[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

>       >       situation and the purpose of the investigation.
>       >
>       > Yes I think this is what I was saying, and what I meant by all instances
>       > containing the same isomorphic pattern.
>       >
>       > But note that strictly speaking no instance can be "identical with" this
>       > pattern, without (by implication) all instances being identical with each
>       > other (which is clearly not the case). Therefore, the pattern is something
>       > distinct from any of its particular instantiations.
>       >
>       > Do you understand my reasoning here?
>
>       Not quite. How can it be something distinct from its instantiations without
>       having any existence? I think it comes down to a wider or narrower definition,
>       together with the context, in order to tease out a workable "B5". Given a
>       specific definition, I am sure I would agree with your point, given another,
>       maybe not.
> 
> Take who incarnations of B5: the sheet music (X), and the orchestral rendition
> (Y). Neither of these two things is identical to each other. I think you agree
> with this. That is: X != Y.

But note that one is dependent on the other, but that's probably besides the
point.

> Given these two instantiations are not identical with each other, then they
> cannot be identical with any third thing (let's call that third thing Z). If X
> != Y, then we know ((X == Z) && (Y == Z)) must be false. Do you agree so far?

Yes.

> Then my contention is, this abstract thing we call B5, cannot be identical
> with X, and cannot be identical with Y, because then it would constitute that
> same common thing Z, but we already proved (based on the lack of an identity
> between X and Y) that there can be no third thing which X and Y are both
> identical to. Thus B5 is not identical with any of its particular
> instantiations, it has its own identity, independent of and from, any of its
> instantiations.  

I disagree. We have shown, as per your reasoning and defintion, that B5 is not
equal to the sheet music, and that it is not performance. You have not shown
what it is. I think, this is a trivial problem. B5, is dependent on context, and
supplying context, I think it is easy to say what it is and isn't. I think it is
impossible and not useful, to define it as some kind of "via negative" as
negations.

>       >       > Thought experiments 11-15, in my view, more or less conclusively establish functionalism as the only workable
>       theory of
>       >       > consciousness.
>       >
>       >       This might be for another thread.
>       >
>       > Sure. Would you like to start it?
>
>       What would you like to use as a starting point?
> 
> 
> Up to you. Perhaps start with one you disagree with my conclusion (but name the ones you do agree with), and we can explore that
> thought experiment in more detail.

I think I'll leave it for the moment. The various threads give me a feeling of
being overwhelmed. But I think we can probably close one or two, and that would
then open up space (and time ;)) for new threads.

>       > I think your choice then is to become agnostic about materialism, or
>       > alternatively, accept materialism and all it's implications.
>       >
>       > If you remain agnostic about the implications of materialism, the I would say
>       > you don't really accept materialism, and are agnostic about it.
>
>       Well, there are a few differences here. I might have a materialist outlook, and
>       prefer the methods of science to find truth. But, in the example above, we
>       cannot do that, so currently it is impossible. It is a thought experiment. The
>       second argument is that materialism is not incompatible with being agnostic
>       about questions, while gathering more evidence. The third point is, that we do
>       not know what consciousness is, nor how it works. On the surface of it, what you
>       say would seem to be the truth, but if our starting point of understanding is
>       flawed, then the implication is flawed. That is why, as long as it is basically
>       impossible to test, even materialists are allowed to stay agnostic. But, what
>       separates this example from, just to take our favourite example, multiple
>       worlds, is that this actually related to a possible experiment (in the future)
>       in the physical worlds, so I would feel much more positively disposed towards
>       the implication here, than towards any implication of multiple worlds.
> 
> Materialism has, at least in philosophy of mind, recently been renamed as
> "physicalism" for physics reveals there are many things in the universe that
> are not matter (energy, fields, spacetime, etc.)

This is a good point, and avoid misunderstanding. I will try and update my
"reflex" to write materialism and use physicalism instead. Keep in mind, that if
you should happen to see materialism, you can think physicalism. Physicalism is
also more prone to spelling errors for me. Maybe I should use say "p". ;)

> Physicalism is the philosophy that: "all things are physical." So according to
> physicalism, consciousness is physical.

Yes.

> If one accepts physicalism as a starting point, I think they must (if they
> call themselves physicalists, rather than physicalism-agnostics) accept the
> conclusions that follow from all things being physical.

Yes.

> Physicalism (as with materialism) are ontological commitments. I don't see
> either as compatible with pure agnosticism.

I think this depends on what we mean when we say agnosticism. I can be agnostic
about a great many things, such as, did I leave the lights on in the bathroom,
while being a physicalist. I can be a physicalist, while being agnostic about
the description of the ultimate nature of the universe. It is part of "physics"
but we might hit a limit where we cannot keep accelerating particles.

I have evidence of physicalism in the form of my senses. No one has been able to
falsify the world. Therefore physicalism does not have any ontological
commitments, since it is based on proof.

Does that clear things up about agnosticism, being agnostic, while being
physicalist based on evidence?

Do you have a better term? As with materialism, I feel I have confused you, so
maybe you have a better term? 
 
>       Can you see how agnosticism towards some of these thought experiments can be
>       reconciled with a materialist outlook? Or am I wrong here?
> 
> I don't see what it means to be a physicalist if one does not accept the
> implications that follow from holding to that idea. If you want to remain
> agnostic on the implications that follow from physicalism, I think you must
> become agnostic on physicalism as a philosophy.
> 
> Consider:
> P implies Q.
> You remain agnostic on Q.
> Can you still accept P while remaining agnostic on Q?

Yep. Let's say P is the world, and Q is a god that created the world. By
definition, god is "outside" the world, and can therefore not be verified by the
senses, be falsified or proven. I can safely remain physicalist about P, the
world, and be entirely agnostic, or apathetic about Q.

I think this is an excellent example about how logic and math trick us, or leads
us wrong, when we completely disconnect it from empirical evidence.

> I don't think so. You must either accept Q if you accept P, or you must remain
> agnostic on Q and by extension, remain agnostic on P.

I disagree. I think we touched on this. I do not accept inferences, when Q lies
outside our physical universe and cannot be verified or falsified with epirical
proof. Then you'd have to accept god as per my example above.

That's obviously a silly example, by design, and illustrates why I believe
inference is not a valid strategy for things which we can never verify
empirically.

>       > Well the idea didn't originate from thought experiments, it originated from a
>       > strict belief in physical law. This is what drove Huxley to his position of
>       > epiphenomenalism: if the physical universe is causally closed, he saw no room
>       > for consciousness to do anything, as everything is already pre-determined by
>       > physical laws playing out.
>
>       Free will is another interesting topic. I see big probabilities, perhaps, of it
>       becoming another mega thread? ;) I have no clear position there, but I do not
>       Denett is a compatibilist, and I can live with that position as a starting point
>       for further investigation.
> 
> I think the sentence with Dennett got autocorrected.
> 
> I believe Dennett is a compatibilist. I wouldn't mind a thread on free will,
> if you want to start one. Though I am not sure I disagree on anything if
> you're a compatibilist.

I think perhaps the best thing for me would be to finish the live threads we
have, before starting new ones. I feel a bit overwhelmed. When it comes to free
will, as per my physicalist stance, I have no quarrel with compatibilism. I like
that it talks abotu degrees of free will, which I whole heartedly agree with.
You also know that I am a fan of pragmaticism, so the "illusion" (if that is
what it is) of free will is good enough for me. ;) Maybe we are in agreement
here? I think, that perhaps we might find some disagreement in nuances or if
there are any "sub-schools" of compatibilism, but the question is, how far
should we dig? ;)

>       >       Just like Qualia. A red herring,
>       >       that doesn't really exist as something outside of an active process when mind
>       >       meets the world. Without the mind, there is no qualia or redness.
>       >
>       > I am not sure why you say qualia are a red herring.
>
>       The idea here is that a red herring is something that misleads or distracts from
>       a relevant or important question.
>
>       So from a point of view of people who do believe qualia exists in the world, it
>       is a red herring. They chase illusions, that do not exist as they define them.
> 
> I take you to mean qualia exist only in minds, not that they don't exist. If
> so we agree. Otherwise I would object that qualia are real phenomenon that
> require some explanation.

I discussed this on the list around april 2023, and ended up the the "red
herring" camp. I think the concept of qualia is flawed, and should be abandoned.

So instead of talking about Qualia or "redness", that I experience when I see a
strawberry, I prefer to just restate it as light reflects of a strawberry,
detected by my eyes, electrons sent to my brain, generating the experience, and
it is entirely physical.

Banishing the concept of qualia and the way we talk about it I think clarifies
things a lot.

Here's a Denett text on (I think) a similar theme.

http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/opessoa/Dennett-Quining-Qualia.pdf

Oh, I also found this, but for some reason I thought that in 2023 there was more
text under the category.

https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1
.

>       >       I think this is just a matter of definition. I'm perfectly content equating
>       >       conscious behaviour, as per the list above, with something being conscious. I
>       >       also think the zombie argument is nonsense from a material point of view. I
>       >       really do not see how it could work.
>       >
>       > I don't think it is a matter of definition. The machine exhibiting those
>       > behaviors either has a mind or it doesn't (regardless of our definition).
>
>       Why would that be regardless of the definition? Without a definition the
>       statement is meaningless. We then don't know what we are talking about.
> 
> True. That's a valid point.
> 
> What I mean is that there is an objective answer to the question of whether or
> not some entity has first person experiences, regardless of what metrics we
> might define as tests or indicators of that entity having them.

I'm not so sure. How would you test for that? How would you falsify it?

>       > So I am asking which truth do you think corresponds with reality (the reality
>       > or nonreality of that machine's mind)?
>
>       If the mind is defined as (and I'm just giving an example here, I'm not saying
>       this is actually _the_ definition) a set of algorithms giving rise to the list
>       of specified behaviours above, then the machines mind is a reality, since it is
>       a set of algorithms that give rise to a certain behaviour in the external world.
> 
> I don't agree with purely third-person behavioral definitions of
> consciousness. It is a way of sneaking in an assumed theory of consciousness,
> which may or may not be valid. So in my view it is better to stick to a
> definition of mind/consciousness all can agree on, then we can argue the
> theory of what systems should or shouldn't possess minds/consciousness.

What would be the sneaky definition? And how could you ever prove a first person
experience, or falsify it?

>       >       > A (possibly relevant)
>       >       > cartoon: https://www.digitaltonto.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Kurzweil-AI-cartoon.gif
>       >
>       >       True. I have not been personally convinced yet, that LLMs are conscious. I
>       >       encourage more research, and I would also like to see a resurrection of some
>       >       kind of harder Turing-prize.
>       >
>       > What would a robot have to do to convince you it was conscious?
>
>       Exhibit a certain set of behaviours.
>
>       > And what would an animal have to do?
>
>       The same.
> 
> I agree.
> 
> I would note that this view assumes a functionalist philosophy of mind.

Does it assume any philosophy of mind? If I believe an entity is conscious
because it acts as if it is conscious, does that commit me to any specific
theory?

The entity could have a soul, it could not have a soul, it's mind could be 
algorithms, or covered by functionalism. I don't see how making up my mind that
if it acts as if it is conscious, I will treat it as conscious would commit me
to any specific theory.

I found this excellent table about physicalist theories of mind:

https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/

Accorindg to this one, judging by behaviour and being a physicalist, it would
commit me to one of the following:

* Behaviourism
* Type identity 
* Functionalism 
* Eliminativism

I think that was a great web site actually. It shows things in a very nice way.

>       >       Anyone rich reading this and who wants to sponsor please reach out, it would
>       >       be a lot of fun to get involved! =)
>       >
>       >       I wonder what size of the prize is necessary to motivate people to win?
>       >
>       > $1000 is probably enough. The right software could automate everything too, no
>       > need for in person events, and many people would volunteer as judges.
>
>       Only 1000 USD?? Then maybe the time is ripe for my own AI prize!! =D I'd love to
>       throw in some qualifiers or tests about about volition, goals and self-preservation
>       into the mix! But I doubt that a 1000 USD would motivate many people to develop
>       chat bots or chat AI:s to compete. But if you are right... maybe there is hope?
>       =)
> 
> I think the fame/prestige is enough of a prize especially with so many AI
> companies competing for glory and investors.

Hmm... maybe I should call the Nobel Prize committee and ask them to sponsor an
AI prize? Maybe then we'll get some "glory" into the competition! ;)

>       You mean the identity thread, or a new one?
> 
> Identity thread.

Good better, to keep it collected. =)

Best regards, 
Daniel