[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

> Copying from the other thread:
>
>       >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know
>       >when it leads to        > you being "dead forever" "experiencing
>       >nothing" "an eternal blank", with        > "someone else" (who isn't
>       >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.  
>       >
>       > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my
>       > point.
>
>       I'm not so sure.
> 
> In brief, I am asking:
> 
> What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something
> right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> 
> - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
> experiencing something right now?

Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened
_if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since
this is impossible.

> - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
> atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?

> - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
> different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something
> right now?

> - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
> experiencing something right now?

See above.

> All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
> changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to
> have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?

I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,
since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
experiments when it comes to the future.

> If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it
> doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone
> was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
> individualism.

I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with
any empirical proof of me not being me.

> If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I
> had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --
> then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
> 
> My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this 

Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position
as well.

The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and
intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable
fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory
than more complex and abstract alternatives.

The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,
the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by
our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our
experiences and identities.

The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for
how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable
for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
abstract or psychological criteria.

The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.
This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than
more esoteric alternatives.

The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human
beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity
is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or
non-physical factors.

Best regards, 
Daniel


P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:

Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical 
way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable 
events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of 
events.

Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a 
bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my 
probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact 
that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated 
through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it 
not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other 
theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place, 
each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare 
the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start 
of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us, 
in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and 
other questions.

So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in 
the face of empirical reality.