by its description; the basis of a physicalist argument is that the
> world
> is defined entirely by physicality; thus, a world that was physically
> identical
> would necessarily contain consciousness, as consciousness would
> necessarily be
> generated from any set of physical circumstances identical to our own."
>
> "Another response is the denial of the idea that qualia and related
> phenomenal
> notions of the mind are in the first place coherent concepts. Daniel
> Dennett and
> others argue that while consciousness and subjective experience exist in
> some
> sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims. The
> experience of
> pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's
> mental
> life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences.
> Dennett
> believes that consciousness is a complex series of functions and ideas. If
> we
> all can have these experiences the idea of the p-zombie is meaningless. "
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie


I think this quote, from Dennett, really drives home the problem of zombies:

"Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination
you can remove consciousness while leaving all
cognitive systems intact […] is like supposing that by
an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove
health while leaving all bodily functions and powers
intact. If you think you can imagine this, it’s only
because you are confusedly imagining some health-
module that might or might not be present in a
body. Health isn’t that sort of thing, and neither is
consciousness."
— Daniel Dennett in “The Unimagined Preposterousness of
<https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/rf55zm151?filename=6m312182x.pdf>
Zombies <https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/rf55zm151?filename=6m312182x.pdf>”
(1995)



>
> Upon reading a bit I also found an idea called token physicalism. As I said
> before, haven't delved deeply into this, so apologies for not setting the
> entire
> table, and shifting around the cutlery as we speak. ;)
>

Token-physicalism is known as non-reductive physicalism or emergent
materialism. In general, it is far more flexible in the kinds of physical
systems that could manifest consciousness. It says consciousness is
emergent, a high-level, rather than a low-level phenomenon. As such, it is
usually considered compatible with the notion of multiple realizability,
which is a core notion in functionalism. In short, token physicalism is not
incompatible with functionalist thinking.

"An emergent quality is roughly a quality which
belongs to a complex as a whole and not to its parts.
Some people hold that life and consciousness are
emergent qualities of material aggregates of a
certain kind and degree of complexity."
— C. D. Broad in “The Mind And Its Place In Nature” (1925)



>
>
> >       See my attempted explanation of my fairly uninformed and
> unresearched position
> >       above.
> >
> > Thank you.
> >
> > I write about these two flavors of physicalism (type-physicalism) which
> I call
> > "Strict Physicalism", and a more general "Flexible Physicalism" here:
> >
> > (See page 119 of :
> >
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y75Fx_Vd4FeNXj6AOE0sS4CdssLpULQx/view?usp=sharing
>
> > starting with the section "Is Physicalism True?")
> >
> > This, should you be interested, should provide some more background for
> the
> > strengths and weaknesses between type-physicalism and its alternatives.
>
> Ahh... this was the token physicalism from above. Well, I'm afraid I have
> to be
> a fence straddler here, while reading a bit. I think in theory this could
> be
> investigated further once we gain a better knowledge of how our brain
> works.
>

I think if you studied the field further, you would come to the conclusion
that we have all the information we need already.



>
> > For example, see my section on "Conscious Behaviors" starting on page 59
> of
> > that same document I link above.
>
> In my case... other minds is an experience I have regardless of if I want
> it or
> not (disregarding here of course, suicide). So I can just react to the
> actions I
> see, and act and watch the reactions. I do not think more is actually
> needed.
>

Can something that lacks consciousness do all of the following things:

   - Notice something
   - Clear one’s head
   - Lose one’s temper
   - Pay attention
   - Daydream
   - Have a favorite flavor of ice cream
   - Spit out a bad-tasting food
   - Be anesthetized
   - Hallucinate
   - Give in to torture
   - Get and laugh at a joke
   - Remember an earlier thought
   - Describe how one feels
   - Invent a theory of consciousness

Or do you think there are some behaviors for which a conscious mind is a
requirement?

If there are any, then detecting consciousness can be made into an
empirical science.


>
>
> > If we hard star-trek level medical technology, I think you would agree
> that
> > what counts as death might be pushed back further than what it is today,
> just
> > as how medical science today (with our breathing apparatuses and
> > defibrillators) has a different definition of death compared to doctors
> in the
> > 17th century. Many on this list, (with subscriptions to Alcor), likely
> hold to
> > a different definition of death than current medical science.
>
> Perfectly agree.
>

��


>
> > All this is to say that what constitutes mortal injury changes as
> technology
> > advances. With the ultimate healing technology, say nano-bots that
> capable of
> > restoring any cell to the state it was in at your last check up, then
> there
> > would be no injury you could not recover from (at least recovered to the
> point
> > of your last check-up). Do you agree with this reasoning in principle
> (even
> > though we have no real world demonstrated examples yet)?
>
> In principle, yes. Leaving aside probability and feasibility.
>

Nice.


>
> > Well the uploaded worm certainly died (biologically). And was uploaded
> and
> > resurrected: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_i1NKPzbjM
>
> I wouldn't call it resurrected myself, but that is a matter of definition
> and
> identity.
>

What would be needed for you to conclude it was resurrected?
(Or does that determination rest on what you consider to be unresolved
questions of identity?)


>
> > Then we should see mouse brains, cat brains, chimp brains, and human
> brains. I
> > see, and am aware of, no reason why this should just fail for any
> particular
> > species.
>
> Depends on if we hit any barriers we do not know about when it comes to
> minds,
> how they are built, the speed of hardware, the nature of computing etc.
>

It's possible, but we have seen no evidence of such barriers. So then,
ought we not dismiss those concerns (as you do for other things for which
we have no empirical evidence of)?


>
> But that's just speculation. We can actually experiment and work towards
> it, so
> that's all we need! =)
>
>
> [snip]


> > But what I find fascinating is that science has led us to revise, rather
> than
> > discard, old notions about the soul.
> >
> >       "There is actually an astonishing similarity between the
> >       mind-as-computer-program idea and the medieval Christian idea of
> the
> >       “soul.” Both are fundamentally “immaterial”" -- Frank Tipler in
> "The
> >       Physics of Immortality" (1994)
>
> Oh yes... there are striking parallels between transhumanism were
> technology is
> extrapolated to infinity, and traditional religions.
>

When you throw those in, there are many more parallels, but I think there
are many even with just plain functionalism (ignoring future technology).

Jason


>
>
> > Some more detail on what he means:
> >
> >       “You should  think of the human mind, the human soul, the human
> consciousness–as the result of a computer program being
> >       run on a wet computer which is called the human brain. That we can
> actually quantify thoughts using the same language
> >       that we use for information theory. So there is nothing in the
> human consciousness that is outside the laws of physics
> >       and not fully capable of being described in complete detail by the
> laws of physics. [...]
> > It’s not quite like a chair, it’s more like a word processing program.
> Now, it’s real. It’s immaterial, but it’s still real.
> > But what is that program? It’s just a pattern on a CD. A blank CD, a
> CD–it’s still the same atoms. What has changed, what has
> > made a word processing program valuable, why you have to pay for it, is
> the change in the pattern of the atoms on the CD. But
> > notice the pattern is immaterial. The pattern is rearranging the atoms
> rather than the atoms itself. The atoms are the matter,
> > the pattern is truly immaterial. The soul is the same thing."
> > -- Frank Tipler in "Closer to Truth episode 1513" (2020)
> >
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> >       >       > Thank you, I agree. Note that it is not the
> Bhagavad Gita, which is a much
> >       >       > older and better known text. But when I read your
> sentiment, I immediately
> >       >       > thought of this passage, as it fairly exactly captures
> your suggestion: to
> >       >       > pick out only the best from all the different texts (the
> cherries, or the
> >       >       > nectar) while leaving the rest.
> >       >
> >       >       Yes, exactly! I first thought it said Bhagavad Gita, when
> reading quickly, but
> >       >       then I saw that it in fact was not. Thank you very much
> for this recommendation!
> >       >       =)
> >       >
> >       > You're welcome!
> >       >
> >       > Jason
> >
> >       Best regards,
> >       Daniel
> >       _______________________________________________
> >       extropy-chat mailing list
> >       extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> >       http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
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