[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[efc at disroot.org]

>       > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing something
>       > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
>       >
>       > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be alive and
>       > experiencing something right now?
>
>       Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would have happened
>       _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little sense, since
>       this is impossible.
> 
> I am merely highlighting the fact, which I think all people agree on, that one
> being present in the world, that is, here, alive, and conscious, is not
> contingent on certain particulars in your environment or experience. Consider
> this randomly chosen word, which I will subject you to now:
>
>       "hat"
> 
> If I had written "cat" instead of "hat", you would still be alive and here,
> and conscious, but you would have seen the random word to have been something
> different. These are contingencies that are simply unimportant to you being
> here, and being conscious and alive.

Sounds reasonable!

> Where things get interesting, is when we consider, how far can things go, in
> terms of changing particulars (of your experience, or in your environment)
> without changing the fact that you would still be here, experiencing
> something, as someone.

Yes!

> Can we:
>  *  Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅
>  *  Change elements in your experience? ✅
>  *  Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some other food
>  yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)
>  *  Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you drank something
>  different, these different water molecules would now be in your brain)
>  *  Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what random word
>  I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)
>  *  Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a particular
>  random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories being laid
>  down as altered neural connections)
>  *  Can we change your genes? 
>  *  Can we change who your parents were?
> Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less obvious answers (short of having a theory of personal identity).

True. I would add to that, the rate of change, and the eternally slippery amount
of change, and how that change is made (that is, a thought experiment, or a
change aligned and consistent with our laws of physics).

>       > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had different
>       > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right now?
>
>       > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making your eyes a
>       > different shade of color, would you still be alive and experiencing something
>       > right now?
>
>       > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be alive and
>       > experiencing something right now?
>
>       See above.
> 
> Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then this
> conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.

Sorry, what do you mean? Could you please give an example?

>       > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how much can be
>       > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that would have had to
>       > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never live?
>
>       I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments lead us astray,
>       since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these types of
>       questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_ exclude various
>       experiments when it comes to the future.
> 
> Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent thought
> experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and consider this
> question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:
> 
> You will be put to sleep, and while you are asleep, Bob will decide whether
> you are to play the easy game or the hard game (he is known to go either way,
> with roughly equal odds, depending on his mood).
> 
> If Bob chooses that you play the easy game, then he will flip a fair coin
> 1,000 times, and afterwards, Bob will awaken you regardless of what pattern of
> heads and tails came up.
> 
> If Bob chooses that you play the hard game, then he will flip a fair coin
> 1,000 times, but we will only awaken you if he observes a specific
> predetermined pattern series of 1,000 heads and tails. That is, only if Bob
> sees the exactly correct, single pattern (out of the 2^1000 possible patterns)
> will you awaken. One coin flip off, and you will remain sleeping forever.
> 
> Now, let's say you play this game, and then find that you have awakened. Are
> you justified in believing it was _overwhelmingly_ more probable that you are
> awake because the easy game was played?
> 
> If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick question, but one
> meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can agree on) then
> we can proceed.

For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know where you will go
with this, but I am curious.

>       > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies, and say "it
>       > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so long as someone
>       > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step towards open
>       > individualism.
>
>       I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been presented with
>       any empirical proof of me not being me.
> 
> Note that both closed individualism and open individualism explain the
> appearance of you only being able to remember being Daniel from Daniel's point
> of view.
> 
> Closed individualism says this is due not to the fact that brains are not
> integrated, but because your "identity" (some might say soul) is, for lack of
> a better word, *pinned* to one particular material body. Open individualism
> says it is due solely to the fact that different brains are not integrated.
> 
> One need make no metaphysical assumptions about souls being pinned to bodies,
> the fact that you don't remember being anyone else is entirely explainable due
> to the lack of integration between brains.
> 
> Since both theories make the same predictions for your experience, that you
> experiencing no integration with other minds is not a clue you can use to
> determine which one is true.

Why not? Closed individualism is easy to prove. I'm an individual, I have
continuity of mind and body, and so do other healthy people. They can be
interviewed, queried about memories, they act every day as if they were
individuals, completely aligned with closed individualism.

I think those are all good arguments for closed individualism, in addition to my
intuition of course, which aligns well with closed individualism.

So with that in mind, how would you empirically prove open individualism?

> Perhaps this analogy helps to think about the theories:
> Empty Individualism: Buddhist concept of self as a single thought: No-Self / Anattā
> Closed Individualism: Abrahamic conception of the self as a single individual material body/spiritual soul
> Open Individualism: Hindu concept of the self as selfsame with the all: "Thou art that" (Tat Tvam Asi)


>       > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material fact -- "I
>       > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others would do" --
>       > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty individualism.
>       >
>       > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this 
>
>       Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the closed position
>       as well.
>
>       The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a straightforward and
>       intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the easily observable
>       fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more appealing theory
>       than more complex and abstract alternatives.
> 
> Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and unwarranted)
> assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be discarded, if
> simplicity is what you are after.  

I don't think it does. In my opinion all it says, is that today, what you see is
what you get. Who knows? There might be some kind of uploading able to preserve
continuity in a way that conclusively proves that our consciousness and identity
are subtrate independent, but we have no evidence of this yet.

I think science might be able to answer, or at least give indications of this in
time.

I also think you can have closed individualism without soul-pinning as an
assumption.

>       The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with animalism,
>       the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is determined by
>       our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance of our
>       embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in shaping our
>       experiences and identities.

I think this is a weak argument for closed invidiualism. I like simplicity and
how it confirms intuition much better.

>       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical implications for
>       how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and legal
>       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold people accountable
>       for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather than on more
>       abstract or psychological criteria.

This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed individualism works
well.

Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that changing the way
society works in terms of crime and punishment?

>       The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as the most
>       intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns with our
>       everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous biological entities.
>       This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable theory than
>       more esoteric alternatives.

This I'd lump in under simplicity.

>       The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated with a
>       naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of understanding human
>       beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests that our identity
>       is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by supernatural or
>       non-physical factors.

This is nonsense.

> Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence seems unlike your
> usual style.

My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to bring in some
starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see comments
above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry about that.

Best regards, 
Daniel