[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Brent Allsop]

It is the binding referred to in the "binding problem".
You have knowledge of what you see in your brain.  I am not directly aware
of that knowledge, due to lack of subjective binding.
Half of my visual knowledge is in my brain's Left hemisphere, and Visa
versa for the right.   I am directly aware of all of it, because of
subjective binding. (Via corpus callosum)
This is why both of my brain hemispheres are included in my identity, while
your brain is not.
Binding is basically computation.  For example, two memory registers can be
bound in a CPU.


On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, 10:36 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, 6 Mar 2025, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >
> > Interesting topic.
> > I think all that is possible and important to identity.
> > The more the better.  For example, if you change your shirt, you are a
> tiny bit different.  If you forget something, you have lost a
> > part of yourself, and so on.
> > The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in
> your CPU that is doing the computation.  If you subjectively
> > bind a new quality into your unified subjective experience, you are a
> larger you.
>
> Hello Brent!
>
> Could you give an example of subjective binding, so that I can understand
> a bit more clearly what it means?
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> >       On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> >       > Copying from the other thread:
> >       >
> >       >       >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and
> let me know
> >       >       >when it leads to        > you being "dead forever"
> "experiencing
> >       >       >nothing" "an eternal blank", with        > "someone else"
> (who isn't
> >       >       >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.
> >       >       >
> >       >       > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in
> relaying my
> >       >       > point.
> >       >
> >       >       I'm not so sure.
> >       >
> >       > In brief, I am asking:
> >       >
> >       > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing
> something
> >       > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> >       >
> >       > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be
> alive and
> >       > experiencing something right now?
> >
> >       Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would
> have happened
> >       _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little
> sense, since
> >       this is impossible.
> >
> >       > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had
> different
> >       > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right
> now?
> >
> >       > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making
> your eyes a
> >       > different shade of color, would you still be alive and
> experiencing something
> >       > right now?
> >
> >       > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be
> alive and
> >       > experiencing something right now?
> >
> >       See above.
> >
> >       > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how
> much can be
> >       > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that
> would have had to
> >       > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never
> live?
> >
> >       I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments
> lead us astray,
> >       since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these
> types of
> >       questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_
> exclude various
> >       experiments when it comes to the future.
> >
> >       > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies,
> and say "it
> >       > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so
> long as someone
> >       > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step
> towards open
> >       > individualism.
> >
> >       I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been
> presented with
> >       any empirical proof of me not being me.
> >
> >       > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material
> fact -- "I
> >       > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others
> would do" --
> >       > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty
> individualism.
> >       >
> >       > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this
> >
> >       Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the
> closed position
> >       as well.
> >
> >       The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a
> straightforward and
> >       intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the
> easily observable
> >       fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more
> appealing theory
> >       than more complex and abstract alternatives.
> >
> >       The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated
> with animalism,
> >       the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is
> determined by
> >       our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance
> of our
> >       embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in
> shaping our
> >       experiences and identities.
> >
> >       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical
> implications for
> >       how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and
> legal
> >       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold
> people accountable
> >       for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather
> than on more
> >       abstract or psychological criteria.
> >
> >       The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as
> the most
> >       intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns
> with our
> >       everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous
> biological entities.
> >       This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable
> theory than
> >       more esoteric alternatives.
> >
> >       The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated
> with a
> >       naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of
> understanding human
> >       beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests
> that our identity
> >       is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by
> supernatural or
> >       non-physical factors.
> >
> >       Best regards,
> >       Daniel
> >
> >
> >       P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous
> thread:
> >
> >       Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in
> an empirical
> >       way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe,
> improbable
> >       events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to
> infinite nr of
> >       events.
> >
> >       Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker
> sitting in a
> >       bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate
> my
> >       probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it
> exists. So the fact
> >       that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when
> calculated
> >       through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid
> argument against it
> >       not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic
> world, or other
> >       theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of
> events took place,
> >       each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along
> the more rare
> >       the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations
> from the start
> >       of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does
> not allow us,
> >       in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like
> simulations and
> >       other questions.
> >
> >       So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very
> convincing in
> >       the face of empirical reality.
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> >
> >
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