[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Mar 3, 2025 at 11:41 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, 26 Feb 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
>
> > That reminded me of the concept of "Neti neti" in Hinduism, a way of
> defining
> > God or the true self, as "Not this, not that." It is something having no
> name
> > or description.
>
> Hah! Has a wonderfilu agnostic ring to it, don't you think? ;)
>

Yes! I thought you'd like it.


>
> > I would expand it to include hypotheses, and theories, but I understand
> this
> > relates to our philosophical differences. :-)
>
> True. =)
>
> >
> > I think the "most likely hypothesis" is at least, partly subjective, as
> people
> > might be exposed to different evidence.
>
> True. But if we have a material world, with empirical feedback loops and
> the
> method of science, that is not a problem. Over time people will tend to
> converge. If we do not have feedback loops and empirical proof, then
> imagination
> can run wild, leaving us with competing theories that are debated for
> 1000s of
> years. ;)
>

I'm no fan of that either. But I am of the opinion that we're now in a
position to settle questions that have plagued us for millenium.

Consider for example, Darwin solved the ancient problem of whether the egg
or chicken came first. Einstein's relativity gave an answer to Parmenides
eternalism, and his Brownian motion proved Democritus's theory of atoms.
Turing's invention of the computer (Disproved Descartes and his millenium
old idea that an extraphysical soul was required for intelligent
conversation). So there have been great strides in ancient philosophical
problems. I think other, more recent discoveries of the past few decades
can also answer fundamental problems in ontology and in philosophy of mind.

All this is to say I share your distates for eternal squabblings unrooted
in what we can conclusively demonstrate or otherwise prove (rationally
and/or empirically)


> > For example, if someone does mushrooms and has an experience of
> > depersonalization, that could change that person's perceived "most likely
> > hypothesis" and this wouldn't be an experience that person could share
> > objectively with others.
>
> True, so for me as the other person, not very interesting, apart from how
> that
> might change the behaviour of that person, the wiring of his brain, and if
> I can
> setup an experiment replicating that. The subjective direct experience
> will naturally
> be beyond anyone, but you can see how some kinds of questions can be
> answered.
>

Yes.


>
> > So this personal aspect to the "most likely hypothesis" makes it into a
> kind
> > of personal "belief" (if I can use that word). Just as you and I have
> seen the
> > same arguments for a multiverse, yet we disagree on what we consider to
> be the
> > most likely hypothesis.
>
> Well, you know I would not choose that word, but the hypothesis is a model
> I
> have, and if it can predict things in the world, it is stronger, if the
> hypothesis related to things beyond the world, for me, it is meaningless
> in that
> sense, except as poetry, or for behaviour modification purposes.
>
>
> >
> > Yes, that was my hope, to avoid coloring my arguments in a way that made
> true
> > communication harder. It is a bit of a miracle that language works as
> well as
>
> True!
>
>
>
> I think part of the success, is that we have a shared, material world. But
> languages straddles it, and our subjective minds, and that is why it also
> can
> lead us astray.
>

I very much agree with this (that a shared world is so big a part of our
successful communication). I wonder too though, how much of having a shared
world is also experiential. Dolphins and humans inhabit the same physical
world, but perhaps a very different mental one. Perhaps their echolocation
qualia are completely unlike our visual qualia. How much of an impediment
might this be for communication?


>
>
> > Whether or not we agree on the reality of some thing/concept, a working
> > definition can (in theory) always be agreed upon, for the purposes of
> some
> > discussion. (Short of one person pointing out a logical inconsistency in
> the
> > definition which makes that thing/concept meaningless.)
>
> True.
>

��


>
>
> >
> > "On a direct intuitive level, the high a priori probability assigned to a
> > sequence with a short description corresponds to one possible
> interpretation
> > of “Occam’s Razor.”" -- Ray Solomonoff in “A Formal Theory of Inductive
> > Inference” (1964)
>
> Sounds to me like thought experiment territory, with all the limitations I
> place
> on those, when it comes to what they might or might not mean, when it
> comes to
> empirical evidence.
>

Yes, and this is what I show in the "Predictions of the Theory" part of my
article.


>
> We must also be mindful of that 1. we might not know what is the simplest
> solution.


We may not ever "know", but there are frameworks for comparing relative
complexity of theories in completely objective ways. For example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity


> And 2. there is no provable law that says that simplest is always
> right.


Nothing in science is provable, but there are theories that propose why
with overwhelming probability, observers should find themselves to exist in
universes with simple laws. And moreover, these theories make other
testable predictions (which so far are confirmed).

I know your time is limited and precious, but if you do have time, please
read (just the abstract) of this article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826

As I would summarize the findings of this paper, starting merely from the
assumption that observer states are generated in accordance with
algorithmic information theory (states produced by shorter programs are
more likely than longer programs) it recovers many aspects that we observer
in our own universe, including, the fact that the universe has the property
of time, that it has a past moment in time beyond which we cannot predict
previous states (a beginning), that the laws are simple and computable, but
probabilistic (exactly as we observer with quantum mechanics).

Why do we believe a theory like relativity is true? Because it makes
predictions that if false, would falsify it, and the predictions it has
made have been confirmed. Likewise, why should we believe in the theory
that our observations are governed by algorithmic information theory?
Again, for the same reasons. This theory makes predictions that if false,
would falsify it, and the predictions it has made have been confirmed.

If my articles concerned pure unverifiable philosophy, I wouldn't waste the
digital ink writing them. But these are ideas that finally now (after
millenia of searching) are backed by observation and empirical results.



> There is always the shut up and calculate method, there are many theories,
> and
> theories are not reality. If they cannot predict something or be tested,
> they
> will forever remain creations of thoughts. I think we've been over this
> and I
> think we might risk talking in circles here.
>

Okay.


>
>
> > All the observational evidence we have collected that justifies our
> confidence
> > in the hypothesis of an infinite reality, equally justifies confidence
> in the
> > hypothesis of all those things that are possible in those infinite
> realities.
>
> I disagree. Once we get beyond empirically verifiable proofs, and
> hypotheses
> that enable us to make testable predictions in this world, we have nothing
> to go
> on, and will never be able to know.
>

I think perhaps you misread me here. I am expressing a tautology: if A
implies B, then evidence for A is evidence for B.

You can debate if A is true, or whether A implies B, but that doesn't
undermine the relation I meant to highlight.


>
>
> With that in mind, it would be a great tragedy if the "truth" (TM) would
> be so
> complicated that only one human being on the planet could understand it,
> and
> therefore never would be able to make other understand his proof.
>

It would be, but I don't think it is.

"If we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable
in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall
all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take
part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the
universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate
triumph of human reason — for then we should know the mind of God."
-- Stephen Hawking in “A Brief History of Time” (1988)


The problem, it seems to me, is not that the ultimate theory of everything
is too complicated, it is that it is so simple it slipped under everyone's
nodes. The theory of everything is (in my view) little beyond the theory of
arithmetic.

"Behind it all is surely an idea so simple, so beautiful, so compelling,
that when—in a decade, a century, or a millennium—we grasp it, we will all
say to each other, how could it have been otherwise? How could we have been
so stupid for so long?"
-- John Archibald Wheeler in “How Come the Quantum?” (1986)



>
> I reject the simulation hypothesis because it can never be proven (as per
> our
> discussion) by empirical and verifiable proof or experiments. It is just
> speculation, and since we can never know, I refrain from discuss it.
> Present
> empirical proof, and I will revisit it.
>

By that reasoning you should reject all of science, because nothing can
ever be proven, we can only gain evidence that increases or decreases our
probability estimates for some idea being true or not. And that is all the
simulation argument does, provide a framework for consistently updating
one's probability assessment for the hypothesis that we're presently in a
simulation.


>
> I do acknowledge the value as exercises in creativity, inspiration, poetry
> and
> so on. I also acknowledge value from a pragmatic point of view, where
> people
> need god in order to feel happy, or to lead a good and law abiding life. I
> might
> find it a bit sad though, but I do see a pragmatic point.
>

The (pragmatic) point of having a mind/brain is to predict probable future
experiences according to different courses of action. If we fail to
incorporate the probability of waking up from a simulation as a possible
future experience after death in this universe, you can say it is of no
pragmatic difference to anyone left inside the simulation, but not that it
is of no pragmatic difference to your future experiences.



>
> >
> > The evidence is that the constants of our universe are so finely-tuned,
> the
> > chances are 1 in 10^120 that it is just a coincidence or an accident.
>
> Survivorship bias?


Survivorship bias is the notion of the anthropic principle (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle ) -- the tautology that
life only finds itself in universes compatible with its existence. But the
anthropic principle alone isn't enough to explain how such stark odds were
overcome. For that you need a gigantic number of universes.


> Who knows?


Basically every cosmologist who has attempted to answer this question comes
to the conclusion that it can't be a coincidence. No one knows if it is
right with certainty, but they're about as sure as it is possible to get as
far as any scientific theory is concerned.


> What we know is that the constants have the values
> they have. _Why_ they have these values, we do not know, we might never
> know,
> and speculation is pointless from a pragmatic and scientific point of view
> and
> risks leading us astray.
>
> >       "The fine tunings, how fine-tuned are they? Most of them are 1%
> sort of things. In other words, if things are 1%
> >       different, everything gets bad. And the physicist could say maybe
> those are just luck. On the other hand, this
> >       cosmological constant is tuned to one part in 10^120 — a hundred
> and twenty decimal places. Nobody thinks that’s
> >       accidental. That is not a reasonable idea — that something is
> tuned to 120 decimal places just by accident. That’s the
> >       most extreme example of fine-tuning."
> > -- Leonard Susskind in “What We Still Don’t Know: Are We Real?” (2004)
> >
> > If you want a scientific answer for this fine-tuning that does not
> presume
> > creationism, then the only other answer is a multiverse.
>
> Or the acceptance that we do not know.


We do know it has to be one of these three. Consider that regardless of
whether you know what proposition "A" stands for, you should conclude, on
logic alone, that the sentence "A or not A" is true.
For example, it is true that today over your house, it will either rain or
not rain. I know this is true, despite knowing nothing about your local
weather.

Along the same vein, any time you have multiple propositions that are
*exhaustive* (they cover all possibilities) and *mutually exclusive* (no
two can both be true), then even without telling you what those
propositions are, because they are exhaustive, you know at least one of
them must be true, and further, because they are mutually exclusive, the
probabilities all add to 100%, and you can add probabilities of independent
propositions to get the combined probability.

In the case here, the propositions are:
A: There is only one universe and it was not designed to support life
(coincidence)
B: There is only one universe and it was designed to support life
(creationism)
C: There is not one universe. (multiverse)

There is no room for any 4th possible option here, these 3 cover all
possibilities and so we know, without having to do any experiment, that at
least one of these is true.

Given the overwhelming observational evidence against proposition A, we can
assign it a very low probability. Let's say we assign it less than 1%
probability. This means that the probability of (B or C) is greater than
99%.



>
> >
> > We have 3:
> > Coincidence
> > Creationism
> > Multiverse
> >
> > I have seen no scientific theory, proposal, or hypothesis to explain
> > fine-tuning aside from these 3.
>
> Ok.
>

We don't have to pursue this any further, but I think it is the strongest
evidence we have for a multiverse.


>
>
> > The only question then, is do you think the answer is creationism, or
> > multiverse?
>
> I don't see that as proof. This is outside our reality,


The evidence against coincidence comes from inside reality. And there are 3
well-defined, mutually exclusive, exhaustive possibilities. It is hard for
there to be anything more clear cut.
We use evidence from inside the universe to rule out one of the 3
possibilities. Using logic/math alone, we can conclude "B or C".


> so any nr of theories or
> probabilities can be used or calculated, but probability loses its meaning
> when
> used outside of our observable world. There are many mathematical concepts
> which
> do not translate 1 to 1 into something that we see in the world. Math is a
> process in our minds, and as such, it risks leading us astray, just in the
> same
> way that some people think that there are ethical facts, or that there is
> truth
> without a conscious mind.


If you have to doubt math to keep to your hypothesis, then I agree we can
go no further on this topic.


> I just see three proposed ideas, or beliefs, but no
> way to present an empirical experiment to determine which one is true.


Here is a simple example: we run 1,000,000 simulations of galaxy formation,
using various randomly selected cosmological parameters for gravity, dark
matter density, density fluctuations, etc. and find only 2 of those
1,000,000 simulations led to formations of galaxies.
Can we learn anything from such an experiment?


> So best
> to remain agnostic for the moment until someone comes up with an
> experiment that
> proves how the universe was created.
>

That's an unrelated question.


>
> Philosophy can yield personal, subjective truth, it can help clarify
> concepts,
> highlight the reasons for our ideas or the implications of them. It is
> another
> tool. But when it comes to our world, empirical proof is the only way.
>

I think we may have found another fundamental point of disagreement here
(regarding the utility of rationality).

I think this passage (written by Arnold Zuboff) is relevant to explaining
the role of empiricism and "a priori" (rational) reasoning, and why both
are important and necessary:

"Well, it is distinctive of the great empiricists, starting with Locke,
that they attack the first
kind of independence from experience, the innateness of ideas. But they
never attack the
second kind of independence from experience, that of a priori judgments,
but rather fully
subscribe to it just like the rationalists. The great and common mistake is
to think that the
empiricists favour empirical rather than a priori judgments. They do not.
[...]

These are those judgments whose truth we can discover through examining our
ideas
(whether we think these to be innate or derived from experience being
irrelevant) and seeing
that the denial of some claim would contradict the nature of the objects of
the ideas. Thus
these judgments, whose denials are contradictions, can be known to be true
a priori,
independent of having to make any empirical investigation. That we can make
a priori
judgments in this way has nothing directly to do with the question of
whether our ideas are
either basically innate or basically derived from experience. Only the
insistence that our
basic, our “simple”, ideas are not innate but rather derived from
experience is characteristic
of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, the great empiricists. And each of these
philosophers, while
thus insisting that the basic materials of thought are derived from
experience, still happily
endorsed and engaged in a priori reasoning based on the Principle of
Contradiction just as did
the rationalists. Please don’t think that because they were empiricists
they limited thought to
the empirical."



>
> > What do you conclude about the existence of these other parts of
> > the universe? Are they not real?
>
> I can remain agnostic. We have proven, as you say, the the universe extends
> farther than we can see. That is all. No need to speculate or hypothesize,
> unless it serves as the foundation of more experiments.
>

If you can take this curvature measurement as evidence that the universe
extends farther than what we can see,
why not take the equally empirical result (by the same team) regarding"
fluctuations having a scale invariance slightly less than 1" as evidence
that inflation is true?

You can say, I don't know enough to have an opinion on this, and
truthfully, I don't either, but this was a prediction made by inflation,
one later confirmed by observation.
So assuming what I and these other scientists say is true on this, should
you not (if you had the time to research, understand, and accept this
evidence) reach a similar conclusion regarding the reality of the
inflationary cosmos beyond what we can see?


>
> > "Shut up and calculate" is the same attitude as "don't ask these
> questions." I
> > see it as incuriosity, and the antithesis of a true scientist, who is
> > interested in finding explanations.
>
> I disagree. It could mean that we do not have the conceptual frameworks to
> translate between our calculations and our language, and that we focus on
> refining our calculations and experiments instead of theorizing about
> things
> which we can most likely never verify. I see it as conserving energy of
> thoughts, and using that energy where it counts.
>

The phrase was meant to be a professor's rebuke to a curious student
seeking a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics. I've also interpreted
it as a  negative attitude.
Far better to take Feynman's example, and show awe over the mystery nature
has presented, and encourage the next generation to find answers. (Not to
shut up, put your head down, and robotically enter numbers into a
calculator).


>
> It is important to realize the questions we can answer, and the questions
> we can
> never answer. If not, we risk wasting a lot of time.
>

I agree. I don't waste time on questions I don't think we can answer. I
think you and I just differ on what questions we believe can be answered.


>
>
>
> So I am arguing for my view, but please, for the love of god, do not
> mistake
> this for the opinion that others should think as I do.

I endorse, and appreciate
> people who do theorize, speculate and move at the edge of science! It is
> just
> not my way. =)
>

This helps a lot.

>       I disgaree. See above. There are alternative QM theories as well.
> >
> > I wouldn't call the alternatives theories. They're only conjectures, and
> > incomplete ones at that (they give no mathematically describable account
> of
> > when, or how, or why collapse happens), nor can they explain quantum
> computers
> > or Wigner's friend coherently.
>
> Let's see if they will be refined in the future. =) Withholding judgement
> is a
> valid approach.
>



Max Tegmark on Everett vs. Copenhagen:
"The former is a mathematical theory, the latter is not. The former says
simply that the Schrödinger equation always applies. The latter says that
it only applies sometimes, but doesn't given an equation specifying when it
doesn't apply (when the so-called collapse is supposed to happen). If
someone were to come up with such an equation, then the two theories would
be mathematically different and you might hope to make an experiment to
test which one is right.”

They've had about 100 years to formalize the collapse hypothesis into a
mathematical theory. We're still waiting.

 You could be right, but my reason is more to get the
> most "bang for the buck" of intellectual energy, and I think it is
> important to
> focus on what we can know.
>

Do you want an answer to the question of whether there are multiple
universes or not, or do you not care, or not want to know? If you don't
care or don't want to know, I will stop pursuing this topic.


> > I would alter that to say "scientists should study reality." Also, beyond
> > focusing on working on proving or disproving theories, I think another
> task of
> > a scientist is to develop good explanations.
>
> True.
>
>
> > Thank you! I am trying. I've been working on an article about
> consciousness
> > for the past 4 years.
> >
> > You (or others) can see what I have written so far
> > here:
> https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL
>
> Thank you very much for sharing! I see it has grown considerably in size
> (unless
> there's a lot of pictures) since last time I had a look.
>

Thank you. It is nearly finished.


> >
> > Glad to find more we agree on. :-)
>
> Amen! =)
>
>
> > I think what you describe as eternal doubt, is rather an acceptance of
> > nihilism, or solipsism. But if one really eternally doubts, they should
> have
> > no reason to accept solipsism over any other hypothesis, they should
> doubt
> > solipsism as much as the external reality hypothesis, as much as
> idealism,
> > materialism, and evil demons. So the eternal doubter, is only the purest
> > agnostic, who never accepts any theory as true.
>
> I'm afraid I have to disagree here. Another way to describe the
> difference between the eternal doubter, the solipsist, and the agnostic is:
>

[snip]
If I summarize our disagreement here, I see the solipsist as the odd man
out, and eternal doubter/agnostic together. The way you see it is that
solipsist/eternal doubter are together, and the agnostic is the odd man out.


>
>
> > Then we might say, there is no difference between a simulated reality, a
> > physical reality, or a mathematical reality (at least to those on the
> inside).
> > It can make no difference to them, and a difference that makes no
> difference
> > is "null and void".
>
> I'd perhaps be a bit careful here with the implications, but to you and me,
> living in the material world, it makes no difference if it is a
> simulation, the
> real world, or one out of infinite world, we can never know. So the
> comparisons
> in terms of empirical evidence, are null and void, and the material world
> is all
> we have, and all we can have, as long as we rely on empirical proof.
>
> If one considers other ways to knowledge, as you do, I can see how my
> position
> is limiting and "stubborn". If I had your view, definitions etc. I'd say it
> makes a lot of sense.
>

Okay. ��


>
> >       > In your view, is it science for the fish to conclude it is part
> of a vast
> >       > world which it cannot directly observe all of, or is this
> transcendent
> >       > metaphysics for the fish?
> >
> >       A fish is material, so is the pond and the world the pond is in,
> so there's
> >       nothing stopping the fish from jumping through the surface onto
> land, from
> >       developing legs, from jumping across narrow stretches of land,
> etc. which would
> >       make areas surrounding the pond, and eventually, the world part of
> science for
> >       the fish.
> >
> > But then I could say, if the fish might develop legs, humanity might
> develop
> > hyperdrives and escape to other unseen parts of the universe beyond the
> > horizon. By this reasoning, those parts of the universe are real and
> > scientific.
>
> As I say... if we do, if evidence is presented, I'll revise my position.
>

It seems you want to have it both ways though:

You want the *fish* (before it develops legs and escapes the pond) to be a
*scientist* when he talks of his theory-based conclusion of a larger world
outside his pond which he has never seen.
You want *humans* (before it develops hyper drive and escapes the
observable universe) to be *philosophers* debating pointlessly when we talk
about our theory-based conclusions for a larger reality beyond the
observable universe which we have never seen.

So I am not asking for a revisioned position, but if you had to be
consistent, would you say the fish in my example was doing philosophy, or
would you say that the humans (before hyper drives) are doing science?


> Let's say someone invents a machine that can teleport us to other parallell
> universes, I'll be the first one to admit I was wrong, and update my map
> of the
> world. But until then, that parallell universe does not exist as far as I
> am
> concerned. The same goes for the silly example of the bearded man in the
> sky. If
> he drops by to say hello, sure, why not? ;) But lacking that, does not
> exist.
>

I wish we had started a few decades back, and said "You will see that the
multiverse exists, and we'll have evidence, once the first quantum computer
is built."
Alas, we started our conversation only after they were built. ��


>
> But I think it is not productive to make the commitment to carry around
> infinite
> possibilities of gods, dimensions etc. in your mental realm,


It takes up less space in my mind than the belief in a single universe
(there are information theoretic reasons for this).

*Observable Universe*
Particle velocities
Physical constants
Physical equations 10^90 bits
*Quantum Multiverse*
Physical constants
Physical equations ~= 144,000 bits

*String Theory Landscape*
Physical equations ~=120,000 bits
*All physical possibilities* 0 bits


> until there is
> empirical proof there of. Let me also add the distinction that the
> fundamental
> element of fire is a different category of question, than if a parallell
> universe exists. We know how to look for elements, but there is no way for
> us
> based on our current scince to identify multiple worlds.
>

Until electron microscopes let us see them, evidence of atoms came
indirectly, by way of statistical arguments worked out by Einstein.

It is like that with multiple universes, the evidence is indirect, or
statistical.


>
> Agree! =) I think last time we had a nice mega-thread going on, we also
> ended up
> on different sides of one fundamental philosophical position. I find it
> fascinating how mental worlds unfold from these different positions about
> these
> fundamental questions!
>

Indeed! I wonder how much of someone's mentality could be worked out from
their answers to just a few core questions. What might those questions be?


> > This becomes
> > clearer when you view our universe according to the "block time"
> eternalist
> > view, seeing it as one coherent, unchanging structure. It is a
> mathematical
> > object, not unlike the unit circle or the Mandelbrot set.
>
> So you don't think the concept of 3 would be destroyed if all conscious
> minds in
> the universe were destroyed? Where would 3 exist in that case?
>

Thoughts about 3 would be destroyed, but 3 itself would remain.

Note that 3 possesses an infinite number of properties, only an
infinitesimal fraction of those properties have been considered by human
minds, yet they remain out there, waiting to be discovered.
So did we really invent 3, when it has so many innumerable properties that
humans will never consider?


>
> > I am not sure how one observation can imply anything about the
> non-existence
> > of other possible observations. Could you elaborate?
>
> [sni]
> But we are here. Does that not prove that such a possibility is
> impossible? If
> time is infinite in all directions, and if that would be a possibility,
> then
> surely it would have been realized, and nothing would have remained left.
>
> One could of course argue, that in another reality, a counter is invented,
> but
> then again, in anothe reality a counter to the counter is invented, ad
> infinitum.
>

This makes me think of Lewis's Modal Realism:

"There are so many other worlds, in fact, that absolutely every way that a
world could possibly be is a way that some world is. And as with worlds, so
it is with parts of worlds. There are ever so many ways that a part of a
world could be; and so many and so varied are the other worlds that
absolutely every way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that
some part of some world is."
-- David Lewis in “On the Plurality of Worlds” (1986)

So there are worlds that are destroyed, but also worlds that are spared,
and all manner of collections and combinations and groups, and so on, as
you say, ad infinitum.

But according to how I view things, time (and change) are also illusions.
Reality, and all its objects, are timeless and eternal. There is never any
real destruction.

As Tegmark says:
"Mathematical structures are eternal and unchanging: they don’t exist in
space and time—rather, space and time exist in (some of) them. If cosmic
history were a movie, then the mathematical structure would be the entire
DVD."
-- Max Tegmark in “Our Mathematical Universe” (2014)



>
> > It is an area many philosophers and mathematicians still struggle with
> today.
> > It verges near the uncomputable, and depends tightly on how observers are
> > defined (as so many of the unsolved problems in physics now do).
>
> Sometimes I wish I was better at math than I am.


Me too!


> I find these types of questions
> enormously fascinating! Alas... here writes one who was struggling with
> such
> lowly things as his electromagnetism and waves course. ;)
>
> Or as the ancient joke goes... what is the difference between the
> mathematicians
> office and the philosophers office? The philosophers office does not have a
> garbage bin. ;)
>

LOL that's a good one. Why is it that these jokes always seem to favor the
mathematicians? Don't they have better things to do than work out jokes to
disparage the other departments? ;-)


>
> True. A very fascinating thought! Makes one think that there's nothing new
> under
> the sun. Makes one wonder what the old brahmins might have come up with if
> they
> had access to a mailinglist like this? Or would there have been trolling
> and
> flame wars that would have prevented them from working? ;)
>

I think that might be why Hinduism contains so many great truths, that it
was alive with new writers, thinking, debate, etc., and for whatever reason
it didn't get locked into a single book, but kept growing.


>
> When do you think QC will have it's "wow" moment, that puts all the current
> press releases to shame?
>

*It's had a few so far:*
- First working quantum computer
- First execution of Shor's algorithm to factor a number
- Quantum supremacy

*Some upcoming ones:*
- First factoring of large RSA or ECC key.
- First execution of (conscious?) AI on a quantum computer. (This would
disprove collapse theories, as it is one case where Copenhagen and Everett
give different predictions) -- if we can ever agree on consciousness,
anyway.


>
> > So even pure thought experiments can be quite useful in advancing
> science, at
> > least, their utility shouldn't be entirely disregarded.
>
> Oh yes... I'm sorry if I gave the impression of thought experiments being
> useless. You are right of course, thought experiments can be very valuable
> tools!
>

No worries, I am glad we agree on this!


>
> Well, maybe we are all zombies? The subjective experience of another is
> something I at the moment never can experience, so I disregard it. In fact,
> perhaps every other human being except me, or even including me, is a
> robot?
> Never seen any evidence, so until evidence presents itself, since I by
> design
> tend to treat people who behave as if they have consciousness as
> conscious, I
> continue to do so until someone disproves it, or until someone increases my
> knowledge of consciousness. I don't see what the fuzz is all about. We
> could all
> be philozophical zombies... would that change your world?
>

I only raise it as an example where you are comfortable settling on a
conclusion by way of theory, despite lack of any empirical evidence.


>
> > But again, this is an application of a theory, into domains which we get
> no
> > observational or empirical confirmation.
>
> True! Let us leave it. As our dear Wittgenstein once said... "Whereof one
> cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". ;)
>

Okay.


>
> > So if I
> > use functionalism to conclude that other people are conscious, then I am
> using
> > a theory without ever getting empirical proof/confirmation of that
> theory's
> > prediction.
>
> True. That would not equate to knowledge would it?
>

No, not knowledge.


>
>
> > I think "proof" only exists in mathematics, not in the material world.
>
> Well, I did say empirical proof (ok, I might have forgotten to type it
> from time
> to time, but that is what I aim to say) and I think empirical proof works
> and is
> essential to science. That is another type of proof, than say, mathematical
> proof.
>

I mean even empirically, speaking, I find proof too strong a word in
science. I think evidence is better. Proof, to me, implies certainty.
Though I understand you use it in less strict a manner.


>
>
> > All those people I cite believe in a material world. They just disagree
> on the
> > material world necessarily being the most fundamental aspect of reality.
>
> Well, let me add a very important point here. I do not know what the
> fundamental
> aspect of reality is. The investigation is currently on going!


I am glad to see this. :-) I agree.


> > Yes. We saw a recent example of this actually, with the lab that thought
> they
> > measured neutrinos exceeding the speed of light.
>
> I missed that. What happened? What was the result?
>

I thought it was more recent, but I guess it was a while go:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_OPERA_faster-than-light_neutrino_anomaly
In short, they got some strange results, repeated tests, confirmed FTL
neutrinos again, and eventually found it was due to some glitch with their
clocks.


>
> >       > If we can be so confident in our theories to dismiss
> observations like that,
> >       > then should we not take our theories just as seriously when they
> say things we
> >       > can't see (and therefore have no empirical reasons to doubt)?
> >
> >       All theories are not equally strongly proven. Also, we should not
> of course
> >       dismiss the event, but note that the event does have an
> explanation. So I do not
> >       see that this example would make me change my position.
> >
> > But could it?
> >
> > Let's say we had large QCs factoring massive numbers, and the broad
> scientific
> > community overwhelmingly reached the consensus that this implied a
> multiverse.
> > Would you hold fast to your philosophy that it's still meaningless to
> discuss
> > or think about the multiverse?
>
>
> [snip]


>
> So let's wait for it, and hopefully with the advance of science, you will
> be
> able to ask me this question in 10-20-50+ years and I will then be in a
> better
> position to answers it. =)
>

It's been almost 70 year since Everett. He not only explained the collapse,
he explained it away. He resolved all issues with Shrodinger's cat,
Wigner's friend, the measurement problem, non-linearity, FTL influences,
god playing dice, etc. and paved the path to the invention, conception, and
engineering of quantum computers.

I don't know what more you expect to see in the next 50 years, but perhaps
by then, we will have conscious AI's running on quantum computers,
measuring superposed particles, quantum erasing their memory of the result,
and remaining conscious of the fact they measured a definite outcome, while
maintaining an interference pattern. Then, (if we agree the AI is
conscious), we can finally put the (never formalized hypothesis of
Copenhagen and observer-causes collapse) to bed. :-)


>
>
> Ok. As always, it was a pleasure to discuss!
>

Yes I have enjoyed this discussion immensely.


>
> > I view 4 as more of a question of purpose and meaning. What should we
> > optimize, prioritize, and make our goal? This becomes a greater question
> once
> > we master and meet the bare needs of survival for everyone. In a
> post-scarcity
> > society, particularly in one where technology and VR/mind uploading
> makes any
> > experience possible, what kinds of experiences are those we ought to
> create?
> > What would it be for? Is it an end to itself?
>
> Here is where I think philosophy and psychology have their time to shine!
> Questions of purpose and meaning, how to increase our contentment, or
> depth of
> experience, our feeling of meaning etc. these are all questions I find very
> interesting.
>

This field might interest you (Axiology/Value Theory):
https://www.britannica.com/topic/axiology
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_theory


> > My only frustration is that when I do present empirical evidence, you
> don't
> > seem to update your "priors" accordingly (as a true Bayesian would).
>
> Oh this can be due to several reasons. I might find the evidence not
> satisfactory. I might not understand the evidence. It might be a question
> of
> time, that is... I might think it over, reject it, encounter it again,
> think it
> over, I might see a point, and finally accept it.
>

Thanks. I appreciate that insight to your thought process.

[snip]


> >       Sure can, and does! It enriches life, gives meaning and hope. Just
> like religion
> >       and philosophy. But that doesn't mean it is true. On pragmatic
> grounds, and
> >       psychological grounds, I can see great benefits for the right type
> of person
> >       with the right inclination. It becomes a kind of "scientificalized
> religion".
> >
> > I just see it as a search for truth (free to explore any domain or line
> of questioning).
>
> Absolutely! For me, it is more about focusing on which domains and lines of
> questioning are the most worthwhile for me.
>

Yes, and I of course accept those lines of questioning will be different
for each person.


> > I guess I don't see why you allow yourself to make an educated guess in
> this
> > case, rather than dismiss it as null & void. (Since there are no
> observable
> > consequences whether these other things are conscious or p-zombies).
>
> See above. Upon some refletion, does it matter? In the word of Dolly
> Parton...
>
> "Sometimes it's hard to be agnostic..."
>

LOL


>
> > If it suits you, I am happy for that.
>
> =)
>
>
> [snip]


> > I am not suggesting this to be the case, only introducing a thought
> experiment
> > to learn more about how you perceive Occam's razor and in what
> situations you
> > would say it is misleading us.
>
> I'd say probably that the less we know about the problem, the more it might
> mislead us. Do you think that makes sense?
>

That's reasonable.


>
>
> > I just wanted to understand you better about what it means when Occam's
> razor
> > leads us astray. It seemed to me, you were thinking that if we prefer a
> theory
> > by Occam, but if that theory includes other unseen universes, then it is
> > leading us astray. Was that your meaning?
>
> No, more that Occam himself might lead us astray when it comes to choosing
> between options, we if don't really know what we are choosing between.
>

This is where I would turn to something like Kolmogorov complexity, to make
it rigorous and objective.


>
> > There is speculation that this is what the later installments of The
> Matrix
> > were ultimately hinting at (that the world Neo thought he had escaped
> into was
> > still just part of a larger simulation).
>
> Yes... this is an interesting (theoretical) scenario I always think about
> when
> people think they are living in a simulation. There's nothing saying that
> it is
> a simulation, within a simulation, within a simulation.


Things get a lot easier when one dispenses with the either or mentality. It
doesn't have to be one or the other. In an infinite reality, we each have
infinite explanations. So it is not one or the other, either, or, or both,
it is all.


Just like atheist
> teenagers love to point out that if god created the earth, who created
> god, and
> who created gods creator? The most unsatisfactory answer to me has always
> been
> an axiom of god is. Period. Then why not the world is? ;)
>


"The doctrine that the world was created is ill advised and should be
rejected. If God created the world, where was he before the creation? If
you say he was transcendent then and needed no support, where is he now?
How could God have made this world without any raw material? If you say
that he made this first, and then the world, you are faced with an endless
regression. If you declare that this raw material arose naturally you fall
into another fallacy, For the whole universe might thus have been its own
creator, and have arisen quite naturally."
-- Jinasena in “Mahapurana” (898 A.D.)



>
> >       In an ideal case, it
> >       makes perfect sense, what if there is an imperfect simulation?
> >
> > Even if it is perfect, it is possible to break out if someone on the
> outside
> > is watching, assuming we do something interesting enough for them to
> want to
> > intervene or break us out. :-)
> >
> > Many stories begin with an air-gapped AI convincing someone on the
> outside to
> > let it out.
>
> True. Let me know if someone reaches out! That would really shake my
> agnostic
> mind! =)
>

They could abduct a copy of you or me into their realm, and interview that
one, without having to disturb the course of this simulation.

Perhaps every day we pause the simulation of this world, go out, stretch or
legs, run some errands, then jump back in just where it left off when it
paused. None of us inside need remember having taken a break, just as we
don't remember anything of our real life on the outside. (I guess it would
be like being severed).


>
>
> > I would too. It is a shame such debates are not more common. I think
> they do a
> > lot to advance understanding for the broader public.
>
> Is it because the field is too new? That the scientists themselves do not
> know?
>

I think it's hard to organize, find people interested and capable of
debating, who think they are confident enough in their ideas and rhetoric
to not do a discredit to their side, etc. In short, there is a lot to lose
for the debate participants, though the public overall would probably gain.


>
> > I would consider that uncertainty over one's true identity, rather than
> a lack
> > of certainty that one is presently conscious.
>
> Maybe even simpler... certainty of some kind of computations, that takes
> place
> in some kind of substrate? That would hold true regardless of if you are a
> simulated person in the mind of an AI. It would still be a computation in
> some
> kind of substrate (and I'm not talking crass, material substrates here).
>

That is assuming functionalism or computationalism, as a true theory of
consciousness. But accepting that, I agree that would a conclusion you can
draw.




>
> > Though some have taken Descartes's dictum further to say one knows only
> "this
> > thought exists" and it is a further supposition to assume there is an
> "I" or a
> > "thinker" beyond that thought.
>
> Well, for both of those to be possible, there needs to be some form of
> computation done "in" something.
>

"Even if everything in this universe were an illusion, there would still
have to be something outside this universe that generates the illusion."
-- John A. Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn in “The Mystery of Existence”
(2013)

This is why I say we can rely, partly, on the laws of logic to escape
beyond the assumption of only one's present conscious state.


>
> What do you think of the anti-solipsist argument that the solipsist just by
> arguing refutes himself?
>

I think it can succeed only if one accepts a theory of consciousness that
is not epiphenomenal.

If one believes in epiphenomenalism, then the people you see and argue with
need not be conscious (they could be zombies, or other non-conscious
sub-elements of your own imagination).

If however, you believe consciousness is detectable by means of behavioral
clues, then the argument can work.


>
>
> > I may have shared the first part of my article on consciousness with you
> > previously. That is where this comes from. It is not published yet.
>
> Could be. Hmm... I wonder where else I could have seen it?
>

It is also possible I took something I wrote to your or someone else in an
e-mail list, and incorporated that into the article.


>
>
> > It certainly could be painful, but I don't think that the necessary
> system is
> > necessarily so damaged as to no longer be capable of rational thought.
>
> I think it is a spectrum, and not a binary situation. It can be slightly
> damaged, damaged or severely damaged. A small damage left unhealed, could
> become
> "infected" and over time lead to a deterioration. But here I'm sure there
> are
> plenty of medicine men and doctors who could lecture me about the actual
> state
> of affairs.
>
>
> [snip]


> > There are certainly many examples. Gödel, Nash, Tesla, Sidis, etc. but I
> don't
> > know if anyone's studied the ratios compared to the general population.
> There
> > is probably also an isolating aspect to being so much smarter than one's
> > peers, that isn't helpful.
>
> True. Probably a composite problem. Reminds me of the book Flowers for
> Algernon.
> Not easy I imagine to be a genius. =/
>
> >       > This theory absolves the improbability of having to overcome
> sperm
> >       > cell lotteries. Applying Bayesian inference to the two
> alternative hypothesis:
> >       > closed individualism, vs. open individualism, and updating the
> probability for
> >       > closed individualism with its 1 in
> 8,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 odds of
> >       > being born, this shrinks the probability of closed individualism
> (the
> >       > conventional view) down to 0.0000000000000000000000125, and
> elevates the
> >       > probability of the alternative, open individualism
> >       > to: 99.9999999999999999999999875%.
> >       >
> >       > You can consider your grandparents, and great grandparents, etc.
> to get as
> >       > close to 100% as you like. :-)
> >
> > Want to copy the following in a reply on the other thread I opened to
> discuss closed vs. open individualism?
> > (I copied and pasted the probability argument there already.)
>
> Sounds good.
>

I look forward this one a lot. :-) I hope we can get somewhere.


>
>
> > But I can't promise I won't try to prove that your conception of "I" is
> > something far greater than you presently believe it to be.
>
> Go for it! ;) I have some thoughts on the matter, based on "process"
> thinking.
> Perhaps we might find some common ground there.
>

Challenge accepted. ��


> > Are you saying that you believe, if your mom ordered fish instead of
> chicken
> > while you were a developing fetus, that you wouldn't be here? That is,
> that
> > you would be eternally unconscious/never alive/never born, while some
> > materially-different doppelganger (who isn't you) would instead be
> replying to
> > me on this list? (ignoring any butterfly effect divergences).
>
> I think this is one of those questions outside my narrow definition of
> science
> and proof, that I'd rather leave unanswered.
>

Okay.


> >       >
> >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know
> when it leads to
> >       > you being "dead forever" "experiencing nothing" "an eternal
> blank", with
> >       > "someone else" (who isn't you) walking around living and
> enjoying the world.
> >
> > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my point.
>
> I'm not so sure.
>

(I will copy my reply here to the other thread).


>
> > It seems that depending on the idea, you will either accept a theory in
> the
> > absence of empirical proof, or alternatively, you will accept ideas only
> with
> > empirical proof.
>
> Well, there is a distinction here, but I do see how you can get that
> feeling.
> One distinction is between super-natural questions and natural questions.
> I like
> to disregard super-natural questions since they are forever beyond our
> reach.
>
> Another aspect here is related to natural questions. There are many things
> I am
> not interested in, I keep agnostic. Other things I am interested in, and
> since
> they are physical questions, very easy to work with when it comes to
> empirical
> proof.
>

Understood.


>
> Yet another aspect of this, is the division between things that happen to
> me, vs
> things I can affect. Time, space, reality happen to me, I have no choice
> but to
> experience them. That is why I can act in and through time, space and
> reality,
> with having to have "belief". That is why you think that I accept the
> theory of
> reality without proof, but this I think is a misunderstanding. I act, I
> have no
> choice to act in reality. If someone disproves reality, then I revise. I
> do not
> need to have a conscious idea about time, space and reality in order to
> act in
> it.
>
> When it comes to other things inside this time/space/reality construct, I
> am the
> one acting on these other things, I choose goals, values, I design
> experiments,
> and then we are back to empirical proof.
>
> > Ideas you require no empirical proof for:
> >  *  The material world is the most primitive and fundamental aspect of
> reality
> >  *  Physical laws are eternally constant
> >  *  Other people are conscious
> > Ideas you require empirical proof for:
> >  *  The simulation hypothesis
> >  *  The reality of parts of the universe beyond the horizon
> >  *  The reality of the quantum multiverse, or the other big bangs of
> inflation
> > I would have no issue if you were agnostic on everything, but it puzzles
> me
> > that you hold opinions on some of these topics, while declaring others
> to be
> > null & void, and not worth reasoning about.
>
> When it comes to the material world, see above. Physical laws I have also
> addressed as well as consciousness.
>
> I admit that I might not have been consistent all the way through, but
> here I am
> very thankful to you for questioning me, and catching these situation. I
> can
> only blame myself being human, and me writing these answers over several
> writing
> sessions, and sometimes late and night or in the morning, when I'm perhaps
> not
> at my best.
>
> Thank you for pointing out the above! I've tried to revise.
>

I greatly appreciate your response here. None of us is ever fully
consistent and it is only in testing our ideas to the limit and trying to
break them that we can, as you say, get a little closer to truth. ;-)


>
> > We can agree we disagree here, but I thought I would point out my
> observation
> > to you.
>
> Thank you very much. You're most welcome! =)
>
>
>
[snip]


> > If you review that section, you will find it is entirely about
> connecting the
> > theory with empirical evidence.
>
> "If our conscious states result from the existence of all computations,
> then they
> are subject to the rules of algorithmic information theory."
>
> How can we prove if our conscious states result from the existence of all
> computations? I do not understand this.
>

That is only the assumption. To prove it (empirically) we need to examine
what predictions follow from that assumption, then compare it against what
we observe in the real world.

If (and its a big IF) there is a correspondence, and no prediction is
refuted, we can build confidence in the truth of that assumption. Please
see the sub-sections of that section to see what predictions follow, and
how we have (so far) found empirical verification.



>
> > I'm only asking about your opinion on what you would or wouldn't
> consider as
> > evidence of us existing in a simulation.
>
> I'd probably think that this would be proof of many people living in a
> simulated
> reality that runs in my reality. That would not change my view about that
> reality being a simulation in another reality.
>

Right, it shouldn't change (immediately) your assumption about that. But it
does cause (the rational Bayesian) to revisit the 3 options in the
simulation argument, and update the probability estimates for each of those
three possibilities. In particular, given the observational evidence at
hand, you could strongly rule out:

(1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a
“posthuman” stage;

as well as:

(2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant
number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations
thereof);

Then following the reasoning in the argument, (short of finding a flaw in
it), you should revise your probability estimate for yourself being within
a simulation.


> >       It is important
> >       to keep that distinction or else you lose the foundation of truth,
> or risk
> >       falling into solipsism if everything is doubted.
> >
> > Is this the danger you see in entertaining the simulation hypothesis?
> That
> > questioning the nature of reality might lead to a pit of solipsism and
> > nihilism?
>
> I wouldn't call it "danger" perhaps more a nuisance. But yes, I see an
> implication here, that if you seriously believe in the simulation
> hypothesis,
> you cannot be sure about anything in your reality, and again, that the
> reality+
> is not itself a simulation happening in reality++ and so on. So I find it
> inelegant.
>

If it helps, algorithmic information theory, while not ruling out being in
a multi-layered Sim(world) or Sim(Sim(world)), each additional layer adds
complexity, and thus decreases the fraction of your explanations where that
level of depth accounts for your present experience.


>
>
>
> I disagree. Without consciousness there are no numbers and no truth. Both
> are
> dependent on conscious minds.
>

How does that follow?

If electrons (themselves mathematical objects) can exist independently of
human minds, why can't integers (which are much simpler mathematical
objects than electrons).


>
>
> >
> > I like that idea a lot. It seems to combine aspects of negative
> utilitarianism
> > (minimize suffering, with conventional utilitarianism (maximize good).
> So if
> > one attempts to maximize good, while not introducing harm, that seems
> close to
> > the ideal.
>
> True, I have come to the same conclusion, but I wonder if it is not open
> to the
> critique that it is so demanding that ultimately, it is useless when it
> comes to
> guiding ones action?
>

Most problems in morality seem to be incomputable. (At least at the limit,
of ensuring one never makes a mistake)


>
> I also wonder if it does not simply collapse into some kind of personal
> hedonism?
>
> > "I believe that the proper utilization of time is this: if you can, serve
> > other people, other sentient beings. If not, at least refrain from
> harming
> > them." -- The 14th Dalai Lama in “The Art of Happiness” (1998)
>
> This could lead to the paradox of everyone trying to serve everyone! But
> refraining from harming everyone would be less susceptible to this, since
> the
> end state of no one harming anyone might be reached! ;)
>

It didn't perfectly match Pareto utilitarianism, but I thought it was
similar, in saying (basically) do good, but if you can't do that, at least
don't do bad.


>
>
> >
> > Your viewpoint may be simpler, but does it explain any of the otherwise
> > unsolved problems in physics?
>
> That is for physics to decide. Let's wait and see. ;)
>

This theory already provides the answers that physicists have long been
looking for. We can wait forever hoping another theory will come through,
but why not give attention to the one that seems to work, and try to refute
that (while we have something to work on) than keep waiting for something
else?


>
> >       > (Note: I had to pretty agressively deleting some previous
> replies from a few
> >       > e-mails ago to keep the size within limits.) Have a great day!
> >
> >       Thank you, and you too!
> >
> > Again, to you! :-)
>
> That was one long session! I think we reached a agree to disagree on quite
> a few
> tracks here, and also some that led us into new topics. I also would like
> to
> thank you for finding inconsistencies and questioning me. This is how we
> get
> closer to the truth (TM)! =)
>

It has been very rewarding, though increasingly time consuming. I am not
sure how much longer I will be able to continue, but I will try. :-)


>
> As Epicurus used to say...
>
> "In a philosophical dispute, he gains most who is defeated, since he
> learns the
> most". -- Vatican Sayings, saying 74.
>
>
A wonderful quote we should all live by. :-)

As always, thank you Daniel.

Jason
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