[ExI] A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Mar 25, 2025 at 6:25 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, 24 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Hi Daniel,
>
> Hello Jason,
>
> > I think this thread may be coming to a close. But I include just a few
> > comments to the remaining points of disagreement.
>
> I think so. I think the remaining ones can perhaps be taken off list.
>
> [snip]

>
> > I forgot what started this topic, but anyway, I think conscious states
> are
> > like this (they are particular abstract patterns). And a logical
> argument was
> > used to prove that conscious states cannot be identical to particular
> physical
> > states, if conscious states are multiply realizable.
>
> Leaving aside the fact that we don't know. But, as always, I find your
> theories
> well thought out, and starting from your definitions, I find no problem
> following your logic, to your conclusions. =)
>

I guess that is all I can ask for. :-) If we can't agree on premises then
at least you see no flaws in the reasoning (the argument is "valid" if not
"sound" in your view -- a sound argument requires the premises to be true,
a valid argument requires only that the conclusions follow from the
premises).


>
> >       I think I'll leave it for the moment. The various threads give me
> a feeling of
> >       being overwhelmed. But I think we can probably close one or two,
> and that would
> >       then open up space (and time ;)) for new threads.
> >
> > Okay. I would welcome you to read those 20 thought experiments though, if
> > anything, it will provide a clearer picture of the history of how
> thinking
> > moved from dualism, to epiphenomenalism, to type-physicalism, to
> > functionalism.
>
> I'll make a note of it! And will have a look once I've dug into the
> identity
> thread. That one needs some love and attention now, I think. ;)
>

Sounds good.


>
> >       I can be a physicalist, while being agnostic about
> >       the description of the ultimate nature of the universe.
> >
> > That might require a further qualification, e.g. "I believe all
> phenomena that
> > appear in this universe are physical." rather than "all things are
> physical".
> > For if one is agnostic about the ultimate nature of the universe, then
> there
> > remains room for non physical things operating beyond this universe. But
> I see
> > your point that one can remain a physicalist concerning the goings-on
> within a
> > universe. :-)
>
> This is another example why I enjoy talking with you. You find these cases
> where
> confusion easily slips in. Yes... you are right. I do keep a "boundary"
> between
> within and without, and tend to disregard without. I'm searching for a
> better
> definition. Surely some philosopher somewhere has reached a similar
> conclusion
> or point of view. I'll have to perform some "google fu" to see if there
> perhaps
> isn't an existing path somewhere I can read up on. That's much quicker
> route
> than us discovering it together, although, perhaps, less fun. =)
>

Thank you!

I know someone who used the word "primitive physicalist" or "Aristotelian"
to refer to someone who believed all real things are purely and primitively
(fundamentally) physical, and had nothing outside the universe that is not
physical.
But I don't know what someone who was agnostic on that while being a
physicist within the universe should be called. If you want me to invent
something, perhaps "metaphysical agnostic" would work.


>
>
>
> >       Do you have a better term? As with materialism, I feel I have
> confused you, so
> >       maybe you have a better term?
> >
> > I am not aware of one. I think physicalist/physicalism is generally fine
> (and
> > only requires further specification when one delves into more detailed
> > ontological discussions).
>
> I'll keep looking! I think it's the agnostic streak in me that is causing
> the
> problem! I need a nice "fusion" of the two. ;)
>

It's combining both (physicalism + metaphysical agnosticism) views into a
single word that is hard.


>
> >       > I don't see what it means to be a physicalist if one does not
> accept the
> >       > implications that follow from holding to that idea. If you want
> to remain
> >       > agnostic on the implications that follow from physicalism, I
> think you must
> >       > become agnostic on physicalism as a philosophy.
> >       >
> >       > Consider:
> >       > P implies Q.
> >       > You remain agnostic on Q.
> >       > Can you still accept P while remaining agnostic on Q?
> >
> >       Yep. Let's say P is the world, and Q is a god that created the
> world. By
> >       definition, god is "outside" the world, and can therefore not be
> verified by the
> >       senses, be falsified or proven. I can safely remain physicalist
> about P, the
> >       world, and be entirely agnostic, or apathetic about Q.
> >
> >       I think this is an excellent example about how logic and math
> trick us, or leads
> >       us wrong, when we completely disconnect it from empirical evidence.
> >
> > Your example doesn't work because in this case P does not imply Q. For a
> clearer example of P implying Q, consider:
> >
> > P = "is a square"
> > Q = "it has four sides"
>
> Ok, I was too quick, but let me restate the cosmological argument here:
>
>
> Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
> The universe began to exist.
> Therefore, the universe has a cause.
> This cause is often identified as God.
>
> or
>
> If P, then Q
> P
> Therefore, Q
>
> and I actually expect the response that the proof doesn't work, since it
> doesn't. The key here is that if Q is not of this world, and can never be
> verified (or falsified) we can of course reject it, in order to minimize
> oru
> ontological commitments, and by the fact, that we will never be able to
> verify.
> But this is old ground.
>

I think the proof is valid but not sound. In particular, I see issues with
both "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." and "The universe began
to exist." I don't think either of those premises are necessarily or
demonstrably true.
However, if one accepted those premises, then they would be led by the
argument to accept the universe has a cause.

Even arguments that are unsound can still be useful, in terms of focusing
the question on what assumptions one is making, and which assumptions need
be true to reach a particular conclusion.



> > I think inference is fine when the assumptions and reasoning are sound. I
> > think the only issue with your example is that you chose a case where P
> does
> > not imply Q, so all the resulting conclusions were in error.
>
> This is another common problem with relying too much on logic and math,
> and no
> connection with the world. We can always debate P and Q, and if there is a
> connectio nor not. But, in this case...
>
> Where there is smoke (P), there is fire (Q): If P -> Q. No quarrel with
> that. We
> can both use our senses to establish P, we can infer Q, and then you and I
> can
> both check to see if Q. If not, we revise our mental model. This is
> basically
> and excellent example of my position, and why I find it reasonable.
>

One of course needs to be rigorous and precise to make a strong logical
argument, and it must stand the test of others looking at it and trying to
find holes in either the premises or in the reasoning.
When I defined my three possibilities (A, B, and C), I did so in a way to
guarantee that all logically possible cases were covered, so that at least
one, but not both or all, of those possibilities must be true.


>
> >       > I believe Dennett is a compatibilist. I wouldn't mind a thread
> on free will,
> >       > if you want to start one. Though I am not sure I disagree on
> anything if
> >       > you're a compatibilist.
> >
> >       I think perhaps the best thing for me would be to finish the live
> threads we
> >       have, before starting new ones. I feel a bit overwhelmed. When it
> comes to free
> >       will, as per my physicalist stance, I have no quarrel with
> compatibilism. I like
> >       that it talks abotu degrees of free will, which I whole heartedly
> agree with.
> >       You also know that I am a fan of pragmaticism, so the "illusion"
> (if that is
> >       what it is) of free will is good enough for me. ;) Maybe we are in
> agreement
> >       here? I think, that perhaps we might find some disagreement in
> nuances or if
> >       there are any "sub-schools" of compatibilism, but the question is,
> how far
> >       should we dig? ;)
> >
> > Well I perhaps wouldn't call it an illusion.
>
> You are better at words than I am, so I am absolutely certain you'll be
> able to
> come up with a better word for it, that would be perfectly acceptable for
> me. =)
> I was trying to explain that we might not have any free will at the system
> level, but inside the system, for all we can tell, we appear to have free
> will.
> Since we never can reach the system level (break out of the simulation)
> for us,
> "felt" free will is good enough, although, ultimately, it might not be.
> Something like that.
>

I would say nothing like free will exists at the physical level, and that
it only emerges at the system level (once we get to machines that are
complex enough to be chaotic/non-analyltic/non-linear/undeciable in their
behavior). At that level (e.g. a computer running a complex program is at
this level) one cannot anticipate what that system will do without either
watching it to see what it does (or simulating/emulating it to a sufficient
degree of accuracy that you are again, only watching what it (the
simulation) does. So it is not even a subjective limitation, but a global
one that includes third-person objective observers as well. They cannot
predict or anticipate what a sufficiently complex system will do. (This I
think is the basis of Turing's conclusion regarding the Halting problem (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem )).


>
> > I am not following why you think we shouldn't have a word to refer to
> "the
> > experience that is generated."
>
> We definitely should have, and have that word. My point however, is, that
> it
> leads to confusion, chasing something which is badly defined. So by
> dropping the
> word and concept, and redefining it in scientific terms, we clear up the
> confusion, and "qualia" disappears.
>

Hmm. I am not sure I entirely agree with Dennett on this. I think there are
inherent limitations in the communicability of qualia that science can
never completely transcend. But we need not explore that any further in
this thread.


>
> > "Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of
> > conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I
> > grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have
> properties in
> > virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do."
> >
> > So Dennett (I think) was not calling to excise the word qualia, but
> rather, to
> > shed off the mystical baggage that some had attached to it.
>
> I think qualia goes away by adopting a different terminology and method of
> investigating, say, the science of neuroscience. That does not obligate one
> never to use the word "red". It does however obligate one not to use the
> badly
> defined, folk-psychology word "red" when doing neuro-science.
>
> But since this crosses over from meta-physics into science, I am certain
> there
> are better people to take the question from there.
>
> I think actually, that we know perfectly well (or well... somewhat well)
> exactly
> what happens when light bounces of an object at the right wave length and
> hits
> our brain as a "red" object. So I don't really see why we should bother
> with the
> qualia terminology at all, and I think I'm quite comfortable with that
> idea.
>

I wouldn't say we know what happens, at a certain point. This is where the
primary mystery enters the picture. As various thinkers have written for
the past few hundred years (up to the near-present time):

"We class sensations along with emotions, and
volitions, and thoughts, under the common head of
states of consciousness. But what consciousness is, we
know not; and how it is that anything so remarkable
as a state of consciousness comes about as a result
of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable
as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed
his lamp."
— Thomas Henry Huxley in “Lessonsin Elementary
Physiology” (1866)

"We suppose that a physical process starts from a
visible object, travels to the eye, there changes into
another physical process, causes yet another
physical process in the optic nerve, and finally
produces some effects in the brain, simultaneously
with which we see the object from which the
process started, the seeing being something
“mental,” totally different in character from the
physical processes, which preceded and accompany
it. This view is so queer that metaphysicians have
invented all sorts of theories designed to substitute
something less incredible."
— Bertrand Russell in “An Outline of Philosophy” (1927)

"If you ask a physicist what is his idea of yellow light,
he will tell you that it is transversal electromagnetic
waves of a wavelength in the neighbourhood of 590
millimicrons. If you ask him; But where does yellow
come in? He will say: In my picture not at all, but
these kinds of vibrations, when they hit the retina
of a healthy eye, give the person whose eye it is the
sensation of yellow."
— Erwin Schrödinger in “Mind and Matter” (1958)

"We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of
consciousness, but we have, it seems, no
understanding whatever of how this can be so. It
strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic.
Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is
turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw
a total blank on the nature of this conversion.
Neural transmissions just seem like the wrong kind
of materials with which to bring consciousness into
the world, but it appears that in some way they
perform this mysterious feat."
— Colin McGinn in "Can we Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" (1989)

"How could a physical system such as a
brain also be an experiencer? Why should there be
something it is like to be such a system? Present-day
scientific theories hardly touch the really difficult
questions about consciousness. We do not just lack a
detailed theory; we are entirely in the dark about how
consciousness fits into the natural order."
— David Chalmersin “The Conscious Mind” (1996)


Do you maintain there is no further mystery about what happens in the brain
beyond what we can describe at the physical level?


> But, if I reverse the question... what would you say are the drawbacks of
> that
> position? Basically, let neuroscience do it's thing, and stop talking about
> Qualia?
>

I actually think neuroscientists are among the worst people to ask to
explain consciousness or qualia. I liken that to looking to an electrician
to explain how Microsoft Word, since after all, that program running on a
computer is "nothing but" a complex circuit of many wires and switches. Of
course, no electrician will succeed in doing this, because it is analyzing
the system at far too low a level to offer any meaningful understanding. We
need a systems person who can understand and connect the various levels in
the hierarchy at play, and understand the software and algorithms and other
high-level features of the brain's processing if we are to ever understand
consciousness in a useful way.


>
> Oh, sorry... let me also add that perhaps this conversation should be put
> on
> hold or move into a Qualia thread, but then I suspect that we'll reach the
> same
> result as 2023, so maybe not a good idea? ;)
>

I am fine if you want to copy the above into a new thread for further
discussion.


>
> >       Oh, I also found this, but for some reason I thought that in 2023
> there was more
> >       text under the category.
> >
> >
> https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/81-Qualia-are-Red-Herrings?is_tree_open=1
> >
> > Qualia are the very thing that consciousness theories attempt to
> explain. If
> > they don't exist, then what are theories of consciousness about?
>
> Maybe neuroscience is a better way than philosophy? Speculating without
> data can
> lead to building castles in the sky, which then have to be torn down?
>

I think both science and philosophy are needed. As Chalmers writes:

"The problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the
border of science and philosophy. I would say that
it is properly a scientific subject matter: it is a
natural phenomenon like motion, life, and
cognition, and calls out for explanation in the way
that these do. But it is not open to investigation by
the usual scientific methods. Everyday scientific
methodology has trouble getting a grip on it, not
least because of the difficulties in observing the
phenomenon. Outside the first-person case, data
are hard to come by. This is not to say that no
external data can be relevant, but we first have to
arrive at a coherent philosophical understanding
before we can justify the data’s relevance. So the
problem of consciousness may be a scientific
problem that requires philosophical methods of
understanding before we can get off the ground."
— David Chalmersin “The Conscious Mind” (1996)

I think philosophy (together with arguments from physics, neuroscience, and
computer science) provide strong arguments for functionalism.
Functionalism, in turn, once assumed/established, allows science to make
further progress in identifying or classifying conscious systems. But I am
not sure that science alone could have gained any confidence in a correct
theory of consciousness (absent the logical/philosophical arguments).


>
> > The individual would know. As to the question of how do you prove it
> > objectively (to others besides the first-person having the experience),
> that
> > is a big and open problem in philosophy of mind. Aaronson dubbed it "The
> > Pretty Hard Problem."
>
> I think the best option is to remain agnostic. I don't see how that could
> be
> done, so my strategy would be to reformulate it into neuroscience and
> physics,
> and disregard the rest. Qualia is a "red herring" that distracts us from
> doing
> science.


As I see it, qualia are like the observed motion of the planets and the
moon. They present the mystery "What keeps those heavenly bodies up there
in the sky, perpetually moving?"
The question might be bad, or based on incomplete or flawed assumptions,
but it's that mystery and the questions it forces us to confront, that are
the very thing that motivates science to attack the problem in the first
place.
If you remove qualia from the picture, then what's the point of science
investigating the brain? We already understand everything going on at the
physical and chemical level. The brain would be no more interesting than
the kidneys or liver, if we ignore consciousness and qualia, and focus only
on what physics/chemistry/biology allow us to explain already. So rather
than a distracting red herring, I think the mystery qualia present is
indispensable to attracting any interest of researchers / scientists to
look at the problem and try to understand the brain at a deeper level.


> At the end of the day, the only thing we have to go on is a
> _comprehensiva_ behaviourism which I would add, includes not only
> behaviours,
> voluntary and involuntary, but neuron patterns, nervoussystem activity,
> dopamine, serotonine and other chemicals or reactions of organs in the
> body.
>
> Since we never can "reach" the subjective level of ourselves experience
> other
> minds as themselves,


I don't agree with that. It could very well be that we can understand the
workings of the mind and consciousness, with a sufficiently in depth, level
transcending understanding. Think of it like trying to reverse engineer
Microsoft Word. We have two easily accessible views, the software interface
at the top level, and the transistors and wires at the bottom level. If we
want to understand how Microsoft word works, we need to eventually tie
these two levels together, and this requires understanding the operations,
subroutines, functions, libraries, packages, modules, and overall software
architecture. These are all the intermediate levels which are not
immediately visible from either the top-most or bottom-most levels, it
takes a lot of work to derive them, but it is not an impossible problem
(just a difficult and time-consuming one).


> I think it is best to ignore that, just like (I) ignore
> MWI, god and other things outside the scope of the phenomenal world.
>

It would be easy to, except for the fact that the entire phenomenal world
exists within mind (as conscious percepts). Eminent physicists never let
this (admittedly inconvenient) fact slip their mind:

"It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to
accept the view that the substratum of everything is
of mental character. But no one can deny that mind
is the first and most direct thing in our experience,
and all else is remote inference."
— Arthur Eddington in “The Nature of the Physical World” (1927)

"We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that
we talk about, everything that we regard as existing,
postulates consciousness."
— Max Planck in “Interviews with Great Scientists” (1931)

"Admittedly our sense perceptions constitute our
sole knowledge about things. This objective world
remains a hypothesis, however natural."
 — Erwin Schrödinger in “Mind and Matter” (1958)


> > If you defined consciousness as anything that behaves like it is
> conscious,
> > then (aside from being circular) this definition has snuck in a purely
>
> I think the reason for people believing it is circular is that they commit
> the
> mistake of looking at each state in isolation. That is not how the brain
> works.
> It can maintain several states at the same time, conscious and
> unconscious. So
> looking at the entire organisms, including hormones and what ever, and
> using
> behaviour as the key for that state, does not imply, I think any circular
> reasoning.
>
> It does make things more complicated for sure, but some things are, and
> simplifying too much leads to bad theories.
>
> > functionalists assumption of mind and discarded any alternatives such as
> > type-physicalism, biological naturalism, panpsychism, Penrose's quantum
> mind,
> > etc. which in addition to requiring the presence of certain behaviors,
> would
> > require special physical materials, living organic cells,
> > consciousness-enabled particles, or non-algorithmic quantum gravitational
> > processes. So by giving a behavioral definition of consciousness, it
> serves to
> > presume behavioral/functional conditions are the only thing that is
> needed.
>
> How come? Looking at the link, I see at least 4 isms being compatible with
> physicalism. I do not see on that page, that focusing on behaviour by
> default
> should commit one to only functionalism.
>

Behaviorism isn't a philosophy of mind, it's a philosophy of believing the
mind is unexplainable and should be ignored.
Eliminativism is a denial of mind.

That leaves physicalism and functionalism.

Physicalism comes in two flavors (type and token physicalism) though I
think it is better to think of these as (reductive physicalism, and
emergent physicalism).
Reductive, or type physicalism, says you need special materials (behavior
is not enough), emergent physicalism does not add this restriction, saying
that consciousness is a high-level emergent phenomenon, and various
materials could in principle be used.

Emergent physicalism thereby implies multiple realizability, and multiple
realizability implies functionalism.

So if one hangs their hat on the behavioral aspects of an entity as the
sole determinants of consciousness, then all paths lead to functionalism.
(Since we know that an appropriately programmed computer can manifest any
definable behavior, and computers can be made in various ways using various
materials, this is another further confirmation of emergent
physicalism/multiple-realizability/functionalism).


>
> > While this is a position I agree with, it won't serve as a workable
> definition
> > in philosophy if we are to permit these other theories to exist and be
> > debated.
>
> True. I do have to confess, that on this site:
>
> https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/
>
> eliminativisim does seem quite an attractive stance at the surfave of
> things. =)
>

I've never seen a philosopher actually argue for that position. If you come
across any references though, let me know.


>
> >       Does it assume any philosophy of mind? If I believe an entity is
> conscious
> >       because it acts as if it is conscious, does that commit me to any
> specific
> >       theory?
> >
> > Yes. I think it commits you to functionalism.
>
> I think I disagree (as per the above and the below).
>
> >       I found this excellent table about physicalist theories of mind:
> >
> >
> https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/physicalism/
> >
> >       Accorindg to this one, judging by behaviour and being a
> physicalist, it would
> >       commit me to one of the following:
> >
> >       * Behaviourism
> >       * Type identity
> >       * Functionalism
> >       * Eliminativism
> >
> > The eliminativist would say there is no consciousness, even in something
> that
> > in all respects behaves as if it is conscious. The type-identity
> theorists
>
> That is an attractive idea. My interpretation there is (similar to what I
> have
> argued previously) that the concept of consciousness is flawed, so by
> discarding
> it, or "reducing" it, we will be in a much better situation to understand
> what
> is actually going on.
>

There's a big difference between reducing, and eliminating.

Strawsen calls that, the "silliest claim ever made":
https://www.nybooks.com/online/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers

I hope that you would not deny that you are conscious right now of
something. :-)


> > would impose further constraints on what things could be conscious
> depending
> > on their material composition or design. E.g., a type-identity
> physicalist
> > could deny the android is conscious.
>
> Another idea here, is to have a separate theory for separate organisms.
> Type-identity would focus on human minds. But let's say the subject are
> octopi,
> as per the link, we'd need to start from scratch there.
>

I don't like the idea of requiring a separate theory of consciousness for
each of the 10 million species on Earth. And why stop at species and not
individuals?


>
> >       I think that was a great web site actually. It shows things in a
> very nice way.
> >
> > It is a nice chart. Though I don't think behaviorism was ever a serious
> idea
> > in philosophy of mind. Behaviorism was a school of thought in the field
> of
> > psychology that held internal mental states were inscrutable. It was only
> > through the fall of behaviorism (with the cognitive revolution) that
> serious
> > scientists and philosophers were allowed to discuss and debate
> consciousness.
>
> I think it depends on how it is defined. It can include all the others,
> from one
> point of view.
>

I think if one were to update behaviorism to include internal mental/brain
processes, they would arrive at functionalism.


>
> >       > I think the fame/prestige is enough of a prize especially with
> so many AI
> >       > companies competing for glory and investors.
> >
> >       Hmm... maybe I should call the Nobel Prize committee and ask them
> to sponsor an
> >       AI prize? Maybe then we'll get some "glory" into the competition!
> ;)
> >
> > I think what's most important is having a design that everyone agrees is
> well
> > thought out and robust, such that passing the test would be a reliable
> > indicator of human or superhuman intelligence.
> >
> > I also think it would be nice if all entrants were given a score that was
> > statistically significant. (e.g. each applicant converses with a
> sufficient
> > number of judges to reach a meaningful objective score) and also this
> score
> > should be tested against other humans as well to give a feel for what
> score is
> > "good enough" to be considered human-level intelligence. Perhaps scores
> for
> > different ages, and levels of education, etc. could be set. Then there
> could
> > be prizes for passing a high-school level and so on.
>
> My ideal would be that I should not be able to tell if it is a human or an
> AI
> over a week or so. Imagine I talk with a human, I could ask the human what
> its
> job is. Let's say marketing. During the course of a week, I'd ask it to
> help me
> with marketing campaigns, go out online and do some research, bring me
> back a
> nice report, etc. etc. The simple LLM:s I have played with (free ones)
> currently
> would have no chance to perform that role like a human being. The AI would
> also
> have to have all its censoring disabled, that's a clear tell that it's an
> AI and
> not a human being. And of course, it would have to take the initiative.
> I'd love
> for it to reach out and proactively suggest things based on our previous
> conversation. That's also something I'm currently missing.
>

I like the long term time frame idea.


>
> I think we've made great progress, but I think current technology, without
> some
> serious hard coding, de-censoring, and integration with other systems, is
> far,
> far from tricking a human it is human over a period of a week or more.


Yes I think we still have a ways to go, but it seems all the pieces are in
play for a dedicated and organized effort to achieve it.

Jason
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