[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Brent Allsop]

Interesting topic.
I think all that is possible and important to identity.
The more the better.  For example, if you change your shirt, you are a tiny
bit different.  If you forget something, you have lost a part of yourself,
and so on.
The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in your
CPU that is doing the computation.  If you subjectively bind a new quality
into your unified subjective experience, you are a larger you.






On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Copying from the other thread:
> >
> >       >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me
> know
> >       >when it leads to        > you being "dead forever" "experiencing
> >       >nothing" "an eternal blank", with        > "someone else" (who
> isn't
> >       >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.
> >       >
> >       > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my
> >       > point.
> >
> >       I'm not so sure.
> >
> > In brief, I am asking:
> >
> > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing
> something
> > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> >
> > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
> > experiencing something right now?
>
> Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have
> happened
> _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense,
> since
> this is impossible.
>
> > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
> > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?
>
> > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
> > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing
> something
> > right now?
>
> > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
> > experiencing something right now?
>
> See above.
>
> > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
> > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have
> had to
> > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?
>
> I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us
> astray,
> since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
> questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
> experiments when it comes to the future.
>
> > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say
> "it
> > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as
> someone
> > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
> > individualism.
>
> I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been
> presented with
> any empirical proof of me not being me.
>
> > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact --
> "I
> > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do"
> --
> > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
> >
> > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this
>
> Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed
> position
> as well.
>
> The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward
> and
> intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily
> observable
> fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing
> theory
> than more complex and abstract alternatives.
>
> The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with
> animalism,
> the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined
> by
> our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
> embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping
> our
> experiences and identities.
>
> The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications
> for
> how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
> responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people
> accountable
> for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
> abstract or psychological criteria.
>
> The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
> intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
> everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological
> entities.
> This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory
> than
> more esoteric alternatives.
>
> The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
> naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding
> human
> beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our
> identity
> is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by
> supernatural or
> non-physical factors.
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:
>
> Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an
> empirical
> way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
> events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr
> of
> events.
>
> Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting
> in a
> bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
> probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the
> fact
> that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when
> calculated
> through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument
> against it
> not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or
> other
> theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took
> place,
> each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more
> rare
> the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the
> start
> of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not
> allow us,
> in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations
> and
> other questions.
>
> So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very
> convincing in
> the face of empirical reality.
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