[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 9:45 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Copying from the other thread:
> >
> >       >       > Extend this with other genes, one at a time, and let me
> know
> >       >when it leads to        > you being "dead forever" "experiencing
> >       >nothing" "an eternal blank", with        > "someone else" (who
> isn't
> >       >you) walking around living and enjoying the world.
> >       >
> >       > I am curious if what I wrote here was of any help in relaying my
> >       > point.
> >
> >       I'm not so sure.
> >
> > In brief, I am asking:
> >
> > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing
> something
> > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> >
> > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
> > experiencing something right now?
>
> Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have
> happened
> _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense,
> since
> this is impossible.
>

I am merely highlighting the fact, which I think all people agree on, that
one being present in the world, that is, here, alive, and conscious, is not
contingent on certain particulars in your environment or experience.
Consider this randomly chosen word, which I will subject you to now:

*"hat"*


If I had written "cat" instead of "hat", you would still be alive and here,
and conscious, but you would have seen the random word to have been
something different. These are contingencies that are simply unimportant to
you being here, and being conscious and alive.

Where things get interesting, is when we consider, how far can things go,
in terms of changing particulars (of your experience, or in your
environment) without changing the fact that you would still be here,
experiencing something, as someone.

Can we:

   - Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅
   - Change elements in your experience? ✅
   - Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some other food
   yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)
   - Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you drank
   something different, these different water molecules would now be in your
   brain)
   - Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what random
   word I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)
   - Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a particular
   random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories being laid
   down as altered neural connections)
   - Can we change your genes?
   - Can we change who your parents were?

Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less obvious answers
(short of having a theory of personal identity).



>
> > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
> > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?
>
> > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
> > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing
> something
> > right now?
>
> > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
> > experiencing something right now?
>
> See above.
>

Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then this
conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.



>
> > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
> > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have
> had to
> > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?
>
> I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us
> astray,
> since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
> questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
> experiments when it comes to the future.
>

Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent thought
experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and consider this
question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:


You will be put to sleep, and while you are asleep, Bob will decide whether
you are to play *the easy game* or *the hard game* (he is known to go
either way, with roughly equal odds, depending on his mood).

If Bob chooses that you play the easy game, then he will flip a fair coin
1,000 times, and afterwards, Bob will awaken you regardless of what pattern
of heads and tails came up.

If Bob chooses that you play the hard game, then he will flip a fair coin
1,000 times, but we will only awaken you if he observes a specific
predetermined pattern series of 1,000 heads and tails.
That is, only if Bob sees the exactly correct, single pattern (out of the
2^1000 possible patterns) will you awaken. One coin flip off, and you will
remain sleeping forever.

Now, let's say you play this game, and then find that you have awakened.
Are you justified in believing it was _overwhelmingly_ more probable that
you are awake because *the easy game* was played?

If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick question, but one
meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can agree on)
then we can proceed.



>
> > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say
> "it
> > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as
> someone
> > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
> > individualism.
>
> I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been
> presented with
> any empirical proof of me not being me.
>

Note that both closed individualism and open individualism explain the
appearance of you only being able to remember being Daniel from Daniel's
point of view.

Closed individualism says this is due not to the fact that brains are not
integrated, but because your "identity" (some might say soul) is, for lack
of a better word, *pinned* to one particular material body.
Open individualism says it is due solely to the fact that different brains
are not integrated.

One need make no metaphysical assumptions about souls being pinned to
bodies, the fact that you don't remember being anyone else is entirely
explainable due to the lack of integration between brains.

Since both theories make the same predictions for your experience, that you
experiencing no integration with other minds is not a clue you can use to
determine which one is true.


Perhaps this analogy helps to think about the theories:
Empty Individualism: Buddhist concept of self as a single thought: No-Self
/ Anattā
Closed Individualism: Abrahamic conception of the self as a single
individual material body/spiritual soul
Open Individualism: Hindu concept of the self as selfsame with the all:
"Thou art that" (Tat Tvam Asi)


>
> > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact --
> "I
> > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do"
> --
> > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
> >
> > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this
>
> Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed
> position
> as well.
>
> The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward
> and
> intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily
> observable
> fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing
> theory
> than more complex and abstract alternatives.
>

Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and unwarranted)
assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be discarded, if
simplicity is what you are after.


>
> The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with
> animalism,
> the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined
> by
> our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
> embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping
> our
> experiences and identities.
>
> The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications
> for
> how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
> responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people
> accountable
> for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
> abstract or psychological criteria.
>
> The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
> intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
> everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological
> entities.
> This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory
> than
> more esoteric alternatives.
>
> The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
> naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding
> human
> beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our
> identity
> is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by
> supernatural or
> non-physical factors.
>

Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence seems unlike
your usual style.

Jason



>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> P.S. I think I was also supposed to add this bit from the previous thread:
>
> Ah, but first of all, there is no proof of open individualism in an
> empirical
> way. Second of all, due to the size and nature of the universe, improbable
> events happen all the time, due to the infinite, or close to infinite nr
> of
> events.
>
> Calculating the probability of the existence of the wheat cracker sitting
> in a
> bowl on my desk right now, according to the same way you calculate my
> probability, yields similar low probabilities, yet there it exists. So the
> fact
> that a specific state of events happens, even though unlikely when
> calculated
> through a chain of events from the big bang, is not a valid argument
> against it
> not existing, and it is not an argument that proves any platonic world, or
> other
> theories of identity. All it can tell us is that a hueg nr of events took
> place,
> each with a certain probability, and the further time moves along the more
> rare
> the event when seen through the lens of probability calculations from the
> start
> of time. It is just a feature of the way our world works, and does not
> allow us,
> in this case to draw any non-empiciral conclusions. Just like simulations
> and
> other questions.
>
> So I do not find the proof a proof at all, and I'm afraid not very
> convincing in
> the face of empirical reality.
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20250308/00efb26f/attachment.htm>