[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Mar 10, 2025, 6:40 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> >       > What factors were necessary for you to be alive and experiencing
> something
> >       > right now in this moment? What had to happen?
> >       >
> >       > - If you put on a different shirt today, would you still be
> alive and
> >       > experiencing something right now?
> >
> >       Yes! In fact, I have confirmed this! ;) If you mean, what would
> have happened
> >       _if_ I did this earlier this morning, the question makes little
> sense, since
> >       this is impossible.
> >
> > I am merely highlighting the fact, which I think all people agree on,
> that one
> > being present in the world, that is, here, alive, and conscious, is not
> > contingent on certain particulars in your environment or experience.
> Consider
> > this randomly chosen word, which I will subject you to now:
> >
> >       "hat"
> >
> > If I had written "cat" instead of "hat", you would still be alive and
> here,
> > and conscious, but you would have seen the random word to have been
> something
> > different. These are contingencies that are simply unimportant to you
> being
> > here, and being conscious and alive.
>
> Sounds reasonable!
>

��


> > Where things get interesting, is when we consider, how far can things
> go, in
> > terms of changing particulars (of your experience, or in your
> environment)
> > without changing the fact that you would still be here, experiencing
> > something, as someone.
>
> Yes!
>
> > Can we:
> >  *  Can we change the clothes you are wearing? ✅
> >  *  Change elements in your experience? ✅
> >  *  Can we change atoms in your body? ✅ (had you eaten some other food
> >  yesterday, you would still be here, having some experience)
> >  *  Can we change atoms in your brain? ✅ (likewise, had you drank
> something
> >  different, these different water molecules would now be in your brain)
> >  *  Can we change which neurons are active? ✅ (depending on what random
> word
> >  I wrote, different neurons are now active in your brain)
> >  *  Can we change how neurons are wired? ✅ (since I gave you a particular
> >  random word, and not the other, different patterns and memories being
> laid
> >  down as altered neural connections)
> >  *  Can we change your genes?
> >  *  Can we change who your parents were?
> > Very quickly, we get to questions that have less and less obvious
> answers (short of having a theory of personal identity).
>
> True. I would add to that, the rate of change, and the eternally slippery
> amount
> of change, and how that change is made (that is, a thought experiment, or a
> change aligned and consistent with our laws of physics).
>

Good points. Those are also cases of concern that various theories of
personal identity contend with.



> >       > - If you ate something else last week, such that your brain had
> different
> >       > atoms, would you still be alive and experiencing something right
> now?
> >
> >       > - If you had a gene mutation during your development, making
> your eyes a
> >       > different shade of color, would you still be alive and
> experiencing something
> >       > right now?
> >
> >       > - If you forgot something trivial yesterday, would you still be
> alive and
> >       > experiencing something right now?
> >
> >       See above.
> >
> > Are you able to consider counterfactual situations? If not then this
> > conversation is going to be very difficult, if not impossible.
>
> Sorry, what do you mean? Could you please give an example?
>


I interpreted your "See above." As referring to when you wrote:

"If you mean, what would have happened  _if_ I did this earlier this
morning, the question makes little sense, since this is impossible."

A counterfactual situation is one that concerns something which didn't
happen. For example if someone asks "How hungry would you feel right now,
if you didn't eat breakfast this morning?" And the person says "Well I did
eat breakfast this morning." And if that person does not, or refuses to
consider or address that hypothetical question because it concerns
something that didn't actually happen, then that person isn't able to
handle counterfactuals.

It is possible I misinterpreted your meaning of "since this is impossible"
or what you meant by "see above."

But if I did interpret your answer correctly, then not being able to answer
or consider questions involving alternative possible pasts (counterfactual
events), imposes a severe limitation on the situations we can consider and
which are especially important to developing theories of personal identity.



> >       > All these questions probe at personal identity. What, and how
> much can be
> >       > changed without losing who you are? What is the minimum that
> would have had to
> >       > have changed before you were born to make sure you would never
> live?
> >
> >       I think perhaps this is an example of where thought experiments
> lead us astray,
> >       since this is all in the past. If we cannot change the past, these
> types of
> >       questions are difficult to answer. That does however, _not_
> exclude various
> >       experiments when it comes to the future.
>

I'm not asking you to change the past. Only to consider what might have
happened, had something in the past occurred differently.


>
> > Okay, I would like to reframe this entirely as an equivalent thought
> > experiment concerning the future. I hope you will oblige and consider
> this
> > question thoroughly to give an answer. Here is the scenario:
> >
> > You will be put to sleep, and while you are asleep, Bob will decide
> whether
> > you are to play the easy game or the hard game (he is known to go either
> way,
> > with roughly equal odds, depending on his mood).
> >
> > If Bob chooses that you play the easy game, then he will flip a fair coin
> > 1,000 times, and afterwards, Bob will awaken you regardless of what
> pattern of
> > heads and tails came up.
> >
> > If Bob chooses that you play the hard game, then he will flip a fair coin
> > 1,000 times, but we will only awaken you if he observes a specific
> > predetermined pattern series of 1,000 heads and tails. That is, only if
> Bob
> > sees the exactly correct, single pattern (out of the 2^1000 possible
> patterns)
> > will you awaken. One coin flip off, and you will remain sleeping forever.
> >
> > Now, let's say you play this game, and then find that you have awakened.
> Are
> > you justified in believing it was _overwhelmingly_ more probable that
> you are
> > awake because the easy game was played?
> >
> > If you can answer this question (noteL it is not a trick question, but
> one
> > meant to be straight-forward and one that nearly everyone can agree on)
> then
> > we can proceed.
>
> For the sake of discussion, let's go with yes. I think I know where you
> will go
> with this, but I am curious.
>

In the field of personal identity, there is also an "easy game" and a "hard
game".

Closed individualism conditions your existence on being born as a specific
individual having a specific material body and specific genetic make up.
(Empty individualism goes even further, conditioning it on a specific state
of mind). By placing such tight constraints on coming into existence, one
must overcome incredible odds in order to exist.

Closed individualism is therefore (I argue) equivalent to the "hard game"
described above, where "being awakened" requires a stroke of incredible
luck. The difference is that winning in closed individualism requires
winning a series of ancestral "sperm cell lotteries" rather than winning a
series of coin tosses.) -- Note that the 1 in 2^1000 is reached and
exceeded after considering 37 ancestor conceptions, which is just 5 prior
generations.

Open individualism, is the equivalent of the easy game. No luck is
required, no special circumstances were needed, you would always be born
(awakened), no matter what.

So accepting that one is justified (based on one's observation of having
been awakened) in concluding it is almost certain that they played the easy
game, rather than the hard game. Your task is this:



To show why we are not similarly justified in concluding open individualism
(the easy game) rather than closed individualism (the hard game).



(The first instinct many people have when confronted with this argument is
to say "Well someone had to win" but note this doesn't make it one bit more
likely that *you* should be a winner. Even if *someone* wins the lottery on
every drawing, it remains unlikely that *you* should be the one who wins.)



> >       > If you get to the point of denying any necessary contingencies,
> and say "it
> >       > doesn't matter if you change that factor, or that factor, so
> long as someone
> >       > was born, I would have been that person" then this is a step
> towards open
> >       > individualism.
> >
> >       I think I'm leaning towards closed individualism. I have not been
> presented with
> >       any empirical proof of me not being me.
> >
> > Note that both closed individualism and open individualism explain the
> > appearance of you only being able to remember being Daniel from Daniel's
> point
> > of view.
> >
> > Closed individualism says this is due not to the fact that brains are not
> > integrated, but because your "identity" (some might say soul) is, for
> lack of
> > a better word, *pinned* to one particular material body. Open
> individualism
> > says it is due solely to the fact that different brains are not
> integrated.
> >
> > One need make no metaphysical assumptions about souls being pinned to
> bodies,
> > the fact that you don't remember being anyone else is entirely
> explainable due
> > to the lack of integration between brains.
> >
> > Since both theories make the same predictions for your experience, that
> you
> > experiencing no integration with other minds is not a clue you can use to
> > determine which one is true.
>
> Why not? Closed individualism is easy to prove.

I'm an individual, I have
> continuity of mind and body, and so do other healthy people.


This is a fact all theories of personal identity agree with. No theory of
personal identity rejects the idea that bodies, brains, memories, etc.
exist and are generally experienced as if they occur continuously, and are
generally limited to the memories accessable to a single nervous system.

But none of this esteblishes closed individualism as true.

They can be
> interviewed, queried about memories, they act every day as if they were
> individuals, completely aligned with closed individualism.
>

This is equally aligned with open individualism (and empty individualism
too, for that matter).


> I think those are all good arguments for closed individualism, in addition
> to my
> intuition of course, which aligns well with closed individualism.
>

Closed individualism is intuitive, and it makes sense (evolutionarily
speaking) that we should be programmed to believe it by default. But that
something feels a certain way should not be considered sufficient grounds
of proof. It feels like Earth isn't moving, for example.

Also consider that the intuitive nature of closed individualism breaks down
as soon as one strays away from ordinary situations of common experience.
When you consider transporters, duplication machines, fission or fusion of
minds or bodies, memory erasures and implantations, etc. Then closed
individualism begins to seem ill-equipped to provide intuitive answers.


> So with that in mind, how would you empirically prove open individualism?
>

Using the argument I outlined above. We can take the empirical observation
that somehow one has awakened into existence.

>From that observation we can reason that it is overwhelmingly more likely
that this awakening was contingent upon an "easy game" of personal identity
having been played, rather than a "hard game" of personal identity.


> > Perhaps this analogy helps to think about the theories:
> > Empty Individualism: Buddhist concept of self as a single thought:
> No-Self / Anattā
> > Closed Individualism: Abrahamic conception of the self as a single
> individual material body/spiritual soul
> > Open Individualism: Hindu concept of the self as selfsame with the all:
> "Thou art that" (Tat Tvam Asi)
>
>
> >       > If, however, you make your existence contingent on some material
> fact -- "I
> >       > had to have exactly these atoms make up my body, and no others
> would do" --
> >       > then you are firmly in the space of closed or empty
> individualism.
> >       >
> >       > My question was meant to gauge where you stand on this
> >
> >       Closed I'd say. I'll add some common arguments in favour of the
> closed position
> >       as well.
> >
> >       The simplicity argument: Closed individualism provides a
> straightforward and
> >       intuitive account of personal identity, as it is based on the
> easily observable
> >       fact of biological continuity. This simplicity makes it a more
> appealing theory
> >       than more complex and abstract alternatives.
> >
> > Closed individualism makes the further (unnecessary and unwarranted)
> > assumption of "soul pinning". This assumption should be discarded, if
> > simplicity is what you are after.
>
> I don't think it does. In my opinion all it says, is that today, what you
> see is
> what you get.


I think "soul pinning" is a metaphysical assumption implicit in closed
individualism.

It is the idea that *your experiences* are locked into being only the
experiences that happen to some particular bundle of matter (your body) and
it's continuous transformations.

But if you make a copy, or if one collection is destroyed and another
remade with different materials, you say those experiences aren't yours,
because this metaphysical thing (that you say is tied to this one bundle of
matter) isn't there, present in that other copied or reformed bundle of
matter.

But *what is* this metaphysical thing pinned to some bundle of matter (a
thing which can't be measured) which you maintain is necessary for the
experiences to *be yours*?


Who knows? There might be some kind of uploading able to preserve
> continuity in a way that conclusively proves that our consciousness and
> identity
> are subtrate independent, but we have no evidence of this yet.
>

Substrate independence is a concern of philosophy of mind. I don't see it
as related to theories of personal identity.


> I think science might be able to answer, or at least give indications of
> this in
> time.
>
> I also think you can have closed individualism without soul-pinning as an
> assumption.
>

What would that look like?

I think if one drops the notion of soul pinning from closed individualism,
then are left with open individualism.



> >       The animalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated
> with animalism,
> >       the view that human beings are animals and that our identity is
> determined by
> >       our biological nature. This perspective emphasizes the importance
> of our
> >       embodied existence and the role that our physical bodies play in
> shaping our
> >       experiences and identities.
>
> I think this is a weak argument for closed invidiualism. I like simplicity
> and
> how it confirms intuition much better.
>

I thought it was pretty nonsensical to mention animalism as an argument.
You can argue it is simpler and more intuitive, but as I see it, open
individualism makes fewer assumptions about what is required to be you, and
it provides more intuitive answers than closed individualism when it comes
to less than ordinary situations.


> >       The practicality argument: Closed individualism has practical
> implications for
> >       how we think about personal identity and its relation to moral and
> legal
> >       responsibility. For example, it suggests that we should hold
> people accountable
> >       for their actions based on their biological continuity, rather
> than on more
> >       abstract or psychological criteria.
>
> This is interesting. From a pragmatic point of view, closed individualism
> works
> well.
>


It may work well, but I don't think pragmatism holds any weight when the
concern is finding what is true rather than deciding how to organize
society.


> Let's assume open individualism is true, how would you see that changing
> the way
> society works in terms of crime and punishment?


If more people believed open individualism, I think there would be more
compassion, more charity, more concern for the future, and less harming and
cheating of others.

As far as crime and punishment, the goal should always be harm minimization
never inflicting pain for the purpose of pain alone, though punishment may
serve the purpose of reducing pain overall (via deterrence). It is a
complex question.


> >       The common sense argument: Closed individualism is often seen as
> the most
> >       intuitive and common-sense view of personal identity, as it aligns
> with our
> >       everyday experience of ourselves and others as continuous
> biological entities.
> >       This common-sense appeal makes it a more accessible and relatable
> theory than
> >       more esoteric alternatives.
>
> This I'd lump in under simplicity.
>

I would also note that most of the great breakthroughs of science came
about by demonstrating common sense was wrong.


> >       The naturalism argument: Closed individualism is often associated
> with a
> >       naturalistic worldview, which emphasizes the importance of
> understanding human
> >       beings as part of the natural world. This perspective suggests
> that our identity
> >       is determined by natural processes and phenomena, rather than by
> supernatural or
> >       non-physical factors.
>
> This is nonsense.
>
> > Did AI help write this? The verbosity and lack of coherence seems unlike
> your
> > usual style.
>
> My apologies! Yes, I should have told you that. =( My idea was to bring in
> some
> starting points for discussion, and to discuss these myself (see comments
> above), and then ask what you think. This was my mistake, sorry about that.
>


No worries! I was pretty sure it wasn't written by you by how far off base
it seemed with it's answers. AI is good for generating a lot of ideas, but
at least here, not so good at judging the relevance of those ideas.

Jason
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