[ExI] Time and Personal Identity
efc at disroot.org
efc at disroot.org
Thu Mar 6 21:04:47 UTC 2025
On Thu, 6 Mar 2025, Brent Allsop wrote:
>
> It is the binding referred to in the "binding problem".
> You have knowledge of what you see in your brain. I am not directly aware of that knowledge, due to lack of subjective binding.
> Half of my visual knowledge is in my brain's Left hemisphere, and Visa versa for the right. I am directly aware of all of it,
> because of subjective binding. (Via corpus callosum)
> This is why both of my brain hemispheres are included in my identity, while your brain is not.
> Binding is basically computation. For example, two memory registers can be bound in a CPU.
Got it, thank you Brent.
Could you imagine expanding the binding to things beyond the brain? To our
bodies, and to our environment anchored in space and time? I guess what
I'm trying to say is that perhaps identity is a connecting process, that
binds together not only the brain, but the brain and surrounding "things"
and anchors them in time and space?
Best regards,
Daniel
>
> On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, 10:36 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 6 Mar 2025, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >
> > Interesting topic.
> > I think all that is possible and important to identity.
> > The more the better. For example, if you change your shirt, you are a tiny bit different. If you forget something,
> you have lost a
> > part of yourself, and so on.
> > The critical part to all of identity, to me, is subjective binding, in your CPU that is doing the computation. If you
> subjectively
> > bind a new quality into your unified subjective experience, you are a larger you.
>
> Hello Brent!
>
> Could you give an example of subjective binding, so that I can understand
> a bit more clearly what it means?
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 7:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> > > Copying from the other thread:
> > >
> > > > > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me know
> > > >when it leads to > you being "dead forever" "experiencing
> > > >nothing" "an eternal blank", with > "someone else" (who isn't
> > > >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.
> > > >
> > > > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my
> > > > point.
> > >
> > > I'm not so sure.
> > >
> > > In brief, I am asking:
> > >
> > > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something
> > > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> > >
> > > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
> > > experiencing something right now?
> >
> > Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened
> > _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since
> > this is impossible.
> >
> > > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
> > > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?
> >
> > > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
> > > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something
> > > right now?
> >
> > > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
> > > experiencing something right now?
> >
> > See above.
> >
> > > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
> > > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to
> > > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?
> >
> > I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,
> > since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
> > questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
> > experiments when it comes to the future.
> >
> > > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it
> > > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone
> > > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
> > > individualism.
> >
> > I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with
> > any empirical proof of me not being me.
> >
> > > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I
> > > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --
> > > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
> > >
> > > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this
> >
> > Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position
> > as well.
> >
> > The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and
> > intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable
> > fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory
> > than more complex and abstract alternatives.
> >
> > The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,
> > the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by
> > our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
> > embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our
> > experiences and identities.
> >
> > The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for
> > how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
> > responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable
> > for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
> > abstract or psychological criteria.
> >
> > The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
> > intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
> > everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.
> > This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than
> > more esoteric alternatives.
> >
> > The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
> > naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human
> > beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity
> > is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or
> > non-physical factors.
> >
> > Best regards,
> > Daniel
> >
> >
> > P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:
> >
> > Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an empirical
> > way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
> > events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr of
> > events.
> >
> > Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting in a
> > bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
> > probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the fact
> > that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when calculated
> > through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument against it
> > not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or other
> > theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took place,
> > each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more rare
> > the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the start
> > of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not allow us,
> > in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations and
> > other questions.
> >
> > So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very convincing in
> > the face of empirical reality.
> > _______________________________________________
> > extropy-chat mailing list
> > extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> > http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
>
>
More information about the extropy-chat
mailing list