[ExI] A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

Hi Daniel,

I think this thread may be coming to a close. But I include just a few
comments to the remaining points of disagreement.

On Mon, Mar 24, 2025 at 7:46 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> > Then my contention is, this abstract thing we call B5, cannot be
> identical
> > with X, and cannot be identical with Y, because then it would constitute
> that
> > same common thing Z, but we already proved (based on the lack of an
> identity
> > between X and Y) that there can be no third thing which X and Y are both
> > identical to. Thus B5 is not identical with any of its particular
> > instantiations, it has its own identity, independent of and from, any of
> its
> > instantiations.
>
> I disagree. We have shown, as per your reasoning and defintion, that B5 is
> not
> equal to the sheet music, and that it is not performance. You have not
> shown
> what it is. I think, this is a trivial problem. B5, is dependent on
> context, and
> supplying context, I think it is easy to say what it is and isn't. I think
> it is
> impossible and not useful, to define it as some kind of "via negative" as
> negations.
>

Is there any incarnation you can imagine it being equal to?

I would liken B5 to a particular JPEG file. A particular JPEG file has an
abstract description in terms of a string of 1s and 0s. But any incarnation
of said file will not be that pure abstraction, but instead will be some
physical arrangement of matter: a piece of cardboard with holes in it, a
set of capacitors with charges of electrons in some but not others,
a polycrystalline disc with differing reflection properties, a cylinder of
glass with a variously magnetized iron-oxide coating, etc. No particular
physical incarnation is identical with the abstract binary string, but all
are isomorphic embodiments of that abstract pattern (under some mapping).

You perhaps think my negative definition fails, because you think there
might be some Z out there that does exist, but the proof I gave is robust
against this, if X != Y, then (X != Z and Y != Z), *for all Z*. So if there
is any way in which two distinct physical embodiments of B5, (or a JPEG
file) could be said to be "the same" it is only by comparing their
similarity/correspondence to some pattern (under some mapping function).


I forgot what started this topic, but anyway, I think conscious states are
like this (they are particular abstract patterns). And a logical argument
was used to prove that conscious states cannot be identical to particular
physical states, if conscious states are multiply realizable.


>
>
> I think I'll leave it for the moment. The various threads give me a
> feeling of
> being overwhelmed. But I think we can probably close one or two, and that
> would
> then open up space (and time ;)) for new threads.
>

Okay. I would welcome you to read those 20 thought experiments though, if
anything, it will provide a clearer picture of the history of how thinking
moved from dualism, to epiphenomenalism, to type-physicalism, to
functionalism.


>
> > Materialism has, at least in philosophy of mind, recently been renamed as
> > "physicalism" for physics reveals there are many things in the universe
> that
> > are not matter (energy, fields, spacetime, etc.)
>
> This is a good point, and avoid misunderstanding. I will try and update my
> "reflex" to write materialism and use physicalism instead. Keep in mind,
> that if
> you should happen to see materialism, you can think physicalism.
> Physicalism is
> also more prone to spelling errors for me. Maybe I should use say "p". ;)
>

No worries (I do such a translation in my head already ;-) )


>
> > Physicalism is the philosophy that: "all things are physical." So
> according to
> > physicalism, consciousness is physical.
>
> Yes.
>
> > If one accepts physicalism as a starting point, I think they must (if
> they
> > call themselves physicalists, rather than physicalism-agnostics) accept
> the
> > conclusions that follow from all things being physical.
>
> Yes.
>
> > Physicalism (as with materialism) are ontological commitments. I don't
> see
> > either as compatible with pure agnosticism.
>
> I think this depends on what we mean when we say agnosticism. I can be
> agnostic
> about a great many things, such as, did I leave the lights on in the
> bathroom,
> while being a physicalist.


That's true.


> I can be a physicalist, while being agnostic about
> the description of the ultimate nature of the universe.


That might require a further qualification, e.g. "I believe all phenomena
that appear in this universe are physical." rather than "all things are
physical".
For if one is agnostic about the ultimate nature of the universe, then
there remains room for non physical things operating beyond this universe.
But I see your point that one can remain a physicalist concerning the
goings-on within a universe. :-)


> It is part of "physics"
> but we might hit a limit where we cannot keep accelerating particles.
>
> I have evidence of physicalism in the form of my senses. No one has been
> able to
> falsify the world. Therefore physicalism does not have any ontological
> commitments, since it is based on proof.
>
> Does that clear things up about agnosticism, being agnostic, while being
> physicalist based on evidence?
>

Yes I think so (taking into account my point above).


>
> Do you have a better term? As with materialism, I feel I have confused
> you, so
> maybe you have a better term?


I am not aware of one. I think physicalist/physicalism is generally fine
(and only requires further specification when one delves into more detailed
ontological discussions).


>
>
> >       Can you see how agnosticism towards some of these thought
> experiments can be
> >       reconciled with a materialist outlook? Or am I wrong here?
> >
> > I don't see what it means to be a physicalist if one does not accept the
> > implications that follow from holding to that idea. If you want to remain
> > agnostic on the implications that follow from physicalism, I think you
> must
> > become agnostic on physicalism as a philosophy.
> >
> > Consider:
> > P implies Q.
> > You remain agnostic on Q.
> > Can you still accept P while remaining agnostic on Q?
>
> Yep. Let's say P is the world, and Q is a god that created the world. By
> definition, god is "outside" the world, and can therefore not be verified
> by the
> senses, be falsified or proven. I can safely remain physicalist about P,
> the
> world, and be entirely agnostic, or apathetic about Q.
>
> I think this is an excellent example about how logic and math trick us, or
> leads
> us wrong, when we completely disconnect it from empirical evidence.
>

Your example doesn't work because in this case P does not imply Q. For a
clearer example of P implying Q, consider:

P = "is a square"
Q = "it has four sides"


>
> > I don't think so. You must either accept Q if you accept P, or you must
> remain
> > agnostic on Q and by extension, remain agnostic on P.
>
> I disagree. I think we touched on this. I do not accept inferences, when Q
> lies
> outside our physical universe and cannot be verified or falsified with
> epirical
> proof. Then you'd have to accept god as per my example above.
>
> That's obviously a silly example, by design, and illustrates why I believe
> inference is not a valid strategy for things which we can never verify
> empirically.
>

I think inference is fine when the assumptions and reasoning are sound. I
think the only issue with your example is that you chose a case where P
does not imply Q, so all the resulting conclusions were in error.


>
>
> >
> > I believe Dennett is a compatibilist. I wouldn't mind a thread on free
> will,
> > if you want to start one. Though I am not sure I disagree on anything if
> > you're a compatibilist.
>
> I think perhaps the best thing for me would be to finish the live threads
> we
> have, before starting new ones. I feel a bit overwhelmed. When it comes to
> free
> will, as per my physicalist stance, I have no quarrel with compatibilism.
> I like
> that it talks abotu degrees of free will, which I whole heartedly agree
> with.
> You also know that I am a fan of pragmaticism, so the "illusion" (if that
> is
> what it is) of free will is good enough for me. ;) Maybe we are in
> agreement
> here? I think, that perhaps we might find some disagreement in nuances or
> if
> there are any "sub-schools" of compatibilism, but the question is, how far
> should we dig? ;)
>

Well I perhaps wouldn't call it an illusion.


>
>
> > I take you to mean qualia exist only in minds, not that they don't
> exist. If
> > so we agree. Otherwise I would object that qualia are real phenomenon
> that
> > require some explanation.
>
> I discussed this on the list around april 2023, and ended up the the "red
> herring" camp. I think the concept of qualia is flawed, and should be
> abandoned.
>
> So instead of talking about Qualia or "redness", that I experience when I
> see a
> strawberry, I prefer to just restate it as light reflects of a strawberry,
> detected by my eyes, electrons sent to my brain, generating the
> experience, and
> it is entirely physical.
>

I am not following why you think we shouldn't have a word to refer to "the
experience that is generated."


>
> Banishing the concept of qualia and the way we talk about it I think
> clarifies
> things a lot.
>
> Here's a Denett text on (I think) a similar theme.
>
> http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/opessoa/Dennett-Quining-Qualia.pdf


(Working link, the one above failed for me:
https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/DennettQuiningQualia1988.pdf )

As I interpret Dennett, his problem was with the various attributes others
had ascribed to qualia, particularly, the idea that they were not
explainable. But he did not deny their exist. As he writes:

"Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of
conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I
grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties
in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do."

So Dennett (I think) was not calling to excise the word qualia, but rather,
to shed off the mystical baggage that some had attached to it.


>
>
> Oh, I also found this, but for some reason I thought that in 2023 there
> was more
> text under the category.
>
>
> https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1


Qualia are the very thing that consciousness theories attempt to explain.
If they don't exist, then what are theories of consciousness about?


>
> > What I mean is that there is an objective answer to the question of
> whether or
> > not some entity has first person experiences, regardless of what metrics
> we
> > might define as tests or indicators of that entity having them.
>
> I'm not so sure. How would you test for that? How would you falsify it?
>

The individual would know. As to the question of how do you prove it
objectively (to others besides the first-person having the experience),
that is a big and open problem in philosophy of mind. Aaronson dubbed it
"The Pretty Hard Problem."



>
>
> > I don't agree with purely third-person behavioral definitions of
> > consciousness. It is a way of sneaking in an assumed theory of
> consciousness,
> > which may or may not be valid. So in my view it is better to stick to a
> > definition of mind/consciousness all can agree on, then we can argue the
> > theory of what systems should or shouldn't possess minds/consciousness.
>
> What would be the sneaky definition? And how could you ever prove a first
> person
> experience, or falsify it?
>

If you defined consciousness as anything that behaves like it is conscious,
then (aside from being circular) this definition has snuck in a purely
functionalists assumption of mind and discarded any alternatives such as
type-physicalism, biological naturalism, panpsychism, Penrose's quantum
mind, etc. which in addition to requiring the presence of certain
behaviors, would require special physical materials, living organic cells,
consciousness-enabled particles, or non-algorithmic quantum gravitational
processes. So by giving a behavioral definition of consciousness, it serves
to presume behavioral/functional conditions are the only thing that is
needed.

While this is a position I agree with, it won't serve as a workable
definition in philosophy if we are to permit these other theories to exist
and be debated.


>
> > I agree.
> >
> > I would note that this view assumes a functionalist philosophy of mind.
>
> Does it assume any philosophy of mind? If I believe an entity is conscious
> because it acts as if it is conscious, does that commit me to any specific
> theory?
>

Yes. I think it commits you to functionalism.


>
> The entity could have a soul, it could not have a soul, it's mind could be
> algorithms, or covered by functionalism. I don't see how making up my mind
> that
> if it acts as if it is conscious, I will treat it as conscious would
> commit me
> to any specific theory.
>

An android might act exactly like a conscious human, but without a
supernatural soul implanted in it by God.
According to dualism such an entity would not be conscious, but according
to your view and definition it would be conscious, because it acts in every
way as if it were conscious.

An android might act exactly like a conscious human, but without any
organic living neurons.
According to biological naturalism, such an entity would not be conscious,
but according to this view it would be.

An android might act like a conscious human, but without any carbon in its
brain (it might be silicon or germanium).
According to type-physicalism, such an entity could not be conscious in the
same way as an organic brain, because its different materials are incapable
of realizing the same physicochemical states as a human.



> I found this excellent table about physicalist theories of mind:
>
> https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/
>
> Accorindg to this one, judging by behaviour and being a physicalist, it
> would
> commit me to one of the following:
>
> * Behaviourism
> * Type identity
> * Functionalism
> * Eliminativism
>

The eliminativist would say there is no consciousness, even in something
that in all respects behaves as if it is conscious.
The type-identity theorists would impose further constraints on what things
could be conscious depending on their material composition or design. E.g.,
a type-identity physicalist could deny the android is conscious.


>
> I think that was a great web site actually. It shows things in a very nice
> way.
>

It is a nice chart. Though I don't think behaviorism was ever a serious
idea in philosophy of mind. Behaviorism was a school of thought in the
field of psychology that held internal mental states were inscrutable. It
was only through the fall of behaviorism (with the cognitive revolution)
that serious scientists and philosophers were allowed to discuss and debate
consciousness.



>
> >
> > I think the fame/prestige is enough of a prize especially with so many AI
> > companies competing for glory and investors.
>
> Hmm... maybe I should call the Nobel Prize committee and ask them to
> sponsor an
> AI prize? Maybe then we'll get some "glory" into the competition! ;)
>
>
I think what's most important is having a design that everyone agrees is
well thought out and robust, such that passing the test would be a reliable
indicator of human or superhuman intelligence.

I also think it would be nice if all entrants were given a score that was
statistically significant. (e.g. each applicant converses with a sufficient
number of judges to reach a meaningful objective score) and also this score
should be tested against other humans as well to give a feel for what score
is "good enough" to be considered human-level intelligence. Perhaps scores
for different ages, and levels of education, etc. could be set. Then there
could be prizes for passing a high-school level and so on.

Jason
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