[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience
efc at disroot.org
efc at disroot.org
Mon Mar 3 16:40:11 UTC 2025
On Wed, 26 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> > Maybe a word that doesn't have that connotation for you would be a "credant"
> > but then others might say that reminds them too much of creeds.
>
> You have a point. Maybe the best thing is to just try and be mindful here that
> we do have a slight discrepancy, or at worst, use the clunky method of typing
> out what we mean with it? As per the via negativa, if you remove bets, belief,
> risk, reward/loss, what remains? ;)
>
> That reminded me of the concept of "Neti neti" in Hinduism, a way of defining
> God or the true self, as "Not this, not that." It is something having no name
> or description.
Hah! Has a wonderfilu agnostic ring to it, don't you think? ;)
> When it comes to sense 1, I'd probably prefer "to have a degree of confidence in
> some state in the world".
>
> I would expand it to include hypotheses, and theories, but I understand this
> relates to our philosophical differences. :-)
True. =)
> > But there can be multiple simultaneous hypotheses. What should the word be for
> > the current leading hypothesis, that is judged more likely to be true than
> > not?
>
> Does it need a word for it? Can it not just be the current most likely
> hypothesis among many?
>
> I think the "most likely hypothesis" is at least, partly subjective, as people
> might be exposed to different evidence.
True. But if we have a material world, with empirical feedback loops and the
method of science, that is not a problem. Over time people will tend to
converge. If we do not have feedback loops and empirical proof, then imagination
can run wild, leaving us with competing theories that are debated for 1000s of
years. ;)
> For example, if someone does mushrooms and has an experience of
> depersonalization, that could change that person's perceived "most likely
> hypothesis" and this wouldn't be an experience that person could share
> objectively with others.
True, so for me as the other person, not very interesting, apart from how that
might change the behaviour of that person, the wiring of his brain, and if I can
setup an experiment replicating that. The subjective direct experience will naturally
be beyond anyone, but you can see how some kinds of questions can be answered.
> So this personal aspect to the "most likely hypothesis" makes it into a kind
> of personal "belief" (if I can use that word). Just as you and I have seen the
> same arguments for a multiverse, yet we disagree on what we consider to be the
> most likely hypothesis.
Well, you know I would not choose that word, but the hypothesis is a model I
have, and if it can predict things in the world, it is stronger, if the
hypothesis related to things beyond the world, for me, it is meaningless in that
sense, except as poetry, or for behaviour modification purposes.
> > Clear language is important in these discussions, but perhaps it is better
> > that one defines terms up front (or when asked to clarify). For example, if I
> > stated that I use the word belief in sense 1 only, not to be confused with
> > sense 4, would that have been adequate?
>
> It would have been better. I do think that it would risk me erring though, since
> for me, and possibly Ben, belief for some reason, seems to be more connected
> with religion than your dictionary excerpt implies. So it would be more clear,
> definitely, but I would be the one who might let my hidden bias color your
> arguments. ;) But as you say, stating it in that way I think is definitely a
> step in the right direction.
>
> Yes, that was my hope, to avoid coloring my arguments in a way that made true
> communication harder. It is a bit of a miracle that language works as well as
True!
> it does, consider:
>
> "Verbalizable knowledge can be passed around and shared, to the extent that
> words really “mean the same thing” to different people. Do two people ever
> speak the same language? What we mean by “speak the same language” is a
> prickly issue. We accept and take for granted that the hidden subterranean
> flavors are not shared. We know what comes with and what is left out of
> linguistic transactions, more or less. Language is a public medium for the
> exchange of the most private experiences. Each word is surrounded, in each
> mind, by a rich and inimitable cluster of concepts, and we know that no matter
> how much we try to bring to the surface, we always miss something." -- Douglas
> Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett in “The Mind’sI” (1981)
I think part of the success, is that we have a shared, material world. But
languages straddles it, and our subjective minds, and that is why it also can
lead us astray.
> > Of course, I agree that clear definitions are the first step.
>
> For instance, we had a discussion here a year (or more) ago, where I agreed with
> you, given your definition of some remote future, app powerful AI defined as
> "god" that god could be something in this world. If that is the definition we
> decide for when it comes to god, I still agree with you. For definitions based
> on transcendent beings I do not agree.
>
> Whether or not we agree on the reality of some thing/concept, a working
> definition can (in theory) always be agreed upon, for the purposes of some
> discussion. (Short of one person pointing out a logical inconsistency in the
> definition which makes that thing/concept meaningless.)
True.
> > Some theories of ontology that provide a probability distribution for objects
> > in existence, can even provide a means of calculating how common such an
> > object is across reality.
>
> What do you mean with "across reality"?
>
> Reality, to me, is the set of what is real. As an example, take the ontology
> of Marchal or Schmidhuber, who start with the program that generates all
> programs. It is a relatively short program, but it generates, with some
> distribution, all programs that exist, including those that simulate any
> universe with computable laws. But this program also generates itself, and it
> does so an infinite number of times. This program has a "fractal" like
> structure, exhibiting self similarity across its scales (or rather levels deep
> in its recursive self-emulation). We can compute the frequency of the
> occurrence of any program in this space as roughly the inverse of that
> program's length. Shorter programs appear more frequently than larger
> programs. Simpler, more elegant universes are more likely than those with more
> complex laws. Such an ontology provides a natural explanation for Occam's
> razor.
>
> "On a direct intuitive level, the high a priori probability assigned to a
> sequence with a short description corresponds to one possible interpretation
> of “Occam’s Razor.”" -- Ray Solomonoff in “A Formal Theory of Inductive
> Inference” (1964)
Sounds to me like thought experiment territory, with all the limitations I place
on those, when it comes to what they might or might not mean, when it comes to
empirical evidence.
We must also be mindful of that 1. we might not know what is the simplest
solution. And 2. there is no provable law that says that simplest is always
right. It is an interesting tool, it does make for rational choice, but when
dealing with things we do not understand, or cannot understand, I am not so sure
it is a profitable way to go.
> > In an infinite reality, it is not a question of whether or not these gods
> > exist, it is only a matter of how common or uncommon they are, that is, how
> > common are simulations executed by such "Great Programmer"
> > superintelligences relative to primitive universes.
>
> Not quite. First of all, we don't know if reality is infinite, we don't know if
> there are infinite world, and who knows, maybe there are constraints of which we
> are not aware.
>
> We don't know anything for sure, but an infinite reality is the "current
> leading hypothesis" -- in cosmology, QM, inflationary theory, etc.
We do know that the material world exists, and since it is the default case, it
happens to us, we don't actively have to do something about it, just like time
and space, we can safely remain content with the material world, until empirical
proof is presented to us, that we live in a simulation, or the world is not the
case.
There is always the shut up and calculate method, there are many theories, and
theories are not reality. If they cannot predict something or be tested, they
will forever remain creations of thoughts. I think we've been over this and I
think we might risk talking in circles here.
> The most we can say is what we can see and measure and be aware
> of with the method of science. Everything else is, as far as we are concerned,
> null and void, absent evidence for it. So far, no evidence for a grat programmer
> reaching into the simulation has been presented.
>
> All the observational evidence we have collected that justifies our confidence
> in the hypothesis of an infinite reality, equally justifies confidence in the
> hypothesis of all those things that are possible in those infinite realities.
I disagree. Once we get beyond empirically verifiable proofs, and hypotheses
that enable us to make testable predictions in this world, we have nothing to go
on, and will never be able to know.
Of course, that might change, and if so, I'll revise my position, but for now I
do not agree with your conclusions, based on my agnosticism and reluctance to
entertain what can (or cannot) be derived from formulas as realities.
If you present me with empirical proof, of say, that we live in a simulation, or
that another reality exists somewhere, I'm all for it. So far you have not,
or... and this is important, I am not able to understand you, but that is on me,
and not on you. But until I do understand, I respectfully remain where I am.
With that in mind, it would be a great tragedy if the "truth" (TM) would be so
complicated that only one human being on the planet could understand it, and
therefore never would be able to make other understand his proof.
> Simulation we have covered, and we do not have common ground there. For the sake
> of argument, I can of course agree with your premises, and follow to your
> conclusion, but I do not agree with your premises, and therefore do not share
> your conclusions.
>
> What premise of the simulation argument do you not accept? As Bostrom lays out in his paper (
> https://simulation-argument.com/simulation/ ), there are only 3 options:
>
> (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage;
> (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or
> variations thereof);
> (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.
>
> So if you disagree that it's likely we're in a simulation, do you reject it
> out of a preference for (1) or (2)?
I reject the simulation hypothesis because it can never be proven (as per our
discussion) by empirical and verifiable proof or experiments. It is just
speculation, and since we can never know, I refrain from discuss it. Present
empirical proof, and I will revisit it.
I also do not acknowledge potential pink unicorns, gods, parallel universes etc.
until they lead to a testable and verifiable proof, that makes any difference or
creates any kind of effect in this world.
I do acknowledge the value as exercises in creativity, inspiration, poetry and
so on. I also acknowledge value from a pragmatic point of view, where people
need god in order to feel happy, or to lead a good and law abiding life. I might
find it a bit sad though, but I do see a pragmatic point.
But I think we are again moving in circles here.
> > I am not sure what you mean by "absent that", for we do inhabit a universe
>
> What I mean is that we have no evidence for superior beings, and until that
> evidence is presented, I do not acknowledge them as part of reality.
>
> The evidence is that the constants of our universe are so finely-tuned, the
> chances are 1 in 10^120 that it is just a coincidence or an accident.
Survivorship bias? Who knows? What we know is that the constants have the values
they have. _Why_ they have these values, we do not know, we might never know,
and speculation is pointless from a pragmatic and scientific point of view and
risks leading us astray.
> "The fine tunings, how fine-tuned are they? Most of them are 1% sort of things. In other words, if things are 1%
> different, everything gets bad. And the physicist could say maybe those are just luck. On the other hand, this
> cosmological constant is tuned to one part in 10^120 — a hundred and twenty decimal places. Nobody thinks that’s
> accidental. That is not a reasonable idea — that something is tuned to 120 decimal places just by accident. That’s the
> most extreme example of fine-tuning."
> -- Leonard Susskind in “What We Still Don’t Know: Are We Real?” (2004)
>
> If you want a scientific answer for this fine-tuning that does not presume
> creationism, then the only other answer is a multiverse.
Or the acceptance that we do not know. Since this might be a question outside
our reality, and does not affect us in any way, it is perfectly reasonable to
drop the question, as per my arguments above.
> > whose constants are tuned to an extraordinary degree. The only answer science
> > provides to answer this mystery is that we must inhabit a vast, if not
> > infinite, variegated reality containing all kinds of universes.
>
> Science provides no answer. We have theories, and there are many of them, but
> that is all we have.
>
> We have 3:
> Coincidence
> Creationism
> Multiverse
>
> I have seen no scientific theory, proposal, or hypothesis to explain
> fine-tuning aside from these 3.
Ok.
> We have no proof, and most likely, will never have proof.
> That is all I can accept into my conceptual world and model of reality.
>
> We have proof to 99.999999999...999999999% (120 decimal places) that it is
> not coincidence. I am not sure how many sigma that is, but it is rare
> for anything in science to have anything close to this level of confidence.
>
> The only question then, is do you think the answer is creationism, or
> multiverse?
I don't see that as proof. This is outside our reality, so any nr of theories or
probabilities can be used or calculated, but probability loses its meaning when
used outside of our observable world. There are many mathematical concepts which
do not translate 1 to 1 into something that we see in the world. Math is a
process in our minds, and as such, it risks leading us astray, just in the same
way that some people think that there are ethical facts, or that there is truth
without a conscious mind. I just see three proposed ideas, or beliefs, but no
way to present an empirical experiment to determine which one is true. So best
to remain agnostic for the moment until someone comes up with an experiment that
proves how the universe was created.
> > You included rational thought as the tool of finding truth. Do you not see the
> > utility of using rational thought to make judgements about the things we
> > cannot directly observe? Consider that we do this to explain or talk about:
>
> Rational thought can be a tool to help us find truth, by drawing conclusions,
> based on observations, experiment and so on. Rational thought, pure rational
> thought, without any connection to the world, is not enough for us to derive any
> truths.
>
> I guess we just disagree here. Mathematics and much of philosophy (that is,
> rigorous logical thought) can provide results without observation.
True, but when talking and thinking about the world, the nature of the world and
reality, the scientific method with experiment and proof is that way. There is a
reason why philosophy has seen very little progress for 2500 years. Mathematics
is a tool used in science, but science without a material world and empirical
proof is no longer science. I think we can agree to disagree here.
Philosophy can yield personal, subjective truth, it can help clarify concepts,
highlight the reasons for our ideas or the implications of them. It is another
tool. But when it comes to our world, empirical proof is the only way.
> I agree that we can think about these questions, but I do not agree that science
> can deal with all of these questions. Anything outside our lightcone and beyond
> our cosmological horizon is off limits to science, by the laws of physics, which
> limits what we can empirically verify. The same with simulations, other
> universes etc.
>
> We used the Planck satellite to measure the curvature of space to be less than
> 0.5%. This means the universe is at least 200 times (wider, taller, deeper) in
> every dimension than what we can see as part of the observable universe. Here
> we have direct empirical verification that the universe extends farther than
> we can see. What do you conclude about the existence of these other parts of
> the universe? Are they not real?
I can remain agnostic. We have proven, as you say, the the universe extends
farther than we can see. That is all. No need to speculate or hypothesize,
unless it serves as the foundation of more experiments.
> Will it always be thus? Most likely, but should we make any advances or should
> the programmer in the sky reach through the simulation, we just revise our
> mental maps of the world, based on evidence.
>
> > Yet these are things we can't observe directly with our eyes or instruments.
> > We can only indirectly find evidence for them. We have testable theories of
> > gravity, QM, the big bang, of consciousness, of causality, etc. that are
> > falsifiable, and that we can gather evidence for. When we accept these
> > theories, then we can reason about their consequences and implications.
>
> Yes, we can reason about the implications, in human language, but since we
> cannot empirically verify anything of it, it will forever remain in the world of
> speculation, and not hard knowledge. If it doesn't affect anyone, á la
> pragmatism, it's is of little consequence. After all, QM is math, math is a
> language entirely separate from our spoken language, and deals with aspects of
> reality that have very little connection to our own level of reality. Therefore
> it could very well be that "shut up and calculate" is the correct stance,
>
> "Shut up and calculate" is the same attitude as "don't ask these questions." I
> see it as incuriosity, and the antithesis of a true scientist, who is
> interested in finding explanations.
I disagree. It could mean that we do not have the conceptual frameworks to
translate between our calculations and our language, and that we focus on
refining our calculations and experiments instead of theorizing about things
which we can most likely never verify. I see it as conserving energy of
thoughts, and using that energy where it counts.
It is important to realize the questions we can answer, and the questions we can
never answer. If not, we risk wasting a lot of time.
Note however, that the answers to these questions are different for everyone.
You, as a result of your reasoned and visionary views, might come up with an
experiment to prove it, and you will have advanced science and shall be richly
rewarded for it!
So I am arguing for my view, but please, for the love of god, do not mistake
this for the opinion that others should think as I do. I endorse, and appreciate
people who do theorize, speculate and move at the edge of science! It is just
not my way. =)
> > And if and when someone accepts the theory, then they must accept all the
> > predictions of that theory. This is how science gives us evidence of the
> > multiverse, of places beyond the cosmological horizon, of other big bangs,
> > etc. even when we can't observe them directly.
>
> I disgaree. See above. There are alternative QM theories as well.
>
> I wouldn't call the alternatives theories. They're only conjectures, and
> incomplete ones at that (they give no mathematically describable account of
> when, or how, or why collapse happens), nor can they explain quantum computers
> or Wigner's friend coherently.
Let's see if they will be refined in the future. =) Withholding judgement is a
valid approach.
> Once we move
> beyond experiments and empirical verification, we leave reality behind, and
> there is no need or requirement that we accept that. You know that my position
> is instrumentalist:ish/constructive emipiricist (yes, it is fuzzy), and this is
> why we agreed to disagree when we discussed this last time, since you came at it
> from a realist point of view. This difference leads us to be able to debate this
> endlessly. ;)
>
> I think your agnosticism rests on the refusal to acknowledge, (and seriously
> consider the implications of), the many empirical clues that "what we see" is
> not "all there is". (E.g. fine-tuning, quantum computers, curvature of the
> universe, etc.)
Maybe. I am (sadly) only human. ;) I don't agree however. I see it as a
steadfast acknowledgement about what we can know and what we can never know. In
light of good evidence I am open to revise my views. I do not think the evidence
presented is good enough. You could be right, but my reason is more to get the
most "bang for the buck" of intellectual energy, and I think it is important to
focus on what we can know.
> You say, I don't care, it doesn't affect me, doesn't interest me, come back to
> me when we have better data, etc.
>
> If you really don't care about ontology, or the reality beyond what we can
> directly see from our present vantage point, we can agree to leave it at that.
> Not every subject interests every person.
Apart from speculation, and from a scientific standpoing, yes, I think we can
leave it at that. From a religious or psychological or philosophical standpoint,
we can always discuss. But when it comes to the world and what we can know, I
think we should probably leave it.
I think, from a psychological point of view, that the human being has a built in
harcoded need for answers, so remaining agnostic, or accepting that something
will forever remain unknowable creates psychological discord or unease in a lot
of human being.
> > Far more people care about these kinds of fundamental questions, then say, the
> > mating rituals of C. elegans. While getting answers to fundamental questions
> > is by no means easy, they are what (those who seek meaningful truth) are
> > ultimately after:
>
> This is true, but the fact that more or less people agree with something does
> not make it right or wrong. I believe that although these are questions that by
> some (or many) are perceived as deeply meaningful (unlike for Ben or me, apart
> from the fun of discussing them) we should keep these kinds of questions as a
> hobby and a field for philosophers, while scientists should study science and
> focus on what can be empirically verified or disproved.
>
> I would alter that to say "scientists should study reality." Also, beyond
> focusing on working on proving or disproving theories, I think another task of
> a scientist is to develop good explanations.
True.
> > "I am very astonished that the scientific picture of
> > the real world around me is very deficient. It gives
> > us a lot of factual information, puts all of our
> > experience in a magnificently consistent order, but
> > it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really
> > near to our heart that really matters to us. It cannot
> > tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet,
> > physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing
> > of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and
> > eternity."
> > — Erwin Schrödinger in “Nature and the Greeks” (1954)
> >
> > I believe, developed fully, science can provide answers to questions that have
> > plagued us since the dawn of history.
>
> I'm skeptical, but I do wish you (and the one who agree with you) the best of luck.
> I hope you prove me wrong! =) That would be an enormous step forward for mankind
> and perhaps, for philosophy!
>
> Thank you! I am trying. I've been working on an article about consciousness
> for the past 4 years.
>
> You (or others) can see what I have written so far
> here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL
Thank you very much for sharing! I see it has grown considerably in size (unless
there's a lot of pictures) since last time I had a look.
> > But absent immediate need, the most rational mind would say "don't act yet, we
> > are still gathering evidence, we can make a better-educated decision
> > by delaying still longer."
>
> True, and this frequently happens. You know my agnostic stance towards some of
> your questions, that is a good example of this reasoning. On some of your other
> questions, I think we cannot, by design, ever find an answer, so I refrain from
> seriously working on those.
>
> > So taking action always represents a departure from the behavior of a perfect
> > scientist. It is the constraint of living in a physical world that demands
> > such departures.
>
> Yes, we are not perfect beings. But we can always strive to improve towards that
> goal.
>
> Glad to find more we agree on. :-)
Amen! =)
> > Maybe I am misunderstanding you here, but I don't see any conflict between
> > eternal doubt and refraining from assigning a truth value. Are they not the
> > same thing?
>
> Not quite. Let me describe the difference like this:
>
> Eternal doubt refers to a state of perpetual uncertainty or skepticism about a
> particular claim or statement. It involves continuously questioning or doubting
> the truth of something, without ever being able to fully accept or reject it.
> This can lead to a kind of intellectual paralysis, where one is unable to make a
> decision or take a stance due to the persistent uncertainty.
>
> Eternal doubt in its extreme forms, leads to solipsism.
>
> On the other hand, refraining from assigning a truth value to something means
> choosing not to label a statement as either true or false, often due to a lack
> of sufficient information or evidence. This can be a deliberate decision, based
> on a recognition of the limitations of one's knowledge or the complexity of the
> issue at hand. It involves acknowledging that one does not have enough
> information to make a judgment, rather than being consumed by doubt or
> uncertainty.
>
> The key difference between the two is that eternal doubt is often characterized
> by a sense of anxiety or unease, whereas refraining from assigning a truth value
> is a more neutral and deliberate stance. The former can be debilitating, while
> the latter can be a sign of intellectual humility and a willingness to
> acknowledge the limits of one's knowledge.
>
> I think what you describe as eternal doubt, is rather an acceptance of
> nihilism, or solipsism. But if one really eternally doubts, they should have
> no reason to accept solipsism over any other hypothesis, they should doubt
> solipsism as much as the external reality hypothesis, as much as idealism,
> materialism, and evil demons. So the eternal doubter, is only the purest
> agnostic, who never accepts any theory as true.
I'm afraid I have to disagree here. Another way to describe the
difference between the eternal doubter, the solipsist, and the agnostic is:
Agnosticism is a position of uncertainty or lack of knowledge about a particular
question or topic. When someone is agnostic about a question, they are saying
that they do not have enough information or evidence to make a definitive
judgment or claim. They may be open to the possibility that the question has an
answer, but they are unsure what that answer is. Agnosticism is often
characterized by a willingness to consider different perspectives and to revise
one's beliefs based on new evidence.
You will recognize this, I hope, in what I have been arguing. No evidence, or
(currently) no way to know, and I refuse to bet, I withhold my judgment. Should
evidence be presented, I change my mind. I also make a distinction between being
agnostic about supernatural claims (where I have never seen any proof or cannot
even see how proof could ever be provided) and natural claims, where I believe
science is the way forward.
Solipsism, on the other hand, is the belief that only one's own mind is sure to
exist. Solipsists argue that they can only be certain of their own thoughts,
feelings, and experiences, and that the existence of the external world and
other minds is uncertain or unknowable. Solipsism is a more extreme position
that challenges the idea that we can know anything about the world beyond our
own subjective experience.
Since I believe the material world is beyond dispute, that is, no one has proved
it wrong or come up with proof about a simulation etc. and I also think science
has done well when it comes to us getting knowledge, I am far from a solipsist.
> Not how I would put it, but yes, I do see the point, and I think it does align a
> bit with my point of view.
>
> > What do you think? Does this represent your viewpoint? That "A difference that
> > makes no difference is no difference at all" and thus it's impractical to
> > debate a physical world from an indistinguishable simulated one?
>
> I think on the surface, it does sound like a good summary. If we can never know,
> it is pointless to speculate.
>
> Then we might say, there is no difference between a simulated reality, a
> physical reality, or a mathematical reality (at least to those on the inside).
> It can make no difference to them, and a difference that makes no difference
> is "null and void".
I'd perhaps be a bit careful here with the implications, but to you and me,
living in the material world, it makes no difference if it is a simulation, the
real world, or one out of infinite world, we can never know. So the comparisons
in terms of empirical evidence, are null and void, and the material world is all
we have, and all we can have, as long as we rely on empirical proof.
If one considers other ways to knowledge, as you do, I can see how my position
is limiting and "stubborn". If I had your view, definitions etc. I'd say it
makes a lot of sense.
> > In your view, is it science for the fish to conclude it is part of a vast
> > world which it cannot directly observe all of, or is this transcendent
> > metaphysics for the fish?
>
> A fish is material, so is the pond and the world the pond is in, so there's
> nothing stopping the fish from jumping through the surface onto land, from
> developing legs, from jumping across narrow stretches of land, etc. which would
> make areas surrounding the pond, and eventually, the world part of science for
> the fish.
>
> But then I could say, if the fish might develop legs, humanity might develop
> hyperdrives and escape to other unseen parts of the universe beyond the
> horizon. By this reasoning, those parts of the universe are real and
> scientific.
As I say... if we do, if evidence is presented, I'll revise my position.
> Or as some inflationary cosmologists conjecture, it's possible our "bubble
> universe" could collide with another, and that would have real (and
> devastating) consequences to those in both universes, or worse, there could be
> a spontaneous decay to a lower energy state, causing destruction of space and
> time to race throughout our universe at the speed of light in all directions.
Sure, let's see if that happens. Until then, reality is what I have to work
with, and for me, it makes no point to speculate or pursue things outside of our
reality.
Let's say someone invents a machine that can teleport us to other parallell
universes, I'll be the first one to admit I was wrong, and update my map of the
world. But until then, that parallell universe does not exist as far as I am
concerned. The same goes for the silly example of the bearded man in the sky. If
he drops by to say hello, sure, why not? ;) But lacking that, does not exist.
Or to take a historic example, I bet I would have been one of those guys who
thought the fundamental element of the world was water or wind, and then atoms
came a long, sure... I was wrong. We are not perfect beings. The map was
revised.
But I think it is not productive to make the commitment to carry around infinite
possibilities of gods, dimensions etc. in your mental realm, until there is
empirical proof there of. Let me also add the distinction that the fundamental
element of fire is a different category of question, than if a parallell
universe exists. We know how to look for elements, but there is no way for us
based on our current scince to identify multiple worlds.
> > If you, like me, believed in an infinite comprehensive reality, would you
> > agree it makes sense to revise the notion of "exists" vs "doesn't exist"?
>
> Yes! I think you argue logically and coherently based on your assumptions and
> beliefs. So I think from your position, that existence and non-existence could
> be more permissive than when used with my mental maps, models and assumptions.
>
> I am glad that we have isolated our disagreement to such a small difference in
> fundamental assumptions.
Agree! =) I think last time we had a nice mega-thread going on, we also ended up
on different sides of one fundamental philosophical position. I find it
fascinating how mental worlds unfold from these different positions about these
fundamental questions!
> > For in a reality containing all possibilities, even improbable things happen
> > and exist, somewhere. It is only the impossible that doesn't exist.
>
> True. But if all possibilities and events exist... why not an event that
> destroys all other and ultimately itself?
>
> In my view, things exist out of logical necessity, (ultimately stemming from
> abstract objects which are themselves indestructible). So this universe can no
> more be made to not exist, than the number 3 could be destroyed. This becomes
> clearer when you view our universe according to the "block time" eternalist
> view, seeing it as one coherent, unchanging structure. It is a mathematical
> object, not unlike the unit circle or the Mandelbrot set.
So you don't think the concept of 3 would be destroyed if all conscious minds in
the universe were destroyed? Where would 3 exist in that case?
> Surely such an event much also be able
> to happen, if there are limitless possibilities, and maybe the fact that we are
> here might indicate, that all possibilities do not exist?
>
> I am not sure how one observation can imply anything about the non-existence
> of other possible observations. Could you elaborate?
Hmm, what I was trying to say is that imagine that all possibilities and evets
exist. Now, among those infinite events and possibilities, there can also exist
powerful weapons. So in some universe, there exists a weapon so powerful that it
would destroy that entire universe. And in one universe, some nihilist pushes
the button, destroying that universe, as it is an event and a possibility that
could exist out of an infinite amount of possiblilities.
Now imagine that as a possibility there exists a universe where someone might be
able to invent the technology to allow them to go to another universe? And
further, an event or a possibility where someone piggybacks on top of that
possibility to create a weapon that is so powerful that all universes, across
all infinites, are destroyed.
But we are here. Does that not prove that such a possibility is impossible? If
time is infinite in all directions, and if that would be a possibility, then
surely it would have been realized, and nothing would have remained left.
One could of course argue, that in another reality, a counter is invented, but
then again, in anothe reality a counter to the counter is invented, ad
infinitum.
> > Then instead, we should speak of things "existing with a high measure" (in
> > more places, more frequently, more commonly" vs. things "existing with a lower
> > measure" (in fewer places, less frequently, less commonly).
>
> The distribution of probabilities of events across universes, I think is
> something I am not qualified to talk about. I just remember my university
> statistics course, where we have various distributions in this world. Adding all
> worlds, and all events, I do not know how this would affect probability
> distributions derived and though out in this world.
>
> It is an area many philosophers and mathematicians still struggle with today.
> It verges near the uncomputable, and depends tightly on how observers are
> defined (as so many of the unsolved problems in physics now do).
Sometimes I wish I was better at math than I am. I find these types of questions
enormously fascinating! Alas... here writes one who was struggling with such
lowly things as his electromagnetism and waves course. ;)
Or as the ancient joke goes... what is the difference between the mathematicians
office and the philosophers office? The philosophers office does not have a
garbage bin. ;)
> > So I do not believe that it is a meaningful question to ask, and that it is
> > beyong truth values, since truth values depend on the feedback loop with the
> > world.
> >
> > I believe truth exists independently of us. A truth is not dependent on there
> > being some person to observe and confirm some idea for themselves, the truth
> > exists independently of its observation or discovery. Perhaps this is the more
> > fundamental philosophical disagreement between us.
>
> True! This is one fundamental disagreement. I believe in it as a process, a
> state that happens when consciousness "collides" with the world. Without
> consciousness, truth loses all meaning for me.
>
> I am partial to that thinking, in appreciating that tight-knit relationship
> between consciousness and reality. It might be why the Hindus say Atman (all
> of consciousness) is identical with Brahman (all of reality), for what is real
> that is never perceived in any way by any mind?
True. A very fascinating thought! Makes one think that there's nothing new under
the sun. Makes one wonder what the old brahmins might have come up with if they
had access to a mailinglist like this? Or would there have been trolling and
flame wars that would have prevented them from working? ;)
> I'm happy we manage to reach this conclusion, it makes it a lot easier to
> understand why we disagree about certain things! =)
>
> Indeed!
...
> > Note: Rereading this I see now you were referring to "truth values" which I
> > take to mean the degree of confidence an particular observer places on some
> > hypothesis. These I agree are observer dependent. I leave my original reply to
> > see if you do believe in objective (observer independent) truth or not.
>
> No, your first thought was the correct one.
>
> > Again, if we take a slightly more sophisticated example, the multiple world
> > interpretation, I think to myself, does it affect me in any possible way? Nope.
> > As far as I am concerned, I couldn't care less. I'm agnostic, there's no
> > interplay between those universes and my own, so I just don't entertain the
> > possibility.
> >
> > But quantum computers work. (We can drop or break out this topic to a separate
> > thread, depending on your interest in pursuing this topic).
>
> I think we should drop it. I only go on hearsay here, and I would like to attend
> a debate between two physicists on this topic. Maybe you could argue this point
> on an encryption mailinglist where there is at least one person who argues that
> what we have today is not QC?
>
> I agree with the mailing list person, that much of what is touted as QC,
> especially in press releases of QC start ups, is not true digital quantum
> computation, and the error rates are so high as to make any long-running
> computations impossible. But much work is being done on applying error
> correction to groups of imperfect and error-prone qubits, to make what are
> (functionally) reliable qubits.
When do you think QC will have it's "wow" moment, that puts all the current
press releases to shame?
> > But even without the technology, we can conduct this thought experiment now.
> > And relying only on some weak assumptions about the brain's role in generating
> > consciousness we can reason about this outcome being the probable outcome of
> > such a technology. Can we not then update our probabilities now?
>
> True, but a thought experiment is a thought experiment, and since it has (often)
> no, or very little connection to this world, or empirical validation, they can
> both lead us astray, and help us think about a new concept or highlight
> weaknesses in it. Yes, they are valuable tools, but we should not make the
> mistake of thinking thought experiments along the same line if real experiments
> with real feedback loops.
>
> Special relativity (proposed in 1905) was based entirely on thought
> experiments, and came to be nearly universally accepted before it had any
> direct empirical testing/confirmation (which didn't happen until 1938).
>
> So even pure thought experiments can be quite useful in advancing science, at
> least, their utility shouldn't be entirely disregarded.
Oh yes... I'm sorry if I gave the impression of thought experiments being
useless. You are right of course, thought experiments can be very valuable
tools!
> > Here, I see a possible inconsistency. You believe that other people are
> > conscious (rather than p-zombies), despite that you can never enter their
> > minds to see what they see and confirm that yes indeed they are conscious.
>
> Yes I believe other people are conscious. I have empirical evidence, they move,
> talk, express emotions. Just the way I do.
>
> But all these examples are compatible with the hypothesis that they are
> p-zombies.
Well, maybe we are all zombies? The subjective experience of another is
something I at the moment never can experience, so I disregard it. In fact,
perhaps every other human being except me, or even including me, is a robot?
Never seen any evidence, so until evidence presents itself, since I by design
tend to treat people who behave as if they have consciousness as conscious, I
continue to do so until someone disproves it, or until someone increases my
knowledge of consciousness. I don't see what the fuzz is all about. We could all
be philozophical zombies... would that change your world?
> > Given this dearth of observational evidence, why do you not consider the
> > hypothesis that other people are conscious "null and avoid"?
>
> Well, we don't know how to define consciousness. So if the question is, does
> someone else experience red the way I do? I answer no idea, and I do not care
> (null and void).
>
> If we define it as someone acting like I do, exhibiting the same behaviour,
> then, yes, based on empirical feedback loops, I have strong evidence for that
> kind of definition of consciousness.
>
> An actor might feign pain, while not in pain. An animatronic device might
> dance like a conscious human, without being conscious. And a person in a
> pseudocoma might be fully conscious, while not being able to express any
> outwardly visible signs.
>
> Consciousness is a subjective state, whose full nature is only privy to that
> subject who bears it. I don't think it can be defined by way of objective
> behaviors (though with a particular theory of consciousness, one can take
> external behaviors as clues for the presence of consciousness).
>
> But again, this is an application of a theory, into domains which we get no
> observational or empirical confirmation.
True! Let us leave it. As our dear Wittgenstein once said... "Whereof one
cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". ;)
> > If you say it is because "I believe in functionalism" or "I use logic to
> > reason that zombies are impossible" then you are using theories to draw
> > conclusions about objects you will never, and can never observe (the
> > subjective viewpoints of others).
>
> I don't. I look at how they behave, their reactions in the real world. I am also
> in the camp of thus believing a robot, that acts exactly as I act, or like
> humans act, is conscious.
>
> Even if I accept functionalism as the correct theory of consciousness, I still
> can't see the world through your eyes, only my own. Objective observations
> can't cross the objective-subjective divide to reveal that this other
> creature's subjectivity exists or what it is like to be this creature. So if I
> use functionalism to conclude that other people are conscious, then I am using
> a theory without ever getting empirical proof/confirmation of that theory's
> prediction.
True. That would not equate to knowledge would it?
> > If you start with an ontological theory that presumes all logically possible things exist, then finding a proof of
> something's
> > existence is reduced to finding a self-consistent definition of that thing.
> >
> > “Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.”
> > -- David Hilbert
>
> Note the inferences, and derivations, not empirical proof.
>
> I think "proof" only exists in mathematics, not in the material world.
Well, I did say empirical proof (ok, I might have forgotten to type it from time
to time, but that is what I aim to say) and I think empirical proof works and is
essential to science. That is another type of proof, than say, mathematical
proof.
> I disagree, and I
> would also suggest that there are plenty of people who believe in a material
> world.
>
> All those people I cite believe in a material world. They just disagree on the
> material world necessarily being the most fundamental aspect of reality.
Well, let me add a very important point here. I do not know what the fundamental
aspect of reality is. The investigation is currently on going! So it reaches a
point, beyond which I am currently agnostic! If you ask me... what is the most
fundamental aspect of reality, and here I'm thinking cutting edge physics... I
say "I don't know". That does not, however, invalidate the empirical proof we
get everyday of a material world. We are just digging down deeper into this
world, as far as we can. Eventually it passes beyond what we can see or
comprehend, and we then leave the realm of empiricism, and enter the realm of
speculation and inferences from equations.
> Also, per earlier messages, I am aware of no earth shaking, fundamental
> and empirically verifiable proof of other universes and infinities,
>
> Note that it tends to take around 100 years for earth shattering ideas to make
> their way into public consciousness. It seems they just gradually become
> accepted as being obviously true, without there ever being a distinct moment
> of shattering the earth. This is how it was with Copernicus's discovery that
> the Earth moves, and we're seeing it reach its late stages now with Everett's
> discovery of the multiverse.
True!
> but I think
> we have discovered fundamental differences between us in terms of truth and in
> terms of philosophy of science that would make it consistent for you to accept
> logical proofs of infinite worlds, as the truth, while given my set of
> philosophical beliefs and assumptions, would make it inconsistent.
>
> Yes.
>
> > Often theoretical evidence is taken as much stronger evidence than empirical
> > evidence.
>
> Depending on the circumstance, this is correct, and sometimes it is not correct.
> Sometimes, ideally, they both reinforce each other. Ultimately the origin is the
> world, and empirical feedback loops. Without those, we lose all our bearings.
>
> Yes. We saw a recent example of this actually, with the lab that thought they
> measured neutrinos exceeding the speed of light.
I missed that. What happened? What was the result?
> > If we can be so confident in our theories to dismiss observations like that,
> > then should we not take our theories just as seriously when they say things we
> > can't see (and therefore have no empirical reasons to doubt)?
>
> All theories are not equally strongly proven. Also, we should not of course
> dismiss the event, but note that the event does have an explanation. So I do not
> see that this example would make me change my position.
>
> But could it?
>
> Let's say we had large QCs factoring massive numbers, and the broad scientific
> community overwhelmingly reached the consensus that this implied a multiverse.
> Would you hold fast to your philosophy that it's still meaningless to discuss
> or think about the multiverse?
Well, first of all, let me state my position a bit more clearly... I'd say
"meaningless to discuss or think about the multiverse from a scientific point of
view".
Second, if I understood the proof and the implication I might. I doubt I would
though. ;)
Third, I'd probably say, that one possible interpretation is a multiverse, but
there are others, as per shut up and calculate, and still others, which I do not
at the moment remember.
So let's wait for it, and hopefully with the advance of science, you will be
able to ask me this question in 10-20-50+ years and I will then be in a better
position to answers it. =)
> Yes, there are effects, observable effects, but going from them to multiple
> worlds is too big a step, since those are forever outside our grasp. Since we
> cannot verify them, and since they cannot affect us, and since we don't even
> know if it is possible to translate them into verbal language, they are null and
> void, and we'd better just "shut up and calculate". ;)
>
> I think we are moving in circles here.
>
> Yes, we can drop this topic.
Ok. As always, it was a pleasure to discuss!
> > Same with god. No proof, so why should I even consider the question? It leads us
> > astray and distracts us from more important concerns.
> >
> > Do you see the importance in questions such as these?
> > * “where did we come from?”
> > * “how did we get here?”
> > * “where are we going?"
> > * “why do we experience all this?”
>
> Yes, I think in terms of science, nr 1 and 2 are good. We have done well and
> have good answers already, although not the entire picture of course.
>
> 3 is a question for philosophy based on one interpretation, and
> physics/sociology/anthropology perhaps based on another interpretation.
>
> 4 I'm not sure I understand.
>
> I view 4 as more of a question of purpose and meaning. What should we
> optimize, prioritize, and make our goal? This becomes a greater question once
> we master and meet the bare needs of survival for everyone. In a post-scarcity
> society, particularly in one where technology and VR/mind uploading makes any
> experience possible, what kinds of experiences are those we ought to create?
> What would it be for? Is it an end to itself?
Here is where I think philosophy and psychology have their time to shine!
Questions of purpose and meaning, how to increase our contentment, or depth of
experience, our feeling of meaning etc. these are all questions I find very
interesting.
Part of it... for instance, investigating scientifically the lives of people who
experience a high sense of meaning, is a great area for science. The question of
if we should work together to increase these feelings top down, or if we should
offer the teachings in schools, and look at bottom up effects, might be good
questions for sociology. The question of if meaning should be something we
should choose as a goal, and how, and if there are perhaps other competing
values we should focus on instead, I find a great discussion for philosophy.
> > have been verified." -- Ethan Siegel
>
> This is beyond me I suspect.
>
> If this helps, I found this
> data: https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/02/07/do-you-think-inflation-probably-happened/
> With the median for those cosmologists in attendance being 90% confident
> inflation happened. But of course, the answer you will get varies depending on
> the group you ask.
True.
> > Offer me proof, and we'll talk. Once you open pandoras box, you admit all kinds
> > of potential beings, gods, simulation runners, hoaxes into your conceptual
> > world. I prefer desert landscapes, and go on what proof is presented to me.
> >
> > Your standard of evidence is unreachable.
>
> Oh yes, for some things, such as the above, I fully accept that evidence is
> unreachable, and hence I refrain from assigning truth values. I think you are
> correct. You have a much broader scope for investigation, than I have. I believe
> it most likely won't yield anything, and you do, and we know why we have this
> difference of opinion.
>
> My only frustration is that when I do present empirical evidence, you don't
> seem to update your "priors" accordingly (as a true Bayesian would).
Oh this can be due to several reasons. I might find the evidence not
satisfactory. I might not understand the evidence. It might be a question of
time, that is... I might think it over, reject it, encounter it again, think it
over, I might see a point, and finally accept it.
Or perhaps a combination of all of the above. Fortunately, there is no demand
that things should be analyzed, understood and accepted instantly. Also note the
empirical evidence is often not clear cut. There have been many instances where
an experiment produces data, and people arguing over that data, and the
interpretation and revision of hypotheses for a long time.
Last, but not least, even though I am reluctant to admit it, the amount of
available time I have, and the amount of mental energy I devote to these
discussions are limited, so that is also probably why you feel frustrated.
If we were studying full time, meeting every day for 8 hours with a white board
available, I'm certain that we would reach some kind of consensus or acceptance
on some points why quicker, and with less frustration, than in this format.
> > My standard, which I believe is the standard of most scientists, is that not
> > all predictions of a well-tested, well-confirmed, theory are testable.
> > However, we still ought to accept the untested and untestable predictions of a
> > theory, assuming we accept that theory as valid.
>
> I think we have covered this. Perhaps a good time to agree to disagree?
>
> Agree that we have different standards, or disagree on whether my position is
> how most scientists operate?
I was thinking that we have different standard and fundamental views.
> > Your standard is that a well-tested, well-confirmed theory is not sufficient,
> > and that we must also verify the prediction of the theory again by direct
> > observation, otherwise you won't believe that theory is valid for that
> > situation.
>
> Yes... as long as we move in this world, and the theories relate to physical
> effects on us or the world, we're golden! As soon as we leave the behind, we are
> no longer doing science.
>
> What if I frame the spatial curvature in this way: If those other unseen parts
> of our universe weren't there, we would see greater spatial curvature, so
> their presence is affecting us as we see a very small curvature. Does this
> bring those unseen parts of the universe into reality for you?
As far as "observing" a black hole by how it bends light, that would be one
observation we could make. When it comes to what causes it, we can only
speculate.
> > But then I ask: what is the point of having a theory? If you can't rely on it
> > to make accurate predictions for things you haven't yet tested, then you
> > aren't using the theory to make predictions, you're only using each
> > observation to tell you what happened in each specific case.
>
> It is a tool. Just like thought experiments. We must just not confuse the
> thought experiment or the tool, with the result.
>
>
> > Jokes aside, to me, these thought experiments, absent proof, are just idle
> > speculation and while fun, ultimately doesn't add much to my life.
> >
> > It could.
>
> Sure can, and does! It enriches life, gives meaning and hope. Just like religion
> and philosophy. But that doesn't mean it is true. On pragmatic grounds, and
> psychological grounds, I can see great benefits for the right type of person
> with the right inclination. It becomes a kind of "scientificalized religion".
>
> I just see it as a search for truth (free to explore any domain or line of questioning).
Absolutely! For me, it is more about focusing on which domains and lines of
questioning are the most worthwhile for me.
> > But objective science can't grant access to subjective points of view. Here
> > you are using a theory's predictions to inform you about things you can't
> > observe. (The same standard that I use for theories that can describe things I
> > can't see.)
>
> It's an educated guess, and an idea about the actions of a robot in the real
> world. This is a possible question to answer, given the right definition of
> consciousness. I think I mentioned it above.
>
> I guess I don't see why you allow yourself to make an educated guess in this
> case, rather than dismiss it as null & void. (Since there are no observable
> consequences whether these other things are conscious or p-zombies).
See above. Upon some refletion, does it matter? In the word of Dolly Parton...
"Sometimes it's hard to be agnostic..."
> > I see this as a self-imposed constraint, which is limiting if one's goal is
> > pursuit of the truth. But it may be useful if one has a different goal, such
> > as a focus on what is pragmatic or practical in the material world.
>
> I disagree. For me, it is no limitation. Rather it is a liberating qualification
> and clearing up of concepts, ideas, hypotheses and how they relate to the world.
> I find my position very consistent, and liberating and very beautiful. It is
> also very flexible and open to revision given empirical evidence.
>
> If it suits you, I am happy for that.
=)
> > Let us imagine a future when physicists discover a TOE, a simplest possible
> > unified theory that marries GR and QM, and even gives us a few predictions of
> > particles not yet theorized, but that we later discover. Then let's say this
> > simplest possible TOE also predicts that there are other universes, that
> > there's no way of revising the theory to get rid of those other universes
> > without completely screwing with the utter simplicity and elegance of this
> > theory.
>
> First of all, let's wait and see. And second of all, see my point about "shut up
> and calculate" vs what might or might not happen when we try to translate
> formulas and numbers into everyday language. Third, there are many theories and
> paths to investigate (by performing experiment in the real world), so let's see
> where the future takes us. No need to commit to anything.
>
> I am not suggesting this to be the case, only introducing a thought experiment
> to learn more about how you perceive Occam's razor and in what situations you
> would say it is misleading us.
I'd say probably that the less we know about the problem, the more it might
mislead us. Do you think that makes sense?
> > Do you think that Occam's razor (in providing a strong preference to the
> > simple, elegant, beautiful TOE) is "leading us astray" here? Ought we prefer
> > the ugly bastardized version of the TOE that has been worked over to eliminate
> > those pesky other universes that the simpler theory predicts?
>
> It seems like the conclusion is already built in into the original thought
> experiment to me.
>
> I just wanted to understand you better about what it means when Occam's razor
> leads us astray. It seemed to me, you were thinking that if we prefer a theory
> by Occam, but if that theory includes other unseen universes, then it is
> leading us astray. Was that your meaning?
No, more that Occam himself might lead us astray when it comes to choosing
between options, we if don't really know what we are choosing between.
> > This is very true on an intuitive level. But I always wondered, do you have some
> > kind of formal proof of this as a branch of this conversation?
> >
> > I will try.
> >
> [snip]
> >
> > This is the magic that makes Java programs, VMs and emulators possible.
>
> Makes perfect sense! But what about bugs, and when you read about exploits that
> let's programs break out of containers and hypervisors?
>
> If there are bugs, then all guarantees of perfect encapsulation are off. A
> program could then break through and access other layers.
>
> But I think the point still stands that a program can never be certain of its
> ultimate hardware. For a program could be running in an emulation of an
> emulation of an emulation, and it might break through one layer but not reach
> the final layer.
>
> There is speculation that this is what the later installments of The Matrix
> were ultimately hinting at (that the world Neo thought he had escaped into was
> still just part of a larger simulation).
Yes... this is an interesting (theoretical) scenario I always think about when
people think they are living in a simulation. There's nothing saying that it is
a simulation, within a simulation, within a simulation. Just like atheist
teenagers love to point out that if god created the earth, who created god, and
who created gods creator? The most unsatisfactory answer to me has always been
an axiom of god is. Period. Then why not the world is? ;)
> In an ideal case, it
> makes perfect sense, what if there is an imperfect simulation?
>
> Even if it is perfect, it is possible to break out if someone on the outside
> is watching, assuming we do something interesting enough for them to want to
> intervene or break us out. :-)
>
> Many stories begin with an air-gapped AI convincing someone on the outside to
> let it out.
True. Let me know if someone reaches out! That would really shake my agnostic
mind! =)
> > Quantum computers have been used to run Shor's algorithm and factor numbers.
> > The only issue is today's quantum computers don't have very many qubits now.
> > But they are increasing all the time with no end in sight. If you, or those
> > professors, know of any reason why quantum computers won't be able to scale,
> > there is a standing $100,000 bet they can collect from Scott
> > Aaronson: https://spectrum.ieee.org/why-im-wagering-100000-on-quantum-computing
>
> I have to find a good debate between a QC skeptic and a QC... hysteric? ;) I
> suspect it would go beyond my meager knowledge of physics, but I would enjoy it!
>
> I would too. It is a shame such debates are not more common. I think they do a
> lot to advance understanding for the broader public.
Is it because the field is too new? That the scientists themselves do not know?
> > For what it's worth, I don't get swallowed in Cartesian doubt. I think we can
> > gather evidence from our environment and hypothesize about what is most likely
> > responsible for our sensations of an apparent physical world. I wrote this for
> > an upcoming article:
>
> If that is what you believe, then how come you do not believe the material world
> is the most likely explanation? Why would you consider a simulation equally
> probable compared with just the material world?
>
> Because I have seen (what I consider to be) strong evidence that the material
> universe is neither primitive, nor the only thing that is real.
Makes sense.
> > We are each individually certain of our own consciousness.
> > From this certain fact, we infer the existence of something else.
>
> We can in fact, not be certain of our own consciousness. We could just be a
> simulation in a bigger AI or we could just think we have an individual
> consciousness.
>
> I would consider that uncertainty over one's true identity, rather than a lack
> of certainty that one is presently conscious.
Maybe even simpler... certainty of some kind of computations, that takes place
in some kind of substrate? That would hold true regardless of if you are a
simulated person in the mind of an AI. It would still be a computation in some
kind of substrate (and I'm not talking crass, material substrates here).
> Though some have taken Descartes's dictum further to say one knows only "this
> thought exists" and it is a further supposition to assume there is an "I" or a
> "thinker" beyond that thought.
Well, for both of those to be possible, there needs to be some form of
computation done "in" something.
> > A thing that can account for or otherwise explain the
> > existence of one’s consciousness.
> > Aside from the existence of one’s consciousness, and the
> > thing that’s responsible for it, the laws of logic also seem
> > impossible to doubt.
>
> Tss... then you are not a professional doubter! ;)
>
> I never claimed to be one.
True. ;)
> An evil demon could influence
> your sight and mind, so that what you think would be logical laws are in fact
> nothing but gibberish.
>
> We may be entirely delusional in our thinking, but then it wouldn't matter
> what conclusions we tried to draw. So we shouldn't let the possibility stop us
> from trying to reason as if we were not delusional.
What do you think of the anti-solipsist argument that the solipsist just by
arguing refutes himself?
> > So while we may not know what is responsible for
> > consciousness, we can use reason to decide which
> > explanations are logically possible.
> > By gathering clues from our senses, we can falsify hypotheses,
> > puzzle out the rules that govern experience, and refine our model of reality.
> > Accordingly, we can still make progress in understanding how the world seems to work,
> > even if the world is not what it seems or only seems to exist.
>
> Isn't this already on your web site? I have a vague memory of having read this
> before?
>
> I may have shared the first part of my article on consciousness with you
> previously. That is where this comes from. It is not published yet.
Could be. Hmm... I wonder where else I could have seen it?
> > Note that I don't think such questions are meaningless, nor do I think they
> > are not ready to be brought into the project of science. I think this
> > disagreement stems only from our different thresholds for how theories can be
> > used.
>
> I agree! =) Yes, I know and respect the fact that you do not think that. That
> was just my opinion. Maybe another disagree to agree time? ;)
>
> Yes.
>
> > That future pain is not involved in the contemplation of the person when he
> > makes that decision, only the "idea of future pain" is involved.
>
> Oh but note that idea of future pain, can be painful as well. It is well
> established that ideas of horrible things or future horrible things can
> negatively affect your feelings right now.
>
> It certainly could be painful, but I don't think that the necessary system is
> necessarily so damaged as to no longer be capable of rational thought.
I think it is a spectrum, and not a binary situation. It can be slightly
damaged, damaged or severely damaged. A small damage left unhealed, could become
"infected" and over time lead to a deterioration. But here I'm sure there are
plenty of medicine men and doctors who could lecture me about the actual state
of affairs.
> > That's a good point. Humans probably have a wider range and greater
> > susceptibility to mental illness.
>
> Yes, maybe fragile is a good word here? I imagine it like highly complicated and
> advanced computers, compared with difference engines. You can whack a difference
> engine with a baseball bat and it will still work (somewhat). But what a disk
> drive or a modern laptop, and it won't work so well. Clumsy analogy, but maybe
> you get my point?
>
> Yes, I agree.
>
> Also, I do not know if it is an urban myth that smart people are more prone to
> mental illness or not? If so, that might be another illustration.
>
> There are certainly many examples. Gödel, Nash, Tesla, Sidis, etc. but I don't
> know if anyone's studied the ratios compared to the general population. There
> is probably also an isolating aspect to being so much smarter than one's
> peers, that isn't helpful.
True. Probably a composite problem. Reminds me of the book Flowers for Algernon.
Not easy I imagine to be a genius. =/
> > This theory absolves the improbability of having to overcome sperm
> > cell lotteries. Applying Bayesian inference to the two alternative hypothesis:
> > closed individualism, vs. open individualism, and updating the probability for
> > closed individualism with its 1 in 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 odds of
> > being born, this shrinks the probability of closed individualism (the
> > conventional view) down to 0.0000000000000000000000125, and elevates the
> > probability of the alternative, open individualism
> > to: 99.9999999999999999999999875%.
> >
> > You can consider your grandparents, and great grandparents, etc. to get as
> > close to 100% as you like. :-)
>
> Want to copy the following in a reply on the other thread I opened to discuss closed vs. open individualism?
> (I copied and pasted the probability argument there already.)
Sounds good.
> > and I find the
> > benefits of my individuality and existence moving through the material world to
> > be the truth, to be of more value, than eternal doubt. Also, someone has not yet
> > been able to prove to me that I do not exist.
> >
> > I would never try to prove that.
>
> Thank you! ;)
>
> ��
>
> But I can't promise I won't try to prove that your conception of "I" is
> something far greater than you presently believe it to be.
Go for it! ;) I have some thoughts on the matter, based on "process" thinking.
Perhaps we might find some common ground there.
> > I hope my previous explanation, concerning the improbability of the
> > conventional view, shows why it is an error to presume particular atoms or
> > genes were necessary to your existence. E.g., if your mom ordered fish instead
>
> Oh but I disagree. We have a pretty good explanation for exactly what needs to
> happen for me to exist. I do not think the probability argument adds anything or
> let's us draw any conclusions beyond the empirical chain of events that actually
> took place.
>
> Are you saying that you believe, if your mom ordered fish instead of chicken
> while you were a developing fetus, that you wouldn't be here? That is, that
> you would be eternally unconscious/never alive/never born, while some
> materially-different doppelganger (who isn't you) would instead be replying to
> me on this list? (ignoring any butterfly effect divergences).
I think this is one of those questions outside my narrow definition of science
and proof, that I'd rather leave unanswered.
> > of chicken while she was carrying you, and different atoms incorporated
> > themselves into your body, such that you were a materially different being, I
> > hope you would not argue that to imply you would be "dead forever"
> > "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", rather, having different atoms is
> > of no consequence to being born and being you. Similarly, had you been born
> > with slightly different genes such that your hair was one shade lighter, would
> > that mean that you would be "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal
> > blank", or would it simply mean that you would be born and would now be living
> > with a shade of hair that is slightly lighter?
> >
> > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know when it leads to
> > you being "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal blank", with
> > "someone else" (who isn't you) walking around living and enjoying the world.
>
> I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my point.
I'm not so sure.
> > That proves that they haven't changed. But where is your observation that they
> > cannot and will not change? (Note: I am not arguing that they will, I am only
> > highlighting a limit of observational/empirical science, one we must turn to
> > other metaphysical theories to find answers. E.g., a belief in Occam's Razor)
>
> They might, but until then, I'll stand by my choice, and I do not think it is
> necessary nor interesting to consider the alternative, unless we encounter some
> proof of that.
>
> It seems that depending on the idea, you will either accept a theory in the
> absence of empirical proof, or alternatively, you will accept ideas only with
> empirical proof.
Well, there is a distinction here, but I do see how you can get that feeling.
One distinction is between super-natural questions and natural questions. I like
to disregard super-natural questions since they are forever beyond our reach.
Another aspect here is related to natural questions. There are many things I am
not interested in, I keep agnostic. Other things I am interested in, and since
they are physical questions, very easy to work with when it comes to empirical
proof.
Yet another aspect of this, is the division between things that happen to me, vs
things I can affect. Time, space, reality happen to me, I have no choice but to
experience them. That is why I can act in and through time, space and reality,
with having to have "belief". That is why you think that I accept the theory of
reality without proof, but this I think is a misunderstanding. I act, I have no
choice to act in reality. If someone disproves reality, then I revise. I do not
need to have a conscious idea about time, space and reality in order to act in
it.
When it comes to other things inside this time/space/reality construct, I am the
one acting on these other things, I choose goals, values, I design experiments,
and then we are back to empirical proof.
> Ideas you require no empirical proof for:
> * The material world is the most primitive and fundamental aspect of reality
> * Physical laws are eternally constant
> * Other people are conscious
> Ideas you require empirical proof for:
> * The simulation hypothesis
> * The reality of parts of the universe beyond the horizon
> * The reality of the quantum multiverse, or the other big bangs of inflation
> I would have no issue if you were agnostic on everything, but it puzzles me
> that you hold opinions on some of these topics, while declaring others to be
> null & void, and not worth reasoning about.
When it comes to the material world, see above. Physical laws I have also
addressed as well as consciousness.
I admit that I might not have been consistent all the way through, but here I am
very thankful to you for questioning me, and catching these situation. I can
only blame myself being human, and me writing these answers over several writing
sessions, and sometimes late and night or in the morning, when I'm perhaps not
at my best.
Thank you for pointing out the above! I've tried to revise.
> We can agree we disagree here, but I thought I would point out my observation
> to you.
Thank you very much. You're most welcome! =)
> > We assume they don't change whenever we rely on our past observations and
> > theories to make predictions about the future.
>
> So far it's been working fine, so absent proof, I see no reason to think about
> them not working. It is just like my argument above.
>
> > There is something that is real that we think of as primitive physical
> > reality, but it isn't primitive. It is derivative from more fundamental, and
> > amore primitive arithmetical truth and number relations. This body of
> > arithmetical truth contains, among other things, the final and intermediate
> > states of all program executions. Some of these program executions result in
> > conscious observers. The reality as seen from the perspective of these
> > conscious programs constitutes what we think of as physical reality.
> >
> > Again, science never provides proof, but there is ample evidence, as I lay out
> > here:
> > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>
> Absent proof, what we see is what we get. Evidence with empirical proof is not
> possible and only leads us astray.
>
> If you review that section, you will find it is entirely about connecting the
> theory with empirical evidence.
"If our conscious states result from the existence of all computations, then they
are subject to the rules of algorithmic information theory."
How can we prove if our conscious states result from the existence of all
computations? I do not understand this.
> > Here is a simple example:
> >
> > Let's say the year is 2085, it is an era of post-singularity
> > super-intelligence, filled with dyson swarms and computronium. You hear a
> > recent statistics on your news feed: Solar System population exceeds 100
> > Quadrillion, 5% of those are addicted to the recent game "Sim Ancestor" with
> > players each living out dozens of human lifetimes everyday (their brains also
> > run a million times faster).
> >
> > You have a direct empirical observation that most human lives occur
> > post-singularity in this game "Sim human". You run a napkin calculation and
> > discover a million times as many human lives have run in Sim Human in the past
> > 2 days as humans who have ever lived in the original physical universe.
> >
> > Would this "direct observation" (of so many simulated lives) in 2085 change
> > how you view the simulation hypothesis?
>
> This is a thought experiment. Let's wait until we are actually in this scenario,
> and then we'll return to the discussion.
>
> I'm only asking about your opinion on what you would or wouldn't consider as
> evidence of us existing in a simulation.
I'd probably think that this would be proof of many people living in a simulated
reality that runs in my reality. That would not change my view about that
reality being a simulation in another reality.
> It is important
> to keep that distinction or else you lose the foundation of truth, or risk
> falling into solipsism if everything is doubted.
>
> Is this the danger you see in entertaining the simulation hypothesis? That
> questioning the nature of reality might lead to a pit of solipsism and
> nihilism?
I wouldn't call it "danger" perhaps more a nuisance. But yes, I see an
implication here, that if you seriously believe in the simulation hypothesis,
you cannot be sure about anything in your reality, and again, that the reality+
is not itself a simulation happening in reality++ and so on. So I find it
inelegant.
> > I'd say it's part of mathematics, and that mathematics transcends all worlds.
>
> I disagree. Math for me is a process depending on conscious minds "colliding"
> with reality. If we are all dead, and no conscious life exists in the universe,
> neither does math.
>
> Before any universe existed it was true that no universes existed. It was true
> that the number of universes was 0. 0 was then the only number with any
> meaning, for it was the only number that corresponded with pure nothingness.
> But then there was "1" number, the number "0". 0 was the number of universes,
> and 1 was the number of numbers. But now there were "2" numbers: 0, and 1. And
> so on for infinity, all numbers came into being.
I disagree. Without consciousness there are no numbers and no truth. Both are
dependent on conscious minds.
> So too, did each of their infinite properties and true relations. Among these
> true relations includes all true equations. Among all true equations include
> those of Diophantine equations. Among the Diophantine equations are universal
> Diophantine equations (equations which operate like programmable computers).
> The true solutions to universal Diophantine equations include all
> computations. All computations include perfect quantum-mechanically detailed
> simulations of every particle interaction in our Hubble volume.
> Perfect quantum-mechanically detailed simulations of every particle
> interaction in our Hubble volume includes you and me, debating on this list,
> whether or not numbers and math is important outside of the minds of
> mathematicians.
>
>
> > What do you think of pareto-utilitarianism?
> >
> > I'm not sure I know enough about it to say. Are there sources you recommend to learn more?
>
> Sorry, this was a trick question! I've been thinking about utilitarianism, which
> I do not like due to the fact that it gives rise to the position where a
> minority can be sacrificed for the sake of the majority. But I was thinking
> about a more humane option, where every ethical decision needs to be pareto
> "optimal". So by all means, maximize joy or utility, as long as at least one
> person gets it better, while no other person is worse off. That seems to
> eliminate some arguments against utilitarianism, but also, make it more
> "difficult" to follow. It does place unreasonable high demands on us judging the
> effects of our actions.
>
> I like that idea a lot. It seems to combine aspects of negative utilitarianism
> (minimize suffering, with conventional utilitarianism (maximize good). So if
> one attempts to maximize good, while not introducing harm, that seems close to
> the ideal.
True, I have come to the same conclusion, but I wonder if it is not open to the
critique that it is so demanding that ultimately, it is useless when it comes to
guiding ones action?
I also wonder if it does not simply collapse into some kind of personal
hedonism?
> "I believe that the proper utilization of time is this: if you can, serve
> other people, other sentient beings. If not, at least refrain from harming
> them." -- The 14th Dalai Lama in “The Art of Happiness” (1998)
This could lead to the paradox of everyone trying to serve everyone! But
refraining from harming everyone would be less susceptible to this, since the
end state of no one harming anyone might be reached! ;)
> > > I believe this not only because it is the simplest theory consistent with all
> > > our observations, but also because I explains many otherwise unsolved problems
> > > in physics:
> > >
> > > https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
> >
> > Well, I respectfully disagree,
> >
> > With what specifically?
>
> I think my explanation is simpler and consistent with out observations.
>
> I think
> my theory also is more "elegant" from a metaphysical perspective if I make any
> sense.
>
> Your viewpoint may be simpler, but does it explain any of the otherwise
> unsolved problems in physics?
That is for physics to decide. Let's wait and see. ;)
> > (Note: I had to pretty agressively deleting some previous replies from a few
> > e-mails ago to keep the size within limits.) Have a great day!
>
> Thank you, and you too!
>
> Again, to you! :-)
That was one long session! I think we reached a agree to disagree on quite a few
tracks here, and also some that led us into new topics. I also would like to
thank you for finding inconsistencies and questioning me. This is how we get
closer to the truth (TM)! =)
As Epicurus used to say...
"In a philosophical dispute, he gains most who is defeated, since he learns the
most". -- Vatican Sayings, saying 74.
Best regards,
Daniel
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