[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

On Thu, 6 Mar 2025, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat wrote:

> 
> Interesting topic.
> I think all that is possible and important to identity.
> The more the better.  For example, if you change your shirt, you are a tiny bit different.  If you forget something, you have lost a
> part of yourself, and so on.
> The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in your CPU that is doing the computation.  If you subjectively
> bind a new quality into your unified subjective experience, you are a larger you.

Hello Brent!

Could you give an example of subjective binding, so that I can understand 
a bit more clearly what it means?

Best regards,
Daniel


> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> 
>
>       On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
>       > Copying from the other thread:
>       >
>       >       >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know
>       >       >when it leads to        > you being "dead forever" "experiencing
>       >       >nothing" "an eternal blank", with        > "someone else" (who isn't
>       >       >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.  
>       >       >
>       >       > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my
>       >       > point.
>       >
>       >       I'm not so sure.
>       >
>       > In brief, I am asking:
>       >
>       > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something
>       > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
>       >
>       > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
>       > experiencing something right now?
>
>       Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened
>       _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since
>       this is impossible.
>
>       > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
>       > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?
>
>       > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
>       > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something
>       > right now?
>
>       > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
>       > experiencing something right now?
>
>       See above.
>
>       > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
>       > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to
>       > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?
>
>       I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,
>       since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
>       questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
>       experiments when it comes to the future.
>
>       > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it
>       > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone
>       > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
>       > individualism.
>
>       I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with
>       any empirical proof of me not being me.
>
>       > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I
>       > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --
>       > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
>       >
>       > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this 
>
>       Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position
>       as well.
>
>       The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and
>       intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable
>       fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory
>       than more complex and abstract alternatives.
>
>       The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,
>       the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by
>       our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
>       embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our
>       experiences and identities.
>
>       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for
>       how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
>       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable
>       for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
>       abstract or psychological criteria.
>
>       The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
>       intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
>       everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.
>       This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than
>       more esoteric alternatives.
>
>       The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
>       naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human
>       beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity
>       is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or
>       non-physical factors.
>
>       Best regards,
>       Daniel
> 
>
>       P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:
>
>       Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical
>       way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
>       events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of
>       events.
>
>       Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a
>       bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
>       probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact
>       that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated
>       through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it
>       not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other
>       theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place,
>       each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare
>       the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start
>       of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us,
>       in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and
>       other questions.
>
>       So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in
>       the face of empirical reality.
>       _______________________________________________
>       extropy-chat mailing list
>       extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>       http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> 
> 
>