[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

On Mon, 24 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:

> Hi Daniel,

Hello Jason,

> I think this thread may be coming to a close. But I include just a few
> comments to the remaining points of disagreement.

I think so. I think the remaining ones can perhaps be taken off list.

>       > Then my contention is, this abstract thing we call B5, cannot be identical
>       > with X, and cannot be identical with Y, because then it would constitute that
>       > same common thing Z, but we already proved (based on the lack of an identity
>       > between X and Y) that there can be no third thing which X and Y are both
>       > identical to. Thus B5 is not identical with any of its particular
>       > instantiations, it has its own identity, independent of and from, any of its
>       > instantiations.  
>
>       I disagree. We have shown, as per your reasoning and defintion, that B5 is not
>       equal to the sheet music, and that it is not performance. You have not shown
>       what it is. I think, this is a trivial problem. B5, is dependent on context, and
>       supplying context, I think it is easy to say what it is and isn't. I think it is
>       impossible and not useful, to define it as some kind of "via negative" as
>       negations.
> 
> Is there any incarnation you can imagine it being equal to?

Many. Depending on the context and definition:

* The original as written down by B himself. 
* A modern script used at a performance. 
* The performance itself.

So I'd say that depending on the context of our discussion, B5 could be any
number of things.

> You perhaps think my negative definition fails, because you think there might
> be some Z out there that does exist, but the proof I gave is robust against
> this, if X != Y, then (X != Z and Y != Z), for all Z. So if there is any way
> in which two distinct physical embodiments of B5, (or a JPEG file) could be
> said to be "the same" it is only by comparing their similarity/correspondence
> to some pattern (under some mapping function).

Well, you gave a proof using your definitions. Given my definitions above, the
problem is trivial.

> I forgot what started this topic, but anyway, I think conscious states are
> like this (they are particular abstract patterns). And a logical argument was
> used to prove that conscious states cannot be identical to particular physical
> states, if conscious states are multiply realizable.

Leaving aside the fact that we don't know. But, as always, I find your theories
well thought out, and starting from your definitions, I find no problem
following your logic, to your conclusions. =)

>       I think I'll leave it for the moment. The various threads give me a feeling of
>       being overwhelmed. But I think we can probably close one or two, and that would
>       then open up space (and time ;)) for new threads.
> 
> Okay. I would welcome you to read those 20 thought experiments though, if
> anything, it will provide a clearer picture of the history of how thinking
> moved from dualism, to epiphenomenalism, to type-physicalism, to
> functionalism.  

I'll make a note of it! And will have a look once I've dug into the identity
thread. That one needs some love and attention now, I think. ;)

>       I can be a physicalist, while being agnostic about
>       the description of the ultimate nature of the universe.
> 
> That might require a further qualification, e.g. "I believe all phenomena that
> appear in this universe are physical." rather than "all things are physical".
> For if one is agnostic about the ultimate nature of the universe, then there
> remains room for non physical things operating beyond this universe. But I see
> your point that one can remain a physicalist concerning the goings-on within a
> universe. :-)

This is another example why I enjoy talking with you. You find these cases where
confusion easily slips in. Yes... you are right. I do keep a "boundary" between
within and without, and tend to disregard without. I'm searching for a better
definition. Surely some philosopher somewhere has reached a similar conclusion
or point of view. I'll have to perform some "google fu" to see if there perhaps
isn't an existing path somewhere I can read up on. That's much quicker route
than us discovering it together, although, perhaps, less fun. =)

>       It is part of "physics"
>       but we might hit a limit where we cannot keep accelerating particles.
>
>       I have evidence of physicalism in the form of my senses. No one has been able to
>       falsify the world. Therefore physicalism does not have any ontological
>       commitments, since it is based on proof.
>
>       Does that clear things up about agnosticism, being agnostic, while being
>       physicalist based on evidence?
> 
> Yes I think so (taking into account my point above).

Great!

>       Do you have a better term? As with materialism, I feel I have confused you, so
>       maybe you have a better term?
> 
> I am not aware of one. I think physicalist/physicalism is generally fine (and
> only requires further specification when one delves into more detailed
> ontological discussions).

I'll keep looking! I think it's the agnostic streak in me that is causing the
problem! I need a nice "fusion" of the two. ;)

>       > I don't see what it means to be a physicalist if one does not accept the
>       > implications that follow from holding to that idea. If you want to remain
>       > agnostic on the implications that follow from physicalism, I think you must
>       > become agnostic on physicalism as a philosophy.
>       >
>       > Consider:
>       > P implies Q.
>       > You remain agnostic on Q.
>       > Can you still accept P while remaining agnostic on Q?
>
>       Yep. Let's say P is the world, and Q is a god that created the world. By
>       definition, god is "outside" the world, and can therefore not be verified by the
>       senses, be falsified or proven. I can safely remain physicalist about P, the
>       world, and be entirely agnostic, or apathetic about Q.
>
>       I think this is an excellent example about how logic and math trick us, or leads
>       us wrong, when we completely disconnect it from empirical evidence.
> 
> Your example doesn't work because in this case P does not imply Q. For a clearer example of P implying Q, consider:
> 
> P = "is a square"
> Q = "it has four sides"

Ok, I was too quick, but let me restate the cosmological argument here:


Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
The universe began to exist.
Therefore, the universe has a cause.
This cause is often identified as God.

or

If P, then Q
P
Therefore, Q

and I actually expect the response that the proof doesn't work, since it
doesn't. The key here is that if Q is not of this world, and can never be
verified (or falsified) we can of course reject it, in order to minimize oru
ontological commitments, and by the fact, that we will never be able to verify.
But this is old ground.

>       > I don't think so. You must either accept Q if you accept P, or you must remain
>       > agnostic on Q and by extension, remain agnostic on P.
>
>       I disagree. I think we touched on this. I do not accept inferences, when Q lies
>       outside our physical universe and cannot be verified or falsified with epirical
>       proof. Then you'd have to accept god as per my example above.
>
>       That's obviously a silly example, by design, and illustrates why I believe
>       inference is not a valid strategy for things which we can never verify
>       empirically.
> 
> I think inference is fine when the assumptions and reasoning are sound. I
> think the only issue with your example is that you chose a case where P does
> not imply Q, so all the resulting conclusions were in error.

This is another common problem with relying too much on logic and math, and no
connection with the world. We can always debate P and Q, and if there is a
connectio nor not. But, in this case...

Where there is smoke (P), there is fire (Q): If P -> Q. No quarrel with that. We
can both use our senses to establish P, we can infer Q, and then you and I can
both check to see if Q. If not, we revise our mental model. This is basically
and excellent example of my position, and why I find it reasonable.

>       > I believe Dennett is a compatibilist. I wouldn't mind a thread on free will,
>       > if you want to start one. Though I am not sure I disagree on anything if
>       > you're a compatibilist.
>
>       I think perhaps the best thing for me would be to finish the live threads we
>       have, before starting new ones. I feel a bit overwhelmed. When it comes to free
>       will, as per my physicalist stance, I have no quarrel with compatibilism. I like
>       that it talks abotu degrees of free will, which I whole heartedly agree with.
>       You also know that I am a fan of pragmaticism, so the "illusion" (if that is
>       what it is) of free will is good enough for me. ;) Maybe we are in agreement
>       here? I think, that perhaps we might find some disagreement in nuances or if
>       there are any "sub-schools" of compatibilism, but the question is, how far
>       should we dig? ;)
> 
> Well I perhaps wouldn't call it an illusion.

You are better at words than I am, so I am absolutely certain you'll be able to
come up with a better word for it, that would be perfectly acceptable for me. =)
I was trying to explain that we might not have any free will at the system
level, but inside the system, for all we can tell, we appear to have free will.
Since we never can reach the system level (break out of the simulation) for us,
"felt" free will is good enough, although, ultimately, it might not be.
Something like that.

>       > I take you to mean qualia exist only in minds, not that they don't exist. If
>       > so we agree. Otherwise I would object that qualia are real phenomenon that
>       > require some explanation.
>
>       I discussed this on the list around april 2023, and ended up the the "red
>       herring" camp. I think the concept of qualia is flawed, and should be abandoned.
>
>       So instead of talking about Qualia or "redness", that I experience when I see a
>       strawberry, I prefer to just restate it as light reflects of a strawberry,
>       detected by my eyes, electrons sent to my brain, generating the experience, and
>       it is entirely physical.
> 
> I am not following why you think we shouldn't have a word to refer to "the
> experience that is generated."

We definitely should have, and have that word. My point however, is, that it
leads to confusion, chasing something which is badly defined. So by dropping the
word and concept, and redefining it in scientific terms, we clear up the
confusion, and "qualia" disappears.

> "Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of
> conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I
> grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in
> virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do."
> 
> So Dennett (I think) was not calling to excise the word qualia, but rather, to
> shed off the mystical baggage that some had attached to it.

I think qualia goes away by adopting a different terminology and method of
investigating, say, the science of neuroscience. That does not obligate one
never to use the word "red". It does however obligate one not to use the badly
defined, folk-psychology word "red" when doing neuro-science.

But since this crosses over from meta-physics into science, I am certain there
are better people to take the question from there.

I think actually, that we know perfectly well (or well... somewhat well) exactly
what happens when light bounces of an object at the right wave length and hits
our brain as a "red" object. So I don't really see why we should bother with the
qualia terminology at all, and I think I'm quite comfortable with that idea.

But, if I reverse the question... what would you say are the drawbacks of that
position? Basically, let neuroscience do it's thing, and stop talking about
Qualia?

Oh, sorry... let me also add that perhaps this conversation should be put on
hold or move into a Qualia thread, but then I suspect that we'll reach the same
result as 2023, so maybe not a good idea? ;)

>       Oh, I also found this, but for some reason I thought that in 2023 there was more
>       text under the category.
>
>       https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1
> 
> Qualia are the very thing that consciousness theories attempt to explain. If
> they don't exist, then what are theories of consciousness about?

Maybe neuroscience is a better way than philosophy? Speculating without data can
lead to building castles in the sky, which then have to be torn down?

>       > What I mean is that there is an objective answer to the question of whether or
>       > not some entity has first person experiences, regardless of what metrics we
>       > might define as tests or indicators of that entity having them.
>
>       I'm not so sure. How would you test for that? How would you falsify it?
> 
> The individual would know. As to the question of how do you prove it
> objectively (to others besides the first-person having the experience), that
> is a big and open problem in philosophy of mind. Aaronson dubbed it "The
> Pretty Hard Problem."

I think the best option is to remain agnostic. I don't see how that could be
done, so my strategy would be to reformulate it into neuroscience and physics,
and disregard the rest. Qualia is a "red herring" that distracts us from doing
science. At the end of the day, the only thing we have to go on is a
_comprehensiva_ behaviourism which I would add, includes not only behaviours,
voluntary and involuntary, but neuron patterns, nervoussystem activity,
dopamine, serotonine and other chemicals or reactions of organs in the body.

Since we never can "reach" the subjective level of ourselves experience other
minds as themselves, I think it is best to ignore that, just like (I) ignore
MWI, god and other things outside the scope of the phenomenal world.

>       > I don't agree with purely third-person behavioral definitions of
>       > consciousness. It is a way of sneaking in an assumed theory of consciousness,
>       > which may or may not be valid. So in my view it is better to stick to a
>       > definition of mind/consciousness all can agree on, then we can argue the
>       > theory of what systems should or shouldn't possess minds/consciousness.
>
>       What would be the sneaky definition? And how could you ever prove a first person
>       experience, or falsify it?
> 
> If you defined consciousness as anything that behaves like it is conscious,
> then (aside from being circular) this definition has snuck in a purely

I think the reason for people believing it is circular is that they commit the
mistake of looking at each state in isolation. That is not how the brain works.
It can maintain several states at the same time, conscious and unconscious. So
looking at the entire organisms, including hormones and what ever, and using
behaviour as the key for that state, does not imply, I think any circular
reasoning.

It does make things more complicated for sure, but some things are, and
simplifying too much leads to bad theories.

> functionalists assumption of mind and discarded any alternatives such as
> type-physicalism, biological naturalism, panpsychism, Penrose's quantum mind,
> etc. which in addition to requiring the presence of certain behaviors, would
> require special physical materials, living organic cells,
> consciousness-enabled particles, or non-algorithmic quantum gravitational
> processes. So by giving a behavioral definition of consciousness, it serves to
> presume behavioral/functional conditions are the only thing that is needed.

How come? Looking at the link, I see at least 4 isms being compatible with
physicalism. I do not see on that page, that focusing on behaviour by default
should commit one to only functionalism.

> While this is a position I agree with, it won't serve as a workable definition
> in philosophy if we are to permit these other theories to exist and be
> debated.  

True. I do have to confess, that on this site:

https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/

eliminativisim does seem quite an attractive stance at the surfave of things. =)

>       Does it assume any philosophy of mind? If I believe an entity is conscious
>       because it acts as if it is conscious, does that commit me to any specific
>       theory?
> 
> Yes. I think it commits you to functionalism.

I think I disagree (as per the above and the below).

>       I found this excellent table about physicalist theories of mind:
>
>       https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/
>
>       Accorindg to this one, judging by behaviour and being a physicalist, it would
>       commit me to one of the following:
>
>       * Behaviourism
>       * Type identity
>       * Functionalism
>       * Eliminativism
> 
> The eliminativist would say there is no consciousness, even in something that
> in all respects behaves as if it is conscious. The type-identity theorists

That is an attractive idea. My interpretation there is (similar to what I have
argued previously) that the concept of consciousness is flawed, so by discarding
it, or "reducing" it, we will be in a much better situation to understand what
is actually going on.

> would impose further constraints on what things could be conscious depending
> on their material composition or design. E.g., a type-identity physicalist
> could deny the android is conscious. 

Another idea here, is to have a separate theory for separate organisms.
Type-identity would focus on human minds. But let's say the subject are octopi,
as per the link, we'd need to start from scratch there.

>       I think that was a great web site actually. It shows things in a very nice way.
> 
> It is a nice chart. Though I don't think behaviorism was ever a serious idea
> in philosophy of mind. Behaviorism was a school of thought in the field of
> psychology that held internal mental states were inscrutable. It was only
> through the fall of behaviorism (with the cognitive revolution) that serious
> scientists and philosophers were allowed to discuss and debate consciousness.

I think it depends on how it is defined. It can include all the others, from one
point of view.

>       > I think the fame/prestige is enough of a prize especially with so many AI
>       > companies competing for glory and investors.
>
>       Hmm... maybe I should call the Nobel Prize committee and ask them to sponsor an
>       AI prize? Maybe then we'll get some "glory" into the competition! ;)
> 
> I think what's most important is having a design that everyone agrees is well
> thought out and robust, such that passing the test would be a reliable
> indicator of human or superhuman intelligence.
> 
> I also think it would be nice if all entrants were given a score that was
> statistically significant. (e.g. each applicant converses with a sufficient
> number of judges to reach a meaningful objective score) and also this score
> should be tested against other humans as well to give a feel for what score is
> "good enough" to be considered human-level intelligence. Perhaps scores for
> different ages, and levels of education, etc. could be set. Then there could
> be prizes for passing a high-school level and so on.

My ideal would be that I should not be able to tell if it is a human or an AI
over a week or so. Imagine I talk with a human, I could ask the human what its
job is. Let's say marketing. During the course of a week, I'd ask it to help me
with marketing campaigns, go out online and do some research, bring me back a
nice report, etc. etc. The simple LLM:s I have played with (free ones) currently
would have no chance to perform that role like a human being. The AI would also
have to have all its censoring disabled, that's a clear tell that it's an AI and
not a human being. And of course, it would have to take the initiative. I'd love
for it to reach out and proactively suggest things based on our previous
conversation. That's also something I'm currently missing.

I think we've made great progress, but I think current technology, without some
serious hard coding, de-censoring, and integration with other systems, is far,
far from tricking a human it is human over a period of a week or more.

Best regards, 
Daniel